This article aims to describe underlying principles of paradigm shifts in clinical medicine by means of analysis of typical examples. Retrospectively, profound shifts of ruling paradigms can be shown in diverse fields such as outcome research, in the redefining of patient's and doctor's autonomies, in the challenges presented by consumer medicine and the free market economy. This has provoked controversy between doctors, patients and the community. The judgement on whether recent shifts in paradigms in medicine have improved the health care (...) delivered today is by no means uncontroversial. Aiming to demonstrate how shifts of paradigms in medicine occur and what consequences can result from such shifts we reflect on the works of Thomas S. Kuhn, the eminent philosopher of science. An analysis of his theories lends important insight into the observed shifts in paradigms. (shrink)

Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen. Im ersten Teil argumentiere ich, daß in der frühen Neuzeit durch die Zurückweisung des scholastischen Vokabulars das Problem, Ordnung und Regelmäßigkeit in der Natur zu erklären, neu aufgeworfen wird. Descartes führt den Begriff des Naturgesetzes ein, um dieses Problem zu lösen. Im zweiten und dritten Teil analysiere ich, was Descartes unter einem Naturgesetz versteht. Im zweiten Teil zeige ich, daß es für die verbreitete Auffassung, Descartes halte Naturgesetze für ewige Wahrheiten, keine guten Gründe gibt. (...) Im dritten Teil untersuche ich die Rolle, die Gott – Descartes zufolge – als Urheber der Naturgesetze spielt. Ich argumentiere, daß die “Daumenkino”-Auffassung von Naturgesetzen keine Folge der “creatio continua”- These ist, sondern eine Konsequenz des Cartesischen Materiebegriffs. Schließlich bemühe ich mich verständlich zu machen, weshalb Descartes fürchtet, seine Naturgesetzauffassung lege die Hypothese nahe, Gott sei die Weltseele. (shrink)

Traditionell grundete die spekulative Kraft metaphysischen Denkens im Vertrauen auf so etwas wie eine innere, sachlich fundierte Bindung zwischen Sprache, Denken und Wirklichkeit. Freilich werden in dem Masse, wie die sprachlichen Bedingungen allen Philosophierens in den Blick geraten, auch wichtige (und traditionell unproblematische) Annahmen der Metaphysik fraglich. So bleibt als Alternative nur die Annahme, dass Metaphysik wie alle anderen Domanen auch als korrigierbare bzw. revidierbare Angelegenheit gelten muss. Damit durfte die Rede von einer "Ersten Philosophie" obsolet werden, nicht jedoch die (...) Idee einer philosophischen Branche, die unsere Auffassungen uber die Wirklichkeit eruiert und dabei allgemeine und allgemeinste Zuge kenntlich zu machen sucht. (shrink)

Als letzter Assistent von Max Scheler hat Paul Ludwig Landsberg (*1901 in Bonn; + 1944 im KZ Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen) dessen Ansätze zu einer Philosophischen Anthropologie in einer durchaus eigenständigen Weise fortgeführt. Insbesondere hat er dabei den Versuch unternommen, eine Grundlegung der Anthropologie durch die Explikation menschlicher Selbstauffassungsgehalte zu leisten: Das Problem menschlicher »Bildung« ist ihm daher nicht einfachhin ein abgeleitetes Anwendungsgebiet der Philosophischen Anthropologie, aus welcher gleichsam nachträglich eine Bildungstheorie deduziert würde, sondern der phänomenologisch zu betrachtende Ausgangspunkt, von welchem her allererst (...) auf die Probleme der Anthropologie hin gedacht werden kann. Die vorliegende Studie nun beginnt mit einer Skizzierung des existentiellen Hintergrundes der Philosophischen Anthropologie (1. Kapitel) und ihrer vorläufigen Begriffs- und Aufgabenbestimmung (2. Kapitel). In der Hauptsache jedoch ist sie darum bemüht, die phänomenologisch erhellte Erfahrungs-Struktur menschlicher Bildung (3. Kapitel) für eine kategoriale Bestimmung anthropologischer und pädagogischer Fragestellungen (4. Kapitel) fruchtbar zu machen. Abschließend werden Grundzüge einer Metaphysik skizziert, die - im Anschluß an die Einsichten Landsbergs, zugleich aber auch in abwägender Auseinandersetzung mit modern-postmoderner Metaphysik-Kritik - die Bildung der Person im Welthorizont zu denken versucht (5. Kapitel). (shrink)

