If the professionalization of the social professions is increasingly based on the model of professionalization engineering, what are the imaginaries underlying this movement? How can we understand that the profession of engineer, the one who, at least in the imagination, invents and designs machines with a magically predictable functioning, can be the model for designing training systems for the helping professions? This contribution proposes to explore these questions through two mythological figures often summoned when it comes to engineering and technology (...) : Prometheus and Hephaestus. These two figures will help us to move from the model of professionalization engineering to ingenium. (shrink)

A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism (also in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism). To do this, we start by discussing the Good (...) Company Problem for neo-logicists recently raised by Paolo Mancosu (2016), concerning the existence of rival abstractive definitions of cardinal number which are nonetheless equally able to reconstruct Peano Arithmetic. We survey Mancosu’s envisaged possible replies to this predicament, and suggest as a further path the adoption of some form of mathematical pluralism concerning abstraction principles. We then explore three possible ways of substantiating such pluralism—Conceptual Pluralism,Domain Pluralism,Pluralism about Criteria—showing how each of them can be related to analogous proposals in the philosophy of logic. We conclude by considering advantages, concerns, and theoretical ramifications for these varieties of mathematical pluralism. (shrink)

Minimalism and Trivialism are two recent forms of lightweight Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics: Minimalism is the view that mathematical objects arethinin the sense that “very little is required for their existence”, whereas Trivialism is the view that mathematical statements have trivial truth‐conditions, that is, that “nothing is required of the world in order for those conditions to be satisfied”. In order to clarify the relation between the mathematical and the non‐mathematical domain that these views envisage, it has recently (...) been proposed that both Linnebo's notion of sufficiency and Rayo's “just is”‐operator can, or even should, be interpreted in terms of metaphysicalgrounding. This interpretation makes Minimalism and Trivialism akin to Aristotelianism in the philosophy of mathematics, according to which mathematical entities depend for their existence and their properties on non‐mathematical ones. In this paper we raise a general objection to this interpretation. We highlight a tension – a “Big Picture” Problem – between the metaphysical picture underlying both Minimalism and Trivialism, on the one side, and the metaphysics of Platonism and Aristotelianism on the other. We then consider various ways in which Linnebo and Rayo could respond. We finally argue that Minimalism and Trivialism are closer to Aristotelianism than to Platonism; however, even though these positions are not forms of traditional Platonism, they are not standard forms of Aristotelianism either. (shrink)

How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical (...) pluralists have at their disposal when it comes to the metatheory of their position, and by spelling out which routes are advisable. We explore ramifications of all relevant responses to our question: no logic, a single logic, more than one logic. In the end, we express skepticism that any proposed answer is viable. This threatens the coherence of current and future versions of logical pluralism. (shrink)

The fact that Gödel's famous incompleteness theorem and the archetype of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar, are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but is a part of the common knowledge of the community of logicians. Indeed, almost every more or less formal treatment of the theorem makes a reference to this connection. Gödel himself remarked in the paper announcing his celebrated result :The analogy between this result and Richard's antinomy leaps to the eye;there is (...) also a close relationship with the ‘liar’ antinomy, since … we are… confronted with a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.In the light of the fact that the existence of this connection is commonplace it is all the more surprising that very little can be learnt about its exact nature except perhaps that it is some kind of similarity or analogy. There is, however, a lot more to it than that. Indeed, as we shall try to show below, the general ideas underlying the three central theorems concerning internal limitations of formal deductive systems can be taken as different ways to resolve the Liar paradox. More precisely, it will turn out that an abstract formal variant of the Liar paradox, which can almost straightforwardly inferred from its original ordinary language version, is a possible common generalization of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, the theorem of Tarski on the undefinability of truth, and that of Church concerning the undecidability of provability. (shrink)

