Mentalization is a form of social cognition that enables to perceive and interpret human behaviour in terms of intentional mental states and is influenced by social context. Hence, we examined mentalization related to specific attachment relationships. This study involved 115 participants who reported their relationship-specific and global attachment styles, and perspective-taking tendency towards their attachment figures. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task-Revised was used as a proxy for mentalization disregarding relationships. The results showed that perspective-taking was associated with relationship-specific (...) attachment avoidance whereas global characteristics of mentalization were not related to attachment quality. Our findings indicate that the link between attachment quality and mentalization is relationship-specific. (shrink)

A comprehensive understanding of participants’ motives to complete web-based surveys has the potential to improve data quality. In this study we tested the construct validity of a scale developed to measure motivation to participate in webbased surveys. We expected that 7 different motivations observed in our previous study will form a 3-factor structure, as predicted by Self-Determination Theory. This web-based questionnaire study comprised 257 participants completing the Voluntary Participation in Online Studies Scale. Their responses to 21 items underwent a principal (...) component analysis and confi rmatory factor analysis. As we expected, three factors were identifi ed: intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation and amotivation. In line with Self-Determination Theory there are three distinct groups of motives among web-surveys participants with amotivation as an understudied motivational state. We discuss the results suggesting which types of motivation might lead to higher quality of data with an emphasis on possible negative effects of amotivation. (shrink)

Curiosity is a personality trait that is inversely related to depression and positively related to subjective wellbeing. However, the relationship between curiosity and these two outcomes is still unclear which hampers our general understanding of well-being. Based on research within positive psychology that showed character strengths such as curiosity can indirectly decrease depression, we hypothesized that the inverse relationship between curiosity and depression would be mediated by subjective well-being. Two hundred and fifty seven participants, between 18 and 64 years old (...) completed a web-based survey comprising: The Curiosity and Exploration Inventory - II, Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression and the Steen Happiness Index. We found that well-being mediated the relationship between curiosity and depression. The results indicate that curious individuals tend to report higher levels of subjective well-being which, in turn, is associated with lower levels of depression. Our findings contribute to the understanding of positive results obtained from clinical samples that underwent positive psychotherapy of depression. (shrink)

Representational accounts of painful experiences, which characterize contents of pain in indicative terms, face a serious problem known as the Messenger-Shooting Objection. This problem arises from the fact that indicative representational accounts do not seem to be able to accommodate the observation that painful experiences rationalize actions aimed towards their own removal. I present a novel representational account of painful experiences which can solve the Messenger-Shooting Objection while still being an indicative representational theory. I argue that the proposed account is (...) also coherent with the contemporary scientific paradigm concerning pains. (shrink)

Ireneusz Ziemiański argues that idolatry belongs to the essence of religion and for this reason a non-idolatrous religion is impossible. I formulate three objections to this thesis: the objection from "religion zero", the objection from the accidental act of worship and the objection from the non-relevance of ontic distance. The objection from “religion zero” refers to the possibility of the existence of an individual and non-institutionalised religion, thus lacking the components of typical religions that are constantly threatened by idolatry. The (...) objection from the accidental act of worship suggests that it is possible that someone confuses the object of his own act of worship and unconsciously worships God without committing idolatry. The objection from the non-relevance of ontic distance indicates that the transcendence of God is not an obstacle to worship, but a necessary condition for it. (shrink)

In the contemporary analytic discussions concerning human olfactory perception, it is commonly claimed that (1) olfactory experiences are representations having content and (2) olfactory experiences represent odours, like coffee odour or vanilla odour. However, despite these common assumptions, there seems to be an ontological controversy between two views: the first states that odours are perceptually represented as features and the second states that they are represented as objects. In this paper, I aim to systematically address the Bfeature or object^ status (...) of represented odours by concerning whether odours are represented (a) as subjects of properties, (b) as mereological wholes, and (c) entities persisting in a way characteristic for objects. I argue that olfactorily represented odours constitute a sui generis category and cannot be easily classified as objects or features. Such investigations constitute a step in establishing whether various human modalities are unified by organising the environment according to the same categories. (shrink)

