If the professionalization of the social professions is increasingly based on the model of professionalization engineering, what are the imaginaries underlying this movement? How can we understand that the profession of engineer, the one who, at least in the imagination, invents and designs machines with a magically predictable functioning, can be the model for designing training systems for the helping professions? This contribution proposes to explore these questions through two mythological figures often summoned when it comes to engineering and technology (...) : Prometheus and Hephaestus. These two figures will help us to move from the model of professionalization engineering to ingenium. (shrink)

Several philosophers have recently tried to define natural kinds in epistemic terms only. Given the persistent problems with finding a successful metaphysical theory, these philosophers argue that we would do better to describe natural kinds solely in terms of their epistemic usefulness, such as their role in supporting inductive inferences. In this paper, I argue against these epistemology-only theories of natural kinds and in favor of, at least partly, metaphysical theories. I do so in three steps. In the first section (...) of the paper, I propose two desiderata for a theory of natural kinds. In the second section, I discuss one example of a ‘general’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by Marc Ereshefsky and Thomas Reydon, and argue that theories like theirs fail to provide adequate criteria of natural kinds. In the third section, I focus on one example of a ‘specific’ epistemology-only theory, proposed by P. D. Magnus, and use it to show why such theories cannot justify the claim that the proposed epistemic criteria account for the naturalness of kinds. (shrink)

The current metaphysical race debate is very much focused on the realism question whether races exist. In this paper I argue against the importance of this question. Philosophers, biologists and anthropologists expect that answering this question will tell them something substantive about the metaphysics of racial classifications, and will help them to decide whether it is justified to use racial categories in scientific research and public policy. I argue that there are two reasons why these expectations are not fulfilled. First (...) of all, the realism question about race leads to a very broad philosophical debate about the semantics of general terms and the criteria for real kinds, rather than to a debate about the metaphysics of racial categories specifically. Secondly, there is a type of race realism that is so toothless that it is almost completely uninformative about the metaphysics of race. In response to these worries, I argue that the metaphysical race debate should rather be focused on the question in what way and to what extent ‘racial’ distinctions can ground the epistemic practices of various scientific disciplines. I spell out what I mean by this and go on to demonstrate that trying to answer this question leads to a more fruitful metaphysical debate. (shrink)

The paper aims at clarifying the distinctions and relations between pain and suffering. Three negative theses are defended: 1. Pain and suffering are not identical. 2. Pain is not a species of suffering, nor is suffering a species of pain, nor are pain and suffering of a common (proximate) genus. 3. Suffering cannot be defined as the perception of a pain’s badness, nor can pain be defined as a suffered bodily sensation. Three positive theses are endorsed: 4. Pain and suffering (...) are categorically distinct: pain is a localised bodily episode, suffering is a non-localised affective attitude. 5. Suffering can be expressed, pains cannot. As a consequence, we can have compassion for the suffering of others, not for their pains. 6. The relation between pain and suffering is akin to the relation between danger and fear, injustice and indignation, wrongdoing and guilt: suffering is the correct reaction to pain. One upshot is that both the influential view that the experience of pain is incorrigible and the influential view that the ordinary conception of pain is paradoxical are false. (shrink)

Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a definition is (...) now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whosefirst step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made acrosssciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effortfrom research on effort so far:primitive-feelings accounts,comparator-based accounts,resource-based accountsandforce-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking abouteffort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: re-source-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded as more fundamental than resource-basedaccounts -/- . (shrink)

The objective of this longitudinal study is to analyze the intrinsic drivers and values underlying managers’ organizational citizenship behaviors for the environment from a developmental psychology perspective based on measuring the stages of consciousness that shape the meaning-making systems of individuals. At time 1, the stages of consciousness of 138 managers were qualitatively assessed using the Leader Development Profile test. At time 2, a quantitative survey measured the environmental beliefs and OCBEs of these managers. The links between stages of consciousness, (...) environmental beliefs, and OCBEs were analyzed using hierarchical regressions. The main findings show that managers’ stages of consciousness positively influence two types of OCBEs, namely eco-initiatives and eco-helping, while environmental beliefs influence eco-helping and eco-civic engagement but do not appear to be connected with the stage of consciousness development. This paper first contributes to the literature on corporate greening by shedding more light on the aspects of behavioral and developmental psychology that underlie environmental leadership. Second, it bridges the gap between theories that have developed separately by showing the interconnectedness between the managers’ stage of consciousness and the more concrete environmental behaviors in the workplace that could have emulative effects throughout the organization. (shrink)

