The Hard Problem of consciousness—explaining why and how physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience—remains one of the most challenging puzzles in modern thought. Rather than attempting to resolve this issue outright, in this paper I explore whether empirical science can be broadened to incorporate consciousness as a fundamental degree of freedom. Drawing on Russellian monism and revisiting the historical “relegation problem” (the systematic sidelining of consciousness by the scientific revolution), I propose an extension of quantum mechanics by augmenting the (...) Hilbert space with a “consciousness dimension.” This framework provides a basis for reinterpreting psi phenomena (e.g., telepathy, precognition) as natural outcomes of quantum nonlocality and suggests that advanced non– human intelligence (NHI) technology might interface with a quantum–conscious substrate. For a detailed mathematical exposition of this framework, see my preprint [3]. I demarcate the philosophical issues from the empirical ones and propose several experimental strategies— including entanglement–based psi research, quantum–enhanced neuroimaging, and quantum sensor applications—to test the model. Although this framework does not resolve the Hard Problem, it offers a rigorously formulated, historically informed, and empirically testable approach to integrating subjective experience into the scientific study of mind. (shrink)

Here are two claims, both of which (I maintain) are very plausibly true: (1) in the late 1870's, A. A. Michelson measured the speed of light, and his result was only about 150km/s off from the currently accepted value of c (approximately 299,792 km/s); and, (2) Strictly speaking, in special relativity, there is no such thing as the speed of light. These claims are clearly in tension, and this paper resolves that tension. The first step is to defend claim (2), (...) which is, remarkably, controversial even among working physicists and philosophers of physics. In most cases, belief that light has a speed is justified by pointing out that all co-ordinatizations that describe inertial reference frames agree that light has a speed (and that it's c), even if they disagree about other things (like whether two space-like separated events are simultaneous, or whether a given massive body is at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line). This line of reasoning, I argue, comes from commitment to what I call the Co-ordinate Abstraction Principle. I show that this principle, in its most straightforward formulation, is clearly false; even the simplest co-ordinatizations of the most ordinary spaces give rise to fatal counterexamples. Even further, I show that any weakened reformulation of the principle able to avoid these counterexamples will, thereby, be rendered too weak to apply to the speed of light in special relativity. Once the plausible truth of (2) is established, I resolve the tension between (1) and (2). The value, 299,792 km/s, merely describes something about our choices of spatial and temporal units. However, the value of c couldn't be purely conventional, or else it could not have been measured. The reasons our choices of spatial and temporal units give rise to an a posteriori discoverable fact is that the structure of Special Relativity makes an independent unit of spatial distance redundant. I explain why this value is so readily represented as a speed, and how Michelson's measurement could track such a relationship. (shrink)

Traditional arguments against or in favor of continuity rely upon the presupposition that sci- entific theories can serve as markers of descriptive truth. I argue that such a notion of the term is misguided if we are concerned with the question of how our scientific schemes ought to develop. Instead, a reconstruction of the term involves identifying those concepts which guide the develop- ment from one successive scheme to the next and labelling those concepts with the status that they are (...) continuous. I explicitly construct an example of this kind of continuity utilizing two formula- tions of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) and identify what persists from the standard formulation, beginning with an action, to the successive one, making use of spinor helicity variables. Three con- cepts persist which are responsible for supplying explicit constraints on our expressions which serve to match onto empirical predictions: Lorentz invariance, locality and unitarity. Further extensions of this kind of analysis to models beyond the physical sciences are proposed. (shrink)

This is a presentation of recent work on the Kalam Cosmological Argument for general, non-technical audiences. We examine whether the universe might be uncaused and we examine whether there's a good philosophical or scientific case for the universe's beginning.

Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one’s ontology. In the literature, primitivism has generally come with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time—relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, (...) we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which ushers in the direction of time. Relational primitivism is attractive for those who want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology. (shrink)

A concept for the emergence of a time-equivalent property from a static network of interconnected states is shown. This property is referred to as virtual time. For each state, a set of coefficients is defined, which locally represents the information embedded in the network’s connectivity. Network structures denoted as repellers feature successive splits into a steadily increasing number of quantum states. They convey an equivalent calculation of their static connectivity coefficients and virtual particles dynamically propagating within them. Strong indications are (...) provided, that static networks are virtual Turing complete machines for algorithms with finite runtime. This opens up a wide range of possible encodings for said coefficients and motivates further research. (shrink)