Die Figur des Cyborgs stellt eine komplexe Chiffre dar, in der sich Zeitdiagnosen und politische Manifeste, technische Entwicklungen und Visionen sowie Veränderungen in der Theoriebildung versammeln. Damit sind insbesondere drei Bereiche aufgerufen, Politik, Technik und Theorie, welche in unterschiedlicher Weise Gebrauch von der Figur des Cyborgs machen und in denen sich wiederum verschiedene Linien bündeln.

So geschaftig die internationale Nietzsche-Forschung auch ist, bleibt doch weithin unklar, was eigentlich gemeint ist, wenn wir von Nietzsches Philosophie sprechen. Handelt es sich um ein Gefuge von Lehrsatzen Wille zur Macht, Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen, Ubermensch? Wie sollen philosophisch interessierte Leserinnen und Leser damit umgehen, dass Nietzsche sich offensichtlich unentwegt selbst ins Wort fallt und jede doktrinale Festlegung verweigert? Ist das nur eine billige literarische Strategie, um das eigene Gefuge von Lehrsatzen interessanter zu machen? Oder handelt es sich vielmehr (...) um den Versuch, den Glauben an Philosophie als Gefuge von Lehrsatzen grundsatzlich zu problematisieren? Vielleicht ist Nietzsches Philosophie etwas vollig Anderes: eine andere Praxis. Der bekannte Nietzsche-Forscher Andreas Urs Sommer stellt und beantwortet in diesem Band grundlegende Fragen zum Umgang mit Nietzsches Texten, die so ganz anders zu funktionieren scheinen als landlaufige philosophische Texte. Die dafur erforderliche philosophische Hermeneutik muss auf einem sicheren philologisch-historischen Fundament stehen. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz behandelt die Frage, in welcher Weise die Erfahrung einer Illusion und der Vollzug einer Reflexion konstitutive Merkmale der ästhetischen Erfahrung sind. Nach einem weit verbreiteten Verständnis der ästhetischen Erfahrung beschreiben der Begriff der Illusion und der Begriff der Reflexion zwei einander entgegengesetzte Akte: Mit einem Akt der Reflexion machen wir uns eine Illusion bewusst, deren Opfer wir andernfalls waren. Der Beitrag zeigt dagegen, dass im Bereich des Ästhetischen der Begriff der Reflexion keinen Akt beschreibt, der einem Akt der (...) Illusion entgegengesetzt ist. Die Begriffe der Reflexion und Illusion beschreiben hier vielmehr einen einzigen Akt, und zwar so, dass sie hierbei einander wechselseitig erläutern. (shrink)

Als Philosoph steht Schleiermacher noch immer im Schatten seiner Zeitgenossen und auch seiner theologischen Werke. Das Buch will seinen eigenständigen Beitrag zur Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie sichtbar machen. Gefragt wird, worin das philosophische Gravitationszentrum der einschlägigen Texte, Entwürfe und Vorlesungen Schleiermachers besteht, mit welchen theoretischen Mitteln er dabei operiert und welche Stellung er in der philosophischen Bewegung seiner Zeit einnimmt. Als zentral erweist sich der Individualitätsgedanke, der aus einer eigenständigen, kritischen Aneignung Kants und Spinozas resultiert. Mit dieser Konzeption begegnet Schleiermacher Friedrich (...) Schlegel auf Augenhöhe und leistet einen eigenständigen Beitrag zur frühromantischen Philosophie, deren grundlegende Positionen er in seinen philosophischen Vorlesungen in Halle (1804-1806) und Berlin (seit 1808) kritisch durcharbeitet und systematisiert. Dies bringt Schleiermacher, wie schon den frühen Friedrich Schlegel, trotz aller gravierenden Unterschiede vielfach in die Nähe Hegels, so dass sich sein Verhältnis zu den philosophischen Zeitgenossen höchst komplex gestaltet. Schleiermacher erweist sich als eigenständiger Denker auf dem gemeinsamen Boden der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie. (shrink)