We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe (...) about what the others intend, know, and believe. We propose an alternative, pooled knowledge, and argue that it allows formulating conditions on shared intentions that meet the two desiderata. (shrink)

Formalisms such as description logics (DL) are sometimes expected to help terminologies ensure compliance with sound ontological principles. The objective of this paper is to study the degree to which one DL-based biomedical terminology (SNOMED CT) complies with such principles. We defined seven ontological principles (for example: each class must have at least one parent, each class must differ from its parent) and examined the properties of SNOMED CT classes with respect to these principles. Our major results are: 31% of (...) the classes have a single child; 27% have multiple parents; 51% do not exhibit any differentiae between the description of the parent and that of the child. The applications of this study to quality assurance for ontologies are discussed and suggestions are made for dealing with multiple inheritance. (shrink)

Analogies between hearing and seeing already existed in ancient Greek theories of perception. The present paper follows the evolution of such analogies until the rise of 17th century optics, with due regard to the diversity of their origins and nature but with particular emphasis on their bearing on the physical concepts of light and sound. Whereas the old Greek analogies were only side effects of the unifying concepts of perception, the analogies of the 17th century played an important role in (...) constructing optical theories by imitation of acoustic theories, or vice versa. This transition depended on several factors including the changing relations between optics, music, mathematics, and physics, the diversity of early modern concepts of sound, and the rise of a new physics based on experimentation and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

Brentano’s theory of continuity is based on his account of boundaries. The core idea of the theory is that boundaries and coincidences thereof belong to the essence of continua. Brentano is confident that he developed a full-fledged, boundary-based, theory of continuity1; and scholars often concur: whether or not they accept Brentano’s take on continua they consider it a clear contender. My impression, on the contrary, is that, although it is infused with invaluable insights, several aspects of Brentano’s account of continuity (...) remain inchoate. To be clear, the theory of boundaries on which it relies, as well as the account of ontological dependence that Brentano develops alongside his theory of boundaries, constitute splendid achievements. However, the passage from the theory of boundaries to the account of continuity is rather sketchy. This paper pinpoints some chief problems raised by this transition, and proposes some solutions to them which, if not always faithful to the letter of Brentano’s account of continua, are I believe faithful to its spirit. §1 presents Brentano’s critique of the mathematical account of the continuous. §2 introduces Brentano’s positive account of continua. §3 raises three worries about Brentano’s account of continuity. §4 proposes a Neo-Brentanian approach to continua that handles these worries. (shrink)

In the current article and contrary to a widespread assumption, I argue that Humeanism and ontological emergence can peacefully coexist. Such a coexistence can be established by reviving elements of John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science, in which an idiosyncratic account of diachronic emergence is associated with extensions of the Humean mosaic and the correlative coming into being of new best system laws, which have the peculiarity of being temporally indexed. Incidentally, this reconciliation of Humeanism and emergence allows for conceiving (...) the autonomy of the special sciences in an interesting way, consistently with the reductionist ideal of a unified science. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe presence of emotional words and content in stories has been shown to enhance a story’s memorability, and its cultural success. Yet, recent cultural trends run in the opposite direction. Using the Google Books corpus, coupled with two metadata-rich corpora of Anglophone fiction books, we show a decrease in emotionality in English-speaking literature starting plausibly in the nineteenth century. We show that this decrease cannot be explained by changes unrelated to emotionality, and that, in our three corpora, the decrease is (...) driven almost entirely by a decline in the proportion of positive emotion-related words, while the frequency of negative emotion-related words shows little if any decline. Consistently with previous studies, we also find a link between ageing and negative emotionality at the individual level. (shrink)

When Henri Poincaré reviewed the then competing theories of electrodynamics in the 1890s, he required their compatibility with two principles of mechanical origin—the reaction principle and the relativity principle. Historians of relativity theory have usually focused on the relativity principle and neglected or misinterpreted Poincaré’s concern with the reaction principle. In particular, most of them have interpreted his crucial article of 1900 on “Lorentz’s theory and the principle of reaction” as an attempt to save this principle by assuming an electromagnetic (...) momentum in addition to the momentum of matter. The purpose of this article is to dismiss this interpretation and show that Poincaré had the opposite intention as he spelled out the paradoxical consequences of Lorentz’s violation of the reaction principle. In doing so, he formally introduced a quantity that could later be interpreted as a genuine electromagnetic momentum, developed a fundamentally new understanding of Lorentz’s transformations in relation with the relativity principle and identified the paradoxes that Einstein would later solve by assuming the inertia of energy. (shrink)

