Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

It is still largely unclear which pathways explain the religion-health connection and how these mechanisms work. One such intervening mechanism, coherence, is the focus of this article. Based on database searches and a review of the literature retrieved, I differentiate between six meanings of coherence in religion-related research: 1) consistency; 2) credibility; 3) congruence; 4) confidence; 5) character; and 6) cohesion. In this article, this classification is utilized to analyse the conceptualizations and operationalizations of coherence within a particular strain of (...) research, namely the discourse on the so-called coherence hypothesis. In so doing, I accomplish three objectives: 1) the reconsideration of the classical coherence hypothesis launched by Idler in the mid-1980s; 2) the reconstruction of the history of the reception and modification of the hypothesis by using the example of the work of three influential scholars (Christopher G. Ellison, Linda K. George, and Sebastian Murken); and 3) the development of a new theoretical model of religion, coherence, and health. Since the review yielded that coherence was primarily used within the meaning of confidence and congruence and that personal and social factors have been widely neglected, one advantage of my model is the integration of all six conceptual varieties of coherence within a meaning-making coping framework. (shrink)

It is still largely unclear which pathways explain the religion-health connection and how these mechanisms work. One such intervening mechanism, coherence, is the focus of this article. Based on database searches and a review of the literature retrieved, I differentiate between six meanings of coherence in religion-related research: 1) consistency; 2) credibility; 3) congruence; 4) confidence; 5) character; and 6) cohesion. In this article, this classification is utilized to analyse the conceptualizations and operationalizations of coherence within a particular strain of (...) research, namely the discourse on the so-called coherence hypothesis. In so doing, I accomplish three objectives: 1) the reconsideration of the classical coherence hypothesis launched by Idler in the mid-1980s; 2) the reconstruction of the history of the reception and modification of the hypothesis by using the example of the work of three influential scholars ; and 3) the development of a new theoretical model of religion, coherence, and health. Since the review yielded that coherence was primarily used within the meaning of confidence and congruence and that personal and social factors have been widely neglected, one advantage of my model is the integration of all six conceptual varieties of coherence within a meaning-making coping framework. (shrink)

Grounding on Holland’s RIASEC model of vocational interests and the respective assumptions on person-environment fit, this paper focuses on how congruence is related to study outcomes, especially students’ persistence, performance, and satisfaction. The paper distinguishes the measure of congruence with respect to social congruence and aspirational congruence and also distinguishes the effects of congruence for gender and six different study areas including Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics, medicine, economics, education, and languages. The paper analyses 10,226 university freshmen of the German National (...) Educational Panel Study and follows them longitudinally with respect to their study outcomes. The results show that students’ persistence was more related to SOC than to ASP, especially for male students. Furthermore, SOC was particularly important for students in STEM areas. Regarding performance, however, ASP was more important. Here, we notably found correlations for STEM subjects with a balanced proportion of female students. Regarding satisfaction, mainly marginal correlations could be found. The results indicate conceptual differences between social and aspirational congruence as well as specific effects for gender and study area. While research might take this into account by specifically developing their models for different study areas, career counseling may reflect on the different significance of the interest-based person-environment fit for different study areas. Initiatives for raising young people’s participation in STEM should therefore specifically focus on students that have high chances to develop interest profiles that are congruent to STEM rather than students who show profiles which already indicate a low congruence. (shrink)

German medical schools have not yet sufficiently introduced students to the field of good scientific practice. In order to prevent scientific misconduct and to foster scientific integrity, courses on GSP must be an integral part of the curriculum of medical students. Based on a review of the literature, teaching units and materials for two courses on GSP were developed and tested in a pilot course. The pilot course was accompanied by a pre-post evaluation that assessed students’ knowledge and attitudes towards (...) scientific integrity and scientific misconduct. A syllabus was designed that comprised the following six topics: theoretical foundations of GSP; scientific publishing; empirical data; scientific supervision and teamwork; clinical research; personal interests. The comparison pre versus post-intervention yielded statistically significant changes in regard to the participants’ knowledge and attitude toward all forms of scientific misconduct treated in the course. As the majority of participants was not familiar with the fundamental regulations or guidelines of GSP, it seems crucial to train students in actively applying such norms to real-world conflicts. Students’ unfamiliarity with the fundamentals of GSP can be linked to the fact that many students have already experienced forms of scientific misconduct. Thus, GSP syllabi should be closely adjusted to a student’s realm of experience. All in all, courses on GSP can be seen as a potential means to increase the number of young scholars. (shrink)

Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subjects assertion that p matches her non-verbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from nearly 6,000 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we suggest that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely (...) asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)

Background Treatment of chronic inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) aims to improve patients’ quality of life and the extent of treatment success is measured via patient reported outcomes (PROs). However, questionnaires used to collect PROs often include scales that are not specific to IBDs. Improving these scales requires a deeper understanding of patients’ lived experience. With this study we give first insights and develop hypotheses on how patients with IBDs experience their body and self and how they adjust their life plans (...) in the context of precision medicine (PM). The guiding question is to understand what they need to achieve a good life, while facing their disease. Methods We developed a conception of the “good life” that draws on Philippa Foot’s “naturalized” approach and distinguishes six different dimensions that are relevant for a good life. This conception guided us as we conducted 10 qualitative interviews with patients suffering from IBD who were in precision medicine clinical research settings. The interviews aimed to gain insights for answering our research question: How do body experiences affect the good life of patients with IBD? We analyzed the interviews with interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Results Five group experiential themes emerged: (i) Life options and plans, (ii) other people’s responses, (iii) strategies to deal with others’ responses, (iv) perception of the body and self, and (v) perception of life as good despite suffering. We report here on three of them (i, iv and v), which are primarily relevant for evaluating the outcomes of PM care. Whereas with “life options and plans (i),” our study predominantly confirmed previous research, with “perception of the body and self (iv),” we found that some of the patients changed their relationship to their body and themselves. They perceived the body or the disease as the “other” and their self appears divorced from their own body. Although this might be an avoidance strategy patients use to assign responsibility for their condition and its “disgusting” symptoms to the “other,” it is important to include it in patient reported outcome (PRO) assessments. Conclusions We conclude with the insight that the multi-dimensional approach based on Foot’s concept of a good life is well-suited as a basis for investigating the quality of life of people with IBD. Interviews based on this concept produced results that go beyond the understanding of health-related quality of life (HRQoL). Additionally, we offer some considerations about patients’ opportunities for achieving a good life and suggestions for further developing patient reported outcome scales. (shrink)

Across languages of the world, some grammatical patterns have been argued to be more common than expected by chance. These are sometimes referred to as language universals. One such universal is the correlation between constituent order freedom and the presence of a case system in a language. Here, we explore whether this correlation can be explained by a bias to balance production effort and informativity of cues to grammatical function. Two groups of learners were presented with miniature artificial languages containing (...) optional case marking and either flexible or fixed constituent order. Learners of the flexible order language used case marking significantly more often. This result parallels the typological correlation between constituent order flexibility and the presence of case marking in a language and provides a possible explanation for the historical development of Old English to Modern English, from flexible constituent order with case marking to relatively fixed order without case marking. In addition, learners of the flexible order language conditioned case marking on constituent order, using more case marking with the cross-linguistically less frequent order, again mirroring typological data. These results suggest that some cross-linguistic generalizations originate in functionally motivated biases operating during language learning. (shrink)

The goal of achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) can generally be realized only in stages. Moreover, resource, capacity and political constraints mean governments often face difficult trade-offs on the path to UHC. In a 2014 report, Making fair choices on the path to UHC, the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage articulated principles for making such trade-offs in an equitable manner. We present three case studies which illustrate how these principles can guide practical decision-making. These case studies (...) show how progressive realization of the right to health can be effectively guided by priority-setting principles, including generating the greatest total health gain, priority for the worse off, and financial risk protection. They also demonstrate the value of a fair and accountable process of priority setting. (shrink)