Del Santo and Gisin have recently argued that classical mechanics exhibits a form of indeterminacy and that by treating the observables of classical mechanics with real number precision we introduce hidden variables that restore determinacy. In this article we introduce the conceptual machinery required to critically evaluate these claims. We present a characterization of indeterminacy which can capture both quantum indeterminacy and the classical indeterminacy of Del Santo and Gisin. This allows us to show that there is an important difference (...) in kind between the two: their classical indeterminacy can be resolved with hidden variables in a manner which is not possible for quantum indeterminacy. (shrink)

Scientific theories often allow multiple formulations, e.g., classical mechanics allows Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations. While we count them as equally true, it has been suggested that one formulation can still be more metaphysically perspicuous than another. This paper provides a new account of metaphysical perspicuity, offering both descriptive and revisionary components: As a descriptive component, we examine how metaphysical perspicuity has been conceptualized in the literature. As a revisionary component, we challenge the conventional conception that associates metaphysical perspicuity with other (...) neighboring notions. Thus, we argue that metaphysical perspicuity is a sui generis notion, worth adding to philosophers’ toolbox. (shrink)

The survival of living beings depends on their ability to navigate a 3-dimensional world described by classical mechanics. However, quantum mechanics (QM), the best physical theory we currently have, employs the very high-dimensional configuration space and describes dramatically non-classical behavior. Thus, our perceptual and intellectual experiences of the world are fundamentally in tension. This paper presents a straightforward, fully QM analysis of the motions of complex Structures that preserve their integrity and functionality. It shows that large-scale motions are restricted to (...) 3 dimensions, and that living beings must have a 3-D, classical, manifest image of their world. The interior motions of Structures remain fully quantum mechanical. Thus, intellectually recognizing that everything must be described by QM in configuration space is fully compatible with the perception of inhabiting a 3-dimensional, classical world. (shrink)

One may demarcate at least three major forms of philosophical antirealism: scientific, sceptical, and transcendental. Each regards certain systems as unknowable. And for each, it has been argued that even if the nature of a system is unknowable, its structure may still be known. Structuralism in this sense is as yet ununified: even though structure is supposed to solve a similar problem in each case, proposals tend to be formulated in ways that make them specific to their respective contexts. Here (...) I present a unified framework for making claims about only the structure of a target system which are not undermined by any of the three forms of antirealism. The framework may therefore provide a baseline for our knowledge of the world which is safe from most philosophical antirealism. The defining characteristic of my approach is how it leverages the role that an unknowable system plays in underlying experiences. I develop a formula for sentences making claims about the structures of target systems and I account for the representation of systems by mathematical structures as well. (shrink)

The mechanistic approach in the cognitive and biological sciences emphasizes that scientific explanations succeed by analyzing the mechanisms underlying phenomena across multiple levels. In this paper, we propose a formal strategy to establish such multi-level mechanistic models, which are foundational to mechanistic explanations. Our objectives are twofold: First, we introduce the novel "mLCA" (multi-Level Coincidence Analysis) script, which transforms binary data tables from tests on mechanistic systems into mechanistic models consistent with those tables. Second, we provide several philosophical insights derived (...) from the outcomes generated by this script and its underlying algorithm. Using illustrative examples, we defend the following claims: 1. Inference methods for generating mechanistic models generally require information on how causal factors are assigned to different levels within data tables generated by multi-level structures. 2. The mLCA script successfully produces appropriate mechanistic models from binary data tables, demonstrating the practical application of the philosophical mechanistic approach in the sciences. 3. The number of solutions generated by mLCA increases significantly as the number of relevant factors grows, reflecting adaptations in causal inference methods to meet the demands of multi-level mechanistic modeling. 4. Any further reduction of solutions, if possible, involves pragmatic considerations, a point that carries profound implications for the broader ambitions of the mechanistic approach. By addressing these points, our paper contributes both to the development of practical algorithmic tools and to a deeper philosophical understanding of multi-level mechanistic modeling. (shrink)

Levels-of-reality talk is common among practicing scientists and philosophers of science, yet such talk of levels has been criticized by Jaegwon Kim, Amie Thomasson, and Angela Potochnik, which I analyze into three objections of increasing strength. The first requires abandoning only some of the wilder claims about levels, while the second prunes off many biological uses, and the third poses serious challenges even for metaphysicians. Metaphysicians who wish to save realism about levels must be prepared to make serious revisions. I (...) argue for a novel approach which carves up levels using a neo-Aristotelian answer to the question of fundamental mereology which takes substances as the tiles of the world and uses metaphysical priority aconformities these generate in the mereological graph to identify levels. This emergentist account of levels is more coherent than varieties less connected to mereological structure, and places fewer constraints on that mereological structure than views like van Inwagen’s. While starkly revisionist, it fares better in recovering historical levels discourse than competitors like material atomism and priority monism. Further, the most painful revision is treating much of the biological levels discourse as representation and metaphor, but Potochnik argues that such talk was never a good candidate for metaphysics. (shrink)

Relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) is ostensibly a quantum mechanical theory of fields, but determining exactly what these are is a thorny metaphysical task in the face of no-go arguments given by Baker (2009). This paper explores three possible answers according to which quantum fields are (I) superpositions of classical fields, (II) fields of expectation values for local observables, or (III) fields of local quantum states. I argue that each of these ontologies has resources available to respond to Baker’s challenge, (...) though all three face residual puzzles. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to defend one version at least of Hume’s dictum: roughly, the idea that possibility is determined by ontology through something like independent variation. My defence is broadly pragmatic, in the sense that adherence to something like Hume’s dictum delivers at least three benefits. The first benefit is that, through Hume’s dictum, a physical theory’s ontology delimits a range of possibilities, that I call kinematical possibilities, which serves as a sufficiently permissive notion of possibility to sustain (...) something like an intensional semantics for its claims, and a sufficiently demanding notion of supervenience to sustain plausible claims of inter-theoretic reduction and theoretical equivalence. The second benefit is that Hume’s dictum allows us to work backwards from a range of kinematical possibilities to an ontology. This is especially useful when aiming to glean an interpretation of a physical theory, since often we are more confident that we have arrived at the right space of possibilities than that we have arrived at the right ontology. The third benefit is that Hume’s dictum —- at least the version I aim to defend here —- may be applied to physical theories more or less as we find them, and therefore we can practice something resembling ontology without having to force our theories into some Procrustean bed, such as a first-order language. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to give a general overview of permutations in physics, particularly the symmetry of theories under permutations. Particular attention is paid to classical mechanics, classical statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. There are two recurring themes: (i) the metaphysical dispute between haecceitism and anti-haecceitism, and the extent to which this dispute may be settled empirically; and relatedly, (ii) the way in which elementary systems are individuated in a theory's formalism, either primitively or in terms of the (...) properties and relations those systems are represented as bearing. Section 1 introduces permutations and provides a brief outline of the symmetric and braid groups. Section 2 discusses permutations in the general setting provided by model theory, in particular providing some definitions and elementary results regarding the permutability and indiscernibility of objects. Section 3 lays some philosophical groundwork for later sections, in particular articulated the distinction between haecceitism and anti-haecceitism and the distinction between transcendental and qualitative individuation. Section 4 addresses classical mechanics and introduces the procedure of quotienting, under which permutable states are identified. Section 5 addresses classical statistical mechanics, and outlines a number of equivalent ways to implement permutation invariance. I also briefly outline how particles may be qualitatively individuated in this framework. Section 6 addresses quantum mechanics. This contains an outline of: the representation theory of the symmetric groups; the topological approach to quantum statistics, in which the braid groups become relevant; and a brief proposal for qualitatively individuating quantum particles, and its implications for entanglement. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of equilibrium ensembles in the classical and quantum theories under permutation invariance. A (much) shorter version of this paper was published as a chapter in E. Knox & A. Wilson (eds), the Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics (Routledge, 2021), pp. 578-594. (shrink)

The method of metaphysics of scientific practice consists in developing metaphysical claims on the basis of empirical information from and about scientific practice. This method stands in the tradition of naturalistic or scientific metaphysics on the one hand, and philosophy of science in practice on the other. In this chapter we draw on some of our own research to specify the method at work. We argue that the method is typically carried out in four steps: identifying the available empirical information (...) that might be relevant to the metaphysical topic of interest; selecting the relevant empirical information; developing a preliminary metaphysical claim that the relevant empirical information supports; mutually adjusting empirical information and metaphysics. We reveal some major methodological challenges and present ways to overcome them. We conclude that when drawing metaphysical claims from scientific practicewe need to: first, make sure that our previous metaphysical views do not influence the empirical information or its selection in problematic ways; second, explain in what sense we are doing metaphysics, countering for instance the idea that metaphysical claims must be highly general and transdisciplinary. We end the chapter by pointing to the advantages of the method of metaphysics of scientific practice. (shrink)

