Deep brain stimulation interventions are novel devices being investigated for the management of severe treatment-resistant psychiatric illnesses. These interventions require the invasive implantation of high-frequency neurostimulatory probes intracranially aiming to provide symptom relief in treatment-resistant disorders including obsessive-compulsive disorder and anorexia nervosa. In the scientific literature, these neurostimulatory interventions are commonly described as reversible and to be used as a last resort option for psychiatric patients. However, the ‘last resort’ status of these interventions is rarely expanded upon. Contrastingly, usages of (...) DBS devices for neurological symptoms have paved the way for established safety and efficacy standards when used earlier in a disease’s timeline. As DBS treatments for these neurological diseases progress to have earlier indications, there is a parallel ethical concern that early implementation may one day become prescribed for psychiatric illnesses. The purpose of this article is to build off contemporary understandings of reversible neurostimulatory interventions to examine and provide clarifications on the ‘last resort’ status of DBS to better address its ethically charged use in psychiatric neurosurgery. To do this, evaluative differences between DBS treatments will be discussed to demonstrate how patient autonomy would be a paramount guiding principle when one day implementing these devices at various points along a psychiatric disease’s timeline. In presenting the clarification of ‘last resort’ status, the ethical tensions of early DBS interventions will be better understood to assist in providing psychiatric patients with more quality of life years in line with their values. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de montrer comment la lecture de Kant par Bergson, loin de se ramener à un mot d’ordre sommaire, comporte une reprise partielle, une critique précise, un refus ultime enfin, qui conduisent au cœur d’une relation profonde entre deux philosophies irréductibles. La reprise partielle de la distinction entre intelligence et intuition, et même entre matière et forme de l’intuition, doit être comprise autrement que comme un hommage ironique. Elle seule permet de comprendre l’unité que Bergson (...) revendique contre Kant, d’abord entre matière et forme de l’intuition, dans le cas du temps, puis entre intelligence et intuition même, à partir de L’évolution créatrice. À son tour, cette unité permet aussi de comprendre pourquoi l’intelligence reste à l’écart de l’intuition pratique dans le dernier grand livre de Bergson. « Gagnée » par l’intuition, l’intelligence ou l’entendement le sont donc bien en un double sens : non seulement surmontés, mais envahis par elle, jusqu’à une limite qui révèle au cœur d’un problème commun, une singulière différence.The purpose of this paper is to show how Bergson’s reading of Kant, far from any expeditive fightword, implies at the same time some reappropriation, a precise critique, and a final objection that together lead to the heart of a profound relationship between two irreducible doctrines. The partial endorsing of Kant’s distinction between intelligence and intuition, and even between matter and form of intuition itself, must not be understood only as a ironical hommage. On the contrary, it helps understanding the unity Bergson advocates against Kant, first between the matter and form of intuition, in the case of time, then between intuition and intelligence itself, after Creative Evolution. In its own turn, that unity helps understanding why intelligence is put aside of practical intuition in Bergson’s last great book. Intelligence or understanding are thus « won » in a double way : not only as surpassed, but also as penetrated by intuition, up to a last limit, which reveals a peculiar difference, at the heart of a common problem. (shrink)

The prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from the axiologies of Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague, Max Scheler. The links between the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann have been studied abundantly, but never in relation to Lossky. In this paper, I examine (...) the manifold relationships – similarities, differences, borrowings, criticisms, and possible influences – between Lossky's axiology and those of Scheler and Hartmann on four key interweaving issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the objectivity of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of values, (3) their ontological definitions of "value", i.e., whether values are relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, etc., and (4) their theories of the stratification of values. (shrink)

Psychiatry as a discipline oscillates between the language of emotions and that of biology; ranging from the immersion into the subjective experience of another person to the objective approach of biomedical science. The tension between these different approaches may seem irreconcilable and confusing to some. This was not the case for Karl Jaspers who pioneered a systematic reflection on the concepts underlying psychiatric theory and practice. In this essay, we engage with Jaspers' thinking and create a dialogue with contemporary psychiatric (...) research and philosophy of mind. Jaspers' conception of erklären and verstehen and his position on research in the neuroscience of mental disorders is brought together with the thought of Thomas Nagel and John Searle. We argue for the compatibility of Jaspers' ideas with Nagel's and Searle's views on the mind/body problem. Furthermore, we look at current trends in biological research in psychiatry through the lens of Jaspers' General Psychopathology, from there we derive suggestions and insights for psychiatric theory and practice. (shrink)

On se propose d’étudier ici l’unité, la diversité et l’évolution de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty à travers ses deux principaux recueils d’essais, Signes publié en 1960, et Sens et non-sens, paru en 1948, dont l’un annonce l’ouvrage posthume sur Le visible et l’invisible (1964), et l’autre prolonge de l’intérieur la Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). On est ainsi conduit à comprendre comment le problème fondamental de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty autorise la diversité de son œuvre, entre philosophie, sciences humaines et (...) politique, sans espoir de synthèse ou de système, mais conjurant aussi toute dispersion et toute résignation. L’évolution même de cette pensée d’une étape à l’autre en confirme le double héritage, autour d’une intuition centrale et d’une variété irréductible d’expériences. (shrink)

