Feminist Interpretations of Action and the Public in Hannah Arendt’s Theory. Arendt’s typology of human activity and her arguments on the precondition of politics allow for a variety in interpretations for contemporary political thought. The feminist reception of Arendt’s work ranges from critical to conciliatory readings that attempt to find the points in which Arendt’s theory might inspire a feminist political project. In this paper I explore the ways in which feminist thought has responded to Arendt’s definition of action, freedom (...) and politics, and whether her theoretical framework can be useful in a feminist rethinking of politics, power and the public realm. (shrink)

The so-called paradox of dogmatism has it that it seems that one is both entitled and not entitled to ignore evidence against what one knows. By knowing something, one knows it to be true, and one also knows that there can be no non-misleading evidence against what is true. But to ignore evidence against what one believes – and, surely, one believes what one knows – is to be dogmatic, something one should not be. I argue that there is no (...) genuine paradox here. One's attitude to evidence is governed not by what one knows but by what one thinks one knows. Thinking that one knows something does not entail that it is true. Knowing this, one knows that there may be non-misleading evidence against what one thinks one knows and should be open to examining what purports to be evidence against it. (shrink)

What is a hypocrite? What role does hypocrisy play in our lives? Why is it thought to be such an ugly vice? Is it ever acceptable? What do we lose in our indifference to it? Hypocrisy: Ethical Investigations seeks to illuminate the concept of hypocrisy by exploring its multiple roles in our moral and political lives and struggles. The authors provide a critical examination of a wide range of perspectives on the nature, varieties, and significance of hypocrisy, arguing that it (...) is a key concept in the investigation of the field of morality in general, including its moralizing excesses. (shrink)

This article presents an overview for clinician investigators on the concepts of decision-making capacity and vulnerability as related to human subjects research. Tools for capacity assessment and unacknowledged sources of vulnerability are discussed, and the practical gaps in current informed consent requirements related to impaired capacity and potential vulnerability are described. Options are suggested for research discussions when full regulatory consent is not possible and an exception from informed consent does not apply.

A widely held view has it that sometimes there is more than one thing in exactly the same place, as is the case, allegedly, with a clay statue. There is the statue, but there also is a piece of clay—both obviously in the same place yet distinct in virtue of their differing properties, if only modal ones. Those holding this view—pluralists—often describe the relation between such objects as one of constitution, with the piece of clay being said to constitute the (...) statue. In the first part of this paper I consider ways in which the supposed relation of constitution may be understood. I conclude that the only coherent interpretation of ‘x constitutes y’ is one on which it is presupposed that x and y are identical. While this does not, by itself, show that pluralism is false, it is something that should make us suspicious of it. In the second part of the paper I propose a simple way with the temporal and modal facts the pluralist appeals to, showing that they do not force us into accepting his puzzling doctrine. (shrink)

In defending the startling claim that that there are no artifacts, indeed, no inanimate material objects of the familiar sort, Peter van Inwagen has argued that truths about such putative objects can be paraphrased as truths that do not make essential reference to them and that we should endorse only the ontological commitments of the paraphrase. In this note I argue that the paraphrases van Inwagen recommends cannot meet his condition. Read one way, they lose us some truths. Read another, (...) they entail the existence of the very objects they are supposed to rid us of. However, we need not share van Inwagen's distaste for the latter: to say that they exist is not to say that anything exists in addition to the simples composing them. (shrink)

There are three major themes in the dialogue thought to be Plato’s Statesman: the nature of statesmanship, the difference between perfect and less than perfect regimes and the method of division. In this paper I focus on the first two themes. I argue, first, that the dialogue makes a plausible case for what it takes to be a wise statesman. In doing so, I play down the importance of the second theme: the difference between regimes. In fact, I consider this (...) discussion to be deeply flawed and even irrelevant to the argument of the first. My main purpose is to provide a critical analysis of the political theory articulated in the dialogue. My analysis is made plausible by abandoning the traditional view that the Statesman was written Plato in its entirety as a unified whole. In my view, a close reading of the text supports the hypothesis that it is, at best, semi-authentic; namely, that it is most likely a collage of fragments written at different times by Plato and other members of the Academy. (shrink)

