Este volumen es el resultado del deseo común de un grupo de amigos de ofrecer un texto, el texto que cada uno ha juzgado oportuno, a un eminente profesor de la Universidad española; un profesor al que, ciertamente, la edad ha jubilado, pero que en absoluto ha dejado, y no solo por su actual condición de Emérito, de mantenerse en activo; un maestro del pensamiento cuyo recorrido intelectual ha suscitado en esos amigos suficiente atención y simpatía como para avenirse a (...) participar en esta tarea de reconocimiento. El profesor en cuestión es Félix Duque; un nombre que cualquiera que haya mínimamente seguido las aventuras filosóficas europeas de los últimos decenios, incluidas las españolas, sin duda habrá de reconocer de inmediato. Pues se trata de alguien que ha practicado con éxito todas las artes que se supone ha de frecuentar un universitario de primer rango, un transmisor crítico del saber, un investigador de vanguardia: el profesor Félix Duque, en efecto, no solo ha ocupado multitud de estrados, universitarios o no, multitud de aulas y de salas, universitarias o no; también ha dedicado no pocas horas a ofrecer al investigador traducciones y ediciones, tan rigurosas como útiles, de textos clásicos de la filosofía; y ha encontrado tiempo, además, para ofrecer una panorámica monumental de esa aventura crucial del intelecto que fue el idealismo alemán brotado de la crítica kantiana. Pero tampoco se ha detenido ahí una actividad como la suya, infatigable y paciente —aunque también a las veces, cómo no, relampagueante—. Y así, Félix (que es como le conocemos sus amigos), no ha vacilado en poner su ordenador al servicio de cuestiones estéticas, y políticas, y ciudadanas, como tampoco ha dudado en embarcarse, cuando la ocasión lo requería, en alguna polémica de fuste; intervenciones hechas siempre en el contexto de un análisis poderoso, y en absoluto complaciente, de las muchas tradiciones difíciles que heredamos los europeos. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study analyses the impact of Oswald Spengler’s work in Spain during the interwar period. It proceeds with three steps as follows: The first part investigates the reception of Spengler’s historic morphology of cultures in the so-called circle of the Revista de Occidente. The second part delves into the early echo of Spengler’s work among the Spanish left up to the Second Spanish Republic. The third part focuses on the impact of Spengler’s historic morphology among conservative traditionalists and members (...) of the radical right prior to the Spanish Civil War. This analysis point towards broad, transideological debate on Spengler in Spain that the Spanish right then usurped and radicalised during the 1930s. (shrink)

O presente artigo procede a uma leitura crítica das posições de Kant e Hegel no âmbito moral. apresentando-as não de um modo erudito e "arqueológico", mas sim como possível medicina mentis para uma época hedonista e anómica como a actual. A ênfase é colocada na denúncia do egoísmo e do narcisismo, em quanto destruidores e, em última instância, tendências suicidas, ao mesmo tempo que se realça como virtude suprema a abnegação, o sacrifício..., não no nome de uma entidade abstracta (Deus, (...) a Pátria, a Justiça, a Revolução, e menos ainda a Lei moral ou o Espírito Absolute), mas sim por mor dos indivíduos concretos, sendo a compaixão a manifestação mais elevada da dignidade humana, e o respeito à Lei a forma universal de expressar essa solidariedade entre os homens livres (adjectivo este que é redundante, pois só se é homem quando a pessoa se quer livre). /// The present article undertakes a critical reading of the positions defended by Kant and Hegel in the moral realm, presenting them not in a learned and "archeological" way, but rather as a possible medicina mentis for an epoch as ours which is profoundly hedonist and anomic. The emphasis is placed in the denunciation of egoism and narcissism due to their destructive character and, in the end, suicidal tendencies, while at the same time underlining as supreme virtues abnegation and sacrifice, and this not in the name of an abstract entity (God, Fatherland, Justice, Revolution, and less still the moral Law or the Absolute Spirit), but because of the concrete individuals, being it the case that compassion is the most elevated manifestation of human dignity and the respect of Law the universal form of expressing such solidarity among free human beings (it is assumed that the qualification "human" applies only to one who wills himself/herself as free). (shrink)

Las acciones que articulan simbióticamente élites empresariales y políticas, mafias, grupos militares legales e ilegales, se posibilitan bajo la búsqueda de dos fines: uno, reordenar el territorio de manera violenta hiper-acumulando tierras, con el fin de salvaguardar sus intereses económicos e inversiones; dos, hiper-acumular poder político con el fin de sostener sus privilegios, usando dicho poder para la reconfiguración del diseño institucional y la planeación de los territorios imponiendo sus condiciones. Este fenómeno que marca la historia de Colombia es lo (...) que ampliamente podríamos comprender como Criminalidad Corporativa Instaurada. Es el caso y modelo impuesto en el Urabá el cual se fue extendiendo al resto del país. (shrink)

