Jury nullification, that phenomenon whereby a jury returns a not-guilty verdict for a defendant it believes to be technically guilty of the alleged crime, is, obviously, a controversial issue. What is not a matter of controversy, however, is the fact that the law protects the jury’s ability to behave this way. Much of the controversy therefore centers on whether juries ought to be informed of this ability to nullify free from legal redress. In this paper I examine a number of (...) arguments both for and against the view that juries ought to be, in the words of the literature, fully informed. In the end I conclude that there is significant empirical evidence to suggest that, rather than simply promoting justice and mercy, as proponents of the instruction argue, fully informing a jury has the unforeseen consequence of encouraging juries to behave in a manner I label bad-faith, and that such bad-faith juries in fact corrupt the principles of justice and fairness that are the cornerstones of the trial system. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between jury nullification and participatory democracy, arguing that the power of juries to nullify laws is essential for the democratic function of the jury system. Jury nullification, defined as a jury's decision to acquit a defendant despite evidence of guilt, serves as a mechanism through which citizens can challenge unjust laws. This analysis explores a dominant criticism of jury nullification, that it is antithetical and contrary to the foundational principles of a stable democratic state. Ultimately, (...) I argue that jury nullification, pace the ‘democracy objection,’ actually serves to promote and enhance democratic engagement and influence in the criminal law by ensuring that legal outcomes reflect community values and standards. (shrink)

Jury nullification, in its simplest definition, occurs when a jury returns a not guilty verdict for a defendant it believes to be legally guilty of the crime charged. To put this explicitly, a jury nullifies when, despite believing both a) that the defendant did, beyond a reasonable doubt, commit the act/omission in question, and b) that such behavior is, in fact, prohibited by law, nevertheless declares the defendant innocent. This book explores the specifically philosophical aspects of the phenomenon. Is jury (...) nullification a right? A power? A mere ability? A privilege? A pernicious form of juror malfeasance? Is a system that allows for jury nullification more, or less just, than one that does not? -/- This important book fills a gap in the current scholarship around jury nullification, which, for the most part, has been confined to purely doctrinal analyses, rather than the broader ethical, social, political, and philosophical contours of this issue. (shrink)

“Jury Nullification, Verdictal Asymmetry, and the Ultimate Logic of Anarchy” is a critical examination and analysis of the ‘anarchy objection’ to jury nullification, a common argument against informing juries of their nullification power. The anarchy objection posits that jury nullification leads to inconsistent verdicts (verdictal asymmetry) and, as a result, social anarchy and chaos. Through careful analysis, I argue that the anarchy objection is predicated on two flawed premises: first, that jury nullification promotes verdictal asymmetry, and second, that such asymmetry (...) leads to anarchy. Such commitments are, I argue, empirically unsupported and conceptually misguided. Verdictal asymmetry is an intrinsic feature of the common law system, present at nearly every adjudicative stages, and not uniquely linked to jury nullification; yet we certainly do not live in an environment of jural/social anarchy. Finally, I discuss how the principle of treating like cases alike is primarily a procedural constraint, not a mandate for verdictal symmetry. By dismantling the anarchy objection, I aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the jurisprudence surrounding the jury nullification debate and its role within the legal system. (shrink)

Jury nullification refers to the behaviour of a jury that votes to acquit a defendant of criminal charges despite believing that: a) the defendant did in fact commit the actions with which she is charged; and, b) such actions are, indeed, prohibited by law. While there are many objections to this practice, the most striking thing about jury nullification is that nothing is done to actually prevent or punish jurors who behave this way. In this paper, I explore three rationales (...) for why jury nullification is an officially tolerated, if not necessarily welcome, element of Anglo-American criminal law jury trials. All three of these rationales centre in one way or another on the idea that the very concept of a jury trial necessitates allowing the jury to extend its traditional purview in such a manner. (shrink)

Participatory Democracy and the Criminal Law examines how the principles of participatory democracy are instantiated within the criminal justice system and explores how these principles could be further developed and expanded within this context. This collection of essays focuses on multiple participatory structures within the criminal law, with the criminal jury serving as a paradigmatic example, alongside community-based sentencing initiatives and restorative justice practices, to name but a few. With a focus on both the theoretical underpinnings and practical applications of (...) participatory political structures, this book will cover a range of topics such as the historical evolution of jury trials, the significance of community representation in sentencing, participatory structures in law enforcement, and models of community-based restorative justice. This work will illuminate the ways in which participatory mechanisms not only administer justice but also reinforce the civic identity of individuals within a democratic society. (shrink)

Jury nullification occurs when a jury votes to acquit a defendant in a criminal trial despite its belief that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. One of the main objections to this practice is that it subverts the rule of law. In this paper, I examine this objection by expanding on what is entailed by the rule of law objection and demonstrating that the very principles that the rule of law are built upon – liberty and autonomy – are, in (...) fact, preserved and promoted, and not subverted by, jury nullification. (shrink)

A book review of Daniel A. Dombrowski's, "Pre-Liberal Political Philosophy: Rawls and Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas.".

A book review of "The Will to Punish," by Didier Fassin.

A review of "Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians," by Eldon Soifer (author).

A review of "Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Relations between States and Religious Communities," by Rinaldo Cristofori (Editor), Silvio Ferrari (Editor).