There has been in recent years a huge surge of interest in the so-called extended Wigner’s friend scenario (EWFS). In short, a series of theorems (with some variation in detail) puts pressure on the ability of different agents in the scenario to account for each of the others’ measured outcomes: the outcomes cannot be assigned single well-defined values while also satisfying other reasonable physical assumptions. These theorems have been interpreted as showing that there can be no absolute, third-person, ‘God’s eye’ (...) description of our reality. The focus of this paper is the strongest of these no-go theorems, the ‘local friendliness’ theorem of Bong et al. (2020, _Nature Physics_, _16_, 1199–1205), which gives earnest consideration to the possibility of a measurement that unitarily reverses an entire lab system, including a conscious agent, thereby erasing the agent’s memory. The purpose of this paper is to begin the philosophical conversation regarding key questions concerning this process: Are the events in the lab merely ‘erased’, or do they in some sense not exist at all? What would it be like to be unitarily reversed? Should an agent care about any experiences they have inside the lab before they are reversed? This analysis employs a parallel case of memory erasure, to which this case can be contrasted, arising in the context of drug-induced amnesia as a result of administering anaesthesia during medical procedures (Carbonell, 2014, _Bioethics_, _28_(5), 245–254). I argue that the consequences of unitarily reversing an agent are much more dramatic than simply memory erasure—the set of events themselves, and the personal timeline of the agent, leave no record at all inside or outside the lab. I consider the ramifications of this for the picture of reality that arises from the EWFS. (shrink)

In this paper we present novel conceptions of identity arising in and motivated by a recently emerged branch of mathematical logic, namely, Homotopy Type theory (HoTT). We consider an established 2013 version of HoTT as well as its more recent generalised version called Directed HoTT or Directed Type theory (DTT), which at the time of writing remains a work in progress. In HoTT, and in particular in DTT, identity is not just a relation but a mathematical structure which admits for (...) an interpretation in terms of Homotopy theory (directed Homotopy theory in the case of DTT), which in its turn is supported by common intuitions concerning identity of material objects through time, change and locomotion. The DDTbased conception of identity presented in the paper is nonsymmetric: here identity is “directed” or has a “sense”. We compare the HoTT-based conceptions of identity with standard theories of identity based on the Classical Predicate calculus, and show how the HoTT-based identity helps to treat traditional logical and philosophical problems related to identity and time. In the concluding part of the paper we explore some ontological implications of the HoTT-based identity and show how HoTT and DTT can serve for designing formal process ontologies. The paper is self-contained and comprises expositions and informal explanations of all relevant philosophical, logical and mathematical contents. (shrink)

In this paper, we address the question whether the persistence of biological species raises some difficulty for the thesis of the metaphysical equivalence between three-dimensionalism (3D) and four-dimensionalism (4D). We argue that even if one assumes that ‘species’ is a homonymous term that refers to two entities (_evolverons_ or synchronic species and _phylons_ or diachronic ones), 3D/4D metaphysical equivalence still holds. In doing so, we challenge Reydon’s strong association between a synchronic view of species and a 3D theory of persistence, (...) and between the diachronic view of species and a 4D theory of persistence (2008). Finally, we show how this debate on persistence of species helps to illustrate some misunderstandings behind contemporary analytic metaphysics of change and persistence. (shrink)

This paper argues that decision theory presupposes free will. Although decision theorists seldom acknowledge this, the way decision theory represents, explains, or rationalizes choice behaviour acquires its intended interpretation only under the assumption that decision-makers are agents capable of making free choices between alternative possibilities. Without that assumption, both normative and descriptive decision theory, including the revealed-preference paradigm, would have to be reinterpreted in implausible ways. The hypothesis that decision-makers have free will is therefore explanatorily indispensable for decision theory. If (...) we regard explanatory indispensability as an indicator of reality in science, decision theorists should embrace the idea of free will. (shrink)

In defending the fundamentality of the open systems view for quantum theory, Cuffaro and Hartmann (2024) articulate an account of frameworks in physics. They argue that the general quantum theory of open systems is a more fundamental framework than standard quantum theory. In this chapter, we articulate an account of frameworks using the examples of quantum field theory and statistical mechanics. We argue that what makes frameworks useful in physics is the combination of generality and abstractness of frameworks. In particular, (...) their abstractness makes them poor targets for metaphysical analysis; the more concrete levels of theories or models are the appropriate target for ontological fundamentality claims. (shrink)