Dynamic Topological Logic ( ) is a modal logic which combines spatial and temporal modalities for reasoning about dynamic topological systems , which are pairs consisting of a topological space X and a continuous function f : X → X . The function f is seen as a change in one unit of time; within one can model the long-term behavior of such systems as f is iterated. One class of dynamic topological systems where the long-term behavior of f is (...) particularly interesting is that of minimal systems ; these are dynamic topological systems which admit no proper, closed, f -invariant subsystems. In such systems the orbit of every point is dense, which within translates into a non-trivial interaction between spatial and temporal modalities. This interaction, however, turns out to make the logic simpler, and while s in general tend to be undecidable, interpreted over minimal systems we obtain decidability, although not in primitive recursive time; this is the main result that we prove in this paper. We also show that interpreted over minimal systems is incomplete for interpretations on relational Kripke frames and hence does not have the finite model property; however it does have a finite non-deterministic quasimodel property. Finally, we give a set of formulas of which characterizes the class of minimal systems within the class of dynamic topological systems, although we do not offer a full axiomatization for the logic. (shrink)

Several recent findings support the notion that changes in the environment can be implicitly represented by the visual system. S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) challenged this view and proposed alternative interpretations based on explicit strategies. Across 4 experiments, the current study finds no empirical support for such alternative proposals. Experiment 1 shows that subjects do not rely on unchanged items when locating an unaware change. Experiments 2 and 3 show that unaware changes affect performance (...) even when they occur at an unpredictable location. Experiment 4 shows that the unaware congruency effect does not depend simply on the pattern of the final display. The authors point to converging evidence from other methodologies and highlight several weaknesses in Mitroff et al.’s theoretical arguments. It is concluded here that implicit representation of change provides the most parsimonious explanation for both past and present findings. (shrink)

In this essay Europe is initially featured as the great cruise ship in Federico Fellini’s film “E la nave va”: a ship full of people, at the mercy of stormy seas, with more people ready to come aboard. Actually Europe’s problem is in keeping together demos and ethos, the whole of individuals and populations, and their effective social and cultural commonality. Therefore, rather than pursuing the images of an improbable collective unity, Europe can be depicted as a fleet of small (...) autonomous ships that, together, follow the same direction cooperating among themselves. (shrink)

Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on (...) the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change. (shrink)

In this essay, I propose a reading of two contrasting passions, two kinds of erōs, in the "Symposium." On the one hand, there is the imperialistic desire for conquering and possessing that Alcibiades represents; and on the other hand, there is the productive love of immortal wisdom that Diotima represents. It’s not just what Alcibiades says in the Symposium, but also what he symbolizes. Alcibiades gives a speech in honor of Socrates and of his unrequited love for him, but even (...) here Alcibiades recounts his attempted seduction of Socrates as a failed conquest, as an unsuccessful attempt to violently take possession of something that Socrates has within him. Even more importantly, in 416 BCE (the dramatic date of Agathon’s symposium) Alcibiades was soon to encourage his fellow countrymen to set off on the ruinous Sicilian expedition. Alcibiades’s actions behind-the-scenes of the "Symposium" reveal the clearest manifestation of his imperialistic erōs (for political power in Athens). They also constitute some necessary background to the dialogue, which Plato’s Athenian readers would have had in mind. Where else can we catch a glimpse of this disastrous desire? It is best illustrated in Thucydides’s "History." I show that the beginnings of this political passion can already be seen in Pericles’s funeral oration (2.35-46, specifically 2.43.1) and that after Pericles’s death, Alcibiades stokes this erōs to such a fevered pitch that the Athenians agree to launch the tragic venture against Sicily. Opposed to this political passion, is Diotima’s. She tries to reorient this misguided erōs and presents an alternative form of desire for everlasting wisdom (philosophia). (shrink)

El presente trabajo revisa la historia del pensamiento occidental desde la reflexión de las distintas concepciones de lo que "historia" y "pensamiento" han significado.

& Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a.