In this paper we defend a particular version of the epistemic approach to argumentation. We advance some general considerations in favor of the approach and then examine the ways in which different versions of it play out with respect to the theory of fallacies, which we see as central to an understanding of argumentation. Epistemic theories divide into objective and subjective versions. We argue in favor of the objective version, showing that it provides a better account than its subjectivist rival (...) of the central fallacy of begging the question. We suggest that the strengths of the objective epistemic theory of fallacies provide support for the epistemic approach to argumentation more generally. (shrink)

Ned Block has recently adduced some new arguments to show that “psychologism is true and thus a natural behaviorist analysis of intelligence that is incompatible with psychologism is false”. He introduces a thought experiment in which a machine is programmed to exhibit intelligent-seeming behavior and appeals to our intuition that such a machine is nevertheless not really inteligent; he traces that intuition to the fact that the machine is being thought of as operating with internal processes that, first, lack a (...) certain internal structure with a certain kind of complexity and, second, are in a certain sense mechanical, reflecting only the programmer’s intelligence.I argue against Block both that the mistakes the source and nature of our intuition and that the conclusion he draws concerning psychologism does not follow. While the intuition he appeals to may show that behaviorism is false, that is not equivalent to showing that psychologism in the sense intended by Block is true.Em trabalhos recentes Ned Block fornece alguns argumentos novos para mostrar que “o psicologismo é verdadeiro e, portanto, uma análise behaviorista da inteligência que seja incompatível com este último tem de ser falsa”. Ele elabora um experimento mental no qual uma máquina é programada para exibir comportamento aparentemente inteligente e mostra em que sentido nossa intuição leva-nos a concluir que tal máquina não é realmente inteligente. Tal intuição origina-se no fato de que a máquina é concebida como operando com processos internos aos quais falta uma estrutura interior dotada de um certo tipo de complexidade e que tais processos internos são mecânicos, refletindo apenas a inteligência do programador.A argumentação contra Block é feita em duas direções: em primeiro lugar mostra-se que a origem e a natureza de nossa intuição é incorreta; em segundo que as conclusões que ele extrai a partir do psicologismo não procedem. Embora a intuição que Block invoca possa mostrar que o behaviorismo é falso, isso não equivale a provar que o psicologismo no sentido por ele pretendido seja verdadeiro. (shrink)

In order that Hungarian enterprises might survive and grow in western markets, management culture will have to change. Hungary has a lot of advantages, a well educated work force, a culture of change and a latent ability to rebuild itself. It is geographically well placed in the centre of Europe but, unfortunately, it has no mineral wealth to speak of and it is relatively small. Hungary, therefore, has to depend on export to grow and prosper. Change might require sacrifice, but, (...) if this is done correctly and fairly it is worth doing. (shrink)

What the rational thing to do in the face of disagreement by an epistemic peer is has been much discussed recently. Those who think that a peer’s disagreement is itself evidence against one’s belief, as many do, are committed to a special form of epistemic dependence. If such disagreement is really evidence, it seems reasonable to take it into account and to adjust one’s belief accordingly. But then it seems that the belief one ends up with depends, in part, on (...) what someone else believes, even if one does not know why that someone believes what he does. While the practical impossibility of finding actual cases of peer disagreement has been often noted, its conceptual possibility has gone unquestioned. Here we challenge this consensus and argue, first, that, strictly speaking, peer disagreement is impossible and, second, that cases of – all-too-common – near-peer disagreement present no special puzzle and require nothing more than adhering to standard principles of sensible epistemic conduct. In particular, we argue that in such cases there is no good reason to adopt the widely accepted principle that evidence of evidence is evidence. If so, even if one takes a near-peer’s disagreement as a reason for reexamining one’s belief, one is not epistemically dependent in the sense one would be if that disagreement were evidence concerning the matter in question. (shrink)