Grzegorz Musiał’s late work is exemplary of the Modernist coupling of desire and death, which German Ritz linked to the way that homosexual sensibility has been encoded in Polish literary Modernism. This reading of Musiał is paradoxical at heart, as the writer’s literary output must also be ridden with tensions, because his clinging to a bygone aesthetic in order to render homosexual desire seems quaint in an era in which the idea of gay emancipation is widespread. Musiał’s literary alter ego, (...) who is realized as a fictional character and as the speaker in his poems, is a hybrid of an erudite homosexual male equipped with the classical sensibility and a devout Catholic, whose appreciation and outright enjoyment of church ritual is almost camp. Musiał attempts to pit this literary dummy against the usually younger homosexual men who, like a mob of the living dead, populate the underground world of night clubs and anonymous sex. (shrink)

Teizm probabilistyczny Dariusza Łukasiewicza to teizm, który nobilituje pojęcie przypadku i wyjaśnia rolę, jaką ono odgrywa w kontekście opatrzności Bożej. Epistemolog może jednak zainteresować się kwestią o wiele bardziej podstawową i zapytać, czy nasze przekonania dotyczące przypadku można określić mianem wiedzy? Artykuł podzielony jest na trzy części. W pierwszej omawiam wybrane sposoby uzasadniania wiedzy o przypadku: uzasadnienie zdroworozsądkowe, pragmatyczne, empiryczne i aprioryczne, i konkluduję, że posiadamy wiedzę tychiczną w odniesieniu do przypadku nieintencjonalnego, epistemicznego, probabilistycznego i kauzalnego. W części drugiej podejmuję (...) problem sceptycyzmu w kwestii przypadku i sugeruję, że znaczącą rolę w dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem tychicznym odgrywają standardy racjonalności. W części trzeciej odnoszę się do dyskutowanego przez Łukasiewicza pojęcia przypadku kompozytywnego i twierdzę, że: nie dysponujemy wiedzą na temat tak rozumianego przypadku; oraz, że nie należy tego faktu traktować jako racji na rzecz sceptycyzmu tychicznego. (shrink)

Podstawowym celem artykułu jest przybliżenie dyskursu wokół możliwości regulacji gospodarki współdzielenia (ang. sharing economy) oraz omówienie potencjalnych instrumentów polityki publicznej, które mogą służyć do ograniczenia negatywnych skutków rozwoju tego systemu gospodarczego. Artykuł w pierwszej kolejności przybliża rozumienie koncepcji regulacji i régulation oraz omawia związki gospodarki współdzielenia z koncepcją współzarządzania cyfrowego. Następnie po przybliżeniu wybranych pozytywnych i negatywnych efektów gospodarki współdzielenia wskazane zostają wybrane instrumenty regulacyjne. W podsumowaniu wskazano na możliwe kierunki dalszych badań.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse approaches to the sharing economy from the perspective of public policy science. In the first part of the text, attention is paid to perceiving the development of the emerging sharing economy not only as phenomenon with positive economic effects but also as a set of public problems (e.g., on the labour market and for existing economic structures) that require intervention at the level of national governments as well as at international level. Subsequent (...) sections identify possible actions for regulating the development of the sharing economy. The role of soft law, stakeholders’ networks, self-regulation and standardisation are discussed in the chapter. The summary includes potential directions for further research. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to try to answer the question of the nature of Kantian project of the transcendental philosophy. Is it, in real, as Kant by himself says, that his philosophy, as the critic of the pure theoretical reason presupposes, is merely the preparation the ground under the metaphysics, and merely asks the question of the possibility of metaphysics at all, or rather Kant's system of the theoretical philosophy called by Kant as formal or transcendental idealism (...) can be classified as one of the main ontological systems: ontological realism or idealism, in the classical sense. I think the crucial notion, which can help to solve this problem, is the notion of reality used by Kant in several meanings and contexts which I am going to examine in this article. (shrink)

Introduction to the topical collection "The Structure of Perceptual Objects"—with contributions by Mohan Matthen, EJ Green, Alisa Mandrigin, Blazej Skrzypulec, and Anna Drożdżowicz.

