This article aims to describe underlying principles of paradigm shifts in clinical medicine by means of analysis of typical examples. Retrospectively, profound shifts of ruling paradigms can be shown in diverse fields such as outcome research, in the redefining of patient's and doctor's autonomies, in the challenges presented by consumer medicine and the free market economy. This has provoked controversy between doctors, patients and the community. The judgement on whether recent shifts in paradigms in medicine have improved the health care (...) delivered today is by no means uncontroversial. Aiming to demonstrate how shifts of paradigms in medicine occur and what consequences can result from such shifts we reflect on the works of Thomas S. Kuhn, the eminent philosopher of science. An analysis of his theories lends important insight into the observed shifts in paradigms. (shrink)

A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher likelihood that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that several coherence measures proposed in the literature are reliability conducive in a restricted scenario (Olsson and Schubert 2007, Synthese 157:297–308). My aim is to investigate which coherence measures turn out to be reliability conducive in the more general scenario where it is any finite (...) number of witnesses that give equivalent reports. It is shown that only the so-called Shogenji measure is reliability conducive in this scenario. I take that to be an argument for the Shogenji measure being a fruitful explication of coherence. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an anti-Humean critique to Williamson and Russo’s approach to medical mechanisms. I focus on one of the specific claims made by Williamson and Russo, namely the claim that micro-structural ‘mechanisms’ provide evidence for the stability across populations of causal relationships ascertained at the (macro-) level of (test) populations. This claim is grounded in the epistemic account of causality developed by Williamson, an account which—while not relying exclusively on mechanistic evidence for justifying causal judgements—appeals nevertheless to (...) mechanisms, and rejects their anti-Humean interpretation in terms of capacities, powers, potencies, etc. By using (and expanding on) Cartwright’s basic critique against Humean mechanisms, I suggest that, in order to move beyond the level of plausibility, Williamson and Russo’s position is in need of a clarification as to the occurent reading of the components, functioning and interferences of mechanisms. Relatedly, as concerns Williamson’s epistemic account of causation, I argue that this account is in need of a more straightforward answer as to what truth-makers its causal claims should have. (shrink)

In this article we focus on how the language of developmental psychology shapes our conceptualisations and understandings of childrearing and of the parent-child relationship. By analysing some examples of contemporary research, policy and popular literature on parenting and parenting support in the UK and Flanders, we explore some of the ways in which normative assumptions about parenthood and upbringing are imported into these areas through the language of developmental psychology. We go on to address the particular attraction of developmental psychology (...) in the field of parenting and upbringing within our current cultural context. Drawing on the work of (among others) Zygmunt Bauman, we will show how developmental psychology, as one of the instruments that contributes to a breaking down of our existential condition into a series of well-defined, and thus apparently manageable, tasks and categories, displaces rather than confronts the possibly limitless depth of the enormity of the reality of ‘being a parent’. (shrink)

Let us by ‘first-order beliefs’ mean beliefs about the world, such as the belief that it will rain tomorrow, and by ‘second-order beliefs’ let us mean beliefs about the reliability of first-order, belief-forming processes. In formal epistemology, coherence has been studied, with much ingenuity and precision, for sets of first-order beliefs. However, to the best of our knowledge, sets including second-order beliefs have not yet received serious attention in that literature. In informal epistemology, by contrast, sets of the latter kind (...) play an important role in some respectable coherence theories of knowledge and justification. In this paper, we extend the formal treatment of coherence to second-order beliefs. Our main conclusion is that while extending the framework to second-order beliefs sheds doubt on the generality of the notorious impossibility results for coherentism, another problem crops up that might be no less damaging to the coherentist project: facts of coherence turn out to be epistemically accessible only to agents who have a good deal of insight into matters external to their own belief states. (shrink)

In this article, we explore to what extent parents should be ‘educators’ of their children. In the course of this exploration, we offer some examples of these practices and ways of speaking and thinking, indicate some of the problems and limitations they import into our understanding of the parent–child relationship, and make some tentative suggestions towards an alternative way of thinking about this relationship.

