It is plausible to think that some animals perceive the world as coloreddifferently from the way humans perceive it. I argue that the best way ofaccommodating this fact is to adopt perceiver-relativism, the view that colorpredicates express relations between objects and types of perceivers.Perceiver-relativism makes no claim as to the identity of color properties;it is compatible with both physicalism and dispositionalism. I arguehowever for a response-dependence version of it according to which an object counts as red (for a type of (...) perceiver) iff it standardly looks red to normal perceivers (of that type). Finally, I develop a notion of minimal realism on which this account counts as realist despite its subjectivist elements, in that it is committed to the objectivityof truth. (shrink)

Embodied cognition has attracted significant attention within cognitive science and related fields in recent years. It is most noteworthy for its emphasis on the inextricable connection between mental functioning and embodied activity and thus for its departure from standard cognitive science's implicit commitment to the unembodied mind. This article offers a review of embodied cognition's recent empirical and theoretical contributions and suggests how this movement has moved beyond standard cognitive science. The article then clarifies important respects in which embodied cognition (...) has not departed fundamentally from the standard view. A shared commitment to representationalism, and ultimately, mechanism, suggest that the standard and embodied cognition movements are more closely related than is commonly acknowledged. Arguments against representationalism and mechanism are reviewed and an alternative position that does not entail these conceptual undergirdings is offered. (shrink)

In Emotion, character, and responsibility, J. Sabini and M. Silver set out to show specifically why emotions are important in the conception of a person's character. Thus, their collection of previously published material tackles the daunting task of explaining how and why it is that it is often considered that peoples' emotions reflect upon their characters. What the present author finds particularly appealing, as well as convincing, in all of these writings is Sabini and Silver's grounding of their arguments in (...) everyday experience. This article examines whether it is appropriate to judge people on the basis of their emotions, and whether emotions and emotional responses reflect one's character. The question the present author proposes is whether the reader is prepared to make the sacrifices to the content of emotions which Sabini and Silver make in arguing for their conclusion. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

J.L. Austin described speech acts as utterances which are themselves actions, and not simply descriptions of actions or states of affairs. It is suggested that emotions are also actions, and not simply results of actions. Emotions may be conceived as attunements in the phenomenological tradition, as means of experiencing the world. Understood as attunements, emotions are actions in the sense that they do not simply result from appraisal processes or social constraints, but are themselves our engagements with the world. Three (...) insights into the nature of emotion achieved through the comparison of speech acts and emotions are discussed: emotions may best be studied as acts, and not as elements such as cognitive appraisals, characteristic feeling states, or states of physiological arousal which often accompany emotions; the study of emotions as acts may best be viewed as an exercise in uncovering rather than discovering knowledge; and emotions are commitments to world views and, as such, are susceptible to moral evaluation. (shrink)

Although cognitively oriented theories of emotion are now dominant in the psychological study of emotion, there remain issues upon which these theories do not agree. Central among these are questions regarding the minimal cognitive processes necessary to have an emotion. A potentially productive approach to such questions is the study of the relation of cognitive development and the development of emotions in infants. Such an approach was featured in ancient philosophical and psychological treatises, some of which formed the very foundations (...) of later cognitive theories. However, the recent literature has been nearly indifferent to just these foundations. Ancient commentators, especially Aristotle and the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, understood emotions as fundamentally sociomoral constructs. Owing to a lack of socialisation and moral understanding, infants are not fully capable of experiencing emotions as they are typically understood. Contemporary work in the area of emotion, including that of Michael Lewis, as well as work in other emotion-related areas, is shown to address only inadequately the sociomoral components of emotion and thus to address only inadequately the emotion-cognition relationship. (shrink)

The presupposition strategy is a widely adopted approach to understanding the catus.kot.i or tetralemmas that appear in Nāgārjuna’s works. According to this strategy, the apparent contradictions between the statements in the tetralemmas can be resolved by viewing them as making the false presupposition that there are entities that have svabhāva, independent existence or intrinsic nature, and hence as semantically deficient. Contemporary discussions of the strategy, however, do not take into account recent work on presupposition in linguistics and philosophy, much of (...) which claims either that presupposition is not a genuine linguistic phenomenon at all, or that it is pragmatic rather than semantic, thus threatening the presupposition strategy’s claim to resolve the contradictions in the tetralemmas. Based on a consideration of these critiques, this paper argues for three claims. First, the svabhāva presupposition is best viewed as pragmatic rather than semantic in nature. Second, viewing this presupposition as pragmatic rather than semantic does not in fact undermine the ability of the presupposition strategy to resolve the apparent inconsistencies. Finally, the best way of preserving the viability of the presupposition strategy is to adopt a model of the two truths that views emptiness not as interdependence, as is widely held, but as nonconceptuality. (shrink)