Goodstein’s principle is arguably the first purely number-theoretic statement known to be independent of Peano arithmetic. It involves sequences of natural numbers which at first appear to diverge, but eventually decrease to zero. These sequences are defined relative to a notation system based on exponentiation for the natural numbers. In this article, we provide a self-contained and modern analysis of Goodstein’s principle, obtaining some variations and improvements. We explore notions of optimality for notation systems and apply them to the classical (...) Goodstein process and to a weaker variant based on multiplication rather than exponentiation. In particular, we introduce the notion of base-change maximality, and show how it leads to far-reaching extensions of Goodstein’s result. We moreover show that by varying the initial base of the Goodstein process, one readily obtains independence results for each of the fragments $\mathsf {I}\Sigma _n$ of Peano arithmetic. (shrink)

This is a short entry on "Metatheatre" in Section 4, "Concepts, Themes and Topics Treated in the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

This is a short entry on "Comedy" in Section 3, "Important Features of the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in (...) executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity. (shrink)

The concept of attention is defined by multiple inconsistent metaphors that scientists use to identify relevant phenomena, frame hypotheses, construct experiments, and interpret data. (1) The Filter metaphor shapes debates about partial vs. complete filtering, early vs. late selection, and information filtering vs. enhancement. (2) The Spotlight metaphor raises the issue of space‐ vs. object‐based selection, and it guides research on the size, shape, and movement of the attentional focus. (3) The Spotlight‐in‐the‐Brain metaphor is frequently used to interpret imaging studies (...) of attention. (4) The debate between supramodal and pre‐motor theories of attention replays the dichotomy between the Spotlight and the Vision metaphors of attention. Our analysis reveals the central role of metaphor in scientific theory and research on attention, exposes hidden assumptions behind various research strategies, and shows the need for flexibility in the use of current metaphors. (shrink)

Dynamic Topological Logic (DFH) is a multimodal system for reasoning about dynamical systems. It is defined semantically and, as such, most of the work done in the field has been model-theoretic. In particular, the problem of finding a complete axiomatization for the full language of DFH over the class of all dynamical systems has proven to be quite elusive. Here we propose to enrich the language to include a polyadic topological modality, originally introduced by Dawar and Otto in a different (...) context. We then provide a sound axiomatization for DFH over this extended language, and prove that it is complete. The polyadic modality is used in an essential way in our proof. (shrink)

In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...) Socrates takes on a role and speaks as someone else. I call these moments “Socratic mimēsis.” While previous commentators have noticed some of these moments, they have either overstated their rarity or they have not studied them collectively. My dissertation is the first in-depth investigation of this phenomenon in the dialogues. Socrates’ dramatic imitation of others is way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to, and to educate, different kinds of audiences. Although “Socratic mimēsis” occurs throughout the Platonic corpus, I focus on three passages from three different dialogues, which are paradigm instances: [1] in the "Crito" Socrates plays the part of ‘the Laws’ (50a-54c); [2] in the "Theaetetus" he acts the part of ‘Protagoras’ (166a-168c); and [3] in the "Menexenus" he recites a funeral speech learned from ‘Aspasia’ (236d-249c). Instead of one-sidedly reading the dialogues as either only literary works of art or as only a series of philosophical arguments, this study gleans philosophic insights from the literary and dramatic details of the dialogues. In chapter one I argue that in the "Crito" Socrates tries to convince Crito of a universal and absolute ethics based on never committing injustice, but Crito is not able to understand. In order to make Crito more just—but not yet at the level of Socratic ethics—Socrates creates ‘the Laws’ to persuade Crito to expand his personal notion of justice. Socrates instills a political obedience in place of Crito’s existing lawlessness as a second-best recourse. Plato expects the astute listener or reader to see the contrast between Socrates’ earlier ethical principles, said in his own voice, with what he says in the voice of ‘the Laws.’ In chapter two I argue that in the part of the "Theaetetus" where Socrates defends Protagoras (often called ‘the Defense’), Socrates, by imitating ‘Protagoras,’ is actually criticizing Protagorean relativism. The Protagorean theory cannot account for mimēsis and Socrates’ mimetic act performatively contradicts the identity of appearance and reality, which the theory presupposes. Finally, in chapter three I argue that in the Menexenus the funeral oration that Socrates recounts for Menexenus that he heard from ‘Aspasia’ is actually a disguised criticism of political rhetoric and of Athenian imperialism. Although the speech is never interrogated within the dialogue, Plato provokes the listener or reader outside the dialogue to question its message and to see how it conflicts with many of Socrates’ positions in other dialogues. Beyond reconsidering the long-standing and persistent view that Plato was against poetry and mimetic performance, I re-examine the role that performance and role-playing can have in philosophy and pedagogy more generally. Actors, by taking on other personas, and audience members, in observing actors and their actions, are both involved in acts of imagination that can expand their horizon of thinking and feeling. (shrink)