The pivotal role of the relation part-of in the description of living organisms is widely acknowledged. Organisms are open systems, which means that in contradistinction to mechanical artifacts they are characterized by a continuous flow and exchange of matter. A closer analysis of the spatial relations in biological organisms reveals that the decision as to whether a given particular is part-of a second particular or whether it is only contained-in the second particular is often controversial. We here propose a rule-based (...) approach which allows us to decide on the basis of well-defined criteria which of the two relations holds between two anatomical objects, given that one spatially includes the other. We discuss the advantages and limitations of this approach, using concrete examples from human anatomy. (shrink)

An English double-embedded relative clause from which the middle verb is omitted can often be processed more easily than its grammatical counterpart, a phenomenon known as the grammaticality illusion. This effect has been found to be reversed in German, suggesting that the illusion is language specific rather than a consequence of universal working memory constraints. We present results from three self-paced reading experiments which show that Dutch native speakers also do not show the grammaticality illusion in Dutch, whereas both German (...) and Dutch native speakers do show the illusion when reading English sentences. These findings provide evidence against working memory constraints as an explanation for the observed effect in English. We propose an alternative account based on the statistical patterns of the languages involved. In support of this alternative, a single recurrent neural network model that is trained on both Dutch and English sentences is shown to predict the cross-linguistic difference in the grammaticality effect. (shrink)

I start from a relatively simple idea: the human being is constantly making a multiple experience of truth (once again, in reference to Gadamer's statement), both scientifical and technical, as well as religious or aesthetic. Still, what is the relationship between those experiences of truth? Can they express somehow, precisely by their multiplicity, a neutral ethos of today's man, or do they manage to take part in a larger and more elevated experience of truth? In the following paper I will (...) try to bring into focus precisely such issues. I return to the meaning given by Gadamer to the experience of truth. Then I make the distinction between the common sense and the proper sense of alternative. The later concerns the correlation - sometimes paradoxical - of different experiences of truth. For instance, the correlation between the technical and the religious experience. So one can understand that religious experience is above all an experience of human finitude. (shrink)

This article discusses the influence that Schopenhauer’s thought had on Mihai Eminescu’s work with reference to the idea of “pessimism.” It also considers Schopenhauer’s influence on Romanian philosophy and literature at the end of the nineteenth century. We shall examine Eminescu’s alleged “Schopenhauerian pessimism,” considering firstly “pessimism” as a part of Eminescu’s “myth.” Secondly, we shall cover the critical reception of Eminescu’s “Schopenhauerian pessimism,” discussing the existing literary and philosophical scholarship. Finding that there are issues for debate regarding Schopenhauer’s alleged (...) influence upon Eminescu, we argue that Eminescu’s “Schopenhauerian pessimism” may be a “legend.” The article examines the connection between Eminescu and one of Schopenhauer’s most influential followers, Eduard von Hartmann. (shrink)

A computational model of inference during story comprehension is presented, in which story situations are represented distributively as points in a high‐dimensional “situation‐state space.” This state space organizes itself on the basis of a constructed microworld description. From the same description, causal/temporal world knowledge is extracted. The distributed representation of story situations is more flexible than Golden and Rumelhart's [Discourse Proc 16 (1993) 203] localist representation.A story taking place in the microworld corresponds to a trajectory through situation‐state space. During the (...) inference process, world knowledge is applied to the story trajectory. This results in an adjusted trajectory, reflecting the inference of propositions that are likely to be the case. Although inferences do not result from a search for coherence, they do cause story coherence to increase. The results of simulations correspond to empirical data concerning inference, reading time, and depth of processing.An extension of the model for simulating story retention shows how coherence is preserved during retention without controlling the retention process. Simulation results correspond to empirical data concerning story recall and intrusion. (shrink)

The principal task of Marxist ethics is not to formulate particular moral principles or to implement them but to describe and explain moral reality. Ethics is not a philosophical discipline although as a science of morals in its own rights it is based on philosophical premises of historical materialism. Trying to define the principal tasks of Marxist ethics in the socialist society the author contends that Marxist ethics should determine the contents, the forms and the ways in which the communist (...) morality develops and functions: in the analysis and scientific examination of the social reality it should reveal the causes of contradictions and moral conflicts in the socialist society, it should also identify favourable conditions for an extensive acceptance of the communist morality. (shrink)

An account of the Home Army’s elite paratrooper unit, formed at the outset of the war under orders of General Sikorski. The article recounts the unit’s formation and subsequent operations.