Adolf Reinach belongs to the Brentanian lineage of Austrian Aristotelianism. His theory of social acts is well known, but his account of ownership has been mostly overlooked. This paper introduces and defends Reinach’s account of ownership. Ownership, for Reinach, is not a bundle of property rights. On the contrary, he argues that ownership is a primitive and indivisible relation between a person and a thing that grounds property rights. Most importantly, Reinach asserts that the nature ownership is not determined by (...) positive law but presupposed by it. Some have objected that such realism raises insuperable difficulties as to the origin of ownership, difficulties that could only be dealt with under a more conventionalist approach. I argue that the independence of the nature ownership from positive law is, in fact, compatible with the claim that its existence is dependent on human conventions. (shrink)

Analogies between hearing and seeing already existed in ancient Greek theories of perception. The present paper follows the evolution of such analogies until the rise of 17th century optics, with due regard to the diversity of their origins and nature but with particular emphasis on their bearing on the physical concepts of light and sound. Whereas the old Greek analogies were only side effects of the unifying concepts of perception, the analogies of the 17th century played an important role in (...) constructing optical theories by imitation of acoustic theories, or vice versa. This transition depended on several factors including the changing relations between optics, music, mathematics, and physics, the diversity of early modern concepts of sound, and the rise of a new physics based on experimentation and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

Cet article examine le traitement donné par Descartes et certains de ses successeurs d’une question classique, quoique peu étudiée, celle de savoir si l’on peut penser plusieurs choses à la fois. Le thème d’une saisie simultanée est central dans la théorie cartésienne de la connaissance, en particulier dans les Regulæ, où il s’appuie sur le recours à une attention divisée. Restreignant ce pouvoir à la seule imagination, Clauberg voit dans le corps vivant le paradigme de la simultanéité. Spinoza offre quant (...) à lui un point de vue synthétique : la simultanéité dans le corps et l’esprit sont des expressions de la puissance individuelle et de son progrès. L’attention n’est plus comme chez Descartes une condition de la simultanéité intellectuelle, mais un obstacle qu’il s’agit de surmonter pour comprendre plus et mieux. (shrink)

Animal pain and suffering is mostly caused by humans, particularly by the human use of domestic animals. This calls for the recognition of animal pain and suffering. My focus is on pain-related suffering. I argue for recognition in the phenomenological sense of giving adequate regard to pain experience in animals and their capacity to express it in their own species-specific terms, in a way that will motivate us to prevent it. My advocacy for the recognition of pain in animals consequently (...) includes a consideration of moral and political action to avert their suffering. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give a description of the objects of the sense of touch. Those objects, it is argued, are forces, rather than flesh deformation, solidity or weight. Tangible forces, basically tensions and pressures, are construed as symmetric and non-spatially reducible causal relations. Two consequences are drawn: first, the perception of heat and cold falls outside the sense of touch; second, muscular sense (together with a large part of proprioception) falls inside the sense of touch.

L'étude des mathématiques de la préhistoire ne peut être fondée uniquement sur les documents archéologiques bruts, sous peine de stérilité ; elle a tout intérêt à les mettre en situation grâce au comparatisme ethnographique, selon lequel les sociétés primitives actuelles ou récemment disparues nous renseignent sur nos ancêtres de la préhistoire. D'abord utilisée spontanément par quelques historiens des mathématiques, cette méthode est de nos jours rejetée en principe par le courant récent des ethnomathématiciens. Il s'agit de montrer par quelques exemples (...) que la méthode est pourtant féconde, d'une part parce qu'elle ruine les constructions fantastiques dont raffolent certains mathématiciens, et d'autre part parce qu'elle ouvre un vaste champ de recherches pratiquement inexploré. (shrink)