The performance and the success of a group working as a team on a common goal depends on the individuals’ skills and the collective coordination of their abilities. On a perceptual level, individual gaze behavior is reasonably well investigated. However, the coordination of visual skills in a team has been investigated only in laboratory studies and the practical examination and knowledge transfer to field studies or the applicability in real-life situations have so far been neglected. This is mainly due to (...) the fact that a methodological approach along with a suitable evaluation procedure to analyze the gaze coordination within a team in highly dynamic events outside the lab, is still missing. Thus, this study was conducted to develop a tool to investigate the coordinated gaze behavior within a team of three human beings acting with a common goal in a dynamic real-world scenario. This team was a basketball referee team adjudicating a game. Using mobile eye-tracking devices and an indigenously designed software tool for the simultaneous analysis of the gaze data of three participants, allowed, for the first time, the simultaneous investigation of the coordinated gaze behavior of three people in a highly dynamic setting. Overall, the study provides a new and innovative method to investigate the coordinated gaze behavior of a three-person team in specific tasks. This method is also applicable to investigate research questions about teams in dynamic real-world scenarios and get a deeper look at interactions and behavior patterns of human beings in group settings. (shrink)

Progress towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) requires making difficult trade-offs. In this journal, Dr. Margaret Chan, the WHO Director-General, has endorsed the principles for making such decisions put forward by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and UHC. These principles include maximizing population health, priority for the worse off, and shielding people from health-related financial risks. But how should one apply these principles in particular cases and how should one adjudicate between them when their demands conflict? This paper by some (...) members of the Consultative Group and a diverse group of health policy professionals addresses these questions. It considers three stylized versions of actual policy dilemmas. Each of these cases pertains to one of the three principal dimensions of progress towards UHC: which services to cover first, which populations to prioritize for coverage, and how to move from out-of-pocket expenditures to pre-payment with pooling of funds. Our cases are simplified to highlight common trade-offs. While we make specific recommendations, our primary aim is to demonstrate both the form and substance of the reasoning involved in striking a fair balance between competing interests on the road to UHC. (shrink)

'Identity' as a concept has many faces, and its very versatility in different contexts can make it hard to define. Florian Coulmas discusses the many meanings of this slippery concept, considering why individual and collective identities are important to us, and discussing the problems asserting individual identities can create.

This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I (...) argue that inasmuch as pluralism draws its motivation from its ability to defuse logical disputes—that is, disputes between advocates of rival logics—it is unable to provide an answer: pluralism collapses into monism with respect to either the strongest or the weakest admissible logic. (shrink)

One of the goals of computerized tutoring systems is to optimize the learning of facts. Over a hundred years of declarative memory research have identified two robust effects that can improve such systems: the spacing and the testing effect. By making optimal use of both and adjusting the system to the individual learner using cognitive models based on declarative memory theories, such systems consistently outperform traditional methods. This adjustment process is driven by a continuously updated estimate of the rate of (...) forgetting for each item and learner on the basis of the learner's accuracy and response time. In this study, we investigated to what extent these estimates of individual rates of forgetting are stable over time and across different materials. We demonstrate that they are stable over time but not across materials. Even though most theories of human declarative memory assume a single underlying rate of forgetting, we show that, in practice, it makes sense to assume different materials are forgotten at different rates. If a computerized, adaptive fact-learning system allowed different rates of forgetting for different materials, it could adapt to individual learners more readily. (shrink)

To operate in an unpredictable environment, a vehicle with advanced driving assistance systems, such as a robot or a drone, not only needs to register its surroundings but also to combine data from different sensors into a world model, for which it employs filter algorithms. Such world models, as this article argues with reference to the SLAM problem in robotics, consist of nothing other than probabilities about states and events arising in the environment. The model, thus, contains a virtuality of (...) possible worlds that are the basis for adaptive behavior. The article shows that the current development of these technologies requires new concepts because their complex adaptive behaviors cannot be explained by referring them to mere algorithmic processes. Instead, it proposes the heuristic instrument of microdecisions to designate the temporality of decisions between alternatives that are created by probabilistic procedures of world modeling. Microdecisions are more than the implementation of deterministic processes—they decide between possibilities and, thus, always open up the potential of their otherness. By describing autonomous adaptive technologies with this heuristic, the question of sovereignty inevitably arises. It forces us to re-think what autonomy means when decisions can be automated. (shrink)