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 413-414, June 2012.

“Narrativity and the Symbolic Vacuum” examines the descriptive and the prescriptive narrativity claim in the context of a claim that there are narratives in the biblical literature that resist both. The descriptive narrativity claim maintains that it is not an option for a person to conceive of their life without narrative coherence. The prescriptive claim holds that narrativity is a necessary condition for a good and successful human life. Phenomenological thought and Aristotelian virtue ethics, expressing a critical stance towards modernity (...) (modernity with its desire for objective, narrative-free criteria for truth), encourage narrativity claims. Biblical theology, despite its pervasive use of narrative strategies, offers a space in which narrativity claims are relativized. It is especially in confrontation with death where human life cannot be narratively managed. That is why it is in particular the cross in the New Testament which defies both descriptive and prescriptive narrativity claims. (shrink)

Legal scholars, privacy advocates and major tech corporations all coalesce around one single idea. Data should be considered property. Legal analysts point to the ability of governments to regulate property, privacy advocates argue that personal rights would be better protected through a property model, and large tech companies want to claim ownership over data as a proprietary trade secret. I argue that the tendency to view data as property is a result of the long legacy of enlightenment philosophy surrounding property. (...) In particular, John Locke has a special hold on the public imaginary, and his twin concepts of self-ownership and the labor theory of accumulation lead us to conceptualize data as a special form of property. However, the property model of data has significant drawbacks. By commodifying data, we commodify ourselves and allow for colonial theories of enclosure to dominate the discourse. Instead, I propose an alternative framing of data, drawn from the work of Judith Butler, whose ideas allow us to see data as an extension of the performance of identity. Drawing on both Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter I argue that viewing data as part of the performance of identity allows us to mitigate the harms of a property model and reconsider our relationship with our data. (shrink)

This systematic review identified and evaluated instruments measuring patients' perceptions of patient‐centred nursing care. Of 2629 studies reviewed, 12 were eligible for inclusion. Four instruments were reported: The Individualized Care Scale, the Client‐Centred Care Questionnaire, the Oncology patients' Perceptions of the Quality of Nursing Care Scale and the Smoliner scale. These instruments cover themes addressing patient participation and the clinician–patient relationship. Instruments were shown to have satisfactory psychometric properties, although not all were adequately assessed. More research is needed regarding test–retest (...) reliability, convergent and discriminant validity, validity with known groups and structural validity using confirmatory factor analysis. (shrink)

This book offers a scientific whistleblower’s perspective on current implementation of federal research misconduct regulations. It provides a narrative of general interest that relates current cases of research ethics to philosophical, historical and sociological accounts of fraud in scientific research. The evidence presented suggests that the problems of falsification and fabrication remain as great as ever, but hidden because the current system puts universities in charge of investigations and permits them to use confidentiality regulations to hide the outcomes of investigations. (...) The book documents the significant conflict of interest that arises because federal regulation gives universities the responsibility to conduct investigations of their own faculty with severely limited oversight. The book is intended for young research scientists or anyone who wishes to understand the challenges faced by scientists in the workplace today. The central thread in the book is an exclusive account of an experienced research scientist who was the first to expose the facts that led to the longest running research misconduct investigation in the history of the National Science Foundation. (shrink)

Is there any good reason to believe in Nietzsche's metaphysics even thought he himself claims that it is not "the truth" in correspondence with the world? According to Danto, Nietzsche's metaphysics is only valid for Nietzsche himself. However, this answer does not take into consideration Nietzsche's claim for the general superiority of his philosophy. Nietzsche's view seems inconsistent: on the one hand, he claimed all perspectives are equally false in respect to "the truth," but on the other, he regarded his (...) view as superior. This book explains in which respect Nietzshe justifies his claims, that Nietzsche's position is not inconsistent, and why consistency is important for him. (shrink)

This is the first volume of essays on Berkeley's Three Dialogues, a classic of early modern philosophy. Leading experts cover all the central issues in the text: the rejection of material substance, the nature of perception and reality, the limits of human knowledge, and the perceived threats of skepticism, atheism, and immorality.