Why were luminaries of European philosophy like Bergson, Cassirer, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus and Sartre, even Marx systematically excluded from the North Atlantic canon of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Why did Anglo-American university philosophy departments for the most part lump together the philosophical schools to which many of these thinkers belonged --Phenomenology, Existentialism, Structuralism, Constructivism, Deconstruction, and Postmodernism -- as Continental Philosophy. All were then dismissed as belonging more in literature and psychology departments than philosophy proper. That same (...) worldview categorized Americans Emerson and Thoreau as well as Spaniards Ortega y Gassett and Unamuno (along with Montaigne and Isaiah Berlin) as essayists, not philosophers. French Existentialists Sartre and Camus? They clearly belonged in the literature departments (just ask the Nobel committee!). Freud’s theory of the superego? Excluded from epistemology and relegated to the psychology department to keep company with Koehler’s Gestalt Psychology and Husserl’s Phenomenology. Most likely because his reductionism bottomed out at the scale of transactions on material production, Karl Marx too was shunted into the political science and economics departments, where Marcuse, Lacan, Gramsci, and Althusser would keep him company a few years later. Comte’s ideas were safely ensconced in a new discipline, sociology, with an even newer subdiscipline, sociology of science, carved out a few years later for Robert Merton and Bruno Latour. More recently, the rest of the philosophical lot (Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, and Foucault, to name the most prominent) were likewise dismissed along with Whitehead’s Process philosophy, and for the same reason: they were thought to belong more to psychology or sociology than philosophy proper Why? The monograph argues that the dismissals can be explained in terms of a generalized rejection of relations of interdependence and the context-dependent constraints that generate such mutualism. (shrink)

There are many- not just one- periodic laws in chemistry. These laws correspond to non-accidental regularity relations about physical and chemical properties of (sets of) chemical elements. I support this by showing how these regularity relations can be understood from the perspective of a philosophical analysis of laws. Specifically, I show that these relations instantiate standard features associated with laws; they can be spelled out in terms of two standard accounts of laws; and, they can coherently figure in debates about (...) the reality of laws as plausible candidates of ceteris paribus laws. (shrink)

There have been a number of recent attempts to identify the best metaphysical framework for capturing Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). All such accounts commit to some form of fundamentalia, whether they be traditional objects, physical relations, events or ‘flashes’, or the cosmos as a fundamental whole. However, Rovelli’s own recommendation is that ‘a natural philosophical home for RQM is an anti-foundationalist perspective' (Rovelli in Philos Trans R Soc 376:10, 2018). This gives us some prima facie reason to explore options (...) beyond these foundationalist frameworks, and take seriously a picture that lacks fundamentalia. I construct an argument from elimination in favour of an anti-foundationalist interpretation of RQM. The argument notes that _priority monism_ and _priority pluralism_ are exhaustive foundationalist options, and then shows that there are reasons to reject their union with RQM. I finish by recommending _metaphysical coherentism_ as a promising anti-foundationalist alternative, which captures the key characteristics of RQM through accepting symmetrical dependence, whilst avoiding challenges by jettisoning any commitment to fundamental entities. (shrink)

One type of computational indeterminacy arises from partitioning a system’s physical state space into state types that correspond to the abstract state types underlying the computation concerned. The mechanistic individuative strategy posits that computation can be uniquely identified through either narrow physical properties exclusively or wide, proximal properties. The semantic strategy posits that computation should be uniquely identified through semantic properties. We develop, and defend, an alternative functional individuative strategy that appeals—when needed—to wide, distal functions. We claim that there is (...) no actual computation outside of a functional context. Desiderata for the underlying notion of teleofunction are discussed. (shrink)

This paper designs and defends a conceptual framework for the disambiguation of scientific language regarding open and closed systems. We argue that the open-closed distinction should always be precisifed by specifying a characteristic quantity that is conserved if and only if the system is closed. Open systems are those for which conservation of the characteristic quantity fails. This precisification is in accord with much but not all existing practice. We show that an open system can have well-posed autonomous dynamics and (...) need not be embeddable in any larger system. We distinguish two kinds of autonomy and show that they dissociate from the open-closed distinction. We argue that this framework clears the path towards a new approach to the modelling of autonomous open systems in quantum physics and cosmology. (shrink)

These are lectures prepared for a series of seminars I am invited to give at Princeton’s Philosophy Department in November 2024.

