The current paper synthesizes theory and data from the field of life history (LH) evolution to advance a new developmental theory of variation in human LH strategies. The theory posits that clusters of correlated LH traits (e.g., timing of puberty, age at sexual debut and first birth, parental investment strategies) lie on a slow-to-fast continuum; that harshness (externally caused levels of morbidity-mortality) and unpredictability (spatial-temporal variation in harshness) are the most fundamental environmental influences on the evolution and development of LH (...) strategies; and that these influences depend on population densities and related levels of intraspecific competition and resource scarcity, on age schedules of mortality, on the sensitivity of morbidity-mortality to the organism’s resource-allocation decisions, and on the extent to which environmental fluctuations affect individuals versus populations over short versus long timescales. These interrelated factors operate at evolutionary and developmental levels and should be distinguished because they exert distinctive effects on LH traits and are hierarchically operative in terms of primacy of influence. Although converging lines of evidence support core assumptions of the theory, many questions remain unanswered. This review demonstrates the value of applying a multilevel evolutionary-developmental approach to the analysis of a central feature of human phenotypic variation: LH strategy. (shrink)

Newton certainly regarded his second law of motion in the Principia as a fundamental axiom of mechanics. Yet the works that came after the Principia, the major treatises on the foundations of mechanics in the eighteenth century—by Varignon, Hermann, Euler, Maclaurin, d’Alembert, Euler (again), Lagrange, and Laplace—do not record, cite, discuss, or even mention the Principia’s statement of the second law. Nevertheless, the present study shows that all of these scientists do in fact assume the principle that the Principia’s second (...) law asserts as a fundamental axiom in their mechanics. (For what that second law asserts, we rely on Newton’s own testimony.) Some, like Varignon and Hermann, assume the axiom implicitly, apparently unaware that any assumption is being made, while others, like Maclaurin and Euler, assume the axiom explicitly, apparently unaware that the assertion assumed is the second law as Newton himself understood it. But in every case these scientists employ the principle asserted by the Principia’s second law fundamentally, unaware that they should be citing Neutonus, Prin., Phil. Nat. Math., Lex II. (shrink)

In this article I explore some statistical difficulties confronting going conceptions of ‘group’ as understood in accounts of group selection. Most such theories require real groups but define the reality of groups in ways that make it impossible to test for their reality. There are alternatives, but they either require or invite a nominalism about groups that many theorists abjure.

Hume, in the Enquiry Section X Part 1, claims that ’all probability supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where one side is found to overbalance the other and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority’. He concludes that in assessing miracle-claims one should weigh the historical testimony supporting the miracle against the testimony supporting the regularity to which it is an exception. I argue that both his premise and his conclusion are false.

In this paper I will argue that, in general, where the evidence supports two theories equally, the simpler theory is not more likely to be true and is not likely to be nearer the truth. In other words simplicity does not tell us anything about model bias. Our preference for simpler theories (apart from their obvious pragmatic advantages) can be explained by the facts that humans are known to elaborate unsuccessful theories rather than attempt a thorough revision and that a (...) fixed set of data can only justify adjusting a certain number of parameters to a limited degree of precision. No extra tendency towards simplicity in the natural world is necessary to explain our preference for simpler theories. Thus Occam's razor eliminates itself (when interpreted in this form). (shrink)

Background: Moral distress can be broadly described as the psychological distress that can develop in response to a morally challenging event. In the context of healthcare, its effects are well documented in the nursing profession, but there is a paucity of research exploring its relevance to healthcare assistants. Objective: This article aims to examine the existing research on moral distress in healthcare assistants, identity the important factors that are likely to contribute to moral distress, and propose preventative measures. Research Design: (...) This is a survey of the existing literature on moral distress in healthcare assistants. It uses insights from moral distress in nursing to argue that healthcare assistants are also likely to experience moral distress in certain contexts. Participants and Research Context: No research participants were part of this analysis. Ethical Considerations: This article offers a conceptual analysis and recommendations only. Findings: The analysis identifies certain factors that may be particularly applicable to healthcare assistants such as powerlessness and a lack of ethical knowledge. We demonstrate that these factors contribute to moral distress. Discussion: Recommendations include various preventative measures such as regular reflective debriefing sessions involving healthcare assistants, nurses and other clinicians, joint workplace ethical training, and modifications to the Care Certificate. Implementation of these measures should be monitored carefully and the results published to augment our existing knowledge of moral distress in healthcare assistants. Conclusion: This analysis establishes the need for more research and discussion on this topic. Future research should focus on evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed recommendations. (shrink)

