Analyses of height variation using the 1970 UK national cohort study (12,508 children at age 10 and 5470 at age 16) found clear evidence that children of higher socioeconomic status (as measured by social class, crowding, tenure, type of accommodation, income and receipt of government financial assistance) were on average taller than children of lower socioeconomic status but there was little or no difference in average stature between children living in urban or rural areas. Significant differences in height remained for (...) most of the variables after removing the effects of father’s social class suggesting that reliance on social class perse to explain height variation is inadvisable. (shrink)

The two main ways in which disease and nutrition can influence fertility are by reducing fecundity or by extending the birth interval. Fecundity refers to reproductive ability, that is the potential to breed, as compared to fertility which denotes actual childbearing . Reduced fecundity, which is usually referred to as subfecundity, results from impairment of any of the biological aspects of reproduction, including coital inability, conceptive failure as well as pregnancy loss. Subfecundity is only one factor operating to reduce fertility; (...) other factors include those governing mate exposure and birth control. (shrink)

The population of Campobasso Province shows a level of inbreeding that is distinct from most Italian rural populations, regardless of their geographic location (Fr=0·0040; Fn=0·0102; Ft=0·0142). The genetic structure of the ItalianGreeks of Reggio Calabria Province is similar to other Italians of Campobasso Province (Fr=0·0041; Fn=0·0127; Ft=0·0168). The Italian–Greeks of Lecce Province show random mating, and their inbreeding is in fact very low (Fr=0·0038; Fn=0·0024; Ft=0·0062).

Data on patterns of marriage, differential fertility and mortality were collected from 211 Kotia women residing in Visakhapatnam district of Andhra Pradesh, India. Consanguineous marriages made up just over a quarter of the total, and of these, father's sister's daughter (FSD) were more common than mother's brother's daughter (MBD). The mean inbreeding coefficient for the sample (F) was 0·0172. Women in consanguineous marriages had a lower mean number of total conceptions, live births and living offspring (net fertility) than women in (...) non[hyphen]consanguineous marriages. Significant heterogeneity was found in the means of living offspring for FSD, MBD and non-consanguineous couples, but not for conceptions and live births. (shrink)

SummaryUsing a sample of 2090 father and son pairs, the regional variation in height, weight and body mass index with intra- and inter-generational migration within Britain was examined. Highly significant regional differences in means were found only for fathers. The overall mean height difference between regions ranged from about 2.7 cm to 3.1 cm, with the tallest fathers being found in the East & South-East region and the shortest in Wales. The variation in mean weight between regions was less significant, (...) with the difference between the heaviest region and lightest being about 3.5 kg. For BMI the highest mean was in the North and Wales and the lowest in the South-West. Intra-generational migrants were, on average, significantly taller than non-migrants for both fathers and sons, but BMI was only significant in fathers, with migrant fathers, on average, having a lower BMI. There were no significant differences in weight between geographically mobile groups for either fathers or sons. Differentiating between regional in- and out-migration revealed that in the fathers' generation in-migrants were taller, on average, in six of the nine regions. The tallest in-migrants among fathers came into the North region; the tallest out-migrants were from Yorkshire & Humberside and the shortest were from Scotland. The largest positive gain on fathers' height was in the West Midlands region and Scotland, while negative effects were found in the Yorkshire & Humberside, East Midlands and East & South-East regions. For sons in-migrants were taller in all regions except Wales, with the largest differences between in-migrants and non-migrants being in the South-East and South-West. For out-migrants, the tallest sons came from Wales, while the shortest came from the East Midlands region. The North, East Midlands, East & South-East and West Midlands regions were net gainers, while Wales and Scotland were net losers. For BMI among fathers, in-migrants were of lower BMI than non-migrants. For out-migrant fathers, the North-West and South-West regions were the only two regions showing positive values, with the largest negative values being found in the East Midlands and Yorkshire & Humberside. The net effect of migration indicated that the largest gains were in the East Midlands and Yorkshire & Humberside regions and the largest losses were in Scotland and Wales. The inter-generational migration for BMI showed that in-migrating sons into the North-West and Wales had higher BMI than sedentes, while in-migrants into Yorkshire & Humberside were lower in BMI. In all regions out-migrants had lower BMI than non-migrants. The net effect of migration revealed that six of the nine regions were net gainers, while the Yorkshire & Humberside region was a net loser. (shrink)

