The university campus provides the backdrop to a student’s education and social journey. For many students, the transition from secondary school through to graduation can be one of upheaval, geographical, financial and social change. Evidence suggests increasing levels of mental health difficulties among UK university students. The university campus is a possible resource to mitigate wellbeing issues through facilitating the salutogenic effects of engagement with nature. This mixed method research examines the opportunity to integrate nature through interventions for University of (...) Sheffield undergraduate students. It uses a green prescription style activity and a specially designed mobile phone app. Through focus groups the participants’ experience reveals the necessity for a whole university approach that considers intervention and campus design simultaneously. This study’s findings qualify research into young adult’s experience of urban green spaces and their tangible connection to plants such as trees. Policy and practice implications include the requirement for a coherent approach to understanding the place-attachment aspects to nature in the university environment. Further afield, there is a need for collaborative wellbeing interventions and urban green space development within the UK context. (shrink)

In Poggiolesi we have introduced a rigorous definition of the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding; in the present paper our aim is to construct a logic for the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding based on that definition. Our logic will have the form of a calculus of natural deduction, will be proved to be sound and complete and will allow us to have fine-grained grounding principles.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 31.1 (2007) 189-196MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Fiction and Theory of Mind: An ExchangeLisa Zunshine University of KentuckyBrian Boyd's review of my new book, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Ohio State University Press, 2006) engages a large variety of issues.1 I would like to address an important question about the integration of scientific methodology with literary analysis suggested by Boyd's (...) discussion.2 As I argue below, two different perspectives of this integration may mark two different—indeed, incompatible—ways of formulating the disciplinary goals and philosophy of the new field of cognitive literary theory.Why We Read Fiction makes a case for admitting the recent findings of cognitive psychologists into literary studies by showing how their research into the ability to explain behavior in terms of the underlying states of mind can furnish us with a series of surprising insights into our interaction with literary texts. Using as my case studies novels ranging from Richardson's Clarissa, Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, and Austen's Pride and Prejudice to Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway, Nabokov's Lolita, and Hammett's The Maltese Falcon, I advance and explore a series of hypotheses about cognitive cravings that are satisfied—and created!—when we read fiction.Although my study draws on the already well-established as well as forthcoming work of numerous cognitive scientists (including Simon Baron-Cohen, Clark H. Barrett, Richard Byrne and Andrew Whiten, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Christopher Frith, Uta Frith, Paul Bloom, Susan Carey and Elizabeth Spelke, Peter Carruthers, Andy Clark, Antonio Damasio, Daniel Dennett, Alison Gopnik, Francesca Happe, Paul [End Page 189] Harris, Lawrence Hirschfeld, Stanley Klein, Alan Leslie, Andrew Meltzoff, Robert Mitchell, Keith Oatley, Gloria Origgi, Oliver Sacks, Dan Sperber, James Stiller, and Endel Tulving), it makes a point of being accessible to non-specialist readers. Cognitive science can be incredibly complicated and so can literary criticism, but I wanted to write a book on cognitive literary theory that does not scare anybody away with unnecessary jargon, knotty sentences, and overlong quotations. (Ironically, I must have succeeded too well in making my book reader-friendly and tucking my references in the endnotes since Boyd observes that I rely on only "a few findings" of cognitive scientists in my discussion.)The book consists of three parts. The first part, "Attributing Minds," introduces the first key theoretical concept of this book: mind-reading, also known as Theory of Mind. Drawing on the work of Simon Baron-Cohen (Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind), I suggest that fiction engages, teases, and pushes to its tentative limits our mind-reading capacity. Building on the recent research of Robin Dunbar and his colleagues, I then consider one particular aspect of Woolf's prose as an example of spectacular literary experimentation with our Theory of Mind. Finally, I turn to Steven Pinker's controversial analysis of Woolf in The Blank Slate to discuss the possibilities of a more profitable dialogue between cognitive science and literary studies.Of particular importance to this part of my argument is my belief that fictional narratives endlessly experiment with rather than automatically execute our evolved cognitive adaptations. When cognitive scientists succeed in isolating a certain regularity of our information-processing—for example, a constraint on the number of mutually reflecting minds that we can process with ease—we can take that constraint and see how it plays itself out in a fictional narrative. What we discover is that where there is a cognitive constraint, there is a "guarantee" of sorts that writers will intuitively experiment in the direction of challenging that constraint, probing and poking it and getting around it. The exact forms of such probing and poking will depend on specific cultural circumstances, including the mind-reading profiles of individual writers and their readers. The cognitive "limits" thus present us with creative openings rather than with a promise of stagnation and endless replication of established forms. This realization marks the possibility of a genuine interaction between cognitive psychology and... (shrink)