O artigo pretende sublinhar a incompatibilidade que a hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer apresenta com relação ao projeto filosófico de Heidegger. O objetivo é, desta forma, problematizar a ideia segundo a qual a hermenêutica filosófica constitui um desdobramento representativo do pensamento heideggeriano. A hermenêutica de Gadamer é percebida aqui como estando comprometida com uma tarefa de refundação, e a práxis, entendida como imanência da vida histórica, se mostra precisamente como um novo fundamento. O encontro de Gadamer com a práxis revela-se, assim, (...) à luz de uma não identificação, ainda que pouco explícita, da hermenêutica filosófica em relação ao projeto heideggeriano. (shrink)

Even though Kant, because of his modus operandi, has been saluted as the renewer of dialectic method (after mature Plato), nonetheless his ars exponiendi, as apparent, for example, in the subjective deduction of categories, has always been characteristically dual (noumenon/phenomenon, understanding/sensibility, theory/praxis, etc.) or fourfold (as in the antinomies, eventually liable to be reduced to two pairs in conflict). However, in the second Critique a notable contradiction arises in a judgment that is pretendedly analytic and also the consequence of the (...) categorical imperative commanding that every man be treated as an end in himself (as representing humanity in his person). There, it is said that such consideration occurs at the same time and in the same regard as the use of man as a means. Far from treating this contradiction as a mere mistake, this article tries to unfold the fruitfulness of that contradictory judgment in order to reconcile the world of politics, based on the spheres of work and private property (characteristic of the realm of means), with the world of morality (beyond mere ethics).With the purpose of elucidating this point, we will resort to the ‘useful fiction’ of a ‘stepmother Nature’ (in the mundane) and to the heterogony of ends, which transform the external freedom (first and most important of passions) into a reflexive and Law-bounded freedom, open to condolence and sacrifice. (shrink)

En este artículo se discuten las críticas de John Dupré contra la unidad metodológica de la ciencia. Como se sabe, a partir de la premisa del desorden de las cosas, Dupré rechaza tanto las versiones fuertes como las variantes débiles de unificación, pero construye sus mejores argumentos contra las últimas a partir de la tesis de que no hay una solución satisfactoria del problema de la demarcación. Tras exponer los argumentos de Dupré en favor de la implausibilidad de cualquier formulación (...) débil de la tesis de la unidad de la ciencia (incluyendo aquellas que se enfocan en la unidad metodológica), explicaré su formulación del problema de la demarcación, examinaré su caracterización de la teoría de la falsabilidad de Popper y responderé a sus argumentos en contra de la posición de Popper sobre la cientificidad. Mis argumentos mostrarán la inadecuación del tratamiento que da Dupré a este problema y señalarán una ruta para mostrar que la solución de Popper al problema de la demarcación, por medio del criterio de falsabilidad, permite defender una forma no reduccionista de la unidad de la ciencia. (shrink)

Scientific concepts are defined by metaphors. These metaphors determine what atten- tion is and what count as adequate explanations of the phenomenon. The authors analyze these metaphors within 3 types of attention theories: (a) --cause-- theories, in which attention is presumed to modulate information processing (e.g., attention as a spotlight; attention as a limited resource); (b) --effect-- theories, in which attention is considered to be a by-product of information processing (e.g., the competition meta- phor); and (c) hybrid theories that combine (...) cause and effect aspects (e.g., biased- competition models). The present analysis reveals the crucial role of metaphors in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the efforts of scientists to find a resolution to the classic problem of cause versus effect interpretations. (shrink)

This article will contrast two portrayals of Protagoras: one in the "Theaetetus," where Socrates discusses Protagorean theory and even comes to his defense by imitating the deceased sophist; and another in the "Protagoras," where Socrates recounts his encounter with the sophist. I suggest that Plato wants listeners and readers of the dialogues to hear the dissonance between the two portraits and to wonder why Socrates so distorts Protagoras in the "Theaetetus." Protagoras in the "Protagoras" behaves and speaks in ways that (...) are incompatible with the Protagorean position presented in the "Theaetetus.". (shrink)

For any ordinal $\Lambda$, we can define a polymodal logic $\mathsf{GLP}_\Lambda$, with a modality $[\xi]$ for each $\xi < \Lambda$. These represent provability predicates of increasing strength. Although $\mathsf{GLP}_\Lambda$ has no Kripke models, Ignatiev showed that indeed one can construct a Kripke model of the variable-free fragment with natural number modalities, denoted $\mathsf{GLP}^0_\omega$. Later, Icard defined a topological model for $\mathsf{GLP}^0_\omega$ which is very closely related to Ignatiev's. In this paper we show how to extend these constructions for arbitrary $\Lambda$. (...) More generally, for each $\Theta,\Lambda$ we build a Kripke model $\mathfrak I^\Theta_\Lambda$ and a topological model $\mathfrak T^\Theta_\Lambda$, and show that $\mathsf{GLP}^0_\Lambda$ is sound for both of these structures, as well as complete, provided $\Theta$ is large enough. (shrink)

