Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.

Trust is difficult to define. Instead of doing so, I propose that the best way to understand the concept is through a genealogical account. I show how a root notion of trust arises out of some basic features of what it is for humans to live socially, in which we rely on others to act cooperatively. I explore how this concept acquires resonances of hope and threat, and how we analogically apply this in related but different contexts. The genealogical account (...) explains both why the notion has such value for us and why it is difficult to define. (shrink)

"This is a timely collection of important papers.

We investigate the reverse-mathematical status of several theorems to the effect that the natural number system is second-order categorical. One of our results is as follows. Define a system to be a triple A,i,f such that A is a set and i∈A and f:A→A. A subset X⊆A is said to be inductive if i∈X and ∀a ∈X). The system A,i,f is said to be inductive if the only inductive subset of A is A itself. Define a Peano system to be (...) an inductive system such that f is one-to-one and i∉the range of f. The standard example of a Peano system is N,0,S where N={0,1,2,…,n,…}=the set of natural numbers and S:N→N is given by S=n+1 for all n∈N. Consider the statement that all Peano systems are isomorphic to N,0,S. We prove that this statement is logically equivalent to WKL0 over RCA0⁎ source. From this and similar equivalences we draw some foundational/philosophical consequences. (shrink)

In recent work Mary Kate McGowan presents an account of oppressive speech inspired by David Lewis's analysis of conversational kinematics. Speech can effect identity-based oppression, she argues, by altering 'the conversational score', which is to say, roughly, that it can introduce presuppositions and expectations into a conversation, and thus determine what sort of subsequent conversational 'moves' are apt, correct, felicitous, etc., in a manner that oppresses members of a certain group (e.g. because the suppositions and expectations derogate or demean members (...) of that group). In keeping with the Lewisian picture, McGowan stresses the asymmetric pliability of conversational scores. She argues that it is easier to introduce (for example) sexist presuppositions and expectations into a conversation than it is to remove them. Responding to a sexist remark, she thus suggests, is like trying to "unring a bell". I begin by situating McGowan's work in the wider literature on speech and social hierarchy, and explaining how her account of oppressive speech improves upon the work of others in its explication of the relationship between individuals' verbal conduct and structurally oppressive social arrangements. I then propose an explanation and supportive elaboration of McGowan's claims about the asymmetric pliability of conversations involving identity-oppressive speech. Rather than regarding such asymmetry as a sui generis phenomenon, I show how we can understand it as a consequence of a more general asymmetry between making things salient and un-salient in speech, and I show how this asymmetry also operates in various cases that interested Lewis. (shrink)

In disagreements about trivial matters, it often seems appropriate for disputing parties to adopt a ‘middle ground’ view about the disputed matter. But in disputes about more substantial controversies (e.g. in ethics, religion, or politics) this sort of doxastic conduct can seem viciously acquiescent. How should we distinguish between the two kinds of cases, and thereby account for our divergent intuitions about how we ought to respond to them? One possibility is to say that ceding ground in a trivial dispute (...) is appropriate because the disputing parties are usually epistemic peers within the relevant domain, whereas in a more substantial disagreement the disputing parties rarely, if ever, qualify as epistemic peers, and so ‘sticking to one’s guns’ is usually the appropriate doxastic response. My aim in this paper is to explain why this way of drawing the desired distinction is ultimately problematic, even if it seems promising at first blush. (shrink)

This article develops a social epistemological analysis of Web-based search engines, addressing the following questions. First, what epistemic functions do search engines perform? Second, what dimensions of assessment are appropriate for the epistemic evaluation of search engines? Third, how well do current search engines perform on these? The article explains why they fulfil the role of a surrogate expert, and proposes three ways of assessing their utility as an epistemic tool—timeliness, authority prioritisation, and objectivity. “Personalisation” is a current trend in (...) Internet-delivered services, and consists in tailoring online content to the interests of the individual user. It is argued here that personalisation threatens the objectivity of search results. Objectivity is a public good; so there is a prima facie case for government regulation of search engines. (shrink)