Le réductionnisme consiste en la thèse selon laquelle toute entité Y « se réduit », ou est en principe « réductible », à une entité unique de base (ou un ensemble unique d’entités de base) X(i). Ceci étant, la thèse du réductionnisme ne peut être rendue intelligible qu’au travers d’une explicitation première de ce en quoi consiste la « réduction » de Y à X(i). Une telle explicitation s’opère le long de deux dimensions, l’une associée à la nature des relata (...) de la réduction, l’autre à la nature de la relation de réduction. Lorsque les relata de la réduction ressortissent à nos modalités de représentation du monde naturel, on parle de réductionnisme épistémologique, dont les deux variétés les plus répandues sont les réductionnismes théorique et explicatif. L’enjeu de cette première famille de réductionnisme consiste essentiellement à savoir si notre connaissance du monde peut en principe prendre la forme d’un discours unifié ou, au contraire, se révèle inexorablement fragmentée. Lorsque les relata de la réduction ressortissent aux entités qui peuplent le monde naturel lui-même, on parle plutôt de réductionnisme ontologique, dont une sous-variété sensible est le réductionnisme causal, c’est-à-dire, en substance, la thèse selon laquelle les pouvoirs causaux naturels, comme les pouvoirs vivants, mentaux ou sociaux, ne sont en réalité que des combinaisons de pouvoirs physiques sous-jacents. Relativement à cette seconde famille de réductionnisme, l’enjeu principal consiste en la défense de la spécificité, et d’ailleurs aussi de l’existence même, de réalités supérieures, telles que, par exemple, le libre arbitre humain. (shrink)

A quick, but inconclusive, way to defend generous realism is to rely on the reciprocal conceptual dependency between component and resultant forces. Conceptually, there cannot be component without compounds, nor compounds, or resultants, without components. If there are only component forces, then they are not really component ; and if there are only resultant forces then there are not really resultant.

Urban agriculture is an important source of food and income throughout Africa. The majority of cultivators on the continent are women who use urban agriculture to provide for their family. Much research on urban agriculture in Africa focuses on the material benefits of urban agriculture for women, but a smaller body of literature considers its social and psychological empowering effects. The present study seeks to contribute to this debate by looking at the ways in which urban agriculture empowers women on (...) the Cape Flats, a region of Cape Town where urban agriculture is supported by nongovernmental organisations. Based on interviews with cultivators, the findings show that NGO-run urban agriculture projects not only aid food security, but also help women to develop supportive networks that unlock benefits across the personal, social and economic spectrum. (shrink)

On a pris l'habitude de voir en l'analyse un instrument logique de décomposition et de clarification des concepts, confirmant du même coup l'évaluation critique qu'en a donnée Kant : l'analyse est un procédé stérile qui ne contribue en rien à l'expansion et au renouvellement des connaissances. Soulignant la cohérence de ses emplois historiques, le présent ouvrage cherche au contraire à rétablir l'analyse en sa fonction inventive : de l'Antiquité au XVII siècle, la méthode analytique constitue, en effet, une solution aux (...) insuffisances de la déduction logique ; s'appuyant sur la construction et le déchiffrement des figures, elle offre une voie à la fois détournée et probante pour la résolution des problèmes. Descartes est l'héritier de cette tradition, mais il est aussi, à maints égards, l'artisan de la conception moderne de l'analyse dont il a fait la voie privilégiée de la connaissance de soi dans les Méditations métaphysiques. Accomplissement heuristique de "l'ordre des raisons" mais aussi aventure temporelle inscrite dans la durée féconde de la méditation, l'analyse se révèle alors l'instrument d'une raison radicalement inventive. (shrink)

Il est courant de diviser le champ d’investigation de l’éthique entre trois sous- domaines : la méta-éthique, l’éthique normative et l’éthique appliquée. L’éthique appliquée est le domaine le plus concret : on y traite par exemple des questions de savoir s’il faut autoriser l’avortement, l’euthanasie, la peine de mort... L’éthique normative traite de ces questions à un niveau plus abstrait : elle se demande ce qui fait qu’une action ou un type d’action est moralement bonne ou mauvaise. La relation entre (...) l’éthique normative et l’éthique appliquée est un peu comme la relation entre la science pure, comme la physique, et l’ingénierie (Timmons : 17). Le domaine le plus abstrait de l’éthique est la méta-ethique : elle ne s’occupe par de la question de savoir ce qui fait qu’une action est bonne ou mauvaise (éthique normative) et encore moins de la question de savoir si le suicide est moralement bon ou mauvais. Elle s’intéresse à trois types de questions. Les premières sont métaphysiques : qu’est-ce qu’une valeur, qu’une norme (sont-ce des propriétés naturelles comme la masse, des propriétés non naturelles ? Des choses qui n’existent pas ?) ? Existe-t-il des valeurs objectives ? Les secondes sont épistémologiques : comment connaissons-nous les valeurs et les normes ? Par la raison ? L’intuition ? Les émotions ? Dans la mesure où la méta-éthique semble être le domaine le plus abstrait de l’éthique, la prudence pédagogique voudrait qu’on l’étudie en dernier : commencer par un cas concret, puis remonter petit à petit vers des questions plus abstraites. Pour des raisons qui vous apparaîtront j’espère au fur et à mesure, j’ai choisi de commencer néanmoins par des questions qui relève de la méta-éthique. Nous aborderons l’éthique normative et l’éthique appliquée dans la deuxième partie du cours. (shrink)

