Wnt signaling plays pivotal roles during our entire lives, from conception to death, through the regulation of morphogenesis in developing embryos and the maintenance of tissue homeostasis in adults. The regulation of Wnt signaling occurs on several levels: at the receptor level on the plasma membrane, at the β‐catenin protein level in the cytoplasm, and through transcriptional regulation in the nucleus. Several recent studies have focused on the mechanisms of Wnt receptor regulation, following the discovery that the Wnt receptor frizzled (...) (Fzd) is a target of the ubiquitin ligases, RNF43 and ZNRF3. RNF43 and ZNRF3 are homologous genes that are mutated in several cancers. The details underlying their mechanism of action continue to unfold, while at the same time raising many new questions. In this review, we discuss advances and controversies in our understanding of Wnt receptor regulation. (shrink)

조선 말기에 활동했던 易學者 李元龜의 사상에 대해서는 實學으로 보는 견해, 朱子學의 계승이라는 평가, 그리고 道學과 實學이 종합되어있다는 여러 평가가 교착되어있는 상태이다. 그의 太極陰陽論이나 理氣論에서 사용하고 있는 개념범주들은 성리학의 것과 모순되거나 위배되는 것이 아니라 오히려 性理學의 기본개념전제들을 정확히 이해하고 있으며 이 토대위에서 그의 易學 체계를 수립한다. 그는 성리학적 개념들을 다시 역학적인 개념으로 환원시켜 설명하고, 역학의 數理를 빌려 人倫과 産業이라는 經世論으로 논의를 심화확대하고 있다. 역학적 관점에서 본다면 그는 9와 6이란 음양의 數理를 통해 음양의 상호 존중과 인륜산업의 조화와 발전을 도모하고 있는데, 이는 가치론적으로 (...) 음양을 차별하던 기존의 음양론과는 상당히 다른 모습을 보인다. 그는 수리를 강조하면서 義理를 경시하지 않았고, 象數學 전통과 義理學 전통을 겸한 독창적인 수리사상을 가지고 있었다고 할 수 있다. 이원구 역학은 宋代 數理論 중심의 理學의 연장선상에 있다. 다만 송대 理學이 주로 형이상학적인 측면에 한정해서 象數를 논의했던 것과는 달리, 人事 중심의 인간학적인 문제로까지 확장시키고 있다는 점에서 그 차이점을 찾을 수 있다. (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

Joseph Rouse is one of the most distinctive and innovative proponents of practice theory today. This article focuses in section I on two extended elaborations with systematic intent from Rouse’s corpus over the last two decades regarding the nature of practices, highlighting in particular the concept of normativity. Toward this end, this article explains why Rouse argues that we need to bring about something like a Copernican revolution in our understanding of the intrinsic normativity of practices as an essentially interactive, (...) temporal, contestable, and open-ended process. In section II, this article then examines some commonalities and apparent divergences of Rouse’s practice theory from the existential phenomenology of the early Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. The article draws to a close by considering two apparent divergences between Rouse’s conception of practices and existential phenomenology: (1) the degree of compatibility between the claim of existential phenomenology to reveal necessary enabling background conditions of our lived experience and Rouse’s normative conception of practices; and (2) the compatibility of “quasi-transcendental” constitution, as this is at work according to existential phenomenology, and Rouse’s argument that it is wrong to understand practices as exclusively centered on the activities of human beings. (shrink)

This study seeks effective ways for managing employees with a high Machiavellian personality in organizations by identifying how to enhance their pro-organizational attitudes and behaviors [organizational citizenship behavior ] through transformational leadership. Drawing upon the dual-focused model of TFL, we suggest that exerting TFL upon employees high in Machiavellianism involves ethical dilemmas in that individual-focused and group-focused TFL have contrasting effects on leading pro-organizational attitudes/behaviors among these pro-individual employees. Analysis of data from 184 employees working in South Korea shows that (...) Machiavellianism negatively relates to affective commitment, OCB toward the organization, and OCB toward individuals, but positively to continuance commitment. More importantly, the results reveal that group-focused TFL can effectively manage employees high in Machiavellianism by mitigating the negative relations between Machiavellianism and affective commitment and between Machiavellianism and OCB-O. However, individual-focused TFL strengthens these negative relations as well as the negative relation between Machiavellianism and OCB-I. This study thus shows that to lead employees high in Machiavellianism in a pro-organizational direction, group-focused TFL rather than individual-focused TFL needs to be employed. (shrink)