: Many recent studies of Dōgen have rightly emphasized that for Dōgen language and thought are capable of expressing the buddha dharma. But they have not recognized that this positive assessment of language rests on an underlying critique of the prevalent commonsense view that language functions by representing an independent reality. Focusing on Dōgen's use of apparently paradoxical language, it is suggested that in order to understand this critique we need to trace it back to its roots in the interpretation (...) of Madhyamaka given by the Tiantai thinker Zhiyi. (shrink)

The Ozone Layer: A Philosophy of Science Perspective provides the first thorough and accessible history of stratospheric ozone, from the discovery of ozone in the nineteenth century to current investigations of the Antarctic ozone hole. Drawing directly on the extensive scientific literature, Christie uses the story of ozone as a case study for examining fundamental issues relating to the collection and evaluation of evidence, the conduct of scientific debate and the construction of scientific consensus. By linking key debates in the (...) philosophy of science to an example of real-world science, the author not only provides an excellent introduction to the philosophy of science but also challenges many of its preconceptions. This accessible book will interest students and academics concerned with the history, philosophy and sociology of science, as well as having general appeal on this topic of contemporary relevance and concern. (shrink)

This paper defends a “conceptualist” interpretation of Nāgārjuna which stands in-between two other prominent accounts, the nihilist view and what I call the anti-essentialist view. The nihilist reading, recently defended by Thomas Wood, holds that for Nāgārjuna nothing exists either at the ultimate or at the conventional level. On the anti-essentialist account, supported by Jay Garfield and David Kalupahana, though Nāgārjuna rejects the ultimate existence of things as svabhāva (independent), he affirms their conventional existence as interdependent. I argue that the (...) nihilist view raises two challenges to which anti-essentialists have given no adequate response. The first alleges that the notion that all things are interdependent is incoherent. The second consists of passages from Nāgārjuna’s writings that seem to claim that whatever exists is svabhāva or depends on what is svabhāva. The conceptualist interpretation, I suggest, allows us to respond to these challenges while avoiding the implausible nihilist account. On this view, the passages in question assert a claim not about what exists but about the concept of existence, namely that it is a core part of this concept that what exists is either svabhāva or depends on what is svabhāva. Thus, contra the anti-essentialist, Nāgārjuna’s view is that there is no coherent concept of universal interdependent existence. But contra the nihilist, things can still be said to exist conventionally, since conventional discourse is precisely discourse in which subjects do not endorse the svabhāva component of the concept of existence. The upshot – again contra the anti-essentialist – is that both conventional truth and emptiness are strictly inconceivable. (shrink)

Is there life after death? Can we prove the big bang theory? In his engrossing and accessible style, Dr Kerry Spackman uses everyday examples to answer these questions and other diverse issues. the Ant and the Ferrari is a magical tour-de-force that takes on the big questions in life and answers them in Dr Kerry Spackman's easily accessible writing style. this is one of those rare books that will change your beliefs - and in doing so will change (...) your life. tHE ANt AND tHE FERRARI offers readers a clear, navigable path through the big questions that confront us all today. What is the meaning of life? Can we be ethical beings in today's world? Can we know if there is life after death? Is there such a thing as Absolute truth? What caused the Big Bang and why should you care? (shrink)