In Grundgesetze, Vol. II, §91, Frege argues that ‘it is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science’. Many view this as an in nuce statement of the indispensability argument later championed by Quine. Garavaso has questioned this attribution. I argue that even though Frege's applicability argument is not a version of ia, it facilitates acceptance of suitable formulations of ia. The prospects for making the empiricist ia compatible with a rationalist Fregean framework appear (...) thus much less dim than expected. Nonetheless, those arguing for such compatibility eventually face an hardly surmountable dilemma. (shrink)

This article focuses on a specific genre, the report of a university council meeting. It aims to relate the specific features of the text to the body whose minutes it is, and to the institution within which it is produced. To this end, we are analysing a corpus of reports from the University of Nanterre between 1971 and 1973, precisely at the time when the university as we know it was created following the Faure Law. As the archives also revealed (...) the presence of some drafts, it was possible to combine the historical approach with a genetic one, revealing the principles guiding the drafting of these texts. In this way, we have shown that the reports, through the way in which they negotiate the constraints that weigh on their drafting and fulfil their function of 'taking the place' (“tenant lieu”), deliver a certain representation of the council, which the drafts, through their reflexive dimension, make it possible to materialise. (shrink)

One of the assets of the simulation theory, as defended by Alvin Goldman in many papers and in his book Simulating Minds, is its ability to explain egocentric bias, and more generally the priority of first‐person mindreading over third‐person mindreading (ascription of mental states to other people). This chapter argues, on the contrary, that the simulationist framework enables confusions between self and others that go both ways: taking one's beliefs for the other's beliefs (egocentric bias) and vice versa, taking the (...) other's beliefs for one's beliefs (altercentric bias). It sees how the risk of such confusion may be disadvantageous from an evolutionary perspective, questioning thus the evolutionary plausibility of the simulation theory. Egocentric errors have been taken as evidence of the priority of first‐person mindreading over third‐person mindreading, which seems in line with the simulation theory. Recent findings on altercentric bias have opened a new promising way to investigate the cognitive basis of third‐person mindreading. (shrink)

Although developmental biology is an institutionalized discipline, no unambiguous account of what development is and when it stops has so far been provided. In this article, I focus on two sets of developmental molecular mechanisms, namely those underlying the heterochronic pathway in C. elegans and those involving Hox genes in vertebrates, to suggest a conceptual account of animal development. I point out that, in these animals, the early stages of life exhibit salient mechanistic features, in particular in the way mechanisms (...) of genetic regulation occur in the organism. Indeed, these stages are characterized by sequential and irreversible changes in gene expression taking place throughout the organism. A general definition of animal development based on these distinctive features implies that, at least for some animal species, development does not go on throughout the life of the animal, contrary to what has recently been claimed by some biologists and philosophers. Instead, in such species, development encompasses various events occurring sequentially at the beginning of life. (shrink)

The present discussion derives from a larger research project that concerns the medieval Latin translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. The translation was carried out by Hermann the German in Toledo in 1240. I am concerned here specifically with nine passages that are distributed over three chapters of the Commentary in which the Latin translation is sprinkled with transliterations based on Greek and Arabic terms. These transliterations, which are not glosses, can be understood on several levels, and (...) these, in turn, raise questions about the boundary between transliteration proper and translation that borrows from the source language a term which is then integrated into the Latin lexicon in the form of a calque or ‘loan translation’. Examining these transliterations makes it possible, first, to show that the translator does not follow a uniform method throughout the text, which could imply the existence of several translators or several collaborators with disti... (shrink)

HellmanGeoffrey ** and ShapiroStewart. **** Mathematical Structuralism. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics, RushPenelope and ShapiroStewart, eds. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. iv + 94. ISBN 978-1-108-45643-2, 978-1-108-69728-6. doi: 10.1017/9781108582933.