Let CKDT be the assertion that for every countably infinite bipartite graph G, there exist a vertex covering C of G and a matching M in G such that C consists of exactly one vertex from each edge in M. (This is a theorem of Podewski and Steffens [12].) Let ATR0 be the subsystem of second-order arithmetic with arithmetical transfinite recursion and restricted induction. Let RCA0 be the subsystem of second-order arithmetic with recursive comprehension and restricted induction. We show that (...) CKDT is provable in ART0. Combining this with a result of Aharoni, Magidor, and Shore [2], we see that CKDT is logically equivalent to the axioms of ATR0, the equivalence being provable in RCA0. (shrink)

We investigate the provability or nonprovability of certain ordinary mathematical theorems within certain weak subsystems of second order arithmetic. Specifically, we consider the Cauchy/Peano existence theorem for solutions of ordinary differential equations, in the context of the formal system RCA 0 whose principal axioms are ▵ 0 1 comprehension and Σ 0 1 induction. Our main result is that, over RCA 0 , the Cauchy/Peano Theorem is provably equivalent to weak Konig's lemma, i.e. the statement that every infinite {0, 1}-tree (...) has a path. We also show that, over RCA 0 , the Ascoli lemma is provably equivalent to arithmetical comprehension, as is Osgood's theorem on the existence of maximum solutions. At the end of the paper we digress to relate our results to degrees of unsolvability and to computable analysis. (shrink)

O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...) é ótima para que se perceba o núcleo dos problemas. Oferece soluções, sem mascarar as dificuldades. Nós fornecemos ilustração disso através da consideração dos problemas da justificação a priori e do ceticismo. O evidencialismo também oferece a base para que se compreenda uma grande variedade de fatos e conceitos epistemológicos. Nós fornecemos ilustração disso, mostrando que o evidencialismo pode explicar como a justificação pode ser anulada, como as atitudes distintas da crença podem ser objeto de avaliação e como a própria prática da filosofia é epistemicamente valiosa. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Evidencialismo. Evidência. Justificação. Conhecimento. A priori. Ceticismo. ABSTRACT Evidentialism is primarily a thesis about epistemic justification and secondarily a thesis about knowledge. It holds that epistemic justification supervenes on evidence. Versions of evidentialism differ about what counts as evidence, what it is to have something as evidence, and what a particular body of evidence supports. The secondary thesis is that evidential support is necessary for knowledge. Evidentialism helps to frame epistemological issues in a way that is optimal for seeing the heart of the problems. It offers solutions without disguising the difficulties. We illustrate this by considering the problems of a priori justification and skepticism. Evidentialism also provides the basis for understanding a variety of epistemological facts and concepts. We illustrate this by showing that evidentialism can explain how justification can be defeated, how attitudes other than belief can be the object of evaluation, and how the practice of philosophy itself is epistemically valuable. KEY WORDS – Evidentialism. Evidence. Justification. Knowledge. A priori. Skepticism. (shrink)

Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter treats several immensely important and understudied topics—public ignorance of economics, political ideology, and their connection to policy error—from an orthodox economic perspective whose applicability to these topics is overwhelmingly disproven by the available evidence. Moreover, Caplan adds to the traditional and largely irrelevant orthodox economic notion of rational public ignorance the claim that when voters favor counterproductive economic policies, they do so deliberately, i.e., knowingly. This leads him to assume (without any evidence) (...) that “emotion or ideology” explain mass economic error. Straightforward, unchosen mass ignorance of economic principles—neither “rational” nor “irrational,” but simply mistaken—is a more coherent explanation for economic error, and it is backed up by the vast body of public‐opinion research. (shrink)

Let X be a compact metric space. A closed set K $\subseteq$ X is located if the distance function d(x, K) exists as a continuous real-valued function on X; weakly located if the predicate d(x, K) $>$ r is Σ 0 1 allowing parameters. The purpose of this paper is to explore the concepts of located and weakly located subsets of a compact separable metric space in the context of subsystems of second order arithmetic such as RCA 0 , WKL (...) 0 and ACA 0 . We also give some applications of these concepts by discussing some versions of the Tietze extension theorem. In particular we prove an RCA 0 version of this result for weakly located closed sets. (shrink)

This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking—one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics—and deflationism about truth—one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most (...) of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists. (shrink)

This book argues that Wittgenstein's religious thought is misunderstood by its critics, and that their misunderstandings are a result of being oblivious of ...