This paper concerns some claims by Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section X Part II -- specifically, what he says on pp.121-122 of Selby-Bigge's edition. Today (in September 2021) I have re-read the paper for the first time in decades. I cannot recommend that anyone else now read it: my argument was seriously defective. I still think, however, that its conclusion is correct, and accordingly may eventually write a new paper on the topic.

The paper investigates what is meant by "good science" and "bad science" and how these differ as between the natural (physical and biological) sciences on the one hand and social sciences on the other. We conclude on the basis of historical evidence that the natural science are much more heavily constrained by evidence and observation than by theory while the social sciences are constrained by prior theory and hardly at all by direct evidence. Current examples of the latter proposition are (...) taken from recent issues of leading social science journals. We argue that agent based social simulations can be used as a tool to constrain the development of a new social science by direct (what economists dismiss as anecdotal) evidence and that to do so would make social science relevant to the understanding and influencing of social processes. We argue that such a development is both possible and desirable. We do not argue that it is likely. (shrink)

This paper argues that (1) Richard Swinburne’s general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kinds of postulated properties, (2) Swinburne’s main argument in ’The Christian God’ for the simplicity of theism, the one based on considerations about pure limitless intentional power, is significantly weaker than he seems to believe. (...) The paper does not draw a conclusion about whether theism is simple. (shrink)

Sober (1984) presents an account of selection motivated by the view that one property can causally explain the occurrence of another only if the first plays a unique role in the causal production of the second. Sober holds that a causal property will play such a unique role if it is a population level cause of its effect, and on this basis argues that there is selection for a trait T only if T is a population level cause of survival (...) and reproductive success. Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) claim against Sober that some traits directly subject to selection will not satisfy the probabilistic condition on population level causation. In this paper I show that Sober has the resources to resist the Sterelny-Kitcher complaint, but I argue that not all traits that satisfy the probabilistic condition play the required unique role in the production of their effects. (shrink)

Abstract.As an undergraduate at Cambridge, Newton entered into his ‘Waste Book’ an assumption that we have named the Equivalence Assumption (The Younger): ‘‘ If a body move progressively in some crooked line [about a center of motion]..., [then this] crooked line may bee conceived to consist of an infinite number of streight lines. Or else in any point of the croked line the motion may bee conceived to be on in the tangent.’’ In this assumption, Newton somewhat imprecisely describes two (...) mathematical models, a ‘‘polygonal limit model’’ and a ‘‘tangent deflected model,’’ for ‘‘one-body motion,’’ that is, for the motion of a ‘‘body in orbit about a fixed center,’’ and then claims that these two models are equivalent. In the first part of this paper, we study the Principia to determine how the elder Newton would more carefully describe the polygonal limit and tangent deflected models. From these more careful descriptions, we then create Equivalence Assumption (The Elder), a precise interpretation of Equivalence Assumption (The Younger) as it might have been restated by Newton, after say 1687. We then review certain portions of the Waste Book and the Principia to make the case that, although Newton never restates nor even alludes to the Equivalence Assumption after his youthful Waste Book entry, still the polygonal limit and tangent deflected models, as well as an unspoken belief in their equivalence, infuse Newton’s work on orbital motion. In particular, we show that the persuasiveness of the argument for the Area Property in Proposition 1 of the Principia depends crucially on the validity of Equivalence Assumption (The Elder). After this case is made, we present the mathematical analysis required to establish the validity of the Equivalence Assumption (The Elder). Finally, to illustrate the fundamental nature of the resulting theorem, the Equivalence Theorem as we call it, we present three significant applications: we use the Equivalence Theorem first to clarify and resolve questions related to Leibniz’s ‘‘polygonal model’’ of one-body motion; then to repair Newton’s argument for the Area Property in Proposition 1; and finally to clarify and resolve questions related to the transition from impulsive to continuous forces in ‘‘De motu’’ and the Principia. (shrink)