The main goal of the paper is to sketch an ontological model of visual content at the low- and medium-level of visual processing, relying on psychological conceptions of vision. It is argued that influential cognitive models contain assumptions concerning “objects of content,” that is, objects whose presence is a necessary condition of the adequacy of visual representations. Subsequently, the structure of considered objects of content is presented, and its development through the perceptual process is described. In addition, during the course (...) of the article I present some connections between analytic metaphysics and the ontology of visual content. (shrink)

Jeff Speaks twierdzi, że teiści bytu doskonałego powinno powstrzymać się od przypisywania Bogu atrybutów i przyjąć agnostycyzm w kwestii natury Boga. Powodem, dla którego mieliby dokonać takiego ograniczenia, jest problem ukrytych atrybutów. Nawet jeśli teista bytu doskonałego zdoła przypisać Bogu taki zestaw atrybutów, który nie będzie przejawiał żadnych niespójności, to i tak – zdaniem Speaksa – najrozsądniejszym wyborem w sprawie natury Boga będzie agnostycyzm. Speaks przekonuje, że choć możliwa jest sytuacja, w której teista proponuje spójny zestaw atrybutów Boga, to nie (...) może zagwarantować, że między owym zestawem a ukrytymi atrybutami Boga (tymi, które są dla człowieka poznawczo niedostępne) nie dojdzie do konfliktu. Wobec poglądu Speaksa formułuję trzy zarzuty: zarzut z niemożliwości wykazania niespójności, zarzut z częściowej ukrytości atrybutów oraz zarzut z alternatywnego ujęcia transcendencji. Pierwszy zarzut polega na wskazaniu, że niemożliwe jest stwierdzenie zachodzenia faktycznej niespójności między atrybutami jawnymi a ukrytymi. Teista bytu doskonałego może podkreślać, że sama możliwość niespójności między atrybutami to nie to samo, co jej faktyczne zachodzenie. Jeśli tak, to nie widać mocnego powodu, aby teista bytu doskonałego był zmuszony do opowiedzenia się za agnostycyzmem w sprawie natury Boga. Drugi zarzut zawiera się w uwadze, że stanowisko Speaksa odwołuje się do pojęcia atrybutów ukrytych absolutnie. Można jednak zachować pojęcie atrybutów ukrytych, jednocześnie nieco je osłabiając przez mówienie o częściowej ukrytości atrybutów. Owo słabsze pojęcie atrybutów ukrytych nie wymusza na teiście przyjęcia agnostycyzmu, gdyż jeżeli przypisuje on Bogu atrybuty ukryte częściowo, to jednak posiada pewną wiedzę na temat Boga. Trzeci zarzut podkreśla, że zmieniając koncepcję transcendencji, można zrezygnować z pojęcia ukrytych atrybutów, jakie proponuje Speaks. Teista ma więc przynajmniej trzy sposoby uniknięcia agnostycyzmu w kwestii natury Boga. (shrink)

Jacek Wojtysiak twierdzi, że powołując się na zachodzenie wielkiego faktu wiary, można wykazać przewagę teizmu nad ateizmem. Wobec tego poglądu formułuję trzy zarzuty: zarzut z rocznika statystycznego, zarzut z najmniejszego faktu wiary oraz zarzut z niempirycznych racji. Zarzut z rocznika statystycznego zwraca uwagę na fakt, że wielkość faktu wiary jest zawsze zrelatywizowana do momentu w czasie, w którym jest on stwierdzany. A to rodzi pytanie, na który fakt powinien powołać się teista. Zarzut z niewielkiego faktu wiary sugeruje, że w sporze (...) między teizmem a ateizmem nie ma znaczenia, czy fakt wiary podlega pluralizacji, a więc jak wielu podmiotów dotyczy. Zarzut z nieempirycznych racji promuje pogląd, w myśl którego ustalenie empirycznych okoliczności funkcjonowania określonych religii nie zbliża teisty i ateisty do rozstrzygnięcia prowadzonego przez nich sporu. (shrink)