The recent debate on new realism has been widely influenced by Putnam’s views, especially by the distinction between scientific realism and natural or common seense realism. I locate the discussion on mathematical realism in the context of this wider debate. I suggest that a parallel distinction between science-based arguments for realism and more immediate forms of realism is avaiable for mathematics too. I point to differences between contemporary empiricist and intellectualist positions, and stress what I take to be some of (...) the most relevant aspects on which research in this area shall be pursued in the near future, especially concerning the problem of whether philosophical priority should be given to pure or applied mathematics. (shrink)

En partie issu d’un colloque sur les « Effets de voix : la voix et les voix dans la pensée et la littérature romaines » qui s’est tenu en novembre 2014 à Lille, ce livre rassemble dix-huit contributions, classées selon quatre grandes catégories : I. Philosophie, II. Rhétorique et médecine, III. Acoustique, théâtre et littérature, IV. Linguistique, anthropologie, religion. Il comprend également une bibliographie (p. 385-423), un index des noms (p. 425-429), un index des passages cités (p. 431-...

This is the first critical edition of Book X of the Latin version of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s _Nicomachean Ethics_. The text is accompanied by a French translation and explanatory notes, and is preceded by a study of the manuscript tradition and two studies on the Commentary itself. Cette première édition critique de la version latine du Commentaire d’Averroès à l’_Éthique à Nicomaque_, accompagnée d’une traduction française annotée, est précédée de l’examen de la tradition manuscrite du texte et de (...) deux études consacrée à ce Commentaire. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century underwent a major change of direction when a prior consensus in favour of extensionalism and descriptivism made way for approaches using direct reference, the necessity of identity, and modal logic. All three were first defended, in the analytic tradition, by one woman, Ruth Barcan Marcus. But analytic philosophers now tend to credit them to Kripke, or Kripke and Carnap. I argue that seeing Barcan Marcus in her historical context – one dominated by extensionalism (...) and descriptivism – allows us to see how revolutionary she was, in her work and influence on others. I focus on her debate with Quine, who found himself retreating to softened, and more viable, versions of his anti-modal arguments as a result. I make the case that Barcan's formal logic was philosophically well-motivated, connected to her views on reference, and well-matched to her overall views on ontology. Her nominalism led her to reject posits which could not be directly observed and named, such as possibilia. She conceived of modal calculi as facilitating counterfactual discourse about actual existents. I conclude that her contributions ought to be recognized as the first of their kind. Barcan Marcus must be awarded a central place in the canon of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Foundational projects disagree on whether pure and applied mathematics should be explained together. Proponents of unified accounts like neologicists defend Frege’s Constraint (FC), a principle demanding that an explanation of applicability be provided by mathematical definitions. I reconsider the philosophical import of FC, arguing that usual conceptions are biased by ontological assumptions. I explore more reasonable weaker variants — Moderate and Modest FC — arguing against common opinion that ante rem structuralism (and other) views can meet them. I dispel doubts (...) that such constraints are ‘toothless’, showing they both assuage Frege’s original concerns and accommodate neo-logicist intents by dismissing ‘arrogant’ definitions. (shrink)

The author of “Evidence, Explanation, Enhanced Indispensability” advances a criticism to the Enhanced Indispensability Argument and the use of Inference to the Best Explanation in order to draw ontological conclusions from mathematical explanations in science. His argument relies on the availability of equivalent though competing explanations, and a pluralist stance on explanation. I discuss whether pluralism emerges as a stable position, and focus here on two main points: whether cases of equivalent explanations have been actually offered, and which ontological consequences (...) should follow from these. (shrink)