Der Mensch sei von Natur aus politisch, sagt Aristoteles, nur im geordneten Gemeinwesen der Polis finde er seine Bestimmung. Seit der Antike dient die menschliche Natur zur Legitimierung sehr verschiedener, keineswegs 'natürlicher' politischer Ordnungen. In historischen Fallstudien vom Alten Orient bis zur Frühen Neuzeit untersuchen die Beiträge, wie das Verhältnis von Menschennatur und politischer Ordnung gedacht und dargestellt wurde, welche normative Kraft es entfaltete, welche Hierarchien, Machtverhältnisse und Herrschaftsformen es stützte und wo es an seine Grenzen stieß. Denn nicht allein (...) Ordnung, sondern auch ihr Gegenteil kann als naturhaft identifiziert werden. In der Geschichte der politischen Anthropologie zeigt sich der Rekurs auf Natur als ebenso wirkmächtig wie ambivalent. Gerade ihre Bruchlinien und Widersprüche machen vormoderne Auseinandersetzungen um das Verhältnis von Menschennatur und politischer Ordnung für heutige Diskussionen interessant. (shrink)

Der Beitrag unternimmt es, Grundkonstellationen von Heideggers spätem Denken - der Frage nach einem "anderen Anfang" der von der Metaphysik und dem Ge-Stell der Technik beherrschten Geschichte - über eine Vergegenwärtigung seines Gesprächs mit Hegel und Friedrich Georg Jünger luzide zu machen. Zeigt sich Heideggers Suche nach einem "anderen Anfang" der Geschichte in Kunst und Dichtung vom Widerspruch gegen Hegel geprägt, so finden seine seinsgeschichtlichen Erörterungen des Wesens der Technik eine aufschlußreiche Entsprechung in den Arbeiten Friedrich Georg Jüngers, insbesondere dessen (...) Buch über "Die Perfektion der Technik". Kritische Rückfragen thematisieren u.a. den Ort praktischer Rationalität und verantwortlicher Praxis. (shrink)

Alle kulturellen Praktiken sind verkörpert: Ihnen ist die Spannungseinheit von leiblichem Erleben, physischem Tun und kulturellem Sinn eingeschrieben. Von den Kognitions- bis zu den Kulturwissenschaften ist Verkörperung daher mittlerweile ein zentrales Forschungsthema. Der vorgelegte Band widmet sich in interdisziplinärer Perspektive exemplarischen Praktiken und Ritualen des Körpers und will einem drohenden neuen Dualismus zwischen leiblicher und kultureller Verkörperung entgegenwirken. Biologischer Organismus, bewusstes Erleben und kulturelle Traditionen sollen in ihrer Wechselbezüglichkeit hervortreten und damit sichtbar machen, dass „Sinn“ ein Phänomen ist, das die (...) cartesianische Trennung von Geist und Körper unterläuft. (shrink)

We address the question whether there is an explanation for the fact that as Fodor put it the micro-level “converges on stable macro-level properties”, and whether there are lessons from this explanation for other issues in the vicinity. We argue that stability in large systems can be understood in terms of statistical limit theorems. In the thermodynamic limit of infinite system size N → ∞ systems will have strictly stable macroscopic properties in the sense that transitions between different macroscopic phases (...) of matter (if there are any) will not occur in finite time. Indeed stability in this sense is a consequence of the absence of fluctuations, as (large) fluctuations would be required to induce such macroscopic transformations. These properties can be understood in terms of coarse-grained descriptions, and the statistical limit theorems for independent or weakly dependent random variable describing the behaviour averages and the statistics of fluctuations in the large system limit. We argue that RNG analyses applied to off-critical systems can provide a rationalization for the applicability of these limit theorems. Furthermore we discuss some related issues as, for example, the role of the infinite-system idealization. (shrink)