For many years there has been a debate in truthmaking theory between proponents of the substantive and deflationary approaches. Substantivists about truthmaking maintain that we need entities called truthmakers, while deflationists of truthmaking argue that the asymmetric form of the T-schema is sufficient. In contrast to incompatibilists, who argue that one should adopt only one of these approaches, I propose a compatibilist theory of truthmaking in which the two approaches complement each other through the distribution of different functions of truthmaking. (...) I find that this helps to solve the problem of truthmaking of certain contentious truths, such as negative truths. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a lot of skepticism about the existence of facts. It seems that one of the last places for their application is in truthmaking theory. In this paper I discuss two approaches to the use of facts in truthmaking. The first, categorial, holds that facts are entities that belong to one of three ontological categories (true propositions, truth of propositions, instantiations of universals).The second, deflationary, holds that a fact is merely a functional concept denoting any (...) entity that performs a truthmaking function. I argue that in the face of significant criticism of categorial facts as truthmakers, a defender of facts may resort to the deflationary concept. Nevertheless, even in this case we can do without facts as truthmakers. (shrink)

W artykule analizuję sposób, w jaki psychologiczne i neuronaukowe teorie percepcji wzrokowej posługują się pojęciem przedmiotu. Skupię się na dwóch koncepcjach, które wychodząc z odmiennych perspektyw badawczych, starają się rozwiązać tzw. problem scalania (binding problem) w percepcji. W analizie wykorzystuję pojęcia używane na gruncie analitycznej metafizyki, wskazując, że teoretyczna odmienność rozważanych koncepcji przekłada się na różnice w zakładanej przez nie charakterystyce przedmiotu. W metodologicznej części tekstu staram się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak za pomocą kategorii zaczerpniętych ze współczesnej metafizyki można zanalizować (...) używane w teoriach problemu scalania pojęcie przedmiotu. W części drugiej prezentuję wyniki analizy w odniesieniu do psychologicznej teorii FIT (Feature Integration Theory, np. Treisman 1999) oraz modelu neuronalnej synchronizacji Schillena i Königa (1994, dalej model SK). (shrink)

Od opublikowania tekstu Maxa Blacka The Identity of Indiscernibles (1952) — stanowiącego locus classicus analitycznych dyskusji dotyczących obowiązywania zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych — minęło już blisko 60 lat. W rozlicznych tekstach napisanych od tego czasu niejednokrotnie zwracano uwagę, że rozwiązanie problemu w dużej mierze determinowane jest przez przyjęte założenia, np. odnośnie zaakceptowanej wersji zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych (np. Adams 1979) lub natury przestrzeni (np. O’Connor 1976). W poniższym tekście postaram się pokazać, w jaki sposób zmiany w przyjętych założeniach wpływają na (...) wnioski dotyczące obowiązywania zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych. Dodatkowo wskażętakże na pewne związki pomiędzy koncepcjami indywidualności a rozstrzygnięciami dotyczącymi odróżnialności. (shrink)

It seems plausible that visual experiences of darkness have perceptual phenomenal content that clearly differentiates them from absences of visual experiences. I argue, relying on psychological results concerning auditory attention, that the analogous claim is true about auditory experiences of silence. More specifically, I propose that experiences of silence present empty spatial directions like ‘right’ or ‘left’, and so have egocentric spatial content. Furthermore, I claim that such content is genuinely auditory and phenomenal in the sense that one can, in (...) principle, recognize that one is experiencing silence. This position is far from obvious, as the majority of theories concerning silence perception do not ascribe perceptual phenomenal content to experiences of silence. (shrink)

It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called, “Many Properties problem”, i.e. it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some elements of content as subjects, to which (...) features are attributed by a predication-like relation. In this paper, I reconsider this solution and claim that the Many Properties problem can be solved without invoking the notion of “subject”. What is more, I argue that an alternative approach has stronger justification given the empirical data concerning human vision. (shrink)

Being as Event: Hegel’s Philosophy in the Interpretation of Jean-Luc Nancy This paper examines Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation of Hegel, focusing in particular on the category of an event. For Nancy, the closure of metaphysics means among other things the dislocation of the foundationalist of the being and to start thinking about the event as the surprise. The event is characterized by a structural unexpectedness because of its disturbing and surprising nature. That’s why being is in conflict with the present, with (...) being’s substantial, founding essentiality. (shrink)

One of the main functions of visual system is to construct representations of objects. These ‘visual objects’ are formed by developing the structure of more primitive visual representations. In the course of the article, I define the notions of ‘minimal visual object’, ‘maximal-non object representation’, and ‘constructing characteristic’ that differentiates minimal objects from maximal non-objects. Relying on these distinctions, I consider the type of ontological change that transforms visual regions, treated as maximal non-object representations, into basic, low-level visual objects. In (...) order to identify such a change, theories of early vision, models of figure/ground distinction, and analytic, ontological notions of objects’ structure are discussed. Finally, a thesis is stated that external relations constitute the main structural factor that determines the ontological transition between non-object representations and visual objects. (shrink)