Dass der Begriff 'Kreativität' mit dem künstlerischen Gestaltungsprozess verknüpft ist, scheint eine kaum hinterfragte Selbstverständlichkeit. Da durch die gestiegene Relevanz und die veränderte Funktion der Kreativität in Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft ihre Bedeutung jedoch immer wieder neu verhandelt wird, muss auch die Verbindung zwischen Kreativität und Kunst mit ihren Bedingungen und Funktionen neu gedacht werden. Florian Pfab nähert sich der 'Kreativität' aus einer begriffsanalytischen Perspektive. Mit den Mitteln der Systemtheorie entwirft er eine Definition, die den Forderungen an den Begriff zwischen (...) Schöpfermythos und evolutionärem Prinzip mit Blick auf den künstlerischen Gestaltungsprozess gerecht wird"--Back cover. (shrink)

In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...) itself constrained by these standards. However, even if choosing a framework is a practical matter, we would nevertheless expect the process of framework selection to be subject to rational norms. But which norms might those be? And where do they come from? I begin by showing that these questions are crucial to the success of Carnap's entire philosophical project. I then offer a response on behalf of the Carnapian which guarantees the rationality of the process of framework selection, while remaining true to Carnap's firm commitment to tolerance. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Studie erforscht den Zusammenhang zwischen den Konzepten des höchsten Gutes und des kategorischen Imperativs in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Nach einer originiellen Lesart des Autors gebietet der kategorische Imperativ, das eigene Glück stets nur als Bestandteil allgemeinen Glücks zu verfolgen. Das höchste Gut ist nun derjenige Zustand der Welt, der erreicht würde, wenn alle Menschen diesem Prinzip gemäß handeln würden und ihrem gemeinsamen Streben nach allgemeiner Glückseligkeit auch Erfolg beschieden wäre. Dieser Zustand ist ein notwendiges Ziel vernünftigen Handelns, das (...) sich aus dem kategorischen Imperativ ergibt, dessen Verfolgung aber trotzdem über das bloße Handeln nach verallgemeinerbaren Maximen hinausgeht. Durch eine Neuinterpretation von Kants These, im höchsten Gut sei das Glück stets proportional zur Tugend, gelingt es dem Autor, nicht nur diese These, sondern auch Kants Aussagen über Gerechtigkeit, Glückswürdigkeit und Hoffnung argumentativ an den kategorischen Imperativ zu binden und damit im Kontext des höchsten Guts zu rechtfertigen. Dem Autor zufolge hat das höchste Gut somit eine wichtige eigenständige Funktion in der kantischen Ethik, ohne ihren deontologischen Charakter in Frage zu stellen. (shrink)

According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with (...) first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question. (shrink)

The question of ontological foundation has undergone a noteworthy revival in recent years: metaphysicians today quarrel about how exactly to understand the asymmetrical and hyperintensional relationship of grounding. One of the reasons for this revival is that the old quantificationalist meta-ontology inherited from Quine has been effectively criticised by leading philosophers favourable to a meta-ontology, the aim of which is to come to know “which facts/items ground (constitute the base of) which other facts/items”, thus to examine the relation of ontological (...) dependence between beings (e.g. chemical properties depend on physical properties, the economic situation on the behaviour of individuals etc.), i.e. to explore the hierarchical structure of reality. I shall not discuss here the relationship of grounding in itself, but make some historical-formal remarks on the properties of the ultimate ontological foundational item itself and its aporetic nature. To do so I explore various more or less exotic philosophical ecosystems in the following order: Heidegger (Seyn), Plato (ἕν), Wáng Bi (道, dào). On the way I shall propose a new interpretation both of certain hypotheses in the Parmenides and of the nature of the opposition between Wáng Bì and Guō Xiàng in regard to the logical grammar of the expression “nothing (無, wú)” (transl. J. Dudley). (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Do corporations have a duty to promote just institutions? Agreeing with Hsieh’s recent contribution, this article argues that they do. However, contrary to Hsieh, it holds that such a claim cannot be advanced convincingly only by reference to the negative duty to do no harm. Instead, such a duty necessarily must be grounded in positive obligation. In the search of a foundation for a positive duty for corporations to further just institutions, Stephen Kobrin’s notion of “private political authority” offers a (...) promising connecting point. Political authority implies political responsibility; Political obligation, however, includes more than merely not doing any harm—it is essentially positive obligation. The implications of the new political responsibilities of multinational corporations may even go far beyond the particular duty to promote just institutions; they may be symptomatic for a much more profound shift from an individual to a collective age. (shrink)

