Realism and Anti-Realism

The Hard Problem of consciousness—explaining why and how physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience—remains one of the most challenging puzzles in modern thought. Rather than attempting to resolve this issue outright, in this paper I explore whether empirical science can be broadened to incorporate consciousness as a fundamental degree of freedom. Drawing on Russellian monism and revisiting the historical “relegation problem” (the systematic sidelining of consciousness by the scientific revolution), I propose an extension of quantum mechanics by augmenting the (...) Hilbert space with a “consciousness dimension.” This framework provides a basis for reinterpreting psi phenomena (e.g., telepathy, precognition) as natural outcomes of quantum nonlocality and suggests that advanced non– human intelligence (NHI) technology might interface with a quantum–conscious substrate. For a detailed mathematical exposition of this framework, see my preprint [3]. I demarcate the philosophical issues from the empirical ones and propose several experimental strategies— including entanglement–based psi research, quantum–enhanced neuroimaging, and quantum sensor applications—to test the model. Although this framework does not resolve the Hard Problem, it offers a rigorously formulated, historically informed, and empirically testable approach to integrating subjective experience into the scientific study of mind. (shrink)

Early artificial intelligence research was dominated by intellectualist assumptions, producing explicit representation of facts and rules in “good old-fashioned AI”. After this approach foundered, emphasis shifted to deep learning in neural networks, leading to the creation of Large Language Models which have shown remarkable capacity to automatically generate intelligible texts. This new phase of AI is already producing profound social consequences which invite philosophical reflection. This paper argues that Charles Peirce’s philosophy throws valuable light on genAI’s capabilities first with regard (...) to meaning, then knowledge and truth. Firstly, I explore how Peirce’s icon/index/symbol distinction illuminates the functioning of genAI. I argue that genAI’s engineers have skilfully captured a form of symbolicity, but no other sign-kind. In lacking indexical signs, LLMs lack connection with, and accountability to, particular worldly objects. In lacking iconic signs, LLMs are insufficiently disciplined by structural – most notably logical – relationships. Then I argue that GenAI’s astounding stream of articulate, truth-semblant, yet worthless texts issues a timely reckoning to modern philosophy’s representational realism. By contrast, Peirce’s pragmatism scaffolds a rich relational realism (Gili and Maddalena 2022), which shows how meaningful concepts, and a grasp of truth, can only occur across multiple cognitive systems who are simultaneously richly related with one another, and a shared environment in which they continually act and receive feedback, within a logical space of reasons. As Peirce himself noted, “Mere knowledge, though it be systematized, may be a dead memory; while by science we all habitually mean a living and growing body of truth”. (shrink)

Quantum theory might make the cosmos more certain than classical physics ever did.

The debate between realists and anti-realists about fictional entities is important partly because it connects with debates about the nature of reference. According to the descriptivist model held by Fregeans, a name has reference to an object due to the connection of that name with a description, which is met by the relevant object. According to the causal-communicative model held by Millians, a name refers in virtue of a chain of reference linking that name to a referent. In the case (...) of fictional entities, it is a matter of debate whether the entities in question exist or not. Traditionally, Millians have had trouble dealing with antirealism about fictional entities. I argue for a simple realist theory, ‘bare-bones artifactualism’, according to which fictional entities are simple abstract ‘counters’. Each of these simple abstract counters has only those intrinsic properties that other such simple abstract counters also have, except for one distinctive intrinsic property. This one distinctive intrinsic property is a number-bearing property that marks out the abstract counter’s identity, distinct from all other such abstract counters. The number-bearing property allows us to do with abstract counters what spatiotemporal situatedness allows us to do with concrete counters: it allows us to treat the abstract counters as individuals. In support of such artifactualism, I discuss the following considerations: its ontological simplicity; its parallels in our other practices; and its explanatory promise. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the theoretical and empirical foundations of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs), a critical philosophical type of argument used to challenge realist positions across various domains, notably morality. The dissertation systematically analyzes how EDAs function, what they require as minimal empirical input, what their scope and limits are, and how they can be successfully applied to domains beyond morality. -/- By investigating the empirical credibility of evolutionary psychology and the epistemological consequences of belief formation through natural selection, the dissertation (...) provides a rigorous framework for assessing the scope and limits of EDAs. The work investigates key problems such as the "empirical input problem"—which questions the degree of evolutionary evidence required for a successful debunking argument—and the "target problem", which is concerned with how EDAs can be generalised to expand and clearly define the target area for debunking. -/- The dissertation applies its framework to specific case studies, including moral realism, color realism, and aesthetic realism, demonstrating where EDAs are most compelling and where their applicability is limited. Ultimately, the dissertation argues that while EDAs can effectively challenge certain realist positions, they must be applied with methodological precision to avoid overgeneralization. The findings have broader implications for metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, offering new insights into the evolutionary constraints on human cognition and the justification of our beliefs​. (shrink)