After the devastating tsunami hit the northern Sumatran coastline in December 2004, the Indonesian province of Aceh found itself at a crossroad. This crossroad intersected the three-decade-long civil war, the move towards peace and the need for post-disaster recovery. This article analyses the gendered politics embedded in Aceh's navigation through this crossroad. First, it argues that both the conflict and the subsequent peace process were marginalised by the international programmes of post-tsunami recovery. Second, it demonstrates that within this marginalisation, women's (...) investments in both war and peace were further neglected throughout the formal peace process. Third, it highlights how the peace process reflected a narrow, masculinist and public sphere agenda that silenced both women and the gendered issues affecting them. In short, this article seeks to unveil the gendered politics of war and peace in post-tsunami Aceh. It does so with the feminist ambition of demonstrating that sustainable and comprehensive peace in Aceh cannot be secured without recognising and accounting for the impact that the conflict has upon gendered identities. (shrink)

The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (French: Psychologie des Foules; literally: Psychology of Crowds) is a book authored by Gustave Le Bon that was first published in 1895. In the book, Le Bon claims that there are several characteristics of crowd psychology: "impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgement of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of sentiments, and others. Le Bon claimed that "an individual immersed for some length of time in a crowd soon finds himself (...) - either in consequence of magnetic influence given out by the crowd or from some other cause of which we are ignorant - in a special state, which much resembles the state of fascination in which the hypnotized individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotizer. (shrink)

Skill building is a widely recognized teaching goal in philosophy. Some well-researched skill building techniques include scaffolded assignment design, low-stakes assignments, and peer-review. Many papers have highlighted the efficacy of these techniques by demonstrating novel course and assignment design; for example, the use of blogging in philosophy courses has been shown to have positive results on student writing. While the efficacy of skill building centered course design on student learning seems uncontroversial, two major problems are typically raised: the time investment (...) for such course design is significant and implementing these techniques in large classes is not possible. The central aim of this paper is to combat this second claim. I present a course designed around skill building that has been successfully implemented in classes of from 120 to 450 students. I show some techniques that make this implementation possible and not unwieldy, and I argue that students both improved their philosophical skills and enjoyed the course design. (shrink)

I present Modern Symbolic Logic, an introductory philosophy course in first-order logic, as a blended course. A blended course integrates online video learning with in-class activities, out of class supports, and deliverables into a cohesive and mutually supporting package. Blended courses are an enhancement on hybrid courses, which focus on online video learning but not on the additional supports needed for an effective learning experience. This paper has two central aims. The first is to present a blended course in action (...) in order to address a need in the literature for detailed reports of blended classes. The second is to advance an iterative approach to blended course design that significantly lowers the bar of entry for instructions hoping to create a blended course. (shrink)

Two experiments investigated whether infants represent goal‐directed actions of others in a way that allows them to draw inferences to unobserved states of affairs (such as unseen goal states or occluded obstacles). We measured looking times to assess violation of infants' expectations upon perceiving either a change in the actions of computer‐animated figures or in the context of such actions. The first experiment tested whether infants would attribute a goal to an action that they had not seen completed. The second (...) experiment tested whether infants would infer from an observed action the presence of an occluded object that functions as an obstacle. The looking time patterns of 12‐month‐olds indicated that they were able to make both types of inferences, while 9‐month‐olds failed in both tasks. These results demonstrate that, by the end of the first year of life, infants use the principle of rational action not only for the interpretation and prediction of goal‐directed actions, but also for making productive inferences about unseen aspects of their context. We discuss the underlying mechanisms that may be involved in the developmental change from 9 to 12 months of age in the ability to infer hypothetical (unseen) states of affairs in teleological action representations. (shrink)