This paper argues that human beings possess the rational capabilities necessary to achieve the goal of more just and peaceable social orders, but that our educational institutions are failing in their responsibility to do what in fact can be done to produce graduates who make decisions in ways most likely to achieve this goal.Data compiled by us, consistent with other research, indicates that only a small percentage of the individuals graduating from universities and professional schools have developed the capacity for (...) post-conventional moral reasoning. (shrink)

The events of 2020 have shaken the core of bioethics in a way that we hope will pave a new and equitable, though perhaps uncomfortable, path forward. We would like to thank those who responded to o...

I argue that bureaucracies, as described by Max Weber, have essential characteristics that clash with basic educational values. On the one hand, bureaucracies, because of their divisions of labor, inevitably narrow all those who participate. Bureaucracies also, because of the need for impartiality, inevitably dehumanize all who participate. On the other hand, education aims to broaden and humanize those who participate in it. This tension between bureaucracy and education makes bureaucracy an unsuitable mechanism for delivering an education. Bureaucracies are often (...) the best ways to accomplish large tasks involving many people; however, the task of educating all humanity is not one of those tasks. Problems in education can only be exacerbated by “fixing” the bureaucracy, because efficiency, the greatest bureaucratic virtue, is harmful to education. While I offer no solution, I share some thoughts about how a humanizing, broadening, and suitably inefficient education might look. (shrink)

It is common nowadays for laypeople to take public stances on complex issues, such as the effectiveness of a vaccine or the seriousness of anthropogenic climate change, without any kind of disciplinary expertise. Yet those who do so act as if they were experts in the field, disseminating their thoughts and sometimes also spreading their advice. Scholars have ascribed this phenomenon to various kinds of individuals, such as conspiracy or contrarian thinkers, science denialists, know-it-all experts and celebrities. This paper aims (...) to argue that behind such different manifestations lies a common, independently identifiable epistemic disposition that will be called epistemic hubris that will be fully explained in relation to other epistemic vices already discussed in the literature. Epistemic hubris includes, but is not limited to, overconfidence; it may or not entail arrogance; it is similar to yet distinct from hyper-autonomy and conspiracy thinking. Its peculiarity is that individuals who develop it seem to believe that they can easily become experts, even without special training. This disposition negatively affects individuals’ epistemic conduct, hindering knowledge and true belief formation, and can generate morally relevant consequences when people who falsely consider themselves experts begin to share their mistaken beliefs. (shrink)

In the context of climate change, the adoption of pro-environment behaviour is favoured by the understanding of causal passages within climate science. The understanding of the causes of climate change is necessary in order to be able to take mitigation actions (the subject needs to be aware of its role as a causalagent). Conversely, the understanding of the consequences of climate change is essential for rationally managing the risks, especially in cases where adaptation is needed rather than simple mitigation. The (...) case of ozone depletion confirms this view: the understanding of its causal dynamics played a major role in people’sbehavioural response.Para afrontar el cambio climático, la adopción de un comportamiento en favor del medio ambiente se verá favorecida por la comprensión de los argumentos causales de la climatología. La comprensión de las causas del cambio climático es necesario para que seamos capaces de mitigarlo (cada individuo debe ser consciente de su papel como agente causal). La comprensión de las consecuencias del cambio climático es esencial para gestionar racionalmente los riesgos, especialmente en casos en los que más que mitigarlo, debemos intentar adaptarnos. El caso del agujero de la capa de ozono confirma este punto de vista: la comprensión de la dinámica causal desempeñó un papel principal en el cambio de conductas de la gente. (shrink)