Tanto Scheler como Polo aceptan la estructura acto-objeto para explicar el conocimiento intelectual. Pero no la entienden del mismo modo. Scheler defiende la prioridad del objeto (el objeto se da) y Polo la del acto (la operación presenta el objeto). Para Scheler el acto es intencional y para Polo lo es el objeto. Ambos detectan que esta estructura tiene un límite, porque el acto no es nunca el objeto. -/- Both Scheler and Polo use the act-object structure to explain the (...) intelectual knowledge. Nevertheless, they don’t understand this structure on the same way. Scheler holds the priority of the object (the object is given by itself) and Polo on his behalf holds the priority of the act (the operation presentates the object). For Scheler the act is intentional, but for Polo which is intentional is the object. Both observe that this structure has a limit, because the act is never the object. (shrink)

Virtual reality is not only a prowess of technological advancement and AI, but also an element that extends the horizons of human existence and complicates the way of approaching various phenomena of the physical world, for example, violence. Its practice in virtuality leads to a series of challenges, especially when virtual reality is considered as genuine reality. This text delves into virtual violence, the influence of AI on it and the problems that its conception implies. To analyze this phenomenon, parallax (...) is proposed as a concept that helps to understand its development. This theory invites us to see violence in different ways, thus influencing the vision of morality in the virtual world. Although these reflections outline difficulties, a position is proposed that invites to urgently address the need for an applicable morality to virtual and physical fields, emphasizing dignity as the purpose of human practices. (shrink)

New Realism is a movement in philosophy initiated in 2011 by Maurizio Ferraris (University of Turin) and Markus Gabriel (University of Bonn). It has already had success in prompting debates on the perspectives for a realist turn in philosophy. Hundreds of articles pro and contra New Realism have been published, some authored by distinguished contemporary thinkers. All over the world, there have been international forums related to the movement. The main task of New Realism is to develop a theoretical alternative (...) to postmodernism and other antirealist traditions in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This article examines the evolution of the concept of existence in modern visual representation and reasoning, highlighting important milestones. In the late eighteenth century, during the so-called golden age of visual reasoning, nominalism reigned supreme and there was limited scope for existential import or individuals in logic diagrams. By the late nineteenth century, a form of realism had taken hold, whose existential commitments continue to dominate many areas in logic and visual reasoning to this day. Physical, metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic (...) positions underlie both nominalist and realist views. Since the paradigmatic works on visual reasoning in the 1990s, formal diagram systems have been developed that revive either the nominalist or realist perspectives. Unlike in the nineteenth century, these are not motivated by philosophical views. Nevertheless, they may still have an impact on many areas of philosophy and science outside logic. (shrink)

This contribution proposes an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mathematics. It is argued that Aquinas’s philosophy of mathematics is a coherent view whose main features enable us to understand it as a moderate realism according to which mathematical objects have an esse intentionale. This esse intentionale involves both mathematicians’ intellectual activity and natural things being knowable mathematically. It is shown that, in Aquinas’s view, mathematics’ constructive part does not conflict with mathematical realism. It is also held that mathematics’ imaginative (...) reasoning is coherent with Aquinas’s doctrine of formal abstraction and his realism. It focuses on some of Aquinas’s texts, which it places within their textual and doctrinal context and interprets them in the light of some historical elements. (shrink)