In his very interesting paper Harry Kunneman argues for an alternative view on voluntary work which not so much stresses the economic aspect but primarily its existentially meaningful aspect. To underpin this, Kunneman makes use of a broad range of hermeneutical, social-philosophical, complexity theoretical, biological and other ideas. This multipolar structure of the article might also prove to be its very weakness, because the rich train of thought remains highly abstract. This could be overcome by using examples and casuistry to (...) elucidate and specify the many distinctions in the article. (shrink)

This chapter provides an interpretation of the early Heidegger’s underdeveloped conception of the undistinguishedness of everyday human existence in Being and Time. After explaining why certain translation choices of some key terms in this text are interpretively and philosophically important, I first provide a concise argument for why the social constitution interpretation of the relation between ownedness and unownedness makes better overall sense of Heidegger’s ambivalent attitude toward the social constitution of the human being than the standard existentialist interpretation of (...) this relation. I then proceed to the heart of this chapter, which develops his inchoate conception of the undistinguishedness of everydayness by arguing that it specifies the third distinctive mode of concrete human existence in addition to ownedness and unownedness. Accordingly, I show how unownedness is actually a generic phenomenon with two distinct species, namely, undistinguishedness and disownedness, which are at once closely related to, but also differ in significant respects from, each other. Consequently, instead of taking for granted a one-dimensional and mutually exclusive opposition between ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’, I argue that we should adopt a two-dimensional and more nuanced understanding of the relations among undistinguishedness, disownedness, and ownedness that intersects with Heidegger’s underappreciated distinction between genuineness and ungenuineness. After raising and replying to some objections to this interpretation of undistinguishedness, I conclude this chapter by briefly sketching three of its philosophical consequences and pointing out its potential as an important resource for contemporary social theories. (shrink)

A central question along which phenomenological approaches to sociality or intersubjectivity have diverged concerns whether concrete interpersonal encounters or sharing a common world is more fundamental in working out an adequate phenomenology of human sociality. On one side we have philosophers such as the early Sartre, Martin Buber, Michael Theunissen, and Emmanuel Levinas, all of whom emphasize, each in his own way, the priority of some mode of interpersonal encounters (broadly construed) in determining the basic character of human coexistence. On (...) the other side, we have philosophers such as the early Heidegger and the early Merleau-Ponty (and here I would also include Gadamer and the later Wittgenstein), who argue that an adequate account of human sociality must begin, in the proper order of understanding and hence explanation, with how we always already exist in a shared or common world. Which side is right in this debate? I argue that once we correctly understand the precise sense (or way) in which the common world is more fundamental than concrete interpersonal encounters, this enables us to understand how there is no real opposition between the phenomenological conception of the common world and the experience of the other, even in its radical otherness. (shrink)

This book chapter shows how the early Heidegger’s philosophy around the period of Being and Time can address some central questions of contemporary social ontology. After sketching “non-summative constructionism”, which is arguably the generic framework that underlies all forms of contemporary analytic social ontology, I lay out early Heidegger’s conception of human social reality in terms of an extended argument. The Heidegger that shows up in light of this treatment is an acute phenomenologist of human social existence who emphasizes our (...) engagement in norm-governed practices as the basis of social reality. I then defuse a common and understandable set of objections against invoking the early Heidegger as someone who can make any positive contribution to our understanding of social reality. Lastly, I explore the extent to which the early Heidegger’s philosophy provides insights regarding phenomena of collective intentionality by showing how the intelligibility of such phenomena traces back to individual agents’ common understanding of possible ways of understanding things and acting with one another. With the early Heidegger, I argue that this common understanding is the fundamental source and basis of collective intentionality, not the non-summativist constructionism on which contemporary analytic social ontology has sought to focus with much effort. The lesson about social ontology that we should learn from the early Heidegger is that there is a tight connection between the social constitution of the human individual and his or her capacity to perform actions or activities that instantiate collective intentionality. (shrink)

This special section originates from a workshop `New Horizons in Action and Agency’ that we organized in August 2019 at the University of Helsinki, Finland. The aim of the workshop was to provide a...

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions for agents fit to be held responsible in a normative sense, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. On the basis of Alfred R. Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility it can be argued that even if robots were to have all the capacities usually required of moral agency, their history (...) as products of engineering would undermine their autonomy and thus responsibility. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, EarlyView.