Voici un objet qui semble au prime abord bien spéculatif, puisque, jamais, il ne nous sera donné d’entendre cette langue. Voici pourtant l’objet que Magali Année [désormais MA] cherche à restituer et à analyser, dont elle ménage pour nous l’approche en ciselant ses analyses et en exerçant sa grande compétence technique sur la langue grecque. Le présent ouvrage concerne la linguistique certes, mais cette « linguistique vivante » que Saussure appelait de ses vœux, et la philologie nouvelle que...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Comme Elle Respire:Memory of Breath, Breath of MemoryFrédérique Berthet (bio)Translated by David F. Bell (bio)La poésie est un système de respiration, c'est fait pour mieux respirer.[Poetry is a respiration system, it's made for breathing better.]—Erri De Luca- Stop!- What?- I can hear you breathing!...- Stop!- Breathing?- Yes!—Paul Thomas AndersonLittle paper-fish cutouts have been placed on the ground, on the carpet.We're in the reassuring '70s stylishness of a doctor's office. (...) The carpet is soft and glistens like in interior decoration magazines, it's with it, in. We couldn't care less about what Dyson vacuum cleaners and "purifiers" boast they can eliminate several decades later: acarids, those microscopic domestic arthropods, human parasites (notably), and airborne vectors of infectious disease (colds, coughs, respiratory distress). No, in the spring of 1975, innocently and self-satisfyingly, the urbane doctor flaunts the opulent carpet with curly pile in his luxury apartment with its state-of-the-art waiting room.In this grand interior of a medical office, a man in a white coat plies his important trade. For example, that day a little girl is re-learning how to breathe. One might think that exhaling and inhaling is learned for life—je t'aime comme je respire, elle parle comme elle respire, il ment comme il respire1—from the very first cry at birth. But in fact, sometimes in life breathing gets stuck between the nasal cavity and the bronchial tubes, between the respiratory tract and the lungs. Progressively, imperceptibly, the organism is short of air, a malicious infection spreads and impairs [End Page 92] alveolar diffusion to the point of respiratory exhaustion: Is it serious, doctor? We must act quickly, very quickly. How to liquify what stopped up the system one day to the point of blocking it—the doctors know what to do.This doctor undertook long, arduous and learned studies. He knows functionally how a living being breathes, how a child lives organically. He can also re-teach the little girl what she no longer knows how to do: inhale, exhale using the full volume of the thoracic cage, regulating the ventilatory flow, solidifying the invisible membranes. In the child's family, everyone knows (and knows how to do) important things, but no one undertook extensive studies, much less studies of the aerial exchanges in the human body. This special knowledge possessed by the doctor (unless special means something else unspoken that would explain why this specific doctor was chosen rather than any other) surrounds him with a padding of respect that creates (and the little girl feels this) a sort of protective continuum between him and the walls within which he sees her, where he practices his kind of calm and slow urbane medicine. It's far from the formidable hospital she has just left, with its spherical apparatus next to the bed aspirating the red and yellow pleural liquid, the "treatment room" where the surgeon, the "butcher" as the nurses call him among themselves, manipulated the drain without anesthesia, with no regard for the child's suffering. The doctor, and his place in the elevated tower, even though they are not to be confused, make for a cozy reception space in which one is comfortable, even in passing.This doctor—who is, in truth, a massage-physiotherapist—is located in a designer high-rise building with a façade decorated by white, pointed features that manifest a will toward an architectural act. On the ground floor, the entrance hall is finished in dark-veined, clear brown marble, and the entry threshold between the exterior and interior is marked by large transparent glass panes that must be manipulated with care. The entrance hall has an intimidating sonority and a useless cold nudity from which one escapes in an elevator where one is surrounded by mirrors and gold buttons and in which one speeds upward silently toward floors, clouds.The designer high-rise is located at the outskirts, the outskirts of a city of recent Olympic stature, where several years earlier Olympic athletes were welcomed and trained to increase their respiratory capacity and... (shrink)

This article provides a summary of current knowledge about memory illusions. The memory illusions described here focus on the recall of imagined events that have never actually occurred. The purpose is to review theoretical ideas and empirical evidence about the reality-monitoring processes involved in memory illusions. Reality monitoring means deciding whether the memory has been perceptually derived or been self-generated (thought or imagined). A few key findings from the literature have been reported in this paper and these focus on internal (...) source-monitoring judgments which distinguish perceptual events from imagined events. Finally, the experimental paradigms used to shed light on processes occurring in the failure of reality monitoring in healthy subjects may be extended to an examination of the causes and the prevention of hallucinations in patients. (shrink)