At the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσίας] must be in time; that is, that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or it will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one does not partake in being” (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not” (141e9). Parmenides then gets Aristotle to (...) agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is” (141e9-10). This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle answers Parmenides question, “Therefore could something partake of being in any way other than in one of those ways?” (141e7-8) with a two-word answer in Greek: “οὐκ ἔστιν [It’s not possible].” We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time is it “not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]” for something to not partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment, in the past, or in the future? If Aristotle’s assertion is to have any force it must hold always. It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions, like ‘1+1=2.’ Forms, like mathematical entities, must necessarily have atemporal existence. Accordingly, in atemporally maintaining that anything that is must be in time, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm. (shrink)

Goodstein’s theorem states that certain sequences based on exponential notation for the natural numbers are always finite. The result is independent of Peano arithmetic and is a prototypical example of a proof of termination by transfinite induction. A variant based instead on the Ackermann function has more recently been proposed by Arai, Fernández-Duque, Wainer, and Weiermann, and instead is independent of the more powerful theory ATR0. However, this result is contingent on rather elaborate normal forms for natural numbers based (...) on a “sandwiching” procedure. This leaves open both the question of whether the sandwiching procedure can be eliminated while retaining the full strength of the Ackermannian Goodstein principle, and whether other normal forms can lead to nontermination. In this article we settle these questions by showing that any Goodstein process based on the Ackermann function is terminating, and indeed the sandwiching procedure gives rise to Goodstein principles of maximal length. We thus obtain an equivalent principle which does not involve normal forms at all and immediately implies all Ackermannian Goodstein principles that have been considered. Our techniques provide a new approach to termination proofs, where terms in a sequence do not necessarily decrease in complexity, but instead are majorized by some “master” process, already known to be terminating. (shrink)

In this paper, drawing on evidence internal to the Platonic dialogues (supplemented with some ancient testimonia), I answer the question, “How did Plato teach in the Academy?” My reconstruction of Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy is that there was a single person who read the dialogue aloud like a rhapsode (this is in contrast to the dramatic theatrical hypothesis, in which several speakers function as actors in the performance of a dialogue). After the rhapsodic reading, students were allowed to ask (...) that portions of the text to be re-read, to ask a question about the text, and were encouraged to enter into a broader conversation about the topic and themes brought out by the text. This later pedagogical method of interrogating and investigating a dialogue is of more importance than the mere reading of a dialogue. I contend that Plato’s experiences teaching were woven into some of the dialogues, and that Plato’s pedagogy reflects some of the ways that he taught in the Academy. I propose that excellent points made by students may have been written into revised forms of the dialogue. And not only good points, but also mistakes in reasoning may have been added into the dialogues. I suggest that the way certain dialogues are organized with “guest lecturers” and “tag-team” philosophical debates reflect Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy. Plato’s broadmindedness, his openness to various and opposing viewpoints, is also evident from both outside and inside of the dialogue. Lastly, drawing on the idea of Socratic mimēsis, I give a plausible curriculum for how Plato may have used the dialogues to teach them: he had his students “play” with them. Plato may have asked his students to enter into the roles of the characters in the dialogues to better understand them and the type of person they represent. Plato may have also asked students to take over from the position of the character in the dialogue and to suggest a better, truer account of things than what the characters said or did. (shrink)

This paper proposes a formal account of AI trustworthiness, connecting both intrinsic and perceived trustworthiness in an operational schematization. We argue that trustworthiness extends beyond the inherent capabilities of an AI system to include significant influences from observers' perceptions, such as perceived transparency, agency locus, and human oversight. While the concept of perceived trustworthiness is discussed in the literature, few attempts have been made to connect it with the intrinsic trustworthiness of AI systems. Our analysis introduces a novel schematization to (...) quantify trustworthiness by assessing the discrepancies between expected and observed behaviors and how these affect perceived uncertainty and trust. The paper provides a formalization for measuring trustworthiness, taking into account both perceived and intrinsic characteristics. By detailing the factors that influence trust, this study aims to foster more ethical and widely accepted AI technologies, ensuring they meet both functional and ethical criteria. (shrink)