« L’une des manifestations principales de l’emprise du néolibéralisme autoritaire sur la vie des individus consiste dans la destruction des systèmes publics d’éducation ayant pour fonction de former le citoyen et d’émanciper l’homme. s’agit-il seulement d’un échec des politiques d’éducation? Ou ne s’agit-il pas plutôt de projets de non-éducation? La philosophie de Theodor W. Adorno permet de penser les conditions de ce que nous appelons ici la non-éducation, en suivant une approche critique, négative et dialectique. Nous en actualisons, dans cet (...) article, plusieurs thèmes, permettant d’éclairer la situation présente : 1) la pensée mythique, 2) l’industrie culturelle, 3) les pratiques autoritaires. À cela s’ajoute une condition portant sur 4) les tabous liés à la sexualité. certes, lorsqu’Adorno traite de l’éducation et de l’émancipation, la question de la sexualité – ou de sa répression – n’apparaît pas au premier plan. permet-elle de mettre au jour des limites du projet critique lui-même? Ou d’éclairer certains tabous qui lui seraient inhérents, lesquels refléteraient aussi certains tabous du monde enseignant? ». (shrink)

« L’idée même d’opéra populaire est paradoxale tant l’opéra relève, en France, aujourd’hui, de la musique classique, de la musique savante, et paraît éloigné des genres de la “musique populaire” comme des publics populaires, des masses ou tout simplement du plus grand nombre. Cela l’est encore plus si l’on considère les choses du point de vue de la philosophie et de l’esthétique. Theodor W. Adorno déclare déjà, dans les années soixante, que l’opéra, en Allemagne, est un genre essentiellement “bourgeois”, produit (...) par la bourgeoisie et destiné à la bourgeoisie. La question se pose alors d’une forme d’alternative, au-delà de la critique, soit la possibilité d’une affirmation. Car l’opéra populaire existe sous diverses formes. Il faut plutôt mettre en évidence, dans ces conditions, quels obstacles épistémologiques font que l’esthétique ou que la philosophie se heurtent à un tel objet. Cet article revient ainsi sur la conception de la musique populaire et sur la thèse de la bourgeoisité formulée par Adorno en donnant trois contre-exemples d’œuvres musicales (I), avant de considérer la définition de l’opéra populaire proposée par Jean Vilar, qui est à l’origine du projet et de la construction de l’Opéra Bastille (II). ». (shrink)

Our thesis is that there is a notion of justification, corresponding to the active exercise of a competence in order to attain truth, whose value is explained neither by reliabilism, nor by the usual versions of credit theory.

Nous distinguons ordinairement le corps de l’esprit : nous parvenons aisément à concevoir (même si nous n’y croyons pas forcément) que notre esprit survive à notre corps, ou qu’il aille se loger dans un autre corps. Il y a là, pensons-nous, une véritable différence de nature. Mais bien que cette distinction nous soit très intuitive, dès lors que nous cherchons à spécifier le critère sur lequel elle repose, elle se dérobe. Tout se passe comme si nous n’avions aucun mal à (...) classer les choses d’un côté ou de l’autre de la frontière qui sépare le corps de l’esprit, mais que nous ne parvenions pas à la définir précisément. A quel critère obéissons- nous en effet lorsque nous opérons une bipartition entre phénomènes mentaux et phénomènes physiques dans un ensemble tel que : une croyance, le téléphone du salon, un aimant, l’envie d’un florentin, le Mont Blanc, la vue du Mont Blanc, un claquement de porte, un regret, le bruit d’un moulin, la connaissance du théorème de Thalès, la jalousie, la couleur de la neige, le souvenir d’un citronnier à Menton ? Nous serions probablement tous d’accord pour ranger du côté des phénomènes physiques le téléphone du salon, le claquement de porte, la couleur de la neige, l’aimant, le Mont Blanc et le bruit du moulin ; et du côté des phénomènes mentaux la croyance, l’envie d’un florentin, le regret, la vue du Mont Blanc, la connaissance du théorème de Thalès, la jalousie et le souvenir d’un citronnier de Menton. Mais nous divergerions probablement si nous avions à formuler le critère d’après lequel nous avons opéré cette bipartition. La première chose à faire est donc de tenter d’examiner les critères qui peuvent nous permettre d’établir la distinction entre le corps et l’esprit afin de retenir le plus pertinent. Dans la mesure du possible, celui-ci devra être à la fois informatif (ne pas nous renvoyer simplement à la distinction intuitive que nous pratiquons quotidiennement) et neutre (par exemple être acceptable aussi bien par un dualiste que par un matérialiste). Une fois cette distinction établie, nous serons en mesure de poser trois problèmes. (shrink)