This book argues that there is a complex logical and epistemological interplay between the concepts of metaphor, narrative, and emotions. They share a number of important similarities and connections. In the first place, all three are constituted by aspect-seeing, the seeing-as or perception of Gestalts. Secondly, all three are meaning-endowing devices, helping us to furnish our world with meaning. Thirdly, the threesome constitutes a trinity. Emotions have both a narrative and metaphoric structure, and we can analyse the concepts of metaphors (...) and narratives partly in each other's terms. Further, the concept of narratives can partly be analysed in the terms of emotions. And if emotions have both a narrative structure and a metaphoric one, then the concept of emotions must to some extent be analysable through the concepts of narratives and metaphors. But there is more. Metaphors (especially poetic ones) are important tools for the understanding of the tacit sides of emotions, perhaps because of the metaphoric structure of emotions. The notion that narrations can be tools for understanding emotions follows from two facts: narrations are devices for explanation and emotions have a narrative structure. Fourthly, the threesome has an impact on our rationality. It has become commonplace to say that emotions have a cognitive content, that narratives have an explanatory function, and that metaphors can perform cognitive functions. This book is the first attempt to articulate the implications that these new ways of seeing the three concepts entail for our concept of reason. The cognitive roles of the threesome suggest a richer notion of rationality than has traditionally been held, a rationality enlivened with metaphoric, narrative, and emotive qualities. Stefan Snaevarr (Reykjavik, 1953) studied philosophy and related subjects in Norway and Germany. Professor at Lillehammer University College in Norway, he is the author of several books of various kind in English, Norwegian and Icelandic. (shrink)

Die Fähigkeiten, nachzudenken und sich denkend auf Wirkliches zu beziehen, werden in der heutigen Philosophie des Geistes unter dem Begriff "Intentionalität" zusammengefasst. Wie können diese Fähigkeiten im Rahmen unseres naturwissenschaftlich geprägten Weltbildes erklärt werden? Stefan Kappner beantwortet diese Frage, indem er auf die Zeichentheorie von Charles Sanders Peirce zurückgreift.

According to Humean promotionalism about practical reasons, the fact that I have a reason to φ holds in virtue of the fact that φ-ing promotes one or more of my desires. The topic of this discussion note is the question of how best to understand the promotion relation. In particular, I defend a probabilistic understanding of promotion against a line of argument recently brought forth by Jeff Behrends, Joshua DiPaolo, and Nate Sharadin. Roughly, their argument is that probabilistic promotion leads (...) to implausible results in cases in which the relevant desires are certain to be satisfied. In these cases, a probabilistic understanding tells us that we do not have a reason to φ because the probability of desire satisfaction is 1 already. Contrary to Behrends', DiPaolo's, and Sharadin's claims, I argue that this is precisely the result a Humean theory of reasons should generate. According to Humeanism, we have reasons for actions because these actions make a difference to the occurrence of desire satisfaction - where the causal route to desire satisfaction is normatively irrelevant. Thus, if desire satisfaction is dead certain, we have no reason to do anything. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to find out the appropriate understanding of “liberal education”. Firstly, I distinguish the two most important meanings of the notion “freedom” which I call momentary and lifelong freedom. Momentary freedom is a type of negative freedom, and lifelong freedom a type of positive freedom. Secondly, I show the consequences, which these two meanings of “freedom” have on the practice of a “liberal education”. Finally, I analyse which type of liberal education is the best.

This article considers the situation of women in science in Germany. We argue that scientific organizations play a crucial role in shaping science careers, often with different consequences for men and women. To sustain the argument, we offer a study of the careers of male and female scientists in the Max Planck Society. Our findings show that external support increases career options and opportunities for men, but not for women scientists.