LetSbe the group of finitely supported permutations of a countably infinite set. Let$K[S]$be the group algebra ofSover a fieldKof characteristic 0. According to a theorem of Formanek and Lawrence,$K[S]$satisfies the ascending chain condition for two-sided ideals. We study the reverse mathematics of this theorem, proving its equivalence over$RC{A_0}$ to the statement that${\omega ^\omega }$is well ordered. Our equivalence proof proceeds via the statement that the Young diagrams form a well partial ordering.

“Let me tell you where I'm coming from...”—so begins many a discussion in contemporary U.S. culture. Pressed by an almost compulsive desire to situate ourselves within a definite matrix of reference points in both scholarly inquiry and everyday parlance, we seem to reject adamantly the idea of a universal human subject. Yet what does this rhetoric of self-affiliation tell us? What is its history? David Simpson’s _Situatedness_ casts a critical eye on this currently popular form of identification, suggesting that, (...) far from being a simple turn of phrase, it demarcates a whole structure of thinking. Simpson traces the rhetorical syndrome through its truly interdisciplinary genealogy. Discussing its roles within the fields of legal theory, social science, fiction, philosophy, and ethics, he argues that the discourse of situatedness consists of a volatile fusion of modesty and aggressiveness. It oscillates, in other words, between accepting complete causal predetermination and advocating personal agency and responsibility. Simpson’s study neither fully rejects nor endorses the present-day language of self-specification. Rather it calls attention to the limitations and opportunities of situatedness—a notion whose ideological slippage it ultimately sees as allowing late-capitalist liberal democracies to function. Given its wide scope and lively rendering, _Situatedness_ will attract a range of scholars in the humanities and legal studies. It will also interest all those for whom the politics of subjectivity pose real problems of authority, identity, and belief. (shrink)

Innovative practice involves medical interventions that deviate from standard practice in significant ways. For many patients, innovative practice offers the best chance of successful treatment. Because little is known about most innovative treatments, clinicians who engage in innovative practice might consider including extra procedures, such as scans or blood draws, to gather information about the innovation. Such information-gathering interventions can yield valuable information for modifying the innovation to benefit future patients and for designing scientific studies of the innovation. However, existing (...) guidelines do not say when or whether it is appropriate to add potentially risky information-gathering interventions for these purposes. As a result, clinicians may assume that information-gathering interventions are ethically inappropriate and should not be used in innovative practice. This assumption can lead to seriously negative consequences, such as increasing the likelihood that harmful or ineffective innovations will be adopted and creating new barriers to the development of genuinely beneficial treatments. We argue that health care institutions need to promote the responsible use of information-gathering interventions as an adjunct to innovative practice, and that these interventions are not clinical research and should not be subject to research oversight. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Russell's 90th Birthday MedallionTony Simpson Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 69] Click for larger view View full resolutionIn this 150th anniversary year of Russell's birth—and with the nuclear peril again rising—it seems fitting to recall his anti-nuclear campaign and how it was celebrated for another landmark birthday, his 90th, in May 1962. In addition to notable events in Russell's honour at London's Festival Hall and (...) Café Royal, as well as in the House of Commons, English coin designer and painter Christopher Ironside (1913–1992) was commissioned to produce this bronze medallion. Only twelve copies were cast, including this one, originally in Russell's possession at Plas Penrhyn and now held by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. (Another copy is in the Russell Archives.) Inscribed on the obverse of the medallion (diameter: 128 mm.) are the titles of fourteen Russell books. The reverse depicts a mushroom cloud rising over Trafalgar Square with Russell in the foreground of a crowded sit-down protest. The inscription around the edge of this side is of Russell's best-known appeal for peace. [End Page 70]Tony SimpsonBertrand Russell Peace Foundation 5 Churchill Park, Nottingham NG4 2HF, UK [email protected] © 2022 McMaster University... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