A standard understanding of abstraction principles elicits two opposite readings: Intolerant Reductionism, where abstractions are seen as reducing talk of abstract objects to talk about non-problematic domains, and Robustionism, where newly introduced terms genuinely refer to abstract objects. Against this dichotomy between such “austere” and “robust” readings, Dummett suggested ways to steer intermediate paths. We explore different options for intermediate stances, by reviewing metaontological strategies and semantic ones. Based on Dummett’s and Picardi’s understanding of the Context Principle, the paper acknowledges (...) that Frege’s Grundlagen are open to several interpretations of contextual definitions, and argues that the prospects for broadly Fregean intermediate views are all but foreclosed. (shrink)

Cette toute première édition critique de la version arabo-latine de la _Rhétorique_ d’Aristote réalisée par Hermann l’Allemand est accompagnée d’une étude complète de la tradition latine du texte, et présente les principes d’édition adoptés ici, qui prennent en compte la version arabe de la _Rhétorique_. This is the first critical edition of Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_ in its Arabo-Latin translation made by Hermann the German. It contains a full study of the latin tradition of the text, as well as the principles used (...) in the edition, which takes account of the Arabic version of the _Rhetoric_. (shrink)

Le present ouvrage est ne d'un etonnement: comment se fait-il que la grammaire se soit si tardivement constituee en discipline autonome - entre le second siecle avant J. C. et le premier siecle apres J. C. -, bien posterieure donc a l'invention de la conceptualite philosophique? L'etude du langage, loin d'etre d'emblee presentee comme l'objet d'une discipline specifique, fut longtemps distribuee entre differentes disciplines: phonetique, metrique, onomastique, rhetorique, poetique, logique, dialectique. L'enquete a permis de montrer que le caractere tardif de (...) l'emergence de la grammaire devait etre mis au compte du projet specifique qui unit les philosophies platonicienne, aritotelicienne et stoicienne, projet de dire les realites dans le logoi (discours, enonces, raisonnements...), et de la mainmise correlative, par la philosophie, sur l'analyse du langage. (shrink)

The Marx of Communism and the Marx of Structuralism. The article addresses the issue of the response within the French Communist Party to the structuralist and anti-humanist reading of Marx which Althusser formulated in the period leading up to May 1968. While structuralism was regarded by some as a marker of the avant-garde, to a number of communist intellectuals, and in particular those closest to the party leadership, it amounted to a “a philosophy of hopelessness”. e article thus examines the (...) context in which Althusser was declared to be heterodox in the early months of 1966, in particular at the convention of philosophers held in Choisy and at the meeting of the Communist Party central committee in Argenteuil. (shrink)

Some earlier remarks Michael Dummett made on Gödel’s theorem have recently inspired attempts to formulate an alternative to the standard demonstration of the truth of the Gödel sentence. The idea underlying the non-standard approach is to treat the Gödel sentence as an ordinary arithmetical one. But the Gödel sentence is of a very specific nature. Consequently, the non-standard arguments are conceptually mistaken. In this paper, both the faulty arguments themselves and the general reasons underlying their failure are analysed. The analysis (...) reveals the true nature of the epistemological relation between the Gödel sentence and its numerical instances. (shrink)

We argue that Lewis would have rejected recent appeals to the notions of ‘metaphysical dependency’, ‘grounding’ and ‘ontological priority’, because he would have held that they’re not needed and they’re not intelligible. We argue our case by drawing upon Lewis’s views on supervenience, the metaphysics of singletons and the dubiousness of Kripke’s essentialism.