In much of the discussion of expressive qualities in the 19th and 20th Centuries, music and artworks were viewed as capable of expressing emotions too fine-grained to be captured by language or concepts, and this ineffability and nonconceptuality was seen as a primary source of the value of music and the arts. In recent debates about expressive qualities, however, there has been a good deal of skepticism about both the ineffability claim and the claim about value. This essay argues for (...) a moderate position on both of these claims. I argue that while many expressive qualities are indeed fine-grained, they are ultimately neither nonconceptual nor ineffable, since they can be adequately captured by demonstrative concepts of the form THAT MELANCHOLY EXPRESSIVE QUALITY, and hence by corresponding demonstrative language. But there is nonetheless a good deal of truth in the traditional ineffability claim, in that many expressive qualities are descriptively ineffable – they cannot be captured by non-demonstrative descriptive expressions. I also suggest, more briefly, that the descriptive ineffability of expressive qualities represents a significant source of the value of many works. (shrink)

In the paper, titled ‘Choosing death in unjust conditions: hope, autonomy and harm reduction,’ Wiebe and Mullin argue that people living in unjust social conditions are sufficiently autonomous to request medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The ethical issue is that some people may request MAiD primarily because of unjust social conditions, not their illness, disease, disability or decline in capability. It is easily agreed that people living in unjust social conditions can be autonomous. Nevertheless, Wiebe and Mullin fail to appreciate (...) that autonomy is only a necessary condition for MAiD. In addition to autonomy, one must decide that providing assisted dying to a patient because they are living in unjust social conditions is ethical. Central to making this ethical decision is the principle of non-maleficence, famously articulated as ‘do no harm.’ The authors admit that performing MAiD in response to unjust social circumstances is harmful, but they justify this harmful action by appealing to the principle of harm reduction. A fundamental flaw of their approach is that it relies on the legislative definition of intolerable suffering, which is based on circular reasoning and given that 99.2% of patients that have applied for MAiD satisfied this criterion, it is essentially equivalent to no standard/criterion. Canadian society is struggling with the ethical implications of its permissive MAiD programme, and, fundamental to this debate, will be determining the proper balance between autonomy and non-maleficence for people living in unjust social conditions. (shrink)

There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substance dualism given the current state of the debate. The best known type of substance dualism, Cartesian dualism, has traditionally faced a number of (...) objections, but many contemporary philosophers have sought to avoid these by formulating novel versions of the view. I identify three central claims held in common by all forms of substance dualism, consider recent arguments for these claims, and assess how successfully different types of substance dualism respond to the traditional objections. I argue that most contemporary forms of the view still face one or more of three major challenges, from bundle theories of the self, from the recently developed “phenomenal concepts strategy”, and from worries about explanatory simplicity. (shrink)

Descriptions of emotion incidents were extracted from classic American novels of the Romantic, Victorian, and Modern Periods. These descriptions were then rated by respondents on scales relevant to attribution of responsibility for emotions. It was found that ratings of the emotion descriptions differed across the three literary periods, with descriptions from the Romantic Period being rated most intense and most appropriate, descriptions from the Victorian Period as least intense, and descriptions from the Modern Period as least appropriate. In addition, it (...) was found that the contemporary American folk theory of attribution of responsibility for emotions might be characterised as being based on perceived intensity of emotions, the social appropriateness of emotions, and the degree to which persons other than the emoter might be said to be responsible for the emoter's emotion. These findings are supportive of a growing appreciation in the emotion literature for culturally and historically relative approaches to emotion research. (shrink)

The selected effects or ‘etiological’ theory of Proper function is a naturalistic and realist account of biological teleology. It is used to analyse normativity in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of medicine and elsewhere. The theory has been developed with a simple and intuitive view of natural selection. Traits are selected because of their positive effects on the fitness of the organisms that have them. These ‘selected effects’ are the Proper functions of the traits. Proponents argue that this (...) analysis of biological teleology has the unique advantage that the selected effect function of a trait is also a causal explanation of the trait: the trait exists because it performs this function. We show, however, that selected effect functions as currently defined explain the existence of traits only under highly restrictive assumptions about evolutionary dynamics. In many common scenarios in which traits evolve by natural selection, selected effect functions do not explain those traits. This is because definitions of selected effect function extract from any evolutionary scenario only the information that would be explanatorily relevant in the simple evolutionary scenario implicit in those definitions. When applied to more complex scenarios selected effect functions omit the key information that is explanatorily relevant in those scenarios. The assumptions required for selected effect functions to be explanatory are particularly unlikely to hold in the domain that its proponents care most about - the evolution of representation. A more adequate selected effects theory of Proper functions may be possible, but will require much greater attention to the structure of actual evolutionary explanations. (shrink)