Die Philosophie Helmuth Plessners hat in den letzten Jahren eine Renaissance erfahren: Plessner wurde als relevanter Vertreter einer Biophilosophie (wieder) entdeckt, die nicht nur die uberkommene Trennung von Natur und Kultur, sondern auch die Gegenuberstellung disjunkter Wissenschaftskulturen in Frage stellt und ihr Verhaltnis neu bestimmt. DAs Buch nimmt die verschiedenen disziplinaren Faden auf, die die Konzeption von Plessners Biophilosophie insbesondere in den Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch (1928) verstandlich machen. ES stellt Plessners uberlegungen im Kontext von naturwissenschaftlichen (von Uexkull, (...) Buytendijk, Driesch, von Weizsacker, Portmann, Kohler) sowie philosophischen (Bergson, Misch, Hartmann, Scheler, Heidegger, Jonas) Theorien seiner Zeit vor. (shrink)

This paper studies internal (or intra-)mathematical explanations, namely those proofs of mathematical theorems that seem to explain the theorem they prove. The goal of the paper is a rigorous analysis of these explanations. This will be done in two steps. First, we will show how to move from informal proofs of mathematical theorems to a formal presentation that involves proof trees, together with a decomposition of their elements; secondly we will show that those mathematical proofs that are regarded as having (...) explanatory power all display an increase of conceptual complexity from the assumptions to the conclusion. (shrink)

As cultural evolutionists interested in how culture changes over the long term, we've thought and written a lot about migration, but only recently tumbled to an obvious idea: migration has a profound effect on how societies evolve culturally because it is selective. People move to societies that provide a more attractive way of life, and all other things being equal, this process spreads ideas and institutions that lead to economic efficiency, social order and equality.

This paper explores how meaningful learning in management education can occur when we keep our focus on classroom activities and strategies that fosterconceptual conflict, variation in instructional approaches, and accountability from both instructors and students for the learning process. To that end, we offer the DNA of learning metaphor. This metaphor makes explicit effective pedagogical practices and encourages instructors to take a more challenging and possibly transformative approach to their course design and classroom experiences.

Il saggio ricostruisce l'origine dell'interpretazione del Rinascimento italiano da parte di Nietzsche, a partire dalla lettura di uno storico francese a lui contemporaneo.

ABSTRACTTo deny others’ humanity is one of the most heinous forms of intergroup prejudice. Given evidence that perceiving various forms of complexity in outgroup members reduces intergroup prejudice, we investigated across three experiments whether the novel dimension of emotional complexity, or outgroup members’ joint experience of mixed-valence emotions, would also reduce their dehumanisation. Experiment 1 found that perceiving fictitious aliens’ experience of the same primary emotions presented in mixed vs. non-mixed valence pairs led to reduced prejudice via attenuated dehumanisation, i.e. (...) attribution of uniquely human emotions. Experiment 2 confirmed these results, using an unfamiliar real-world group as an outgroup target. Experiment 3 used a familiar outgroup and found generally similar effects, reducing social distance through reduced dehumanisation. These processes suggest that an alternate route to reduced dehumanising of outgroups might involve presenting mixed valence emotions. (shrink)