Given certain well-known observations by Mach and Russell, the question arises what place there is for causation in the physical world. My aim in this chapter is to understand under what conditions we can use causal terminology and how it fi ts in with what physics has to say. I will argue for a disposition-based process-theory of causation. After addressing Mach’s and Russell’s concerns I will start by outlining the kind of problem the disposition based process-theory of causation is meant (...) to solve. In a second step I will discuss the nature of those dispositions that will be relevant for our question. In section 3 I will discuss existing dispositional accounts of causation before I proceed to present my own account (sections 4 to 6) and contrast it with traditional process-theories (section 7). (shrink)

This paper defends a version of the realist view that fictional characters exist. It argues for an instance of abstract realist views, according to which fictional characters are roles, constituted by sets of properties. It is argued that fictional names denote individual concepts, functions from worlds to individuals. It is shown that a dynamic framework for understanding the evolution of discourse information can be used to understand how roles are created and develop along with story content. Taking fictional names to (...) denote individual concepts provides accounts of a number of uses of fictional names. These include non-fictional uses, fictional uses, metafictional uses, interfictional uses, counterfictional uses, and negative existentials. It is argued that this account is not open to objections that have been raised in the literature. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren hat sich eine Vielfalt unterschiedlicher Gremien zur Ethikberatung entwickelt: vom Konsil mit einem einzelnen Berater bis zum Ethikkomitee. In dem Band werden die Ethikberatung, ihre Entwicklung und Anwendung, sowie die Gründung von Gremien in Krankenhäusern, Pflegeeinrichtungen, Hospizen und von niedergelassenen Ärzten anhand von Fallbeispielen erläutert. Dabei schlagen die Autoren eine Brücke zwischen traditioneller philosophischer Ethik und anwendungsbezogener klinischer Ethik. Auch rechtliche Fragen werden erörtert.

Different people have different perceptions about artificial intelligence (AI). It is extremely important to bring together all the alternative frames of thinking—from the various communities of developers, researchers, business leaders, policymakers, and citizens—to properly start acknowledging AI. This article highlights the ‘fruitful collaboration’ that sociology and AI could develop in both social and technical terms. We discuss how biases and unfairness are among the major challenges to be addressed in such a sociotechnical perspective. First, as intelligent machines reveal their nature (...) of ‘magnifying glasses’ in the automation of existing inequalities, we show how the AI technical community is calling for transparency and explainability, accountability and contestability. Not to be considered as panaceas, they all contribute to ensuring human control in novel practices that include requirement, design and development methodologies for a fairer AI. Second, we elaborate on the mounting attention for technological narratives as technology is recognized as a social practice within a specific institutional context. Not only do narratives reflect organizing visions for society, but they also are a tangible sign of the traditional lines of social, economic, and political inequalities. We conclude with a call for a diverse approach within the AI community and a richer knowledge about narratives as they help in better addressing future technical developments, public debate, and policy. AI practice is interdisciplinary by nature and it will benefit from a socio-technical perspective. (shrink)

I consider the plausibility of discounting for kinship, the view that a positive rate of pure intergenerational time preference is justifiable in terms of agent-relative moral reasons relating to partiality between generations. I respond to Parfit's objections to discounting for kinship, but then highlight a number of apparent limitations of this approach. I show that these limitations largely fall away when we reflect on social discounting in the context of decisions that concern the global community as a whole, such as (...) those related to global climate change. (shrink)