Large scale experiments at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider rely heavily on computer simulations, a fact that has recently caught philosophers’ attention. CSs obviously require appropriate modeling, and it is a common assumption among philosophers that the relevant models can be ordered into hierarchical structures. Focusing on LHC’s ATLAS experiment, we will establish three central results here: with some distinct modifications, individual components of ATLAS’ overall simulation infrastructure can be ordered into hierarchical structures. Hence, to a good degree of approximation, hierarchical (...) accounts remain valid at least as descriptive accounts of initial modeling steps. In order to perform the epistemic function Winsberg Model-based reasoning in scientific discovery. Kluwer Academic/plenum Publishers, New York, pp 255–269, 1999) assigns to models in simulation—generate knowledge through a sequence of skillful but non-deductive transformations—ATLAS’ simulation models have to be considered part of a network rather than a hierarchy, in turn making the associated simulation modeling messy rather than motley. Deriving knowledge-claims from this ‘mess’ requires two sources of justification: holistic validation :253–262, 2010; in Carrier M, Nordmann A Science in the context of application. Springer, Berlin, pp 115–130, 2011), and model coherence. As it turns out, the degree of model coherence sets HEP apart from other messy, simulation-intensive disciplines such as climate science, and the reasons for this are to be sought in the historical, empirical and theoretical foundations of the respective discipline. (shrink)

Recently, Fahrbach and Park have argued that the pessimistic meta-induction about scientific theories is unsound. They claim that this very argument does not properly take into account scientific progress, particularly during the twentieth century. They also propose amended arguments in favour of scientific realism, which are supposed to properly reflect the history of science. I try to show that what I call the argument from scientific progress cannot explain satisfactorily why the current theories should have reached a degree of success (...) that excludes their future refutations and allows the inference to their truth. I further argue that this line of argumentation dismisses the burden of proof in a rather unfair manner by using a delaying tactic to postpone the question about the validity of the PMI in the future. (shrink)

Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would (...) need to produce what John MacFarlane has appropriately called a bridge principle, i.e. a general principle articulating a substantive and systematic link between logical entailment and norms of reasoning. This is Harman's skeptical challenge. In this paper I argue that Harman's skeptical challenge can be met. I show how candidate bridge principles can be systematically generated and evaluated against a set of well‐motivated desiderata. Moreover, I argue that bridge principles advanced by MacFarlane himself and others, for all their merit, fail to address the problem originally set forth by Harman and so do not meet the skeptical challenge. Finally, I develop a bridge principle that meets Harman's requirements as well as being substantive. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer expérimentalement que le "sens commun" n'est en matière moral ni complètement objectiviste ni complètement relativiste, mais qu'un même individu peut être tantôt objectiviste tantôt relativiste. De même, nous montrons que les jugements de goût portant sur le prédicat "dégoûtant" ne sont pas toujours relativiste mais peuvent varier selon le contexte entre objectivisme et relativisme.

Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the vast topic of laws of nature. Thus, it first outlines the alleged characteristics of the laws of nature, namely truth, objectivity, contingency, necessity, universality, grounding counterfactuals and their role in science. Among these aspects, the peculiar modal status of laws of nature will be identified as the ‘holy grail’ of the debate. The second part of this chapter is concerned with the three main families of theories of laws of nature – neo-humean, (...) ADT and dispositional theories – which are introduced and evaluated in regard to the aforementioned characteristics. It will then be argued that among those theories, the dispositional ones show the greatest promise of being able to account for the natural necessity of the laws of nature. -/- Before a dispositional account of laws of nature can be given, dispositions themselves need to be understood. Consequently, Chapter 2 introduces various analyses of dispositions. As dispositions are pre-theoretically close to conditionals, a lot of analyses try to reduce dispositions to conditionals. This chapter critically assesses some chosen accounts: the simple conditional analysis, Carnap’s reduction sentences, the simple counterfactual conditional analysis, Lewis’ reformed conditional analysis, Malzkorn’s sophisticated con- ditional analysis, Choi and Gundersen’s context-dependent analysis, Manley and Wasserman’s gradable dispostion ascriptions, and Fara’s habituals. The prevention problem, which poses a threat to any account of dispositions, is depicted. It is argued that, ultimately, none of the conditionalising attempts is able to convince since they all exclude the problem cases which leads to explanation gaps and outlaw areas. -/- Chapter 3 contains the synchronic part of my preferred solution to the prevention problem. The notion of ‘component causes’ is introduced, and the ontological status of components discussed. Millikan’s oil drop experiment is depicted en detail. In a first step, making a distinction between dispositions and the resulting behaviour is advocated. Via the symmetry argument, mani- festations and masks are shown to be ontologically on a par. In a second step, a triadic account consisting of dispositions, wirkungen and resultant behaviour, is established. Finally, the ontological interpretation of the trias is given. It is in the nature of the dispositions to bring about the wirkungen. These interact via combinations rules like the functions f and fa or vector addition, which are built-in into to dispositions. -/- The diachronic part of my favourite interpretation, the triadic process picture of dispositions (TPD), is presented in chapter 4. The dynamics of dispo- sition manifestation are discussed and it is argued that fiddling with the trigger works only up to a certain point. Diachronic masking cases turn out to be no- torious. An excursus to action theory shows that the ontology needs to include processes, as understanding disposition manifestations as processes solves the diachronic prevention problem. The (TPD) can account for all counterexamples by taking the stimulus as the beginning of the manifestation process. -/- Chapter 5 applies the (TPD) to the debate about laws of nature. In order to judge its adequacy, the characteristics of laws of nature given in chapter 1 are consulted. As a first step, the criteria truth, objectivity, universality, grounding counterfactuals and their role in science are covered. It is sketched how the (TPD) can account for these. The second part of the chapter deals with the modal status of the laws of nature. The dispositional essentialist’s view that laws of nature are metaphysical necessary is depicted and then criticised. It is argued that metaphysical necessity is not the appropriate modal status of the laws of nature. Finally, the (TPD) account of the necessity of the laws of nature is presented: laws of nature are naturally necessary and metaphysically contingent. (shrink)

Mit der Coronavirus-Pandemie und den Lockdowns wurde noch einmal klar, dass die Wohnung ein entscheidender Lebens- und Rückzugsort, aber auch ein Gefängnis ist. Obgleich der Mensch ein wohnendes Wesen ist, haben sich nur wenige Philosophen damit beschäftigt. Florian Rötzer unternimmt einen erstaunlichen Streifzug durch die Kulturgeschichte des Wohnens und wirft einen Blick in die digitale Zukunft, die das Wohnen radikal verändert. Denn unsere Wohnung von morgen ist nicht länger ein privater Rückzugsraum, sondern kann von überall gesteuert, eingesehen und gehackt (...) werden. (shrink)

Identification of propositions as the core of attitudes and beliefs (De Houwer, 2014) has resulted in the development of implicit measures targeting personal evaluations of complex sentences (e.g., the IRAP or the RRT). Whereas their utility is uncontested, these paradigms are subject to limitations inherent in their block based design, such as allowing assessment of only a single belief at a time. We introduce the Propositional Evaluation Paradigm (PEP) for assessment of multiple propositional beliefs within a single experimental block. Two (...) experiments provide first evidence for the PEP’s validity. In Experiment 1 endorsement of racist beliefs measured with the PEP was related to criterion variables such as explicit racism assessed via questionnaire and indicators of behavioral tendencies. Experiment 2 indicates that the PEP’s implicit racism scores may predict actual behavior over and above explicit, self-report measures. Finally, Experiment 3 tested the PEP's applicability in the domain of hiring discrimination. Whereas general PEP based gender stereotypes were not related to hiring bias, results suggest a possible role of female stereotypes in hiring discrimination. In the context of these findings, we discuss both the potential and possible challenges in adopting the PEP to different beliefs. In sum, these initial findings suggest that the PEP may offer researchers a reliable and easily administrable option for the indirect assessment of propositional evaluations. (shrink)

Developments in Machine Learning (ML) have attracted attention in a wide range of healthcare fields to improve medical practice and the benefit of patients. Particularly, this should be achieved by providing more or less automated decision recommendations to the treating physician. However, some hopes placed in ML for healthcare seem to be disappointed, at least in part, by a lack of transparency or traceability. Skepticism exists primarily in the fact that the physician, as the person responsible for diagnosis, therapy, and (...) care, has no or insufficient insight into how such recommendations are reached. The following paper aims to make understandable the specificity of the deliberative model of a physician-patient relationship that has been achieved over decades. By outlining the (social-)epistemic and inherently normative relationship between physicians and patients, I want to show how this relationship might be altered by non-traceable ML recommendations. With respect to some healthcare decisions, such changes in deliberative practice may create normatively far-reaching challenges. Therefore, in the future, a differentiation of decision-making situations in healthcare with respect to the necessary depth of insight into the process of outcome generation seems essential. (shrink)

Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to constitute counter-examples to the principle of alternate possibilities, for they are cases in which we have the intuition that an agent is morally responsible for his action, even though he could not have done otherwise. In a recent paper, Swenson rejects this conclusion, on the basis of a comparison between standard FSCs, which typically feature actions, and similar cases involving omissions. Because the absence of alternate possibilities seems to preclude moral responsibility in the cases of (...) omissions, and because there is no morally relevant difference between the cases of actions and omissions, Swenson concludes that agents are not morally responsible in standard FSCs. In the present paper, I argue that Swenson’s argument fails because there are at least two very important differences between both types of cases. First, there is a difference about whether agents in such cases actually perform the relevant action: while agents actually perform the relevant action in standard FSCs, they do not in FSCs supposedly involving omissions, for omissions require the possibility to have done otherwise. Second, while the agent’s behavior in standard FSCs actually explain that he performed the relevant action, the agent’s behavior in FSCs including omission actually fails to explain why the agent did not perform the relevant action. Beyond Swenson’s argument, I end up discussing what factors ultimately explain our intuitions about FSCs involving omissions. (shrink)

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...) notion that any system of logic should have a privileged claim to correctness, I argue that there is a sense in which Carnap’s framework-relative conception of logical norms has a constitutive role to play: though they are not constitutive for the conceptual activity for thinking, they do nevertheless set the ground rules that make certain forms of scientific inquiry possible in the first place. I conclude that Carnap’s principle of tolerance is tamer than one might have thought and that, despite remaining differences, Frege’s and Carnap’s conceptions of logic have more in common than one might have thought. (shrink)

Epistemic utility theory is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk (...) of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk. (shrink)

À quoi les philosophes sont-ils bons ? Faire de la philosophie rend-il meilleur ? Les jugements esthétiques gardent-ils encore quelque secret, ou bien Kant a-t-il tout dit sur la question ? La culture et le statut socio-économique de votre professeur de philosophie a-t-il une influence sur ses options philosophiques ? Pourquoi avons-nous l'impression que la pensée ne saurait être un état de notre cerveau ? Que nous ne serions pas libres si nous n'étions qu'un tas de neurone ? C'est pour (...) répondre à ces questions (et à beaucoup d'autres) que philosophes et psychologues se sont alliés sous la bannière de la toute nouvelle « philosophie expérimentale ». Il s'agit de faire un peu de lumière sur ce qui se passe vraiment dans notre tête lorsque nous faisons de la philosophie et d'interroger l'origine de nos certitudes philosophiques. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a general introduction to the trolley problem. I describe its birth as a philosophical thought experiment, then its successful career in moral psychology. I explain the different reasons behind its popularity and success but argue that, despite its popularity and widespread utilization in psychological research, few researchers have actually tried to directly solve it and that we are still ignorant of the real factors guiding our responses to trolley cases. Against the idea that trolley problems (...) were just a fad, I insist on the importance of seriously studying them and put forward a new hypothesis about the psychological mechanisms underlying our responses to trolley cases. (shrink)

Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth standards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states that an inconsistent set of propositions entails any proposition whatsoever. However, ordinary agents presumably do — occasionally, at least — have inconsistent belief sets. Yet it is false that such agents may, let alone ought to, believe any proposition they please. Therefore, our logic should not recognize explosion as a logical law. Call this the (...) ‘normative argument against explosion’. Arguments of this type play — implicitly or explicitly — a central role in motivating paraconsistent logics. Branden Fitelson, in a throwaway remark, has conjectured that there is no plausible ‘bridge principle’ articulating the normative link between logic and reasoning capable of supporting such arguments. This paper offers a critical evaluation of Fitelson’s conjecture, and hence of normative arguments for paraconsistency and the conceptions of logic’s normative status on which they repose. It is argued that Fitelson’s conjecture turns out to be correct: normative arguments for paraconsistency probably fail. (shrink)