Some philosophical pluralists argue that both a top-down and a bottom-up approach serve as equally justified methods for engaging in ontological inquiry. In the top-down approach, we start with an analysis of theory and extrapolate from there to the world. In the bottom-up approach, we begin with an empirical investigation of the world and let our theory respond accordingly. The idea is that ontological conclusions arrived at via these two equally justified methods are then also equally justified. In this paper, (...) I argue that top-down/bottom-up methodological pluralism inadvertently grants primacy to the top-down approach. I go on to suggest that this is, in fact, unavoidable because it applies to ontological inquiry in general. Ontological inquiry invariably adopts the top-down approach because (a) ontological conclusions are not revealed during empirical investigations; instead, they are conceptual (i.e. theoretical) posits asserted top-down and (b) even if we consider both top-down and bottom-up approaches during ontological inquiry, such a consideration itself occurs from within theory (i.e. top-down). (shrink)

Translation of the book "Metaphysik: Eine Einführung" by Christof Rapp published in C.H. Beck Verlag.

This edition of Doing Philosophy An Introduction through Thought Experiments explains how philosophical problems arise and why searching for solutions is important.

This book is an exposition and analysis of Critical Realism, a philosophical approach that is quickly becoming the go-to position among Christian authors. Critical Realism poses a serious threat to Christian theology. Influential Christian authors argue for Critical Realism as an essential aspect of hermeneutic methodology. Evangelical scholars claim it has great potential for biblical studies. But as Howe shows, Critical Realism is incompatible with Christian doctrine. This book shows how Critical Realism conflicts with and subverts orthodox Christian theology and (...) hermeneutics, and how it undermines Christian apologetics by blunting the possibility of deciding between the claims of conflicting and contradictory theologies and beliefs. This book is an effort to alert Christian authors to the dangers of adopting CR as a part of a Christian worldview. It will be of interest to all those committed to orthodox Christian theology and hermeneutics. (shrink)

Modal phenomena in general, and modal claims in particular, present a problem for contemporary philosophers. The truth conditions of modal claims differ from those of nonemodal claims. I discuss a widely accepted strategy that posits possible and impossible worlds in order to analyze modal claims and thus systematize our intuitions about modal reality.

Creators offload the construction of their artifact in that the world helps to determine the nature of their imposition in ways that can go beyond the content of their imposing activities. Extant theories of imposition fail to account for offloading by requiring match between content and product. Therefore, I develop an externalist theory that accommodates offloading by taking the imposition of mind onto world to be objectively constrained. An important kind of imposition is normativity. Focusing on personal value, what’s valuable (...) for someone is determined by what they value as good or bad for themselves. Such a subjectivist view faces the same problem as extant theories of imposition in seeming to preclude the possibility of making mistakes about value. Applying imposition externalism, I defend an artifactual approach to subjectivism such that mistakes are captured in terms of offloading. A subject’s valuing can fail to match the very value it creates. (shrink)

In the context of debates about truth, nihilism is the view that nothing is true. This is a very striking and (at first) implausible thesis, which is perhaps why it is seldom discussed. _Truth Without Truths_ applies nihilism to the philosophical debates on truth and paradox, and explores how a nihilist approach to truth is a serious contender. -/- ¶ -/- David Liggins demonstrates that a strong case for nihilism about truth is available. The main grounds for taking nihilism on (...) truth seriously are the solutions it provides to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth, and its epistemological superiority to theories that posit truths. The discussion considers a wider range of paradoxes than usual-including the truth-teller paradox and other paradoxes of underdetermination. -/- ¶ -/- Liggins shows how the debate over truth and paradox can be advanced by drawing on metaphysical debates about realism and anti-realism. _Truth Without Truths_ is also a challenge to deflationism. Deflationists provide an austere, metaphysically lightweight account of truth. But there is one posit that all contemporary deflationists make: they posit truths. By showing that we can well do without truths, Liggins argues that deflationism is actually too lavish a position. -/- ¶ -/- Liggins's preferred form of alethic nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, which uses quantification into sentence position, conceived of as non-objectual and non-substitutional. This book is part of a wider movement exploring the implications of admitting forms of non-objectual, non-substitutional quantification – sometimes called 'higher-order metaphysics'. (shrink)