This textbook will give students a clear understanding of the connection between faith and reason. Illuminating Faith gives students a clear and accessible introduction to some of the major ways faith and the relationship between faith and reason have been understood within Western Christianity. In twenty-six short and easy to digest units it covers different accounts of faith beginning with Scripture, moving through the history of Christian thought, and ending with contemporary views. Along the way it explores some of the (...) decisive theological and philosophy accounts of faith, such as faith seeking understanding, faith and supernatural virtue, faith and skepticism, and faith and science. Yet it also includes significant issues and movements not typically covered in introductory texts, such as documents from church councils, faith as knowledge, assent, and trust in the Protestant scholastics, faith and the heart in pietism, secularized accounts of faith, faith after Auschwitz, and faith and liberation. The goal of each unit is to introduce students to topical issues surrounding the nature of faith, to provide historical background for each topic, and to generate further discussion and reflection on the nature of faith. The result is a well balanced and unique introduction to various understandings of faith. Designed specifically with classroom use in mind, Illuminating Faith includes a glossary of words, an update-to-date bibliography, and each chapter ends with questions for discussion as well as suggestions for relevant reading material. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate around the life in the contemporary society, characterized by risks and catastrophes. What does mean to live fearing that in any moment a catastrophe could happen (a tsunami, an earthquake, a nuclear explosion)? Despite of the failure of science and public institutions in the prevention of the catastrophes, the question is the following: Can we use the catastrophe as a paradigm of the contemporary uncertain life, trying to mean it as a theme (...) of mediation? Can we use the catastrophe for developing a philosophy of the recognition of the other who has been involved in the same tragedy? (shrink)

This article investigates the origin of the lack of motivation for adopting significant pro-environmental behavior . I identify three main barriers to motivation: the feeling that there is a need for broad collective action that has not yet materialized, the lack of practical knowledge about what an individual can do in his/her daily life to address environmental problems, and insufficient feedback and approval mechanisms. Subsequently, I argue that an individual's social context may contribute in addressing all three. The motivation for (...) the adoption of PEB behavior is connected to social interaction, which at times seems to shape individual behavior to a greater degree than other factors such as direct risk perception. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the concepts of virtue and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I and Aeschines’ Alcibiades, which are marked by striking similarities in the way they discuss these themes and their interconnection. First of all, in both dialogues the notions of ἀμαθία and ἀρετή seem to be connected and both are bound up with the issue of εὐδαιμονία: Socrates points out that ἀρετή is the only source of true εὐδαιμονία and encourages Alcibiades to acquire it, stressing the need for a (...) constant ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. Thus, another common feature is the Socratic exhortation to pursue and achieve moral virtue, which is identified as a form of knowledge. Ultimately, in both accounts the chief means by which to contrast ἀμαθία is found in the care and knowledge of the self. The above arguments are to be considered within the particular frame of the paideutic relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, which is itself portrayed in similar terms in the two texts. In both dialogues, the relationship is characterized as a form of erotic education and, moreover, Socrates himself links his paideutic activity to divine will. Yet, only in Aeschines’ Alcibiades does this explicitly entail the idea that Socrates transmits virtue without resorting to any τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη. So while in both cases ἀρετή is understood as a kind of knowledge, in Aeschines’ Alcibiades there seems to be a greater tension between this concept of virtue and its modes of transmission, which are “anepistemic”. (shrink)

In this paper we present a sequent calculus for the multi-agent system S5 m . First, we introduce a particularly simple alternative Kripke semantics for the system S5 m . Then, we construct a hypersequent calculus for S5 m that reflects at the syntactic level this alternative interpretation. We prove that this hypersequent calculus is theoremwise equivalent to the Hilbert-style system S5 m , that it is contraction-free and cut-free, and finally that it is decidable. All results are proved in (...) a purely syntactic way and the cut-elimination procedure yields an upper bound of ip 2 (n, 0) where ip 2 is an hyperexponential function of base 2. (shrink)

In this paper I shall present three solutions to the Knower Paradox which, despite important points in common, differ in several respects. The first solution, proposed by C. A. Anderson [1] is a hierarchical solution, developed in the framework of first-order arithmetic. However I will try toshow that this solution is based on an incorrect argument. The second solution, inspired by a book of R.M. Smullyan [14], is developed in the framework of modal logic and it is based on the (...) idea of interpreting one of the basic systems of the modal logic of provability in an epistemic way. Ishall give arguments in support of this solution. The third solution, proposed by P. Egrèé [8] attempts to connect the first and the second solutions. I will show that this attempt fails for philosophical and formal reasons. (shrink)