The paper argues that the correct definition of lying is that to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood in terms of the notion of the common ground of a conversation. It is shown that this definition makes the right predictions for a number of cases involving irony, joking, and false implicature. In addition, the proposed account does not assume that intending to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, and hence counts so-called (...) bald-faced lies as lies. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking centre stage in economic growth and business operations alike. Public discourse about the practical and ethical implications of AI has mainly focussed on the societal level. There is an emerging knowledge base on AI risks to human rights around data security and privacy concerns. A separate strand of work has highlighted the stresses of working in the gig economy. This prevailing focus on human rights and gig impacts has been at the expense of a closer (...) look at how AI may be reshaping traditional workplace relations and, more specifically, workplace health and safety. To address this gap, we outline a conceptual model for developing an AI Work Health and Safety (WHS) Scorecard as a tool to assess and manage the potential risks and hazards to workers resulting from AI use in a workplace. A qualitative, practice-led research study of AI adopters was used to generate and test a novel list of potential AI risks to worker health and safety. Risks were identified after cross-referencing Australian AI Ethics Principles and Principles of Good Work Design with AI ideation, design and implementation stages captured by the AI Canvas, a framework otherwise used for assessing the commercial potential of AI to a business. The unique contribution of this research is the development of a novel matrix itemising currently known or anticipated risks to the WHS and ethical aspects at each AI adoption stage. (shrink)

According to relational egalitarians, equality is not primarily about the distribution of some good but about people relating to one another as equals. However, compared with other theorists in political philosophy – including other egalitarians – relational egalitarians have said relatively little on what role personal responsibility should play in their theories. For example, is equality compatible with responsibility? Should economic distributions be responsibility-sensitive? This article fills this gap. I develop a relational egalitarian framework for personal responsibility and show that (...) relational equality commits us to responsibility. I develop two sets of arguments. First, I draw on relational theories of moral responsibility – particularly Strawsonian views – to show that valuable egalitarian relationships require responsibility. Second, I show why relational equality sometimes requires that economic distributions be sensitive to responsibility and choice. I also defend a seemingly paradoxical result: being committed to responsibility, relational egalitarianism not only justifies some distributive inequalities but some relational inequalities too. Overall, relational egalitarianism gives a nuanced and coherent answer as to why and how responsibility matters from within egalitarianism. That it does should be an important argument in its favour. (shrink)

: We discuss the role that transnational corporations should play in developing global governance, creating a framework of rules and regulations for the global economy. The central issue is whether TNCs should provide global rules and guarantee individual citizenship rights, or instead focus on maximizing profits. First, we describe the problems arising from the globalization process that affect the relationship between public rules and private firms. Next we consider the position of economic and management theories in relation to the social (...) responsibility of the firm. We argue that instrumental stakeholder theory and business and society research can only partially solve the global governance issue, and that more recent concepts of corporate citizenship and republican business ethics deliver theoretically and practically helpful, fresh insights. However, even these need further development, especially with regard to the legitimacy of corporate political activity. (shrink)

The all-affected principle is a widely accepted solution to the problem of constituting the demos. Despite its popularity, a basic question in relation to the principle has not received much attention: why does the fact that an individual is affected by a certain decision ground a right to inclusion in democratic decision-making about that matter? An answer to this question must include a reason that explains why an affected individual should be included because she is affected. We identify three such (...) reasons in the literature – to wit, interest protection, self-government and welfare – and show why they all fail. We then propose two alternative reasons, equal relations and fairness, and show why they are also deficient. Surprisingly, the all-affected principle then appears groundless, which supports withholding belief in the all-affected principle or(/and) investing future research in identifying the thus-far unidentified reason why being affected grounds a claim to inclusion. (shrink)

This paper tries to explain why racial profiling involves a serious injustice and to do so in a way that avoids the problems of existing philosophical accounts. An initially plausible view maintains that racial profiling is pro tanto wrong in and of itself by violating a constraint on fair treatment that is generally violated by acts of statistical discrimination based on ascribed characteristics. However, consideration of other cases involving statistical discrimination suggests that violating a constraint of this kind may not (...) be an especially serious wrong in and of itself. To fully capture the significant wrong that occurs when racial profiling is targeted at black Americans or other similarly situated groups, it is argued that we should appeal to the idea that this basic injustice is exacerbated when it forms part of a larger pattern of similar actions that collectively realize a state of cumulative injustice. (shrink)

