Through his S–R model of statistical relevance, Wesley Salmon offers a solution to the scientific explanation of objectively improbable events.

"A rich collection. Since it holds a number of introductory pieces along with advanced essays and review articles, the volume will be accessible to a broad audience and will work well in philosophy of science courses....Essential."--Lawrence Sklar, University of Michigan.

The concept of a proposition is important in several areas of philosophy and central to the philosophy of language. This collection of readings investigates many different philosophical issues concerning the nature of propositions and the ways they have been regarded through the years. Reflecting both the history of the topic and the range of contemporary views, the book includes articles from Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, the Russell-Frege Correspondence, Alonzo Church, David Kaplan, John Perry, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Mark Richard, Scott (...) Soames, and Nathan Salmon. (shrink)

Toward a theory of n-tuples of individuals and concepts as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Alonzo Church proposed a powerful and elegant theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as singular-concept surrogates. Church’s account accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell-Myhill paradox is misguided. Russell-Myhill is not a problem specifically for Alternative (0). Rather (...) it is a disproof of unrestricted concept comprehension. Unrestricted comprehension is also inconsistent with facts about sets of properties. It is demonstrated furthermore that the principal rival conception of propositions, as classes of possible worlds, is subject to a fatal philosophical collapse: It follows on that conception, given that each of us is fallible, that everyone believes everything. Although it is far superior to its principal rival conception, Church’s proposed theory is vulnerable under (0) to a version of Russell’s notorious Gray’s /Elegy/ objection. Some amendments to Church’s proposal are proffered that address Russell’s objection, including an amendment first proposed in the present author’s /Frege’s Puzzle/ (1986). Church’s response (personal correspondence) is considered. (shrink)

Paradoxes of nested modality, like Chisholm’s paradox, rely on S4 or something stronger as the propositional logic of metaphysical modality. Sarah-Jane Leslie’s objection to the resolution of Chisholm’s paradox by means of rejection of S4 modal logic is investigated. A modal notion of essence congenial to Leslie’s objection is clarified. An argument is presented in support of Leslie’s crucial but unsupported assertion that, on pain of inconsistency, an object’s essence is the same in every possible world. A fallacy in the (...) argument is exposed. Alternative interpretations of Leslie’s objection are provided and are found to involve equivocation between different notions of “essence.” A material artifact’s modal essence, as distinct from its quiddity essence, could have been different than it is. (shrink)

The “somewhat vague, intuitive” notion from computability theory of an effective procedure (method) or algorithm can be fairly precisely defined even if it is not sufficiently formal and precise to belong to mathematics proper (in a narrow sense)—and even if (as many have asserted) for that reason the Church–Turing thesis is unprovable. It is proved logically that the class of effective procedures is not decidable, i.e., that no effective procedure is possible for ascertaining whether a given procedure is effective. This (...) undecidability result is proved directly from the notion itself of an effective procedure, without reliance on any (partly) mathematical lemma, conjecture, or thesis invoking recursiveness or Turing-computability. In fact, there is no reliance on anything very mathematical. The proof does not even appeal to a precise definition of ‘effective procedure’. Instead, it relies solely and entirely on a basic grasp of the intuitive notion of an effective procedure. Though the result that effectiveness is undecidable is not surprising, it is also not without significance. It has the consequence, for example, that the solution to a decision problem, if it is to be complete, must be accompanied by a separate argument that the proposed ascertainment procedure invariably terminates with the correct verdict. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Public health communication campaigns have been credited with helping raise awareness of risk from chronic illness and new infectious diseases and with helping promote the adoption of recommended treatment regimens. Yet many aspects of public health communication interventions have escaped the scrutiny of ethical discussions. With the transference of successful commercial marketing communication tactics to the realm of public health, consideration of ethical issues becomes an essential component in the development and application of public health strategies. Ethical issues in (...) public health communication are explored as they relate to eight topics: ‘targeting’ and ‘tailoring’ public health messages to particular population segments; obtaining the equivalence of informed consent; the use of persuasive communication tactics; messages on responsibility and culpability; messages that apply to harm reduction; and three types of unintended adverse effects associated with public health communication activities that may label and stigmatise, expand social gaps, and promote health as a value. We suggest that an ethical analysis should be applied to each phase of the public health communication process in order to identify ethical dilemmas that may appear subtle, yet reflect important concerns regarding potential effects of public health communication interventions on individuals and society as a whole. (shrink)

