1. Pitʻŭgenstʻain kwa ŏnŏ -- 2. Hyŏndae ŏnŏ chʻŏrhak.

Technology is increasingly prominent as a topic of philosophical and normative reflection, as recent technological advancements in areas such as artificial intelligence and climate technologies have demonstrated their capability to disrupt our existing social, political, and moral practices. Recently, there is a call to diversify philosophy of technology, a field which has so far largely failed to engage with philosophical traditions outside the United States and Europe. While there are an increasing number of works that have attempted to answer the (...) call, they are primarily attempts to apply normative values and/or frameworks of specific philosophical and cultural traditions. These works have not delved extensively into the questions of technology in these philosophical and cultural traditions; in particular, they have yet to explore how these philosophical and cultural traditions conceive and construct human-technology relations, namely how humans and technology are—and should be—related. This essay distinguishes itself from other attempts to apply normative values and/or frameworks of specific philosophical and cultural traditions. Our aim is to offer a Confucian view of human-technology relations through reviving three Confucian ideas in early Confucianism, namely Creating Qi from the Images (zhi qi shang xiang 制器尚象), Evoking Moral Feelings through Things (yi gu xing wu 以故興物), and Embedding the Rites into Qi (cang li yu qi 藏禮於器). Constructing human-technology relations in the Confucian perspective will offer us an account of how Confucianism sees technology (co-)shaping our perception of and action in the world; it can also provide us with alternative ways to consider technology’s normative implications. (shrink)

1. An Tŏng-mun ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏse pangsik -- 2. An Tŏng-mun ŭi Samsan Sŏwŏn wisang chŏngnip kwa kŭ ŭimi -- 3. Ha Ik-pŏm ŭi sam kwa munhak -- 4. Pak Ch'i-bok ŭi Nammyŏnghak kyesŭng yangsang -- 5. Kang Pyŏng-ju ŭi hangmun kwa munhak -- 6. Chŏng Chae-gyu ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa 'Taehak' haesŏk -- 7. Kim Chin-ho ŭi haksŏl e taehayŏ -- 8. Kwak Chong-sŏk ŭi Myŏngdŏksŏl nonjaeng -- 9. Kim Hwang ŭi Kyŏnghak Sipto e taehayŏ.