A work about axis of vision, vertical vs horizontal, and on direction of image, front vs back, guides some observations, developing in the image space, that Picasso elaborates on representation. The essay proposes a close look to some artworks in which the speculation on above-written oppositions, is functional to “present» the representation. The issue concerns not solely reversals acting on orientation of represented world objects, but axis participating in rewriting the culturally prefigured orientation of painting and writing and in considering (...) the «shape-of-picture» and image margins. (shrink)

Il saggio fa parte del volume collettaneo "La trama del testo. Su alcune letture di Nietzsche" e ricostruisce la genesi dell'interpretazione nietzscheana del Rinascimento italiano.

Che cosa vuol dire tradurre? Con questa interessante domanda, Umberto Eco inizia la sua riflessione sulla traduzione. Quando si traduce, in gioco non c'è solamente il testo ma un intero mondo possibile; il compito del traduttore è fare un'ipotesi su questo mondo possibile e la traduzione funzionerà meglio tanto più l’ipotesi risulterà plausibile. Per quanto la traduzione sia ben riuscita, non si arriva mai a dire la stessa cosa, si può solo dire quasi la stessa cosa. Tradurre un capolavoro di (...) un’epoca lontana, tenendo presente la filosofia contemporanea, è un modo di rapportarsi alla tradizione, farla propria e rinnovarla. Si possono confrontare alcune traduzioni e discuterne la correttezza filologica e le implicazioni teoriche, prendendo come esempio un brevissimo passo delle Confessioni di Agostino, particolarmente importante e ricco di significati: interrogatio mea intentio mea et responsio eorum species eorum. È significativo non solo il confronto tra diverse traduzioni italiane, ma anche tra alcune traduzioni in lingue diverse dall’italiano. In alcuni casi le traduzioni un po’più libere e audaci, risultano più efficaci rispetto a quelle più semplici e letterali. What does to translate means? With this interesting question, Umberto Eco begins his consideration about the translation. When translating, at stake it is not only the text but an entire possible world; the translator's task is make a hypothesis about this possible world, and if the hypothesis is credible the translation will work well. Although the translation is successful, you never manage to say the same thing, you can only say almost the same thing. Translating a masterpiece of bygone age, keeping in mind the contemporary philosophy, is a way of relating to tradition, make it own and renew it. You can compare a few translations and discuss the correct philological and theoretical implications, taking as an example a very short passage from the Confessions of Augustine, which is particularly important and meaningful: interrogatio mea intentio mea et responsio eorum species eorum. It is significant not only comparing different Italian translations, but also comparing some translations in other languages. Sometimes the translations a bit more free and brave are more effective than the most simple and literal. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper argues that ancient Babylonian signs (omens) reflect a mode of inferential reasoning as a function of their syntactic and logical structure as conditionals. Taking into account the institutional context that produced a systematic written body of omens, the paper is principally interested in the cognitive disposition of such texts. Investigating what constitutes system in these works, formal aspects of the material are examined in terms of the nature of conditionals and the logic of conditional statements. It is argued (...) that conditional statements about ominous phenomena speak as much to a notion of conceivability and possibility as to empirical physical actuality. It is claimed that the epistemological character of the Babylonian compendia of signs cannot be understood without due attention to epistemic possibility and further, that the cuneiform omen texts comprise a different kind of scientific knowledge from that limited to a knowledge of physical phenomena and their laws. (shrink)

A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects, to determine whether some components are more impaired than others.We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and (...) a matching control group. Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R.The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM.Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM. (shrink)