Steeve Bélanger,Frédérique Bonenfant | : Le concept d’« innovation religieuse » est rarement, mais surtout particulièrement mal défini dans la recherche actuelle. De plus, il est souvent associé aux nouveaux mouvements religieux qui ont émergé à l’époque contemporaine, ce qui limite indéniablement son utilisation comme outil et catégorie d’analyse des phénomènes de changement, de nouveauté, de transformation et de mutation religieux d’hier comme d’aujourd’hui. Afin de la distinguer d’une nouveauté, d’une mode ou d’une tendance religieuse passagère, nous proposons de (...) considérer que l’innovation religieuse consiste en un processus collectif qui, par volonté et/ou par désir de changement face à une situation considérée comme ne répondant pas ou plus aux besoins ou aux aspirations actuelles, introduit une nouveauté religieuse et qui conduit, par négociation ou par imposition au moyen d’un réseau de communication, à un changement socioreligieux significatif, effectif et durable des pratiques et/ou du système de significations. Cette proposition de définition, qui se veut ouverte et englobante, permet de considérer que toute nouveauté introduite dans le domaine religieux peut se transformer en innovation religieuse à condition de traverser les quatre phases qui caractérisent, selon nous, les processus d’innovation religieuse, soit celle de proposition d’une nouveauté, celle de diffusion de la nouveauté, celle d’appropriation de la nouveauté puis celle d’adoption de la nouveauté par changement des pratiques et/ou du système de significations. | : The concept of “religious innovation” is seldom, but most of all very badly defined in current research. Furthermore, it is often associated to new religious movements that have emerged in the contemporary period. This undeniably limits its use as a tool and a category of analysis of the phenomena of religious change, novelty, transformation and mutation yesterday as today. With a view to distinguish it from a novelty, a fashion or a passing religious tendency, we propose to consider that religious innovation consists in a collective process which, either willingly or through a desire for change in the face of a situation deemed not or no longer to answer to actual needs or aspirations, introduces a religious novelty, and which leads, through negotiation or imposition by means of a network of communication, to a socio-religious change, significant, effective and durable, of practices and/or of the system of meanings. This proposed definition, intended as it is to be open and inclusive, allows one to consider that every novelty introduced into the religious domain may be transformed into a religious innovation provided it passes through the four phases characterizing, according to us, the processes of religious innovation, namely that of a proposition of novelty, that of a diffusion of the novelty, that of an appropriation of the novelty and that of an adoption of the novelty through a change of practices and/or of the system of meanings. (shrink)

When one contrasts pain with the classic five senses, discussions generally focus on vision, which is taken as the paradigmatic example of perception. An intentionalist might argue that if the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing bodily disturbances cannot be explained at the level of the content, it can be so at the level of the mode of presentation, and more particularly at the level of the structure of the spatial phenomenology of pain. Here I will argue that the spatial (...) phenomenology of pain shares some key features with touch by contrast to sight, but these similarities should not make us neglect major differences between these two types of bodily sensations. I shall then draw the consequences of these differences for the awareness of one’s body as one’s own. In brief, to fix the boundaries of the body that one experiences as one’s own, one must answer two questions: where does the body stop, and the rest of world start? and what matters for self-preservation? I will suggest that touch primarily answers the first question, whereas pain primarily answers the second question. (shrink)

L’intervention de l’écrivain Thomas Clerc dans l’exposition de Pierre Huyghe au Centre Pompidou en 2013, conçue comme une performance revisitée de L’écrivain public (1995) de Huyghe, interroge le statut de l’auteur-performeur et celui de témoin doublé du statut de spectateur dans la personne de l’écrivain écrivant au cœur d’une exposition dont il fait lui-même partie. Nous interrogeons le déplacement de la fonction de l’écrivain public dans celui du traducteur de sensations et d’émotions propres à un lieu d’art, en situation d’immersion. (...) Faut-il lire ce qui fait événement en un seul et même acte sous la plume de l’écrivain comme autant de traces venant inquiéter le réel dans un travail d’enquête sur le temps d’exposition? Nous questionnons la fonction d’interprète et d’acteur d’une œuvre exposée à travers la figure de l’écrivain à l’œuvre. (shrink)

Boolos's proof of incompleteness is extended straightforwardly to yield simple “diagonalization-free” proofs of some classical limitative theorems of logic.