1. Pŏmbu ŭi p'ungnyu chŏngsin ch'ŏnmyŏng kwa "Hwarang oesa" kusang : kungmin todŏk seugi wa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 2. Nae ka ponŭn Pŏmbu wa Pak Chŏng-hŭi ŭi sasŭng kwan'gye : Pak Chŏng-hŭi chipkwŏn ch'ogi ŭi chŏngch'i kihoek kwa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 3. Han t'ojong sasangga ŭi sam kwa saenggak : iyagi ka innŭn Pŏmbu kim chŏngsŏl yŏnbo -- 4. Samin chŏngdam : chŏngch'i, kyŏngje, munhwa e kŏlch'yŏ -- 5. Yŏhaenggi : kurŭm ttara mul ttara ch'ŏlli rŭl kada.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:VIOLENT MEMES AND SUSPICIOUS MINDS: GIRARD'S SCAPEGOAT MECHANISM IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION AND MEMETICS Guömundur Ingi Markússon Reykjavik, Iceland The present article is an attempt to bring mimetic theory into dialogue with certain evolutionary approaches to human culture, i.e., evolutionarypsychology and memetics. That which immediately suggests a consonance between these approaches is a shared concern for the fundamental aspects ofhuman culture, or "fundamental anthropology." My discussion aims at (...) reconsidering Girard's startling insight concerning the significance of scapegoating in the formation of human culture, ritual and myth—or, in short, his concept of the scapegoat mechanism. Two alternative approaches will be explored: (1) On the basis of evolutionary psychology, scapegoating is considered as a cognitive side-effect; (2) with reference to memetics, it is suggested that the scapegoat mechanism is a memetic parasite. The former account is an interpretation ofPascal Boyer's ideas about group mentality and fundamentalist violence in his recent book ReligionExplained(2001). The latter consideration is inspired byTerrence W. Deacon's concept of language evolution and symbolic reference in his book The Symbolic Species (1997). It should be emphasized at the outset that neither Boyer nor Deacon are concerned with scapegoating and, needless to say, the application and interpretation oftheir ideas is entirely my own. 1. The Scapegoat Mechanism as a Cognitive Side Effect The following is an attempt to formulate a cognitive account of scapegoating based on Pascal Boyer's ideas about fundamentalism (2001, 292ff). Guömundur Ingi Markússon89 1.1. The Coalitional Reasoning ofthe Social Mind Boyer's theory of religion is firmly rooted in evolutionary psychology (2001, 118, passim)} A key concept in evolutionary psychology is the environment ofevolutionary adapteäness (EEA) which is centered around the claim that our cognitive apparatus evolved in response to ecological problems faced by our ancestors in the Pleistocene period (which lasted from ca. 2 million-10,000 years ago). In other words, the cognition of modern humans is geared to the ancestral environments of our huntergatherer past. The key issue in evolutionary psychology is to gain insight into the adaptive problems faced by our ancestors, and figure out the necessary cognitive capabilities needed to solve them. The resulting models of how the mind works can then be tested experimentally. Evolutionary psychologists also emphasize the áomain specificity of our psychological mechanisms, i.e., in simple terms, that our mind is a collection of specialized mechanisms wrought by natural selection to deal with specific features of our environment, such as detecting predators, keeping track of social relations, etc. In Boyer's account, the mixed stock of our evolutionary heritage includes a complex array of psychological mechanisms for keeping track ofa wide spectrum ofsocial relations, the social mina (2001, 122). An essential aspect of our social intelligence is "intuitive psychology" or a "theory of mind," i.e., seeing others as intentional agents, realizing what they are up to, what their beliefs and desires are, being able to predict their behavior, etc. According to evolutionary psychologists we are adapted for social exchange. We easily calculate the costs and benefits of our interactions with others. Experiments have shown that logical problems are much more transparent to people when presented as social exchange problems. In such cases, the logical rule in question is restated as a "check for cheaters" rule, i.e., the problem is to figure out whether people respect social conventions or not. Evolutionary psychologists interpretthese results to the effect that our cognition is geared to evaluate social exchange, and we have evolved a disposition to check for cheaters in social exchange situations (2001, 124f; Cosmides 1989; Cosmides & Tooby 1992).2 1 On evolutionary psychology, see Barkow et al. and Laland and Brown (ch. 5). 2 Cosmides, one of the pioneers of evolutionary psychology, characterizes "check for cheaters" thus: "cheating can be defined as the violation of a rule established, explicitly or implicitly, by acceptance ofa social contract. A social contract relatesperceived benefits to 90Violent Mêmes and Suspicious Minds Evaluation oftrust is essential to human interaction: "That humans depend on cooperation creates strategic problems, where the value (the expected benefit) of a particular move depends on whether someone else makes a particular move...." (2001, 125... (shrink)

1. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 1 : Sa, Pu, Si, Soch'a -- 2. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 2 : Soch'a, Kye, Ŭi, Sŏ, Ŭngjemun, Sŏ, Pal, Ki -- 3. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 3 : Sŏl, Ch'an, Myŏng, Chemun, Chapchŏ, Sindo pimyŏng, Myogalmyŏng, Myojimyŏng, Haengjang -- 4. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 4 : Sŏnghak chibyo -- 5. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 5 : Kyŏngmong yogyŏl, Cheŭich'o, Kyŏngyon ilgi -- 6. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 6 : Ŏrok, Purok -- 7. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 7 : Purok, Sokp'yŏn, Pu, Si -- 8. Yulgok chŏnsŏ 8 (...) : Soch'a, Kye, Ŭi, Sŏ, Ŭngjemun, Sŏ, Ki, Non, Cham, P'yojŏn, Chemun, Chapchŏ, Myogalmyŏng, Myojimyŏng -- 9. Nonŏ Yulgok Sŏnsaeng ŏnhae, Maengja Yulgok Sŏnsaeng ŏnhae, Taehak Yulgok Sŏnsaeng ŏnhae, Chungyong -- 10. Chŏngŏn myosŏn, Sunŏn, Kosan kugokka. (shrink)