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

Laurent Le Bon, directeur du Centre Pompidou-Metz, dévoile au cours d’un entretien avec Roland Huesca l’histoire, les atours et les enjeux de l’écriture de plusieurs catalogues d’expositions : à l’affiche Dada, Chefs-d’œuvre ?..

ObjectivesHostile attribution bias is reportedly common from non-clinical population to those with serious mental illness, such as schizophrenia, and is known to be closely related to theory of mind. This study aimed to investigate whether ToM skills mediate the relationship among neurocognitive ability, personality traits, and attribution bias.MethodsA total of 198 non-clinical youths were recruited. To assess their neurocognitive ability and ToM skills, the participants were asked to complete Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices and the Korean version of the Reading the (...) Mind in Eyes Test. To determine their personality traits, the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire and interpersonal reactivity index were used. To evaluate hostile attribution bias, the Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire was administered. Path analysis and bias-corrected percentile bootstrap methods were used to estimate model fit and the parameters of the mediating effects.ResultsBased on model comparison, the best model characterized two direct pathways from psychoticism and the K-RMET to hostility attribution bias and three indirect pathways, wherein SPM, perspective taking, and psychoticism influenced hostile attribution bias through K-RMET. The final model fit indices were good [x2/df = 1.126; comparative fit index = 0.996; root mean square error of approximation = 0.026; standard root mean square residual = 0.026 and Akaike information criterion = 28.251] and the K-RMET fully mediated the association between SPM, perspective taking, psychoticism, and hostile attribution bias.ConclusionThe main findings suggested that ToM skills, such as the RMET, play an important role in explaining the relationship among neurocognitive ability, personality traits, and hostile attribution bias. ToM skills and a remediation strategy may need to be developed to balance the enhanced hostility bias that underlies the paranoia. (shrink)

This book discusses political change in the view of Confucian thought. This study focuses on the Book of Change, which is one of the nine basic books of Confucius School, and has dominated oriental thought in this field for more than three thousand years.

IntroductionThe COVID-19 outbreak and related lockdowns brought substantial changes in people’s lives and led to concerns about possible increases of addictive behaviors at the initial stages of the pandemic. To examine these concerns, the aim of the present study was to assess longitudinal changes in addictive and problematic behaviors over time during the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsThree waves of data collection took place in different stages of the COVID-19 outbreak in Hungary in a general population, from the first wave of lockdowns to (...) the second and third waves of restrictions. Latent growth curve models were calculated to assess the potential changes in addictive and problematic behaviors over time.ResultsLatent growth curve models showed that the sample varied in their initial scores, but there were no significant changes over time in any of the examined behaviors, except for compulsive sexual behavior disorder, which demonstrated a small but significant increase. However, the rate of this change was negligible. Overall, there were no noteworthy changes over time regarding any of the examined addictive and problematic behaviors.ConclusionContrary to initial concerns, no substantial changes over time were observed regarding the examined addictive behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic and related lockdowns. These findings indicate that those who had no previous problem with these addictive behaviors, might have not developed a problem, and those who had problem with either of the behaviors previously, might have not experienced a significant increase in their symptoms. (shrink)

A belief in God which disregards the human suffering, is not worthy of our attention. It will only be possible to justify God and the belief in God within the experience of suffering. This article describes, by way of an analysis of the human suffering, under which circumstances and on what conditions the belief in God can indeed be connected with the human suffering. It will be argued that precisely our compassion with the provisonal impossibility to sustain our faith can (...) become a place where God is justified. (shrink)