This essay summarizes recent advances made in the analysis of mosaic patches in chimaeric epithelia of the mouse. The conclusions drawn from the observed patterns are relevant to the behaviour of expanding cell populations during tissue growth and homeostasis. References are made to clonal analysis of Drosophila.

After preparing the way with comments on evanescent quantities and then Newton’s interpretation of his second law, this study of Proposition II (Book I)— Proposition II Every body that moves in some curved line described in a plane and, by a radius drawn to a point, either unmoving or moving uniformly forward with a rectilinear motion, describes areas around that point proportional to the times, is urged by a centripetal force tending toward that same point. —asks and answers the following (...) questions: When does a version of Proposition II first appear in Newton’s work? What revisions bring that initial version to the final form in the 1726 Principia? What, exactly, does this proposition assert? In particular, what does Newton mean by the motion of a body “urged by a centripetal force”? Does it assert a true mathematical claim? If not, what revision makes it true? Does the demonstration of Proposition II persuade? Is it as convincing, for example, as the most convincing arguments of the Principia? If not, what revisions would make the demonstration more persuasive? What is the importance of Proposition II, to the physics of Book III and the mathematics of Book I? (shrink)

The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism is the first book to describe the unique contributions of a behavioral perspective to the major issues of philosophy. Leading behavioral philosophers and psychologists have contributed chapters on: the origins of behaviorism as a philosophy of science; the basic principles of behaviorism; ontology; epistemology; values and ethics; free will, determinism and self-control; and language and verbal behavior. A concluding chapter provides an overview of some scholarly criticisms of behavioral philosophy. Far from espousing a `black box' (...) perspective on human cognition and philosophical reasoning, behaviorism (as derived from the works of B. F. Skinner) represents a contemporary and viable approach to conceptualizing important philosophical and psychological issues. Audience: This work will make an excellent text for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students in the fields of philosophy and psychology, as well as being of interest to established scholars in those disciplines. (shrink)

This document provides a system of punctuation that is based on the syntax of English sentences. It accords with the practice of leading publishers, and it conforms to the recommendations of such publications as The New York Public Library Writer’s Guide to Style and Usage. Skillful writers often punctuate in ways that violate this system of punctuation, but they have earned the right to do so: they know what they are doing and why. If you master the system presented in (...) this document, you will not make errors of punctuation that teachers and editors will want to correct. You will also have the ability to justify your occasional departures from the rules: you will understand why your usage is preferable in the circumstances. (shrink)

A frank and candid glimpse into the early life of the maturing poet.

Mass literacy, mass communication, and the Internet have all increased the amount of information available. But false knowledge still abounds. Taking cues from Sir Thomas Browne, the English Renaissance skeptic, this title examines a host of contemporary errors in thinking and offers a powerful explanation of why they occur.

Principia (Book 1, Sect. 6), Newton's Lemma 28 on the algebraic nonintegrability of ovals has had an unusually mixed reception. Beginning in 1691 with Jakob Bernoulli (who accepted the lemma) and Huygens and Leibniz (who rejected it and offered counterexamples), Lemma 28 has a history of eliciting seemingly contradictory reactions. In more recent times, D.T. Whiteside in 1974 gave an “unchallengeable counterexample,” while the mathematician V.I. Arnol'd in 1987 sided with Bernoulli and called Newton's argument an “astonishingly modern topological proof.” (...) This disagreement mostly stems, we argue, from Newton's vague statement of the lemma. Indeed, we identify several different interpretations of Lemma 28, any one of which Newton may have been intending to assert, and we then test a number of proposed counterexamples to see which, if any, are true counterexamples to one or more of these versions of the lemma. Following this, we study Newton's argument for the lemma to see whether and where it fails to be convincing. In the end, our study of Newton's Lemma 28 provides an answer to the question, Who is right: Huygens, Leibniz, Whiteside and the others who reject the lemma, or Bernoulli, Arnol'd, and the others who accept it? (shrink)