Upon discovering that certain beliefs we hold are contingent on arbitrary features of our background, we often feel uneasy. I defend the proposal that if such cases ofcontingency anxietyinvolve defeaters, this is because of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I note two hurdles to our accepting thisDisagreement Hypothesis. Firstly, some cases of contingency anxiety apparently involve no disagreement. Secondly, the proposal may seem to make our awareness of the influence of arbitrary background factors irrelevant in determining whether to revise our (...) beliefs. I show that each of these problems can be successfully accommodated by theDisagreement Hypothesis. (shrink)

Neural devices have the capacity to enable users to regain abilities lost due to disease or injury – for instance, a deep brain stimulator (DBS) that allows a person with Parkinson’s disease to regain the ability to fluently perform movements or a Brain Computer Interface (BCI) that enables a person with spinal cord injury to control a robotic arm. While users recognize and appreciate the technologies’ capacity to maintain or restore their capabilities, the neuroethics literature is replete with examples of (...) concerns expressed about agentive capacities: A perceived lack of control over the movement of a robotic arm might result in an altered sense of feeling responsible for that movement. Clinicians or researchers being able to record and access detailed information of a person’s brain might raise privacy concerns. A disconnect between previous, current, and future understandings of the self might result in a sense of alienation. The ability to receive and interpret sensory feedback might change whether someone trusts the implanted device or themselves. Inquiries into the nature of these concerns and how to mitigate them has produced scholarship that often emphasizes one issue – responsibility, privacy, authenticity, or trust – selectively. However, we believe that examining these ethical dimensions separately fails to capture a key aspect of the experience of living with a neural device. In exploring their interrelations, we argue that their mutual significance for neuroethical research can be adequately captured if they are described under a unified heading of agency. On these grounds, we propose an “Agency Map” which brings together the diverse neuroethical dimensions and their interrelations into a comprehensive framework. With this, we offer a theoretically-grounded approach to understanding how these various dimensions are interwoven in an individual’s experience of agency. (shrink)

Many of our endeavors -- be it personal or communal, technological or artistic -- aim at eradicating all traces of dissatisfaction from our daily lives. They seek to cure us of our discontent in order to deliver us a fuller and flourishing existence. But what if ubiquitous pleasure and instant fulfilment make our lives worse, not better? What if discontent isn't an obstacle to the good life but one of its essential ingredients? In Propelled, Andreas Elpidorou makes a lively (...) case for the value of discontent and illustrates how boredom, frustration, and anticipation are good for us. Weaving together stories from sources as wide-ranging as classical literature, social and cognitive psychology, philosophy, art, and video games, Elpidorou shows that these psychological states aren't unpleasant accidents of our lives. Rather, they illuminate our desires and expectations, inform us when we find ourselves stuck in unpleasant and unfulfilling situations, and motivate us to furnish our lives with meaning, interest, and value. Boredom, frustration, and anticipation aren't obstacles to our goals--they are our guides, propelling us into lives that are truly our own. (shrink)

Egalitarian theories assess when and why distributive inequalities are objectionable. How should egalitarians assess inequalities between generations? One egalitarian theory is (telic) distributive egalitarianism: other things being equal, equal distributions of some good are intrinsically better than unequal distributions. I first argue that distributive egalitarianism produces counterintuitive judgements when applied across generations and that attempts to discount or exclude intergenerational inequalities do not work. This being so, intergenerational comparisons also undercut the intragenerational judgements that made distributive egalitarianism intuitive in the (...) first place. I then argue that egalitarians should shed distributive egalitarianism: relational and instrumental arguments against inequality likely suffice to capture egalitarian concerns – including across generations – without encountering the problems produced by distributive egalitarianism. (shrink)

This paper argues that Wittgenstein does not assimilate certainties to either linguistic norms or empirical propositions but assigns them to a liminal space between rule and experience. This liminal space is also brought into play in remarks written at the same time as those compiled in On Certainty, but attributed to different bodies of text. The paper maintains that certainties express the agreement and constancy in judgements without which – as Wittgenstein contends in his Philosophical Investigations – rule-following would not (...) be possible. It is shown that this intrinsic relation between rule-following and certainties can explain the liminal status of the latter. (shrink)

The principle of the causal closure of the physical plays a central role in the philosophy of mind, especially as a premise in arguments for physicalism. In this paper I explore what role the principle can play in the argument for physicalism and whether the evidence we have for the principle allows for such a role or function.