Adult humans show exceptional relational ability relative to other species. In this research, we trace the development of this ability in young children. We used a task widely used in comparative research—the relational match-to-sample task, which requires participants to notice and match the identity relation: for example, AA should match BB instead of CD. Despite the simplicity of this relation, children under 4 years of age failed to pass this test (Experiment 1), and their performance did not improve even with (...) initial feedback (Experiment 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, we found that two kinds of symbolic-linguistic experience can facilitate relational reasoning in young children. Our findings suggest that children learn to become adept analogical thinkers, and that language fosters this learning in at least two distinct ways. (shrink)

The most prominent recent model of how concepts can have gradient applicability—that is, apply more fully to some items than to others—is that supplied by the prototype theory. Such a model, however, assumes concepts to be internally individuated and structured, and it might thus be challenged by both concept externalism and conceptual atomism. This paper argues that neither of these challenges presents an obstacle to viewing some concepts as having gradient application, and develops a different model of the conditions for (...) such application. I call the notion of gradient applicability I discuss a feature-based one, and distinguish it from both the prototype theory’s typicality-based notion and a vagueness-based notion. On the model I develop, what determines whether a concept has gradient applicability is just the nature of the property it expresses, not facts about its stereotype. Focusing in particular on Fodor’s Informational Atomism, I argue on this basis that externalism is compatible with gradient applicability for all concepts, and that conceptual atomism is compatible with gradient applicability in the case of natural kind concepts, but not in the case of response-dependent concepts. This does not, however, present an obstacle to viewing some response-dependent concepts as having gradient applicability, for I also argue that in fact atomism cannot be true of response-dependent concepts. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a growing interest in Buddhist thought as a potential source of alternative conceptions of the nature of the mind and the relation between the mental and the physical. This article considers and assesses three different models of what contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from Buddhist thought. One model, advocated by Alan Wallace, holds that we can learn from Buddhist meditation that both individual consciousness and the physical world itself emerge from a deeper, “primordial” consciousness. A (...) second model, supported by Owen Flanagan, maintains that we should accept from Buddhist thought only what is compatible with physicalism, and thus draws from Buddhism only insights into moral psychology and spirituality. Evan Thompson has developed a third, phenomenological approach, which derives from Buddhism a non‐dualistic account of the relation between the mental and the physical, dissolving the “explanatory gap” between them. I suggest that all of these models face significant challenges, and propose a different model derived from the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, which shows the potential to resolve some of the challenges facing contemporary theories of consciousness. (shrink)

The misconception that the application of statistical methods makes psychology a science is examined. Criticisms of statistical methods involving issues related to the generalization of aggregate-level findings to individuals, the impoverished language of numbers, the application of questions to methods, and the logic of statistical hypothesis testing are reviewed. It is not suggested, however, that statistical methods be abandoned. Instead, it is suggested that shortcomings of statistical methods indicate the importance of making ontological considerations a primary concern. Methodological considerations in (...) the absence of an understanding of the truth or ontological status of what is being studied will inevitably undermine psychologists’ efforts at understanding what it is to be human. Whereas the use of statistical methods in psychological research does not make the discipline a science, the truthful affiliation of methodology with ontology may. (shrink)

If SNOMED CT is to serve as a biomedical reference terminology, then steps must be taken to ensure comparability of information formulated using successive versions. New releases are therefore shipped with a history mechanism. We assessed the adequacy of this mechanism for its treatment of the distinction between changes occurring on the side of entities in reality and changes in our understanding thereof. We found that these two types are only partially distinguished and that a more detailed study is required (...) to propose clear recommendations for enhancement along at least the following lines: (1) explicit representation of the provenance of a class; (2) separation of the time-period during which a component is stated valid in SNOMED CT from the period it is (or has been) valid in reality, and (3) redesign of the historical relationships table to give users better assistance for recovery in case of introduced mistakes. (shrink)