SummaryThe relationship between inter-generational social mobility of sons and daughters between 1958 and 1991 and biosocial variables, i.e. birth order, number of children in family, father's social class, region, educational attainment of child and father, educational and cognitive test scores, was studied in a large British cohort study. The data used were collected as part of the British National Child Development Study. The extent of social class mobility was determined inter-generationally and was categorized as none, upwardly mobile or downwardly mobile. (...) All of the biosocial variables were associated with social mobility when analysed separately. Multivariate analyses revealed that the most significant predictor of mobility categories in both sexes was education of the cohort member, followed by social class of the father. In both sexes mathematics score was a significant predicator, while in sons reading and non-verbal IQ scores were also important predictors. In the light of these results, it appears that social mobility in Britain takes place largely on meritocratic principles. (shrink)

SummaryUsing a sample of 2090 British father and son pairs the relationships between social and geographical intra- and inter-generational mobility were examined in relation to height, weight and body mass index. There was much more social mobility than geographical migration. Social mobility and geographical migration were not independent: socially non-mobile fathers and sons were more likely to be geographical non-migrants, and upwardly socially mobile fathers and sons were more likely to be regional migrants. Upwardly socially mobile fathers and sons were, (...) on average, taller and had a lower BMI than non-mobile and downwardly mobile fathers and sons. In general, no significant associations were found between geographical migration and height or weight. Migrating fathers had a lower BMI than sedentes, as did their sons who migrated between 1965 and 1991. There was no significant interaction that indicated that social mobility and geographical migration were acting in a simple additive way on height, weight and BMI. (shrink)

Analyses of the height variation of 16-year-old members of the British National Child Development Study revealed a number of biological and social variables which associated with stature. After multiple regression analyses only eight variables, namely social class, family size, tenure , crowding status, number of children sleeping in the bed, region of the country, sex of child, and pubic hair rating, remained significant. The total variation explained by these biosocial variables was 37·5%.

Surnames of grandparents were collected from children in the primary schools of the AlbanianItalian and Greek–Italian villages of southern Italy and Sicily. The coefficients of relationships by isonymy show almost no relationship with ethnicity. Ethnolinguistic minorities of southern Italy and Sicily are geographically subdivided into two main clusters: the first cluster comprises the Albanian, Croat and Greek communities of the Adriatic area; and the second cluster comprises the Albanian and Greek communities of the Ionian, Thirrenian and Sicilian areas.

Surnames were obtained for the second half of the 20th century from civil and religious marriage registers on fifteen Provençal-Italian and five Italian villages of Cuneo Province, Italy. To insert in the analysis an outward comparison, surnames from two Italian villages of Turin Province, one parish of Turin, one village of Alessandria Province and one village of Asti Province were also collected. Ethnicity does not seem to be the main factor affecting the present genetic structure of the Provençal-Italians. They are (...) an open community, and evidence the end of the genetic isolation of the alpine populations. (shrink)

Recent develops in AI technology have led to increasingly sophisticated forms of video manipulation. One such form has been the advent of deepfakes. Deepfakes are AI-generated videos that typically depict people doing and saying things they never did. In this paper, I demonstrate that there is a close structural relationship between deepfakes and more traditional fake barn cases in epistemology. Specifically, I argue that deepfakes generate an analogous degree of epistemic risk to that which is found in traditional cases. Given (...) that barn cases have posed a long-standing challenge for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge, I consider whether a similar challenge extends to deepfakes. In doing so, I consider how Duncan Pritchard’s recent anti-risk virtue epistemology meets the challenge. While Pritchard’s account avoids problems in traditional barn cases, I claim that it leads to local scepticism about knowledge from online videos in the case of deepfakes. I end by considering how two alternative virtue-theoretic approaches might vindicate our epistemic dependence on videos in an increasingly digital world. (shrink)