In this paper I build a case for considering the pioneering behaviourist philosopher Grace de Laguna as one of the grandmothers of analytic philosophy. I argue against the ‘Great Men’ narrative of analytic philosophy as composed of Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein and their followers, and in favour of a more inclusive ‘movement’ narrative of analytic philosophy as a broad and varied movement with an anti-idealist and naturalistic orientation aimed at fitting around novel development in the sciences, including Einsteinian physics and psychology. (...) I compare de Laguna’s prescient early views to Whitehead’s; both share an anti-idealist but also anti-atomist solution to the problem of perception, and both oppose the bifurcation of nature, with de Laguna expressing these views before Whitehead did. I conclude that while both opposed the narrower project of logical atomism, both count as ancestors of the wider analytic movement. (shrink)

A new model of bioturbation has been developed to describe short term sediment reworking induced by macrobenthic communities. The design of the model had to consider the mixing processes, firstly, at the organism level, and secondly, at community level. This paper describes the mixing mode of the four types of bioturbators defined by the authors: the biodiffusors, the upward-conveyors, the downward-conveyors and the regenerators. The mathematical formulation of these sub-models consists of ordinary differential equations. They take into account the size (...) of the bioturbated zone, the output fluxes to the water column, tracer decay, physical mixing due to local currents and the type and intensity of the bioturbation processes. These sub-models make it possible to describe correctly the mixing events that have occurred in cores with each type of bioturbator. They also provide the basis for general bioturbation model, that will take into account the respective degrees of involvement of (i) the different bioturbation processes and their characteristics, (ii) the interference between the different processes, and (iii) make possible to predict the particle reworking in order to include it in studies of organic matter in early diagenesis. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage publié par la Société italienne des historiennes est le fruit d'un séminaire consacré aux voyages féminins qui s'est déroulé à Florence les 20 et 21 février 1998. Voyages de femmes de l'Antiquité au XIXe siècle propose 16 articles s'échelonnant de l'Antiquité à nos jours (4 sur l'Antiquité gréco-romaine, 1 sur le Xe siècle, 2 sur le Moyen Âge, 1 sur le XVIIe siècle, 3 sur le XVIIIe siècle, 3 entre XIXe et XXe siècles, 1 sur les incidences de (...) la guerre sur la condition et l... (shrink)

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. (...) I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading. (shrink)

What is mathematics about? And if it is about some sort of mathematical reality, how can we have access to it? This is the problem raised by Plato, which still today is the subject of lively philosophical disputes. This book traces the history of the problem, from its origins to its contemporary treatment. It discusses the answers given by Aristotle, Proclus and Kant, through Frege's and Russell's versions of logicism, Hilbert's formalism, Gödel's platonism, up to the the current debate on (...) Benacerraf's dilemma and the indispensability argument. Through the considerations of themes in the philosophy of language, ontology, and the philosophy of science, the book aims at offering an historically-informed introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, approached through the lenses of its most fundamental problem. (shrink)

In this paper, I give an account of a hitherto neglected kind of ‘here’, which does not work as an intentional indexical. Instead, it automatically refers to the immediate perceptual environment of the subject’s body, which is known as peripersonal space. In between the self and the external world, there is something like a buffer zone, a place in which objects and events have a unique immediate significance for the subject because they may soon be in contact with her. I (...) argue that seeing objects as being here in a minimal sense means seeing them in the place in which the perceptual system expects the world and the body to collide. I further argue that this minimal notion of here-content gives rise to a tactile sense of presence. It provides a unique experiential access to the reality of the seen object by making us aware of its ability to have an effect on us. (shrink)