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

Background Conventional consent practices face ethical challenges in continuously evolving digital health environments due to their static, one-time nature. Dynamic consent offers a promising solution, providing adaptability and flexibility to address these ethical concerns. However, due to the immaturity of the concept and accompanying technology, dynamic consent has not yet been widely used in practice. This study aims to identify the facilitators of and barriers to adopting dynamic consent in real-world scenarios. Methods This scoping review, conducted in December 2022, adhered (...) to the PRISMA Extension for Scoping Reviews guidelines, focusing on dynamic consent within the health domain. A comprehensive search across Web of Science, PubMed, and Scopus yielded 22 selected articles based on predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Results The facilitators for the adoption of dynamic consent in digital health ecosystems were the provision of multiple consent modalities, personalized alternatives, continuous communication, and the dissemination of up-to-date information. Nevertheless, several barriers, such as consent fatigue, the digital divide, complexities in system implementation, and privacy and security concerns, needed to be addressed. This study also investigated current technological advancements and suggested considerations for further research aimed at resolving the remaining challenges surrounding dynamic consent. Conclusions Dynamic consent emerges as an ethically advantageous method for digital health ecosystems, driven by its adaptability and support for continuous, two-way communication between data subjects and consumers. Ethical implementation in real-world settings requires the development of a robust technical framework capable of accommodating the diverse needs of stakeholders, thereby ensuring ethical integrity and data privacy in the evolving digital health landscape. (shrink)

A large literature on South Korean economic development has presented one dominant narrative on Korean modernity, essentially that of a smooth and peaceful process of modernity brought about by the immutable logic of the market and by a gradual expansion of the middle class and civil society. This essay presents another narrative which stresses the role of social struggles in this process. Korea's transition to modernity has been marked by a high level of social conflicts and by clashes between modernity (...) and tradition and between external and national values. In this process, history and tradition did not simply give way to modernity but have been continuously rediscovered and reappropriated for new social struggles. Korea's modernity has been woven out of these political, social and cultural materials rather than simply out of the universal fabric of capitalism. (shrink)

Is a conception of human nature still possible or even desirable in light of the “postmetaphysical sensibilities” of our time? Furthermore, can philosophy make any contribution towards the articulation of a tenable conception of human nature given this current intellectual climate? I will argue in this paper that affirmative answers can be given to both of these questions. Section I rehearses briefly some of the difficulties and even dangers involved in working out any conception of human nature at all, let (...) alone one that is philosophically informed. Section II sketches what I argue to be three necessary aspects of a tenable philosophical anthropology. Finally, section III argues that such a philosophical anthropology is only justifiable, given our postmetaphysical sensibilities, by its use of “transcendental arguments” in justifying its claims, ones that nonetheless must repudiate a common but damaging assumption that arguing for the conclusions of such arguments commits one necessarily to a hyper-strong conception of subjectivity. In general, my primary aim in this paper is only to make plausible, not so much to justify, let alone defend, adequately the aspects of a conception of a tenable philosophical anthropology as sketched below. (shrink)

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) is rightly regarded as a thinker who extended the development of the so-called expressivist conception of language and world that Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) and especially Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) initially articulated. Being immersed as Humboldt was in the intellectual climate of German Romanticism, he aimed not only to provide a systematic foundation for how he believed linguistic research as a science should be conducted, but also to attempt to rectify what he saw as the deficiencies (...) of Kant’s philosophical system. My aim in this paper is to show how an expressivist thinker like Humboldt has the conceptual resources from within his own framework and, perhaps surprisingly, with some help from the 20th century philosopher of language and mind, Donald Davidson, to reject a criticism commonly made against expressivist conceptions of language and world. This is the charge that this sort of expressivism threatens the objectivity of the world by emphasizing the role of language in the constitution and disclosure of the world. Cristina Lafont makes just this charge against Humboldt (and other philosophers in the German expressivist-hermeneutic tradition). Specifically, she argues that expressivist philosophers of language are all ultimately committed to some pernicious form of linguistic idealism and relativism. In this paper, I first present Humboldt’s reflections on language and give some textual evidence for why he is often read – mistakenly in my view – as a linguistic idealist and relativist. Second, I briefly sketch Lafont’s charge of linguistic idealism and relativism against Humboldt. Third and finally, I show how she misunderstands Humboldt’s expressivist conception of language and world by connecting my rebuttal to her criticism with Davidson’s argument that successful communication does not require the sharing of explicit rules or conventions that govern in advance the use and understanding of words. (shrink)