Contemporary republicanism is characterized by three main ideas: free persons, who are not subject to the arbitrary power of others; free states, which try to protect their citizens from such power without exercising it themselves; and vigilant citizenship, as a means to limit states to their protective role. This book advances an economic model of such republicanism that is ideologically centre-left. It demands an exit-oriented state interventionism, one that would require an activist government to enhance competition and resource exit from (...) dominating relationships within markets of all types, be they marital, labour, or residential. The substantial intervention and redistribution necessitated by such an approach make it leftist, while its tendency to work with rather than against the grain of markets makes it centrist. It is, in short, a contribution to progressive republican political thought, but one that is less social-democratic than market-democratic in character. (shrink)

I argue that considerations pertaining to constitutive luck undermine historicism—the view that an agent’s history can determine whether or not she is morally responsible. The main way that historicists have motivated their view is by appealing to certain cases of manipulation. I argue, however, that since agents can be morally responsible for performing some actions from characters with respect to which they are entirely constitutively lucky, and since there is no relevant difference between these agents and agents who have been (...) manipulated into acting from a character bestowed upon them by their manipulators, we should give up historicism. After presenting this argument and defending it against some potential objections, I briefly criticize the standard structuralist alternative and propose a new structuralist position that is shaped by reflection on constitutive luck. (shrink)

Aesthetic non-inferentialism is the widely-held thesis that aesthetic judgements either are identical to, or are made on the basis of, sensory states like perceptual experience and emotion. It is sometimes objected to on the basis that testimony is a legitimate source of such judgements. Less often is the view challenged on the grounds that one’s inferences can be a source of aesthetic judgements. This paper aims to do precisely that. According to the theory defended here, aesthetic judgements may be unreasoned, (...) insofar as they are immediate judgements made on the basis of, and acquiring their justification from, causally prior sensory states. Yet they may also be reasoned, insofar as they may be the outputs of certain inferences. Crucially, a token aesthetic judgement may be unreasoned and reasoned, simultaneously. A key reason for allowing inference a serious role in aesthetic judgements emerges from reflection upon the nature of aesthetic expertise. (shrink)

Deepfakes are extremely realistic audio/video media. They are produced via a complex machine-learning process, one that centrally involves training an algorithm on hundreds or thousands of audio/video recordings of an object or person, S, with the aim of either creating entirely new audio/video media of S or else altering existing audio/video media of S. Deepfakes are widely predicted to have deleterious consequences (principally, moral and epistemic ones) for both individuals and various of our social practices and institutions. In this introduction (...) to the Topical Collection, I first survey existing philosophical research on deepfakes (Sects. 2 and 3). I then give an overview of the papers that comprise the Collection (Sect. 4). Finally, I conclude with remarks on a line of argument made in a number of papers in the Topical Collection: that deepfakes may cause their own demise (Sect. 5). (shrink)

It is widely thought that, to be morally responsible for some action or omission, an agent must have had, at the very least, the general ability to do otherwise. As we argue, however, there are counterexamples to the claim that moral responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise. We present several cases in which agents lack the general ability to do otherwise and yet are intuitively morally responsible for what they do, and we argue that such cases raise problems (...) for various kinds of accounts of moral responsibility. We suggest two alternative approaches to thinking about the connection between moral responsibility and abilities to do otherwise, one of which denies that there is any ability-to-do-otherwise requirement on moral responsibility and the other of which requires only an opportunity to do otherwise. We also argue that a general-ability-to-do-otherwise requirement not only faces counterexamples but also lacks positive motivation. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers have turned their attention to developments in Artificial Intelligence, and in particular to deepfakes. A deepfake is a portmanteau of ‘deep learning' and ‘fake', and for the most part they are videos which depict people doing and saying things they never did. As a result, much of the emerging literature on deepfakes has turned on questions of trust, harms, and information-sharing. In this paper, I add to the emerging concerns around deepfakes by drawing (...) on resources from vice epistemology. As deepfakes become more sophisticated, I claim, they will develop to be a source of online epistemic corruption. More specifically, they will encourage consumers of digital online media to cultivate and manifest various epistemic vices. My immediate focus in this paper is on their propensity to encourage the development of what I call ‘intellectual cynicism'. After sketching a rough account of this epistemic vice, I go on to suggest that we can partially offset such cynicism – and fears around deceptive online media more generally – by encouraging the development what I term a trained ‘digital sensibility'. This, I contend, involves a calibrated sensitivity to the epistemic merits of online content. (shrink)