Cet article oppose les traditions anthropologiques française et anglaise sur leur traitement du problème de la magie, en particulier sur les deux questions que pose le phénomène de la magie : quel type de rationalité donne à la magie son efficacité alors qu’elle ne fournit aucune prévision ? Comment passe-t-on de la rationalité magique à une rationalité critique et scientifique ? Après un rappel des rapports entre magie, religion et science tels qu’il sont conçus par Tylor et Frazer, on oppose (...) l’idée d’une plasticité des énoncés magiques en fonction des contextes pragmatiques où ils s’inscrivent, chez Malinowski et Evans-Pritchard, et l’idée d’une structure de la pensée magique qui viendrait prendre corps dans les actes de l’individu magicien, chez Mauss et Lévi-Strauss. On conclut alors sur la façon dont ces deux traditions abordent le problème d’une logique de la pratique, et sur les conséquences qu’une telle différence dans la position des problèmes peut avoir aujourd’hui. (shrink)

"The extensive attention devoted to abortion has led Christians for too long to overlook much of the exploding bioethics agenda. Moreover, to focus only on 'issues' is to fail to address the profound changes taking place in the very nature of the medical profession. This book signals the commitment of the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity to help expand the church's bioethical vision and to foster a more substantial Christian contribution to the public debate."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by (...) Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Un verbe exprime en français l'un des secrets de notre être et l'une des clés de notre époque maniaco-dépressive : ce verbe, c'est revivre. Il a deux sens que tout paraît opposer. Revivre, c'est en effet renaître, retrouver le sentiment d'être vivant et relié à autrui. Mais c'est aussi se laisser rattraper par "un passé qui ne passe pas » et se replier sur soi-même. Chacun de nous fait cette double expérience, souvent sans le savoir. Il faut pourtant la penser, (...) l'affronter, résister à ce qui nous enferme, accéder à ce qui nous délivre. Inventaire de nos blessures et de nos ressources, diagnostic du moment présent, parcours dans les idées et les oeuvres, ces propos renouent avec les actes les plus intenses de notre vie. Un art de vivre, c'est-à-dire de revivre, qui pourrait bien être le seul possible aujourd'hui. (4e de couv.). (shrink)

When developing phylogenetic systematics, the entomologist Willi Hennig adopted elements from Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology. In this historical essay I take on the task of documenting this adoption. I argue that in order to build a metaphysical foundation for phylogenetic systematics, Hennig adopted from Hartmann four main metaphysical theses. These are (1) that what is real is what is temporal; (2) that the criterion of individuality is to have duration; (3) that species are supra-individuals; and (4) that there are levels of (...) reality, each of which may be subject to different kinds of law. Reliance on Hartmann’s metaphysics allowed Hennig to ground some of the main theoretical principles of phylogenetic systematics, namely that the biological categories—from the semaphoront to the highest rank—have reality and individuality despite not being universals, and that they form a hierarchy of levels, each of which may require different kinds of explanation. Hartmann’s metaphysics thereby provided a philosophical justification for Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics, both as a theory and as a method of classification. (shrink)

Depuis qu’a paru Le fromage et le vers, le cas du meunier Menocchio a donné lieu à de nombreuses exégèses. On cherche ici à le comprendre à la lumière d’un existentialisme de la connaissance, en partant du principe que son système d’idées est cohérent, et qu’il dérive de la situation qui est la sienne, dans ses dimensions indissolublement personnelles, sociales et « écologiques ». Pour appréhender le sens d’une telle expérience tout en restituant la portée d’une épistémologie élargie aux conditions (...) de toute existence, il paraît essentiel de s’appuyer sur les réflexions méthodologiques de Carlo Ginzburg aussi bien que sur des analyses d’ethnologie européenne qu’il lui est arrivé de mentionner. (shrink)

Les concepts scientifiques, même usés, même désuets, ne sont jamais définitivement périmés. Ils peuvent toujours faire retour dans les conjonctures théoriques ultérieures. Cela tient à la nature très particulière du concept, irréductible aux descriptions positivistes : issus de l’expérience et ayant vocation à en rendre raison, les concepts représentent autant d’arrachements à l’expérience et de survols explicatifs de l’expérience. Des épistémologues antipositivistes du xxe siècle ont été attentifs à de telles caractéristiques philosophiques. On expose ici leur modèle de la conceptualisation (...) scientifique et on le met au travail sur un cas, le concept de tendance, dont on montre il survit à la période de sa première formulation et il mérite de revenir dans les débats psychophysiologiques contemporains. (shrink)

The article explores the scope and the limits of virtue ethics from the perspective of critical theory and critical realism. Based on new research in moral sociology and anthropology, it ponders how the self-realization of each can be combined with the self-determination of all. The article adopts an action-theoretical perspective on morality and defends the priority of the right over the good. It suggests that in plural and polarized societies, there no longer exists a consensus on any version of the (...) good life. It therefore limits the scope of virtue ethics to personal life and pleads for a minima moralia at the social and political level. (shrink)

Normals display selective deficits in morphology and syntax under adverse processing conditions. Digit loads do not impair processing of passives and object relatives but do impair processing of grammatical morphemes. Perceptual degradation and temporal compression selectively impair several aspects of grammar, including passives and object relatives. Hence we replicate Caplan & Waters's specific findings but reach opposite conclusions, based on wider evidence.