Research over the last two decades has identified a group of meiosis‐specific proteins, consisting of budding yeast Spo13, fission yeast Moa1, mouse MEIKIN, and Drosophila Mtrm, with essential functions in meiotic chromosome segregation. These proteins, which we call meiosis I kinase regulators (MOKIRs), mediate two major adaptations to the meiotic cell cycle to allow the generation of haploid gametes from diploid mother cells. Firstly, they promote the segregation of homologous chromosomes in meiosis I (reductional division) by ensuring that sister kinetochores (...) face towards the same pole (mono‐orientation). Secondly, they safeguard the timely separation of sister chromatids in meiosis II (equational division) by counteracting the premature removal of pericentromeric cohesin, and thus prevent the formation of aneuploid gametes. Although MOKIRs bear no obvious sequence similarity, they appear to play functionally conserved roles in regulating meiotic kinases. Here, the known functions of MOKIRs are reviewed and their possible mechanisms of action are discussed. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/tLE9KL89bwk. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop CultureStefán SnaevarrPhilosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Culture, edited by William Irwin and Jorge J. E. Gracia. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007, 297 pp., $29.85 paper.There has been quite a boom lately in the market for philosophical books on popular culture. The young American philosopher William Irwin has led the way by starting the fad of "... and philosophy" books; the (...) first one that Irwin edited was Seinfeld and Philosophy. So it is only fitting that he is one of the editors of this volume on philosophical interpretation of popular culture. In contrast to most of the earlier books of this kind, a sizable number of the contributors to this volume belong to the top brass of America's aestheticians: Noël Carrol, Ted Cohen, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Richard Shusterman, to name but a few. The book is divided into two parts, "Philosophy and Popular Culture" and "Interpretation and Popular Art Forms." These titles are self-explanatory; it might be added that the aforementioned top brass dominates the first part.Irwin provides the book with a witty and well-written introduction, but he operates with a very wide definition of popular culture, classifying movies as such as items of pop culture. However, the medium surely is not the message. The fact that novels can be part of popular culture does not make Joyce's Ulysses a pop cultural object. Irwin's chapter, "Philosophy as/and/of popular culture," is rather two papers in one. One half addresses the concept of popular culture, containing an insightful critical evaluation of, among others, Noël Carroll's concept of mass art. The other half proposes that we can use popular culture to disseminate philosophical ideas to the general public. More so than in the introduction, Irwin is actually rather critical of popular culture in this chapter. He worries about its negative effect on culture in general—no cult of pop culture here. In addition, he rejects the notion of popular culture having the potential of becoming philosophy or its surrogate. He reminds us that Socrates used examples from everyday life and the popular culture of his day to make his philosophical points. In a similar fashion, the popular culture of today can be a stepping stone for philosophers to reach wider audiences. If you cannot beat them, join them! Popular culture could, for instance, be used to warn the public against its own evil aspects. This is an excellent idea, and I could not agree more; I myself often use examples from popular culture in my own lectures with good results. Irwin should expand on this idea and present it in a separate article.Richard Shusterman's chapter does not add much to his earlier writings. It is also somewhat like two articles in one; the first is a criticism of the denigration of pleasure and entertainment as aesthetic values, and the second half is an attempt to bridge the divide between intrinsic value and instrumental value. Both halves [End Page 111] contain some excellent arguments, but popular culture tends to be on the fringe in Shusterman's argument. The focus is on other more traditional, philosophical issues. Perhaps another venue would have been more suitable for this article.In contrast to Shusterman, Caroline Korsmeyer addresses the issues of popular culture in a fairly straightforward manner. Popular culture can be educational, even philosophically so. This claim does not mean that works of popular culture are works of philosophy in the ordinary sense of the word. However, we can "treat philosophy as a success term to refer to works demanding imaginative engagement that results in the recognition... of a philosophical position, such that what is done in philosophy proper that induces a possible conclusion is done in another genre by means appropriate to its appreciation" (31). Given this understanding of philosophy, we can understand works of popular culture as vehicles of philosophy. Korsmeyer maintains that the TV series Angel conveys some of Simone de Beauvoir's ideas from one of her books. Korsmeyer's chapter also contains a delightful discussion of "the probable impossible" and "the possible improbable" in fiction. But... (shrink)

The main thesis of the paper is that change and time depend existentially on a specific property of being, described by the author as the Heraclitean unstability (i.e. a kind ofsusceptibility to non-existence). Change and time are, in substance, quite different aspects of being; but they are mutually connected: time cannot exist without occurence of changes; and vice versa. All these intuitions are logically reconstructed by the author.

A tale of two commissions -- Disciplining disorder -- Transparent fictions -- Conscientious objections -- A failed experiment -- Stem cells, interrupted.