This article offers a descriptive and analytic view of the different stages leading to the constitution of a corpus that is representative of the issues of climate and energy justice. Overall, the corpus contains over five million words and gathers reports, newsletters and web-pages dealing with the most equitable ways of moving to a low-carbon future in the aim of limiting climate change. It can be divided into six sub-corpora, according to types of discourse communities, and methods of constitution. We (...) begin by presenting the small Do It Yourself (DIY) corpora which were used as a starting point. Three discourse communities were selected to observe possible variation in their treatment of the issue: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), United-Nation institutions, and the Renewable Energy Sector (RES). The sources are selected according to author, date, keywords in title. Using the concordance Antconc and WMatrix software we test the reliability of the corpora for their thematic content, terminology and lexical unit classification. Our first results enable us to confirm variation between the discourse communities. The discrepancy in sizes and the time-consuming nature of the initial DIY corpus constitution lead us to use BootCat to extend them, using keywords from the corpora as seeds to retrieve and download webpages. We thus contrast a more traditional approach to corpus building to web-as-corpus data gathering methods. We compare the results found in the BootCat corpora to test if they are as specific as those in the DIY corpora. This enables us to draw conclusions on the possible uses and advantages of relatively small corpora for the study of specialised discourse. (shrink)

According to Peter van Inwagen, there are, from the point of view of serious metaphysics, no composites, only simples. Saying that we have built a ship is a misleading way of saying that we have rearranged some simples ship- wise. However, the notion of rearranging simples is problematic, and van Inwagen’s resort to “honorary simples” does not make it less so. Simples can be rearranged only by way of rearranging these, making talk of them not merely a convenient facon de (...) parler, as van Inwagen claims, but ineliminable even when we are in the “ontology room.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: While we applaud several aspects of Lilian Bermejo-Luque's novel theory of argumentation and especially welcome its epistemological dimensions, in this discussion we raise doubts about her conception of argumentation, her account of argumentative goodness, and her treatments of the notion of “giving reasons” and of justification.RESUMEN: Aunque aprobamos varios aspectos de la nueva teoría de la argumentación propuesta por Lilian Bermejo Luque y, en particular, su dimensión epistemológica, en este debate planteamos algunas dudas sobre su concepción de la argumentación, (...) su análisis de la bondad argumentativa y su tratamiento de la noción de “dar razones” y de justificación. (shrink)

Pluralists believe that there are cases of distinct but spatio-temporally coinciding things. The statue goes, the piece of clay remains: differing persistence conditions, different things. Yet while both are with us, they are obviously in the same place. The argument rests on two assumptions: that statues have their shape essentially and that pieces of clay do not. Only if we make both does the conclusion follow. Here I suggest that while both assumptions are plausible on their face, each may be (...) questioned. Given this, we are not forced to accept their conjunction and can thus avoid the counter-intuitive conclusion it entails. (shrink)

This paper argues, first, that one can render Protagoras’s view on the teach ability of political virtue coherent by distinguishing between the affect required for achieving it and the capacity for developing these affect into fully fledged virtues. Second, the paper argues that by focusing on Books II - III of the Republic one might see an affinity between between Protagoras’s suggestion that virtuous citizens might give advice, without ruling it, in the affairs of the city and Plato’s conservative practical (...) political theory. (shrink)

The so–called truthmaker solution to the problem Gettier is thought to have posed for the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief is to add a fourth condition, requiring that one’s evidence for one’s belief be the state of affairs that makes the belief true. Adrian Heathcote argues that the reason why one lacks knowledge in Russell’s case of the stopped clock is that, as in the classic Gettier–style cases, this condition is not satisfied. I argue that the proposed solution (...) fails, as it embodies a misunderstanding of what evidence is. (shrink)