Despite the emphasis on 'concept' and 'idea', Hegel never fails to utilize the term 'reality' as well throughout his work. This is particularly noteworthy, as Hegel does not discuss this term in a separate chapter, unlike other semantically related concepts such as 'being', 'existence', 'actuality', 'objectivity', and of course 'concept' and 'idea'. The contributions of this volume track Hegel's numerous but scattered mentions of reality and reconstruct the overlooked yet cohesive Hegelian philosophy of reality, overall shedding new light on the (...) realistic dimension of Hegel's entire 'idealistic' philosophy from systematic, interpretive, and historical perspectives. Aller Betonung von "Begriff" und "Idee" zum Trotz verzichtet Hegel nirgendwo in seinem Werk auf die Verwendung des Ausdrucks "Realität". Dies ist umso bemerkenswerter, zumal Hegel diesem Ausdruck anders als bei anderen semantisch verwandten Begriffen wie "Sein", "Dasein", "Existenz", "Wirklichkeit" und "Objektivität" oder auch "Begriff" und "Idee" keine eigene Abhandlung widmet. Die Beiträge dieses Sammelbandes verfolgen Hegels zahlreiche, jedoch an verschiedenen Stellen verstreute Hinweise und rekonstruieren eine bislang unbeachtete, dennoch einheitliche und übergreifende Hegelsche Philosophie der Realität in systematischer, exegetischer und historischer Hinsicht. Dadurch wird die realistische Dimension der gesamten "idealistischen" Philosophie Hegels neu und umfassend beleuchtet. (shrink)

Chasing Reality deals with the controversies over the reality of the external world. Distinguished philosopher Mario Bunge offers an extended defence of realism, a critique of various forms of contemporary anti-realism, and a sketch of his own version of realism, namely hylorealism. Bunge examines the main varieties of antirealism - Berkeley's, Hume's, and Kant's; positivism, phenomenology, and constructivism - and argues that all of these in fact hinder scientific research. Bunge's realist contention is that genuine explanations in the sciences appeal (...) to causal laws and mechanisms that are not directly observable, rather than simply to empirical generalisations. Genuine science, in his view, is objective even when it deals with subjective phenomena such as feelings of fear. This work defends a realist view of universals, kinds, possibilities, and dispositions, while rejecting contemporary accounts of these that are couched in terms of modal logic and 'possible worlds.'. (shrink)

The recent so-called crisis of replication continues to dominate psychology’s methodological landscape. It is argued here that the apparent renaissance of Popperian thinking that characterises some of the key responses to the crisis of replication is fundamentally flawed. In essence, there is a serious lack of any sustained and rigorous treatment of ontology that underpins much of the current debate about replication and Popper’s falsificationist approach. The overriding problem is that the replication debate reflects the methodologist tendency for mainstream psychologists (...) to avoid or gloss over crucial ontological questions. In contradistinction, this article (a) underscores the primacy of ontology; (b) delineates and applies a critical realist stratified ontology to psychology; (c) utilises the latter as a springboard from which to argue for Popper’s methodological “retirement”; and (d) revindicates the indispensability of context and the subtlety of psychological phenomena in arguing for the intrinsic limits of replication and experimentalism in general. (shrink)

Surveys a full range of theories of the nature of truth and evaluates their philosophical costs and benefits.

Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that claims beliefs do not exist. He argues we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real. By arguing for the antirealist view as a revision of our common-sense view about the nature of mind, Poslajko makes the case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with philosophical questions about belief.

Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give three examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was not scaled in (...) 1924. The predicate “greverest” is interdefinable with the predicate “green”: the predicate "green" applies to an object if either the object is greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-greverest" applies to an object if either the object is non-green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is green and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-green" applies to an object if either the object is non-greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. We know that the famous diamond called Golden Jubilee is not green. If someone (a greverest-speaker) informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest, we would automatically come to know Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a greverest object can only be either 1) green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) non-green (in case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “greverest” that we are faced with case 2, the case in which the object is both non-green and greverest, and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. Vice versa, if someone informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not greverest, we would automatically come to know that Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a non-greverest object can only be either 1) non-green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) green (in the case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also non-greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “non-greverest” that we are faced with case 1, the case in which the object is both non-green and non-greverest, and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. At the moment no one has yet been able to convince the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest. I am skeptical that anyone will demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether a specific object is greverest; but I would be happy if someone could demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether an object is greverest: that would be a good news for historical studies. The paper continues with two examples, including an example about the predicate "grue". (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the view that realism about a social kind K entails that the grounding conditions of K are difficult (or impossible) to manipulate. In other words, we define social kind realism in terms of relative frame manipulability (RFM). In articulating our view, we utilize theoretical resources from Epstein’s (Epstein, The ant trap: Rebuilding the foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press, 2015) grounding/anchoring model and causal interventionism. After comparing our view with causal and principle-based (Tahko, (...) Synthese 200(2):1–23, 2022) proposals, we motivate RFM by showing that it accommodates important desiderata about the social landscape (such as recognizing the context-relativity of social properties and the emancipatory dimension of social practice). Finally, we consider three objections. First, we tackle frame-necessitarianism (FN), the view that social kind frames are metaphysically necessary (and thus unmanipulable). Secondly, we engage with what Epstein (Epstein, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(3):768–781 2019a) calls UNIVERSALITY (the view that social kinds can hold in the absence of anchors) and we argue that it should also be resisted. Finally, we tackle a recent objection from Mason’s (Mason, Philosophical Studies, 178(12):3975–3994) essentialism about social kinds. (shrink)

In this article we survey Ásta’s (2008, 2013) conferralist account of essence, which provides a broadly anti-realist picture of essence. We first offer some thoughts on the difference between realist and anti-realist accounts of essence in general. Then we present Ásta’s notion of a conferred property and sketch her conferralist account of essence. Finally, we examine some critical questions conferralism faces.

It is controversial whether virtual reality should be considered fictional or real. Virtual fictionalists claim that objects and events within virtual reality are merely fictional: they are imagined and do not exist. Virtual realists argue that virtual objects and events really exist. This metaphysical debate might appear important for some of the practical questions that arise regarding how to morally evaluate and legally regulate virtual reality. For instance, one advantage claimed of virtual realism is that only by taking virtual objects (...) and events to be real can we explain our strong emotional reactions to certain virtual actions, as well as their potential immorality. This paper argues that emotional reactions towards, and wrongs within, virtual reality are consistent with its being merely fictional. The emotional and ethical judgments we wish to make regarding virtual reality do not provide any grounds for preferring virtual realism. (shrink)

Despite its apparent complexity, our world seems to be governed by simple laws of physics. This volume provides a philosophical introduction to such laws. I explain how they are connected to some of the central issues in philosophy, such as ontology, possibility, explanation, induction, counterfactuals, time, determinism, and fundamentality. I suggest that laws are fundamental facts that govern the world by constraining its physical possibilities. I examine three hallmarks of laws-simplicity, exactness, and objectivity-and discuss whether and how they may be (...) associated with laws of physics. (shrink)

Realism about quantum theory naturally leads to realism about the quantum state of the universe. It leaves open whether it is a pure state represented by a wave function, or an impure (mixed) one represented by a density matrix. I characterize and elaborate on Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the universal quantum state is objective but can be impure. To clarify the thesis, I compare it with Wave Function Realism, explain the conditions under which they are empirically equivalent, consider (...) two generalizations of Density Matrix Realism, and answer some frequently asked questions. I end by highlighting an implication for scientific realism. (shrink)

Oftentimes, reality seems to us a chaos that we try to control with our theories. This article starts from the antithetic standpoint, inspired by Antonio Rosmini’s works: reality is intelligible, and originates our thinking. From this perspective, any research that tries to reach the truth is determined by the real, not the contrary. Moreover, interdisciplinarity, far from being a solipsistic enterprise, aims at achieving truth and guaranteeing scientific advancement. Here, we analyze the distinctive character of Rosminian encyclopedism and his principles (...) for preventing human errors. We then clarify why it is impossible to achieve perfection, and why such an impossibility is not problematic for the interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

I outline and defend a limited realism in socio-political conceptual amelioration (RSCA). RSCA claims that, in some cases, socio-political concepts are ameliorated to represent parts of a concept-independent reality more accurately. My main aim is to dissolve a seeming dilemma for RSCA: Whereas social kinds are mind-dependent (i.e. depending on human thought and action), realism implies that the kinds represented are ontologically independent of the concepts representing them. To dissolve this dilemma, I suggest considering two different roles concepts play concerning (...) social kinds. Concepts can both generate social kinds and represent social kinds. Once a concept has generated a social kind, this social kind is part of a concept-independent reality that can be represented by different concepts. Thereby, RSCA allows amelio-rated concepts to represent social kinds (e.g., rape, marriage) more accurately while acknowledging that human actions or concepts have generated these social kinds. (shrink)

This collection of chapters, from an international group of theologians and scripture scholars, engages the hermeneutical insights of Bernard Lonergan and those influenced by him to both advance theoretical discussions concerning the interpretation of Christian Scripture and to demonstrate the usefulness of such hermeneutical insights through applied readings of specific biblical texts.