Le récent motu proprio Omnium in mentem a modifié le canon 1008 du Code de droit canonique de 1983 et ajouté un troisième paragraphe au canon 1009. Ces changements concernent le sacrement de l’ordre. Ils sont examinés ici sous l’angle du ministère diaconal. Sur l’arrière-fond de la doctrine de Vatican II et de ses développements ultérieurs, l’auteur présente une exégèse des nouveaux canons dont il regrette la déficience de la conceptualité juridique sans pour autant majorer leur portée théologique. Il se (...) réjouit cependant que le service soit désormais le dénominateur commun du ministère ordonné. Les diacres sont habilités à servir le corps ecclésial du Christ pour qu’il réalise sa mission dans le monde. Le souci de cohérence doctrinale est nécessaire mais pas suffisant, encore faut-il savoir pour quoi concrètement on ordonne des diacres. (shrink)

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes (...) a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts. (shrink)

In this candid autobiographical essay, Nathan Salmon recounts and assesses the impact of various philosophers and events on his philosophical development.

Un ouvrage récent de L. Villemin, Pouvoir d’ordre et pouvoir de juridiction , se penche sur l’histoire théologique de la distinction entre « pouvoir d’ordre » et « pouvoir de juridiction » pour en éprouver la validité théologique actuelle. Au fil des siècles, ce binôme a décrit des réalités très variables. En distinguant pouvoir sur le corps eucharistique et pouvoir sur le corps ecclésial, il a consacré un déplacement de la relation classique entre ecclesia et ministerium vers une relation entre (...) potestas et eucharistia. Cela n’est pas sans conséquences pour la vie ecclésiale, la théologie et le droit canonique. Or, Vatican II a choisi d’utiliser un concept unitaire du pouvoir dans l’Eglise, à savoir celui de potestas sacra. N’y a-t-il donc pas lieu d’abandonner la distinction entre ordo et iurisdictio ? Dans la foulée des conclusions de l’ouvrage, Alphonse Borras dégage des perspectives fécondes pour penser les ministères – leur attribution autant que leur exercice – et l’habilitation qu’ils impliquent à servir l’Eglise qui porte l’Evangile en ce lieu. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que l’homme? La question s’impose dans un contexte mondial où les atteintes à la dignité humaine connaissent un regain aussi impressionnant qu’inquiétant. Pourtant, l’homme que nous présente l’Évangile, sous le paradigme du Verbe incarné, le Fils Unique de Dieu, est capable de bien. Bien plus, l’homme est créé comme reflet du Bien par excellence, et élevé, sous le régime de la grâce, à la dignité de fils adoptif de Dieu. Le point d’honneur d’un tel statut est, pour l’homme, de (...) montrer, par une incessante production de paix, la dignité qui est la sienne. Notre article se propose d’examiner ces éléments avancés par Grégoire de Nysse en Beat. 7, à la lumière des récentes dénonciations d’atteintes à la dignité de l’homme. (shrink)

The dogma that the propositional logic of metaphysical modality is S5 is rebutted. The author exposes fallacies in standard arguments supporting S5, arguing that propositional metaphysical modal logic is weaker even than both S4 and B, and is instead the minimal and weak metaphysical-modal logic T.

Can statistical inference shed any worthwhile light on theory change? For many years I have believed that the answer is “Yes.” Let me try to explain why I think so. On my first reading of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) I was so deeply shocked at his repudiation of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification that I put the book down without finishing it. By 1969, when a conference was held (...) at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science on the relations between the history of science and the philosophy of science, I had returned to Structure and formed the view that Kuhn’s rejection of this fundamental distinction resulted from his adoption of an inadequate conception of scientific justification. It appeared that he saw scientific confirmation in terms of the traditional hypothetico-deductive (H-D) schema, according to which a scientific hypothesis (or theory) is confirmed by observing the truth of its logical consequences. (shrink)