When it comes to the mind-body problem, different kinds of physicalism were the most popular approaches among philosophers. The presence of anomalous monism with its lack of (the) laws concerning mental events and multiple realizability led to a doubt regarding reductionism and a slow movement away from it. It did not, however, weaken the popularity of physicalism. Thus, the problem that had to be faced was to create such a form of physicalism that would reject the reduction of what was (...) mental to what was physical. No difference of one sort without a difference of another sort is a slogan that expresses the idea of supervenience, the idea that according to many philosophers was supposed to be the right expression of physicalism of this particular type. The text briefly presents the intuitions that are hidden behind the notion of supervenience and its main varieties: weak, strong and global. Moreover, the text touches upon the fault of supervenience which was observed in its symmetry and, most of all, in its triviality. This type of fault would force the philosophers to admit that this relation is metaphysically irrelevant. (shrink)

It seems that there are important differences concerning the way in which space itself is presented in visual and tactile modalities. In the case of vision, it is usually accepted that visual objects are experienced as located in a visual field. However, it is controversial whether similar field-like characteristics can be attributed to the space in which tactile entities are experienced to be located. The paper investigates whether postulating the presence of a tactile field is justified. I argue that the (...) answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ due to the dual nature of touch: touch is both an interoceptive modality that presents states of one’s body and an exteroceptive modality that presents external entities. More specifically, the interoceptive tactile space has a character of a spatial field. On the other hand, the exteroceptive tactile space does not have characteristics necessary for ascribing the field-status. (shrink)

Bodily awareness seems to present the body as a topologically connected whole, composed of many parts. In consequence, the source of topological and mereological content of bodily awareness comes into question. In particular, it may be asked whether (a) such content is provided by the bodily sense, i.e., sensory mechanisms which, like proprioception, presents the body “from the inside,” or (b) it is a product of “exteroceptive” elements of bodily awareness, which represents the body “from the outside” in a similar (...) way to that of other physical objects. This paper argues that while passive touch and proprioception are unlikely to present the body as a topological and a mereological whole, such content is likely to be provided by kinesthesis. In consequence, it is plausible that holistic topological and mereological bodily content is present in virtue of certain mechanisms of bodily sense. (shrink)

Essential properties are usually thought as properties that things must always possess, whereas accidental properties are considered as changeable. In this paper, we challenge this traditional view. We argue that in some important cases, such as social or biological development, we face not only the change of accidents, but also the change of essences. To analyze this kind of change we propose an alternative view on the relations between the modalities and time. Some properties might be necessary or possible for (...) a thing in a classical sense throughout its existence, whereas others might be necessary or possible only for some restricted periods. We distinguish therefore absolute, prospective, retrospective, and relative modalities. As we argue, these non-classical concepts of modality are useful in analysis of some puzzling case of seemingly changing essences. (shrink)

In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a (...) negative thesis—that the main experimental paradigms used in studying unconscious color perception do not provide support for the position that conscious and unconscious color representations have the same type of content. More specifically, I claim that there is no significant support for the claim that unconscious vision categorically represents surface colors. (shrink)

Discussions concerning the modularity of the pain system have been focused on questions regarding the cognitive penetrability of pain mechanisms. It has been claimed that phenomena such as placebo analgesia demonstrate that the pain system is cognitively penetrated; therefore, it is not encapsulated from central cognition. However, important arguments have been formulated which aim to show that cognitive penetrability does not in fact entail a lack of modularity of the pain system. This paper offers an alternative way to reject the (...) modularity of the pain system, which is independent from, but consistent with, the presence of cognitive penetration. It is proposed that, given the current knowledge regarding the functioning and the structure of the pain system, there are good reasons to accept that certain central cognitive mechanisms are part of the pain system. It is argued that such a ‘cognitive constitution’ of the pain system entails that the pain system is not modular. (shrink)