In recent years a growing number of philosophers in the analytic tradition have focused their attention on the significance of human sociality. An older point of departure of analysis, which actually precedes this current tide of accounts of sociality, has revolved around the debate between “holism” and “individualism” in the philosophy of the human or social sciences and social theory. The more recent point of departure for various accounts of sociality has centered on the nature of conventions, social groups, shared (...) intentions, or collective intentionality. Putting aside the disagreements among these accounts, they all take for granted an antecedently intelligible notion of individual agency as explanatorily primitive and seek to explain the possibility of plural or collective agency in terms of the former. By contrast, other philosophers who have worked at the intersection of analytic and "continental" philosophy have emphasized the primacy of practice as the proper starting point for philosophical reflections on the nature of human sociality. In the analytic tradition this emphasis is typically framed in terms of the possibility of rule-following, a topic put on the philosophical agenda by the later Wittgenstein. Peter Winch’s and Saul Kripke’s influential but controversial readings of Wittgenstein explicitly thematize the issue of rule-following, readings which have in turn generated critical reflection in various disciplines for which this issue is relevant. -/- I begin by briefly explicating the positions of Pettit and Brandom on the issue of rule-following (putting aside any specific differences between them for the moment). Next I connect Pettit’s and Brandom’s views on rule-following, and more generally on normativity and its necessarily social basis, with the views of Theodore Schatzki and Joseph Rouse, whose conceptions of the significance of practice and its inherent sociality are indebted as much to the early Heidegger as well as the later Wittgenstein. I suggest that Pettit’s and Brandom’s views of the necessarily social nature of rule-following (i.e., practice) ought to acknowledge and integrate the shared insight of Schatzki and Rouse that practices are not only modes of activity, but constitute more basically the concrete setting or world within which practices qua modes of activity are intelligible (verständlich) at all. I conclude the paper by suggesting how an integrated account of the significance of the necessarily social nature of practice undermines the assumptions of those philosophers who seek to analyze human sociality solely on the basis of modes of interactions among individual agents. (shrink)

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the (...) agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency. (shrink)

Research on Confucianism in Honam is in full swing in connection with raising interest in regional studies. However, the independent area of Honam Confucianism is still not very prominent in the overall study of Korean Confucianism. It can be said that the lack of specific research interest in the independent domain of Honam Confucianism is due to the existing arguments related to the setting of the category of Korean Confucian studies mediated by the region. The regional categories related to the (...) study of Korean Confucianism explicitly presented after the mid-1990s were generally structured as Kiho Confucianism and Yeongnam Confucianism, at which time "Honam Confucianism" was defined as a part of Kiho Confucianism. Honam Confucianism was specified as a part of Kiho Confucianism as the school structure related to regional categories, which had been understood by dividing into Kiho and Yeongnam schools until the previous period led to the establishment of a category combining local and Confucian studies in earnest. To some extent it can be said to be appropriate to divide the development of Confucianism in Joseon into the Toegye School and the Yulgok School by paying attention to the academic veins of the development of Confucianism in Joseon according to the scholastic unity that began in earnest from the 17th century. However, the division of the Toegye School and the Yulgok School into the Yeongnam School and the Kiho School in relation to the region has some problems, considering that there lacked a group of scholars with different academic backgrounds in the area. Moreover, organizing the topography of Joseon Confucianism by dividing it into Yeongnam Confucianism and Kiho Confucianism beyond the distinction between the Yeongnam School and the Kiho School is an over-simplification in that it not only overlooks the various academic flows within each region but also simplifies the flow of Joseon Confucianism. In this study, I try to review the problems of the discussions on regional classification presented in the existing research on Confucianism in Korea, and to confirm that an independent area of Honam Confucian research is possible by paying close attention to this classification. In this process, I reveal that the understanding of the uniqueness of Honam Confucianism is not only consistently passed down by various Confucian scholars in the Joseon Dynasty, but also recognized by the Confucian scholars who were active in Honam as a regional background. Even now, the general direction of understanding is to understand and grasp the various Confucian trends and characteristics of Honam as Honam Confucianism, centering on the region called Honam. And based on this point, I review the general contents of the existing research results related to Honam Confucianism. Based on this, I have suggested a pilot plan to derive advanced results of future Honam Confucian research. (shrink)