Reference to past possibilities is not an additional luxury in writing history, after all facts have been established. For even facts become such only within a field of alternative options. What it means that one path was taken depends in part on answers to the question which other paths once open were not taken. Historical potential unrealized can be conceived of in a number of ways: as unfulfilled intentions, as unresolved problems, as suppressed endeavours, as waived alternatives within a context (...) of decision, or as losses incurred by gains in some other respect. Some of these conceptions are non-exclusive. None of them provides the single model to grasp past possibilities; rather, they will turn out to be more or less elucidative according to historical case. (shrink)

The nudge approach seeks to improve people’s decisions through small changes in their choice environments. Nudge policies often work through psychological mechanisms that deviate from traditional notions of rationality. Because of that, some critics object that nudging treats people as irrational. Such treatment might be disrespectful in itself and might crowd out more empowering policies. I defend nudging against these objections. By defending a nonstandard, ecological model of rationality, I argue that nudging not only is compatible with rational agency but (...) can even support it. Accordingly, a concern with rationality speaks for more rather than less public policy nudging. (shrink)

Moritz Schlick dealt with the question of causality in various places, including in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre - but especially in two essays that appeared in the journal Die Naturwissenschaften in 1920 and 1931. I will deal here with the essay "Naturphilosophische Betrachtungen über das Kausalprinzip" from 1920. First, in the first section, I will present the historical context and thus the problems to which Schlick was responding. In the second and third sections, I will reconstruct and discuss Schlick's proposed solutions (...) to these problems. (shrink)

Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such (...) concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in. (shrink)

Confronted with mounting pressure to ensure accountability vis-à-vis customers, citizens and beneficiaries, organizational leaders need to decide how to choose and implement so-called accountability standards. Yet while looking for an appropriate standard, they often base their decisions on cost-benefit calculations, thus neglecting other important spheres of influence pertaining to more broadly defined stakeholder interests. We argue in this paper that, as a part of the strategic decision for a certain standard, management needs to identify and act according to the needs (...) of all stakeholders. We contend that the creation of a dialogical understanding among affected stakeholders cannot be a mere outcome of applying certain accountability standards, but rather must be a necessary precondition for their use. This requires a stakeholder dialogue prior to making a choice. We outline such a discursive decision framework for accountability standards based on the Habermasian concept of communicative action and, in the final section, apply our conceptual framework to one of the most prominent accountability tools (AA 1000). (shrink)

Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as moral, epistemic, social, and empirical equals in a scheme with differential voting (...) weights. I end the article by showing that from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, it is sometimes true that differential voting weights are more just than equal voting weights. (shrink)

Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that ofMetaphysicsΘ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit inPhysics3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, inPhysics3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—does not qualify strictly as a change. This distinction informsDe Anima2.5 and imparts unity to Aristotle’s extended treatment of change inPhysics3.1-3.

Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. However, not just any inegalitarian relation is unjust, i.e., the fact that parents do not relate as equals to their children is not unjust. Whereas an adult treating another adult paternalistically is objectionable from the point of view of relational egalitarianism, parent-child paternalism is not. What may explain this difference in judgment? I refer to this as the Puzzle. I discuss four justifications of the Puzzle (...) and argue that none of them is satisfactory. In the final part of the paper, I discuss where this leaves relational egalitarianism as a theory of justice. (shrink)