本书包括八章内容,作者注重中西哲学比较的视野,从知识论和人生价值论方面展示中国新实在论与西方新实在论思想的异同,阐述了中国新实在论思潮的发展历程等。.

This perspective asserts the existence of only two sexes/genders, male and female, based on not only biological and reproductive processes but also from claims of non-binary or transgender identities as defined through negation which rely on the binary concept of sex/gender. Thus, individuals claiming identities on the "gender/sex spectrum" are again defining themselves through negation (definiens per negationem). This perspective suggests that the diversity of gender experiences, (the sex or gender spectrum) is defined by what individuals are not rather than (...) what they are. While the validity of non-binary and transgender identities definiens per negationem is noted, it is important to accept the reality of the binary nature of sex or gender as a scientific fact, and that all human beings are on a developmental pathway leading to either male or female. Without the reality of binary sex or gender, the gender identity spectrum does not exist as there is nothing to negate from. (shrink)

"The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Berkeley’s Immaterialism" The paper discusses the issue of intersubjectivity in Berkeley’s early philosophy. In the course of metaphysical analysis I argue that it is not possible to save within Berkeleian metaphysics intersubjectivity of the object of cognition and the unity of the world of experience, either in version of its strict identity or by taking perfect likeness as a criterion of its identity.

Mimo ujmującej prostoty filozofia Berkeleya pozostaje przedmiotem niekończących się sporów interpretacyjnych. Toczą się one przede wszystkim wokół dwóch ściśle związanych ze sobą zagadnień. Po pierwsze, od dziesiątków lat spór między badaczami dotyczy kwestii właściwej klasyfikacji berkeleyowskiej filozofii – zażarte debaty wywołuje pytanie o to, czy należy uznać ją za system idealistyczny czy raczej realistyczny? Powodu do tego sporu dostarczył sam Berkeley, który redukując cały świat doświadczenia do zespołu istniejących jedynie w umyśle idei, zarazem wielokrotnie zapewniał, że owo upodmiotowienie rzeczywistości nie (...) przynosi w najmniejszym stopniu uszczerbku jej realności. Kontrowersja ta jest jednak tylko pochodną bardziej fundamentalnej kwestii – pytania o metafizyczną strukturę berkeleyowskiej idei. Nic więc dziwnego, że oba te zagadnienia zdominowały dwudziestowieczne studia nad myślą Berkeleya. Jakie są perspektywy zakończenia tych sporów? Czy możliwe jest rozstrzygnięcie obu wymienionych kwestii? Niewątpliwie. Niemożliwe jest jednak osiągnięcie tego celu metodami czysto historycznymi. Jego realizacja wymaga zmiany postawy metodologicznej, która „spór o Berkeleya” pozwoliłaby przenieść na bardziej teoretyczny grunt. Niniejsza książka ma spełnić właśnie taką rolę. (shrink)

"Metaphysical Conditions of the Berkeleian Immaterialism" This paper discusses metaphysical conditions of the Berkeleian immaterialism. First, the abstract concept of existence is demonstrated to be inadequate for Berkeley’s metaphysics. The core of the argumentation involves showing that any attempt to establish immaterialism on the basis of the theory of existence cannot succeed without accepting the constitutiveness of idea’s mode of existence and rejecting the autonomy of an object in relation to its mode of existence. Second, it is shown that Berkeley’s (...) metaphysics demands a mono-existential theory of an object. Consequently, this paper shows that since Berkeley’s idea cannot have more than one mode of existence (i.e. in the human mind perceiving it), metaphysical analysis of Berkeleian philosophy allows one to refute all its multi-existential interpretations. (shrink)