After decades of deregulation and innovation, contemporary financial markets remain firmly anchored in law and legal institutions. The idea that private financial actors simply want to escape government oversight and regulation is simplistic as private interests find the coercive powers of the state too useful to forgo. Instead, such actors engage law selectively to create a more certain environment for themselves and their profit-seeking activities. Contract law adds certainty to financial transactions; law shapes how financial actors use information and exploit (...) information technology; law constitutes financial values; and law allows financial institutions to be turned into assets. Law’s application is shaped by changing conceptions of risk, as well as by new business models for financial institutions. (shrink)

Money undergirds market exchange, but the social significance of money goes well beyond the obvious importance of its highly uneven distribution in modern market economies. In addition, modern money imposes an ostensibly precise and unidimensional valuation on social products, processes and relations that often conflicts with other modes of social valuation. In this regard, monetarization is a particular instance of quantification. Money’s status as an official economic metric is the result of a long, contingent, and uneven historical process. Given alternative (...) forms of valuation, people manage and constrain the commensurability of money through a variety of individual, institutional and organizational practices. The social reception of money is active, not passive. A variety of examples are discussed to illustrate and develop these points. (shrink)

This paper elaborates three approaches to the issue of state autonomy, and uses two empirical cases (British and American treasury policy during the 1930s) to illustrate them. The three approaches are the group affiliations approach, which considers the social characteristics of the individuals who work in an organization; the structural dependance approach, which considers the structural position of the organization within a network of resource flows; and a cultural approach, which considers the role of ideology in the determination of organizational (...) autonomy. The application of these three approaches to the two cases gives some support to all three, but the cultural approach proves especially useful in conjunction with the other two. (shrink)

Defeasible rules are said to allow for the following two-staged sequence, viz., that p → q and yet p & r → not-q. This is puzzling because in the logic of conditionals the sufficiency of p for q cannot normally be undermined if one adds to the antecedent a further proposition r. Critics argue that the better approach to comprehending defeasibility is explicitly to represent the limiting factor r in a single-stage articulation of the rule, viz., as p & not-r (...) → q. This is a more complete statement of the rule; where the old rule announced, confidently and without qualification, that in circumstances or class of cases p consequence q follows, the new rule admits from the outset that q only follows if we add the qualifier that limits the antecedent circumstances to the smaller class of cases p & not-r. This is not only more complete, the critics argue, it is also a more accurate or truthful statement of the rule. The rule p → q, articulated at the first stage of the defeasible process, is only a pretender encountered along the way to this more complete truth. In this paper I show how, and why, contrary to the critics, the process of private law adjudication supports the multi-staged structure and representation of defeasible legal rules. What matters when one party makes a claim against another party is not so much that the claim is true (or even that it is advanced as a legitimate claim under the rule that is most likely to be true), but rather that the claim is of the sort that the party can justifiably say is true. The latter, at least, is what carries the plaintiff past the initial burden of proof, and what calls for the defendant to reply if the plaintiff is not to carry the day. I illustrate the argument by way of the court’s reluctance in a tort case to entertain a purely statistical basis for a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant has caused her injury. Rather, the court will insist on direct evidence that appears to arise out of the particular circumstances of the case as the plaintiff alleges them to be, and even if, as a purely statistical matter, the latter sort of claim is less likely to be true than the claim grounded in pure statistical likelihood. I relate this argument for defeasible rules (and against rules that are more truthful) to some important arguments offered by the philosopher Stephen Darwall in his recent book The Second Person Viewpoint. Private law’s defeasible rules, I argue, capture the special respect (and interpersonal accountability) that attaches only to rights arising out of “second personal” claiming (and counterclaiming) and which are not realizable merely as a matter of “third personal” (moral) truth. (shrink)