Can and should political liberals recognize and otherwise support legal marriage as a matter of basic justice? In this article, we offer a general account of how political liberals should evaluate the issue of whether the legal recognition of marriage is a matter of basic justice. And, we develop and examine some public reason arguments that, given the fundamental interests of citizens, could justify various forms of legal marriage in some contexts. In particular, in certain conditions, the recognition of some (...) form of legal marriage may be the best way to protect the fundamental interests of women as citizens in freely chosen associations. Or, it may be that, in certain conditions, to secure the social conditions necessary for gays, lesbians and bisexuals to be free and equal citizens, some form of legal marriage can or should be recognized. (shrink)

The term "callous" has not, to this point, been studied empirically or considered philosophically in the context of healthcare professionalism. It should be, however, because its uses seem peculiar. Sometimes "callous" is used to suggest that becoming callous confers a benefit of some protection against emotional distress, which might be considered expedient in the healthcare work environment. But, "callous" also refers to a person's unappealing demeanor of hardened insensitivity. The tension between these different moral connotations of "callous" prompts several empirical, (...) psychological, and moral questions; I introduce and entertain a few here. I also suggest a distinction between callousness and inurement and argue for why this distinction is important to appreciate and uphold in health professions education. (shrink)

While ethicists have directed much attention to controversial biomedical issues--including euthanasia, abortion, and genetic engineering--they have largely ignored the less obvious, but more pervasive, everyday ethical problems faced by family physicians. Ethical Issues in Family Medicine addresses these problems, offering an ethics that reflects the distinctive features of family practice, and helping family physicians to appreciate the extent to which ethical issues influence their practice.

The selected effects or ‘etiological’ theory of Proper function is a naturalistic and realist account of biological teleology. It is used to analyse normativity in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of medicine, and elsewhere. The theory has been developed with a simple and intuitive view of natural selection. Traits are selected because of their positive effects on the fitness of the organisms that have them. These ‘selected effects’ are the Proper functions of the traits. Proponents argue that this (...) analysis of biological teleology has the unique advantage that the selected effect function of a trait is also a causal explanation of the trait: the trait exists because it performs this function. We show, however, that selected effect functions as currently defined explain the existence of traits only under highly restrictive assumptions about evolutionary dynamics. In many common scenarios in which traits evolve by natural selection, selected effect functions do not explain those traits. This is because definitions of selected effect function extract from any evolutionary scenario only the information that would be explanatorily relevant in the simple evolutionary scenario implicit in those definitions. When applied to more complex scenarios, selected effect functions omit the key information that is explanatorily relevant in those scenarios. The assumptions required for selected effect functions to be explanatory are particularly unlikely to hold in the domain that its proponents care most about—the evolution of representation. A more adequate selected effects theory of Proper functions may be possible, but will require much greater attention to the structure of actual evolutionary explanations. (shrink)

In writing Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, we aimed to show that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism. To that end, we develop and defend a particular understanding of the commitments of political liberalism. Then, we argue that certain laws and policies are needed to protect and secure the interests of persons as free and equal citizens. We focus on the laws and policies that we think are necessary for gender justice. In particular, we apply our view to the contexts (...) of prostitution law, family and marriage law, state support for caregivers, and religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. In this article, we consider some of the challenges made by the thoughtful critics who are part of this symposium. In particular, we address: why the collective enterprise view of liberal democracy requires shared reasons for the justification of certain laws and policies; how we understand substantive equality and why our understanding of substantive equality does not commit us to a comprehensive doctrine; how we avoid defending a particular political conception of justice in showing that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism; and how it is that, given justice pluralism, public reasons can provide stability for the right reasons. (shrink)

Cognitively-oriented theories have dominated the recent history of the study of emotion. However, critics of this perspective suggest the role of the body in the experience of emotion is largely ignored by cognitive theorists. As an alternative to the cognitive perspective, critics are increasingly pointing to William James’ theory, which emphasized somatic aspects of emotions. This emerging emphasis on the embodiment of emotions is shared by those in the field of AI attempting to model human emotions. Behavior-based agents in AI (...) are attempts to model the role the body might play in the experiencing of emotions. Progress in creating such behavior-based models that function in their environments has been slow, suggesting some potential problems with Jamesian alternatives to cognitive perspectives of emotions. Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of embodiment are suggested as alternatives to James’ and as means for addressing the shortcomings of the cognitive perspective. (shrink)