What is the relationship between perception and mental imagery? I aim to eliminate an answer that I call perceptualism about mental imagery. Strong perceptualism, defended by Bence Nanay, predictive processing theorists, and several others, claims that imagery is a kind of perceptual state. Weak perceptualism, defended by M. G. F. Martin and Matthew Soteriou, claims that mental imagery is a representation of a perceptual state, a view sometimes called The Dependency Thesis. Strong perceptualism is to be rejected since it misclassifies (...) imagery disorders and abnormalities as perceptual disorders and abnormalities. Weak Perceptualism is to be rejected since it gets wrong the aim and accuracy conditions of a whole class of mental imagery–projected mental imagery–and relies on an impoverished concept of perceptual states, ignoring certain of their structural features. Whatever the relationship between perception and imagery, the perceptualist has it wrong. (shrink)

This lucid and wide-ranging volume constitutes a self-contained introduction to the elements and key issues of the philosophy of language.

The terminological boxes into which we press the history of philosophy often obscure deep and important differences among major figures supposedly belonging to a single school of thought. One such disparity within the phenomenological movement, often overlooked but by no means invisible, separates Merleau-Pontys Phenomenology of Perception from the Husserlian program that initially inspired it. For Merleau-Pontys phenomenology amounts to a radical, if discreet, departure not only from Husserls theory of intentionality generally, but more specifically from his account of the (...) intentional constitution of the body and its role in perceptual experience. (shrink)

Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear both (...) (1.) that the dependence response does not beg the question against the proponent of the incompatibility argument and (2.) that the dependence response advances the dialectic whether it is developed as a version of Ockhamism or as a version of multiple-pasts compatibilism. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a version of compatibilism against luck-related objections. After introducing the types of luck that some take to be problematic for moral responsibility, I consider and respond to two recent attempts to show that compatibilism faces the same problem of luck that libertarianism faces—present luck. I then consider a different type of luck—constitutive luck—and provide a new solution to this problem. One upshot of the present discussion is a reason to prefer a history-sensitive compatibilist account over (...) a purely nonhistorical structuralist account. (shrink)

Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive (...) penetration less well-explained, even when formulated with so-called ‘standpoints’ or ‘third relata.’. (shrink)

In response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian (...) accounts of freedom and responsibility—an especially tricky task given that libertarian accounts are a motley set. I conclude that if manipulation arguments reveal any theoretical cost then it is one borne by all accounts according to which we are free and responsible, not by compatibilism in particular. (shrink)

Although convinced by Frankfurt-style cases that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, semicompatibilists have not wanted to accept a parallel claim about moral responsibility for omissions, and so they have accepted asymmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and omissions. In previous work, I have presented a challenge to various attempts at defending this asymmetry. My view is that semicompatibilists should give up these defenses and instead adopt symmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and omissions, (...) and in this paper I highlight three advantages of doing so: first, it avoids a strange implication of the truth of determinism; second, it allows for a principled reply to Philip Swenson’s recent ‘No Principled Difference Argument’; third, it provides a reason to reject a crucial inference rule invoked by Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Direct Argument’ for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. (shrink)

Some compatibilists are internalists. On their view, whether an agent is morally responsible for an action depends only on her psychological structure at that time. Other compatibilists are externalists. On their view, an agent’s history can make a difference as to whether or not she is morally responsible. In response to worries about manipulation, some internalists have claimed that compatibilism requires internalism. Recently, Alfred Mele has argued that this internalist response is untenable. The aim of this paper is to vindicate (...) the claim that compatibilism requires internalism, showing where Mele’s argument goes wrong along the way. (shrink)