Was bedeutet es, über die Dauer des Lebens als individuelle Person fortzubestehen? Wagner entwickelt eine Theorie, die Personen als psycho-physische Akteure auffasst, deren Identität durch die kontingenten faktischen Normen und Strukturen der Handlungswelt bestimmt wird. Personenidentität wird als graduierbare Relation verstanden, die unsere Existenz auf einem Kontinuum zwischen Menschsein und Personsein lokalisiert.

We suggest that the framework proposed by Vigil is useful in laboratory contexts but might come up short for in vivo social interactions. Emotions result from cost-benefits trade-offs but are not solely generated at the individual level to establish emotional social spheres. In organizational contexts, emotion expression can be a constitutive part of a professional activity, and observed sex differences might vanish.

Il ne suffit plus de s'interroger sur l'art littéraire mis au service de la composition des récits bibliques ; il faut poser aux textes eux-mêmes la question de la littérature, discerner l'effet de la littérature sur ce qu'on appelle la Bible. Car la littérature n'est pas un simple effet construit, mais d'abord, culturellement, un mode d'expression qui induit également une réception, une compréhension de ce qu'il exprime. L'exemple de l'appel d'Abraham et de la “ ligature d'Isaac ”, le rappel de (...) la création et la figure de Job ouvrent à cette dimension littéraire essentielle à la Bible qui ne se contente pas d'échanger ou de transmettre des expériences, mais se définit elle-même comme expérience ou épreuve adressée à ses lecteurs.It is no longer enough to question oneself about literary art put to the service of the composition of biblical narratives. One must put the question of literature to the texts themselves, discern the effect of literature on that which one calls the Bible. For literature is just no simply composed, but above all a cultural type of expression that calls for a reception, an understanding of that which it expresses. The examples of the call of Abraham, and the "binding of Isaac ", the recall of creation and the figure of job, give this a literary dimension that is essential to the Bible, which does not stop at exchanging or transmitting some experiences, but defines itself as experience or test addressed to its readers. (shrink)

L’évolution des concepts de corps et de processus d’animation dans le domaine de la robotique conduit aujourd’hui à définir le concept d’un noyau, ensemble d’algorithmes stables, indépendant des espaces corporels auxquels ils s’appliquent. Il devient alors possible d’étudier la manière dont certaines inscriptions corporelles, considérées comme des variables, structurent le comportement et, à plus long terme, le développement d’un robot. Cette démarche méthodologique peut mener à une approche originale du développement soulignant l’importance d’un corps variable aux frontières en continuelle redéfinition.In (...) the field of robotics, the evolution of the concepts of embodiment and animation processes lead to define the concept of a kernel consisting of a set of stable algorhythms, independent of the specific embodiment on which these algorhythms could be applied. Thus, it becomes possible to study experimentally how particular embodiments, considered as experimental variables, shape the robot’s behaviour and its longer-term developmental patterns. This methodological stance results into a new approach to children development stressing the importance of a continuously changing body. (shrink)

This is a critical review of David Patterson's book Anti-Semitism and Its Metaphysical Origins (2015). In this review, I present the author's new explanation of the roots of anti-Semitism, which he finds in the anti-Semite's desire to become like God himself. Patterson's explanation makes an anti-Semite of all those who partake in the "Western rationalist project," especially philosophers (including Jewish philosophers such as Spinoza, Hermann Cohen, and Marx), but also Islamists and anti-Zionist Jews. I criticize Patterson on two fronts: First, (...) his "metaphysical" explanation relies on a petitio principii. Second, he should have argued his stance against that of Zeev Sternhell's thesis, according to which Western anti-Semitism is rooted, not in Western rationalism, but rather in the Western anti-rationalist (anti-Enlightenment) movement. (shrink)

This paper is chiefly concerned with the circumstances in which early Greek elegy was performed. Section II argues that for our extant shorter poems only performance at symposia is securely attested. Section III examines the related questions of the meaning ofelegosand the performance of elegies at funerals. Finally I try to establish the existence of longer elegiac poems intended for performance at public festivals.

The aim of this paper is to offer a new biological interpretation of Fisher’s ‘Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection’ and from this to consider optimality properties of gene frequency changes. These matters are of continuing interest to biologists and philosophers alike. In particular, the extent to which biological evolution can be calculated from the ‘gene’s-eye’ point of view is also discussed. In this sense, the paper bears indirectly on the concepts of the unit of selection and of the ‘selfish gene’. (...) A new biological significance for the Fundamental Theorem, not previously found in the literature, is offered, together with an optimality principle connected with this theorem. (shrink)