The idea of public reason is central to political liberalism's aim to provide an account of the possibility of a just and stable democratic society comprised of free and equal citizens who nonetheless are deeply divided over fundamental values. This commitment to the idea of public reason reflects the normative core of political liberalism which is rooted in the principle of democratic legitimacy and the idea of reciprocity among citizens. Yet both critics and defenders of political liberalism disagree over whether (...) or not the idea of public reason permits citizens to appeal to their comprehensive conceptions of the good in public deliberation over matters of basic justice. Our aim in this paper is to provide a defense of an exclusive idea of public reason, and at the same time we aim to dispel the underlying concerns of two prominent criticisms of the idea of public reason—the concern of alienation from the political process, as expressed by religiously oriented critics, and the concern over women's equality, as expressed by feminist critics. We argue that inclusive accounts of the idea of public reason are not consistent with political liberalism's core commitments. Further, we claim, inclusive accounts of the idea of public reason deepen feminist concerns. We think that, properly understood, an exclusive account of the idea of public reason can address feminist concerns about political liberalism and avoid alienating (reasonable) religious persons in an unacceptable way. Thus, we conclude that an exclusive account of the idea of public reason is our best hope for reconciliation. (shrink)

This chapter examines the engagement between seventeenth-century Quaker scholars, twentieth-century Quaker theologian Rufus Jones, and the twelfth-century allegorical text Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān. It argues that HIY was purposely excised from the history of Quaker theological engagement due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the text, which resulted in a complete ignoring of the text by subsequent Quaker theologians, including Rufus Jones. HIY provides an invaluable dialogue partner with Quaker mysticism, which can offer exciting new ways of examining core premises of Quaker (...) mystical theology and practice—human/divine interdependence and the concomitant Quaker balance between contemplative and active mysticism and religious practice—and create opportunities for bringing the different generations of Quaker theology by Robert Barclay and Rufus Jones back into fruitful dialogue. (shrink)

This book is designed for use in courses in law schools and university departments of philosophy. It can serve as a text for basic and advanced courses and seminars. Readings include excerpts of classic works of Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Hobbes, Kant, Bentham, and Austin. Provided also are excerpts from standard works of twentieth century philosophers. The book explores current legal discourse with readings on topics such as sociobiology, Islamic law, the legal process school, legal feminism, critical legal studies, intersectionality and (...) gender identity theories, law and economics, and new private law theories. It reprints leading cases on natural rights/human rights and readings from online blogs, op-ed essays, news stories and internet publications, as well as drawing on literary treatment of topics relevant to legal philosophy. (shrink)

Is a feminist political liberalism possible? Political liberalism’s regard for a wide range of comprehensive doctrines as reasonable makes some feminists skeptical of its ability to address sex inequality. Indeed, some feminists claim that political liberalism maintains its position as a political liberalism at the expense of securing substantive equality for women. We claim that political liberalism’s core commitments actually restrict all reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine substantive equality for all, including women and other marginalized (...) groups. In particular, we argue that political liberalism’s criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that eliminate social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to reasonable democratic deliberation among equal citizens and that the criterion of reciprocity requires the social conditions necessary for recognition respect among persons as equal citizens. As a result, we maintain that the criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship. (shrink)

_Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness_ explores a variety of different approaches to the study of consciousness developed by Buddhist philosophers in classical India and China. It addresses questions that are still being investigated in cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

Christie, Jaye; Stuart, Stephen The United States have experienced devastating attacks on church-state separation in recent decades. The intrusion of religion into affairs of state is more blatant than in Australia, but there is mounting evidence that the religious right is gaining momentum here. As former Australian High Court judge, Michael Kirby, has said, 'The principle of secularism is one of the greatest developments in human rights in the world. We must safeguard and protect it, for it can come under (...) threat in contemporary Australia.'. (shrink)

Beginning with a discussion of why value neutrality on the part of the genetics counselor does not necessarily preserve autonomy of the counselee, the idea that social values unavoidably underlie the articulation of risks and benefits of genetic testing is made explicit. Despite the best efforts of a counselor to convey value neutral facts, risk assessment by the counselee and family is done according to normative analysis, experience with illness, and definitions of health. Each of these factors must be known (...) by the genetic counselor in order to relate those facts which she acknowledges as relevant to the decisions that will be made by those people seeking the genetic information. (shrink)