In der umfangreichen Literatur zur Globalisierung gehen die Autoren gemeinhin von der These aus, dass die Konzepte von ‘Raum’, ‘Zeit’ und ‘Selbst’ in den letzten Jahrzehnten im Rahmen des Globalisierungsprozesses eine drastische Veränderung durchgemacht haben. Der vorliegende Text bietet eine Analyse verschiedener zur Debatte stehender Themen, wobei die genannten Begriffe metaphorisch gebraucht werden. Die Analyse konzentriert sich zunächst auf die berühmten von Manuel Castells eingeführten Begriffe ‘Raum der Ströme’ und ‘zeitlose Zeit’ sowie auf den eher klassischen Terminus des ‘Selbstverlusts’ bei (...) Hannah Arendt. Anhand einer Analyse dieser Begriffe in der Verwendung der genannten Autoren und ihrer Anhänger möchte der Verfasser dieses Textes Folgendes zeigen: Die angeführten Begriffe sind zu verschwommen, um als Musterkonzepte benutzt werden zu können, und daher nur als reine Metaphern akzeptabel; die Begriffe sind im wohlbekannten literarischen Diskurs der klassischen Moderne verankert und insofern keine globalisierungsspezifischen Begriffe. Der letzte im Text besprochene Autor ist der schottische Mediziner und Professor Andrew Ure aus dem 19. Jahrhundert. Gemäß seiner Sprache, die er zur Schilderung seiner Welt verwendet und die an die oben erwähnten Begriffe von M. Castells und H. Arendt erinnert, gehört er zum Diskurs der klassischen Moderne, dem eine radikal andersartige Evaluierung zuschreiben ist. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone's reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as evidence that he does not believe it, as such reluctance may be explained in other ways. While this may be true, I show that (...) it does not affect my central claim which does not turn on considerations special to assertion. (shrink)

I argue that Wittgenstein was no lifelong musical formalist. I further contend that the attribution of musical formalism obscures, while the break with it I propose explains, the role that music played in the development of his philosophy of language. What is more, I sketch a perspective on the later Wittgenstein’s remarks on the music and musical understanding that supports my claims. Throughout my discussion, rather than assimilating Hanslick’s and Wittgenstein’s views on music, I point to similarities and differences between (...) them, suggesting that taking snapshots and putting them side by side sheds more light on how they are related to each other. (shrink)

People do, quite naturally and not uncommonly, speak of other people as deceiving themselves, as being their own dupes. A man's child is ill and growing constantly worse. The father keeps talking optimistically about the future, keeps explaining away the evidence, and keeps pointing to what he insists are signs of improvement. We can easily imagine ourselves deciding that he has deceived himself about his son's condition. Nor is it the case that talk of self-deception is appropriate only in connection (...) with other people. We can easily imagine the father admitting, say, after the son's death, that he has deceived himself about the child's condition. Thus the notion of self-deception obviously has application. Furthermore, ordinarily talk of self-deception is not thought to be puzzling. (shrink)

What is it to be a hypocrite? Gilbert Ryle's answer is the by now commonly held one: to be hypocritical is to “try to appear activated by a motive other than one's real motive”; again, it is “deliberately to refrain from saying what comes to one's lips, while pretending to say frankly things one does not mean.” Can this be the right answer? My aim is to show that it cannot. In doing this I hope to gesture towards a richer (...) understanding of our notion of hypocrisy. (shrink)

That in Gettier's alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier's protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If they would not, the examples are not counter-examples to the traditional analysis. I go on to discuss a number of examples inspired by (...) Gettier's and argue that they, too, fail to be counter-examples either for reasons similar to those I have urged or because it is not clear that their subject does not know. (shrink)

This book paints a portrait of Ludwig Wittgenstein that is very different from conventional portraits that narrowly depict him as a philosopher's philosopher silent about social, ethical and cultural questions.