In a move characteristic of appropriationist approaches to the history of philosophy, Katzav (Asian Journal of Philosophy 2(47):1–26, Katzav, 2023a) argues that Grace Andrus de Laguna had, already in 1909, developed what is effectively a critique of analytic philosophy (as a form of epistemically conservative philosophy). In response to Katzav’s claim, this symposium paper attempts to pay closer attention to the context of de Laguna’s paper. As Katzav also acknowledges, de Laguna was dialogically engaged with two non-analytic tendencies in her (...) contemporary philosophy, namely pragmatism and absolute idealism. More specifically, her target is Dewey’s, 1905 defence of ‘immediatism’ (and, by extension, James’ ‘radical empiricism’), which was put forward in opposition to absolute idealism. In 1909, de Laguna separates ‘immediatism’ from ‘instrumentalism’ as two distinct tendencies within pragmatism, rejecting the former and embracing the latter. By thus situating her critique, I argue that, while successful against Deweyan non-analytic ‘immediatism’ (and possibly also James’s Bergsonist variant of this view), it cannot, without further ado, be charitably interpreted as applicable against Russell’s analytic theory of sense-data. (shrink)

In this paper Modern Essentialism is used to solve a problem of individuation of spacetime points in General Relativity that has been raised by a New Leibnizian Argument against spacetime substantivalism, elaborated by Earman and Norton. An earlier essentialistic solution, proposed by Maudlin, is criticized as being against both the spirit of metrical essentialism and the fundamental principles of General Relativity. I argue for a modified essentialistic account of spacetime points that avoids those obstacles.

Maria Rosa Antognazza's work has issued a historical challenge to the thesis that the analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) attacked by epistemologists from Gettier onwards was indeed the standard view traditionally upheld from Plato onwards. This challenge led to an ongoing reappraisal of the historical significance of intuitive knowledge, in which the knower is intimately connected to what is known. Such traditional accounts of intuition, and their accompanying claims to epistemological primacy, constituted the precise target of Moritz Schlick's (...) critique. Schlick engages with this topic throughout his oeuvre, from some of his early epistemological writings, to his anti-metaphysical stance as a leading Logical Empiricist. Schlick crucially distinguishes knowledge from mere acquaintance, denying that the latter has epistemic status. He therefore argues that the very notion of ‘intuitive knowledge’ is a contradictio in adjecto. (shrink)

Responding to parts of Sorensen, it is argued that the connectives therefore and but do not contribute conventional implicatures, but are rather to be treated as presupposition triggers. Their special contributions are therefore not asserted, but presupposed. Hence, given the generic assumption that one lies only if one makes an assertion, one cannot lie with arguments in the way Sorensen proposes. Yet, since conventional implicatures are asserted, one can lie with conventional implicatures. Moreover, since conventional implicatures may be asserted by (...) non-declarative utterances, one can lie by uttering non-declaratives carrying conventional implicatures. (shrink)

This paper examines how board gender diversity affects corporate risk disclosure. We exploit an exogenous shock on firms’ risk environment created by the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union and analyze related risk disclosure in annual reports of public firms in the UK. Using this unique setting, we mitigate concerns about omitted variables in concurrent studies. The findings suggest that board gender diversity is positively related to corporate risk disclosure. However, our results also indicate that the proportion of (...) female directors needs to reach a critical mass to impact the risk disclosure decision. Moreover, we find lower bid–ask spreads immediately after the referendum date for those firms that disclosed Brexit-related risks in their annual reports prior to the vote. Collectively, our results are consistent with board gender diversity promoting the disclosure of decision-relevant information through improved board group dynamics. (shrink)

This paper extends scholarship on multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) in the context of corporate social responsibility in three ways. First, I outline a framework to analyze the strength of couplings between actors participating in MSIs. Characterizing an MSI as consisting of numerous local networks that are embedded in a wider global network, I argue that tighter couplings (within local networks) and looser couplings (between local networks) coexist. Second, I suggest that this coexistence of couplings enables MSIs to generate policy outcomes which (...) address the conditions of a transnational regulatory context. I argue that MSIs’ way of organizing enables them to cope with three challenges: the stability, flexibility, and legitimacy of governance. Reflecting on these challenges, the article identifies a number of problems related to MSIs’ role in transnational governance. Third, I discuss the UN Global Compact as an illustrative case and examine problems and opportunities related to its stability, flexibility, and legitimacy. (shrink)

Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...) of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe. (shrink)