The histories of skateboarding and philosophy are not entirely dissimilar. Skateboarding got its start in the middle of the 20th century and quickly garnered a reputation as an activity that both attracted and encouraged a sort of lawless rebellion. In a similar vein, not long after its inception, philosophy was most commonly known for its out-of-the-box questioning of authority. However, both skating and philosophy eventually crept into the mainstream of society and have since earned their place as permanent fixtures in (...) the culture. With all they have in common, it's only appropriate that the two should intersect in this book. -/- This collection of 19 essays (written by philosophers who are also skaters and skating enthusiasts) covers a wide variety of topics important to skating such as its culture, politics, history, art, and status as a sport. If you're a skater (or someone who simply appreciates skating), and you're interested in thinking a bit more carefully--a bit more deeply--about skateboarding, this book was put together to help you do just that. (shrink)

El relativismo acerca de las atribuciones de conocimiento de John MarFarlane pretende ser una teoría que explica la corrección de las intuiciones centrales que tenemos acerca de ellas. Sin embargo, el relativismo es incompatible con la corrección de algunas intuiciones que tenemos con respecto a casos de Stanley, a conjunciones de estos casos y a casos en los que la situación práctica del evaluador es menos apremiante que la del sujeto o la del emisor de la atribución. Esto, no obstante, (...) no señala un límite a las posibilidades del relativismo, sino que insta a dar versiones más sofisticadas del mismo. MarFarlane's relativism about knowledge attributions aspires to be a theory that explains why the central intuitions about them are correct. Nevertheless, relativism is incompatible with the accuracy of some intuitions about Stanley's cases, with conjunctions of them and with intuitions about cases in which there is less at stake from the assessor than what is at stake from the subject or the attributor. Nevertheless, this doesn't establish a limit to the possibilities of relativism, but calls for an improvement of it. (shrink)

The ethical dilemma of large-scale multinational corporations is presented. The list of complaints and issues is summarized. A case is made for the concept of multinationals being inherently beneficial in today's world of high technology and dependence on international trade. The difficulty is extreme power wielded by some groups. It is concluded that a philosophical ideal is for control on size and power as well as international rules to prevent abuses of power. The concern is that today the worthiness of (...) being relatively small is slowly but surely being eroded. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper begins with a review of major difficulties with both extreme conservative and extreme liberal views on foetal moral status and the morality of abortion. There follows an outline and defence of a moderate position on abortion which is centred in an account of emergent foetal victimisability in being killed. Lastly, various perplexities about this view are explored, particularly the question whether, once victimisable at all, the victimisability of a foetus should reasonably be thought to increase proportionately with (...) further biological development. (shrink)

Given the inexperience, misconceptions and misgivings students often bring to a first course in philosophy, we present an activity that acquaints students with the main areas of philosophical inquiry and the tools philosophers use. Students engage in philosophical thinking by reflecting on and answering questions, defending and discussing their answers, and modifying or rejecting views in light of this discussion. The activity introduces students to conceptual analysis, argument, thought-experiment, and the use of counterexampleswhile simultaneously emphasizing and illuminating students’ natural tendency (...) to think philosophically. (shrink)

Computer graphic modeling forms an increasing part of archaeological practice, implicated in modes of recording objects and spaces, interpretation of types, management of three-dimensional information, creation of artificial experiences of place for interpretation, and representation of archaeological ideas to a broader public. In all spheres of life computer graphics are increasingly influential—by some estimates computed visions constitute the "dominant medium of thought" (Gooding 2008, p. 1). Archaeological computer graphics build on a long tradition of physical model building for the development (...) of understanding, and representation of conclusions. Such physical models are now finding a renewed significance as .. (shrink)