Sometimes we say that pleasure is distinct form joy, happiness, or good mood. Some other times we say the joy, happiness or good mood are types of pleasure. This suggests the existence of two concepts of pleasure: one specific, the other generic. According to the specific concept, pleasure is one type of positive affects among others. Pleasure is to be distinguished from joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, elation, jubilation; happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being; enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, delectation, (...) enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill; satisfaction, gratification, pride, triumph; good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness; relief (or at least from some of these concepts). According to the generic concept of pleasure, a pleasure is any of these positive affects. Joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, elation, jubilation, happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being, enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, delectation, enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill, satisfaction, gratification, pride, triumph, good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness, relief and pleasure in the specific sense are all species of pleasures. In this thesis, I shall focus on the generic concept of pleasure, in order to address the question “what is the property of pleasantness common to all positive affects?” In order to address this question nevertheless, one need to have at least rough grip on pleasure in the specific sense and on what distinguishes it from other positive affects. I shall therefore start by hinting at the problem of the definition of the specific concept of pleasure. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real symmetrical and non-causal relations. In the first part, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; in the second part, that they are relations; in the third part, that they are symmetrical relations; in the fourth part, that they are not causal relations, (but causal relata) by which I mean that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces, (...) irreducible to spatio-temporal relations, but is still compatible with humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are species of causation. (shrink)

The role of foundation with respect to transitive closure in the Zermelo system Z has been investigated by Boffa; our aim is to explore the role of antifoundation. We start by showing the consistency of "Z antifoundation transitive closure" relative to Z (by a technique well known for ZF). Further, we introduce a "weak replacement principle" (deductible from antifoundation and transitive closure) and study the relations among these three statements in Z via interpretations. Finally, we give some adaptations for ZF (...) without infinity. (shrink)

Event studies are vital analytical tools used to gauge if unusual investment returns result from events within defined time frames. This article explores events marked by the disclosure of administrative penalties imposed on South African publicly traded financial institutions between 2011 to 2021 due to non-compliance with regulations. Results reveal statistically significant abnormal returns occur in at least 70% of cases, with negative events like fines correlating with negative returns. The findings emphasise the impact of regulatory fines on the performance (...) of listed financial institutions. Banks are advised to monitor and manage conduct risk systematically and carefully. (shrink)

Event studies are vital analytical tools used to gauge if unusual investment returns result from events within defined time frames. This article explores events marked by the disclosure of administrative penalties imposed on South African publicly traded financial institutions between 2011 to 2021 due to non-compliance with regulations. Results reveal statistically significant abnormal returns occur in at least 70% of cases, with negative events like fines correlating with negative returns. The findings emphasise the impact of regulatory fines on the performance (...) of listed financial institutions. Banks are advised to monitor and manage conduct risk systematically and carefully. (shrink)

This article focuses in a comparative manner on the thought of Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard with a view to lending sup port to Busch's claim, that 'existentialism' preceded poststructuralism and postmodernism as far as criticism of certain features of modern philosophy are concerned. Attention is first given to Lyotard's critique of artificial intelligence, especially in so far as it displays a dependence on and development of insights on the part of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological-existential understanding of human embodiment and the specificity of human (...) perception. The focus then shifts to Merleau-Ponty in order to demonstrate the remarkable extent to which his understanding of human embodiment and related issues such as perception and creativity, paved the way for the work of, among others, Lyotard, and anticipated the critique of artificial intelligence on the part of the latter. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(1) 2002: 45-62. (shrink)