Book Reviews: Can Başkent, Perspectives on Interrogative Models of Inquiry, Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, Volume 8, Springer, 2016, vii + 197 pages, ISBN: 978-3-319-20761-2, 978-3-319-20762-9. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20762-9.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Brian Boyd responds:In responding to my critical discussion, Lisa Zunshine restates the argument of Why We Read Fiction at some length but replies to none of my specific criticisms. These criticisms are all based on the evidence of the texts that she offers as case studies, especially Mrs Dalloway and Lolita. Although I—and the textual evidence—contradict her claims, she provides no answers to the criticisms.Let me respond to (...) two restatements. First: "Fictional narratives endlessly experiment with rather than automatically execute our evolved cognitive adaptations" (p. 190). This is often, but almost tautologically, true in the case of experimental fiction, as the work of Richardson, Woolf, and Nabokov (to cite Zunshine's key examples) was in their time. It is not necessarily true in the sense Zunshine especially means it—that authors give us a demanding cognitive workout of our capacity for Theory of Mind by incorporating multiple embedding, A's thoughts of B's thoughts of C's thoughts of D's thoughts of E—even in the case of fictional experimenters like Defoe, Tolstoy, or Joyce, and it is not true of the vast bulk of fiction, from folk tale or jokes to soap operas or pulp [End Page 196] novels, and it cannot therefore be an explanation for "why we read fiction," though it may explain why some of us read some fiction. And to identify overloaded embedding when it is not present, as Zunshine does in discussing Mrs Dalloway, constitutes a simple misreading.Second: "Our Theory of Mind makes literature as we know it possible" (p. 191). Granted, without Theory of Mind we would not have fiction. But nor would we have fiction without many other features of human nature: without sociality, episodic memory, language, childhood pretend play, empathy, the brain's inhibitory mechanisms, folk physics, our mental databases for individuals, and much, much more. An evolutionary and cognitive understanding of fiction needs to take into account many aspects of our capacity for understanding events and stories, not just one.Apart from one three-word phrase, Zunshine's sole quotation from my review is this: "To what extent has Zunshine benefited from the methodology, rather than results, of science?" (I refer to "the results of science" here because I note that although, for instance, she relies most heavily on Simon Baron-Cohen among Theory of Mind researchers, while ignoring major figures in the field like Janet Astington or Josef Perner, she does not even cite the book or any of the more than twenty papers of which Baron-Cohen has been primary author since his 1995 Mindblindness.) Her quotation from my review continues: "Alas, she appears to have learned less than one would have hoped.... Her formulations are often weak and indecisive, hedgings, rather than strong testable hypotheses. Rather than apply scientific stringency to her literary analysis, she seems more interested in exploiting than testing what she can find." She confesses herself puzzled by this charge. Let me explain one simple point.Science's core methodological principle is that claims should be subjected to the test of evidence, and accepted or rejected on the basis of their compatibility with the relevant evidence. Leo Spitzer long ago pointed out that good reading follows scientific method: we read, we make hypotheses about the text, and we either confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses according to what we find in the text, and search for ampler hypotheses when previous ones have been discredited.1 Literary scholarship has long been vitiated by a far flabbier methodology, by the naïve assumption that evidence for a proposition suffices: "I see a and b in the text, therefore my claim C is a valid interpretation." But if reading or interpretation C is incompatible with counter-evidence d and e in the text, it is a falsified hypothesis and needs to yield to a better [End Page 197] reading, an interpretation that can incorporate this counter-evidence. I showed that Zunshine's claims about her prime examples were not compatible with evidence in the texts. She does not challenge the textual counter-evidence I provide, but just ignores it. That is where literary criticism most urgently needs to learn from scientific... (shrink)

A cavallo tra i due concili di Costanza e Basilea, che hanno fortemente influito sul giudizio della Chiesa in relazione alle donne visionarie, si staglia la figura di Francesca Bussa dei Ponziani. Le visioni politiche di Francesca rappresentano un fulgido esempio di come i modelli brigidini e cateriniani siano stati ripresi e rimodellati su un nuovo, mutato contesto storico. La sua consolidata autorità le consentì di ammonire a più riprese papa Eugenio IV riguardo alla sua partecipazione al concilio (...) di Basilea, intervenendo attivamente nello scenario religioso e politico romano. (shrink)