Philosophical considerations regarding experiential spatial content have focused on exteroceptive sensations presenting external entities, and not on interoceptive experiences that present states of our own body. A notable example is studies on interoceptive touch, in which it is argued that interoceptive tactile experiences have rich spatial content such that tactile sensations are experienced as located in a spatial field. This paper investigates whether a similarly rich spatial content can be attributed to experiences of acute, cutaneous pain. It is argued that (...) such experiences of pain do not have field-like content, as they do not present distance relations between painful sensations. (shrink)

Philosophers often state that the persistence of objects in vision is experienced differently than the persistence of sounds in audition. This difference is expressed by using metaphors from the metaphysical endurantism/perdurantism debate. For instance, it is claimed that only sounds are perceived as “temporally extended”. The paper investigates whether it is justified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities: endurants and perdurants respectively. This issue is analyzed from the perspective of major specifications of (...) the endurance/perdurance distinction connected, inter alia, with the notions of temporal parts and temporal localization. It is argued that it is unjustified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities in respect of how they persist. On the other hand, the apparent difference in the way of persisting can be explained by the presence of contingent differences between typical visual and auditory experiences. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception often claim that usual perceptual experiences not only present particulars but also phenomenally present them as particulars. Nevertheless, despite the initial plausibility of this thesis, it is not clear what exactly it means to say that particularity is phenomenally presented. The paper aims to provide a deeper analysis of the claim that perceptual experiences phenomenally present objects as particulars. In doing so, I distinguish two theses regarding phenomenally presented particularity: Generic Particularity and Specific Particularity. According to the (...) first thesis, vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as a general characteristic that may be shared by many entities. The second thesis states that vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as an individual characteristic unique to each particular. I argue that, relying on knowledge concerning the functioning of perceptual mechanisms, vision does not phenomenally present generic particularity but it has certain abilities for presenting specific particularity. (shrink)

While there is a growing philosophical interest in analysing olfactory experiences, the mereological structure of odours considered in respect of how they are perceptually experienced has not yet been extensively investigated. The paper argues that odours are perceptually experienced as having a mereological structure, but this structure is significantly different from the spatial mereological structure of visually experienced objects. Most importantly, in the case of the olfactory part-structure, the classical weak supplementation principle is not satisfied. This thesis is justified by (...) referring to empirical results in olfactory science concerning the human ability to identify components in complex olfactory stimuli. Further, it is shown how differences between olfactory and visual mereologies may arise from the way in which these modalities represent space. (shrink)

The usual visual experiences possess a perspectival phenomenology as they seem to present objects from a certain perspective. Nevertheless, it is not obvious how to characterise experiential content determining such phenomenology. In particular, while there are many works investigating perspectival properties of experienced objects, a question regarding how subject is represented in visual perspectival experiences attracted less attention. In order to address this problem, I consider four popular phenomenal intuitions regarding perspectival experiences and argue that the major theories of perspectival (...) experiences do not account for all of them. Relying on these observations, I show how a theory which accommodates all these intuitions can be developed by (a) recognising that visual perspectival experiences are, in fact, multimodal visuo-bodily experiences and (b) distinguishing between egocentric and structural contents. (shrink)

While philosophers of perception develop representational theories of olfactory experiences, there are doubts regarding whether features of olfactory perception can be accommodated within the representationalist framework. In particular, it is argued that the function of olfaction is not to represent stimuli but rather to evaluate it. The paper claims that the major representational accounts of olfaction have problems in accommodating the evaluative aspects of olfactory phenomenology. However, an alternative position, named “olfactory evaluativism,” is proposed which is free of these problems (...) and may serve as a foundation for further developments of representational approach to olfactory experiences. (shrink)

The paper presents a new philosophical theory of blurred vision according to which visual experiences have two types of content: exteroceptive content, characterizing external entities, and interoceptive content, characterizing the state of the visual system. In particular, it is claimed that blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively presents acuity of vision in relation to eye focus. The proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content and with the strong transparency thesis formulated in terms of mind-independentness. Furthermore, (...) the interoceptive approach is free from controversial assumptions adopted by other philosophical theories of blurred experiences and is able to account for the epistemic and motivational role of visual blur, i.e. that blurred experiences provide a prima facie justification for beliefs regarding our vision and motivate actions directed toward our eyes. (shrink)