David Wallace's `Dennett's Criterion' plays a key part in establishing realist claims about the existence of a multiverse emerging from the mathematical formalism of quantum physics, even after decoherence is fully appreciated. Although the philosophical preconditions of this criterion are not neutral, they are rarely explicitly addressed conceptually. I tease apart three: (I) a rejection of conceptual bridge laws even in cases of inhomogeneous reduction; (II) a reliance on the pragmatic notion of usefulness to highlight quasi-classical patterns, as seen in (...) a decoherence basis, over others; and (III) a structural realist or `functional realist' point of view that leads to individuating those patterns as real macroscopic objects at the coarse-grained level, as they are seen from the Classical Stance (analogous to Dennett's Intentional Stance). I conclude that the justification of Dennett's Criterion will be intimately tied up with the fate of strong forms of naturalism, and in particular that Wallacian quantum mechanics is a key case study for concretely evaluating his `math-first' structural realism (Wallace 2022). (shrink)

Existing metaphysical accounts of mechanisms commit to the existence of objects or entities posited in scientific theories, and thus fall within the category of maximal metaphysics. In this paper, I demonstrate the incompatibility of object-based metaphysics of mechanisms with the prevailing trend in the philosophy of physics by discussing the so-called bottoming-out problem. In response, I propose and flesh out a structuralist metaphysics of mechanisms based on Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), which is a kind of minimal metaphysics. I argue that (...) the metaphysical underpinnings of mechanisms are structures, whose metaphysical nature is elaborated through comparison with existing metaphysical theories of mechanisms. After that, I address the concern of whether objects in mechanisms can be accommodated in my account by invoking existing metaphysical theories of objects in special science by structuralists, such as Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. ( 2007 ). _Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized_. Oxford University Press.)’s real pattern account, and suggesting a potential alignment between OSR and processual ontology. Finally, I demonstrate how my view can naturally serve as the metaphysics for Mechanism 2.0 and be applied to systems biology. (shrink)

Metaphysicians as well as philosophers of science often turn to particle physics for a description of the most fundamental entities in our universe. The common assumption is that physics readily provides a clear account of both what those fundamental building blocks are and how they come together to form more complicated objects, and, conversely, how compound objects can be seen as being composed of those fundamental entities. I argue that this picture contains a major difficulty because quantum theories allow for (...) more than one metaphysically meaningful procedure to decompose a system into parts, fundamental or otherwise. I will identify and interpret two such procedures, mathematically given by the direct sum and the tensor product, and show that they lead to different results for what the parts of a quantum system are. This shows that there are conventional choices involved in finding the fundamental parts of an object which have not yet been widely recognised by either metaphysicians or philosophers of science. I take my findings to provide a sense in which, as a result, particle physics on its own is not enough to determine the fundamental ontology of the world. (shrink)

A striking feature of our world is that we only seem to have records of the past. To explain this ‘record asymmetry’, Albert and Loewer claim that the Past Hypothesis induces a narrow probability density over the world’s possible past macrohistories, but not its future macrohistories. Because we’re indirectly acquainted with this low-entropy initial macrostate, our observations of records allow us to exploit the associated narrow density to infer the past. I will argue that Albert and Loewer cannot make sense (...) of why this probabilistic structure exists without falling back on the very records they wish to explain. To avoid this circularity, I offer an alternative account: the ‘fork asymmetry’ explains the record asymmetry, and this in turn explains the narrow density—not vice versa. (shrink)

There is a fundamental subsets–partitions duality that runs through the exact sciences. In more concrete terms, it is the duality between elements of a subset and the distinctions of a partition. In more abstract terms, it is the reverse-the-arrows of category theory that provides a major architectonic of mathematics. The paper first develops the duality between the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of partitions. Then, probability theory and information theory (as based on logical entropy) are shown to start (...) with the quantitative versions of subsets and partitions. Some basic universal mapping properties in the category of Sets are developed that precede the abstract duality of category theory. But by far the main application is to the clarification and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Since classical mechanics illustrates the Boolean worldview of full distinctness, it is natural that quantum mechanics would be based on the indefiniteness of its characteristic superposition states, which is modeled at the set level by partitions (or equivalence relations). This approach to interpreting quantum mechanics is not a jury-rigged or ad hoc attempt at the interpretation of quantum mechanics but is a natural application of the fundamental duality running throughout the exact sciences. (shrink)

It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge of the properties of its constituents, according to C. D. Broad, when those constituents are isolated from the whole or when they are constituents of other wholes. Elanor Taylor proposes the Collapse Problem. Macro-level property p supposedly emerges when its micro-level components combine in relation r. However, each component has the property that it can combine with the others in r to produce p. Broad’s (...) nondeducibility criterion is not met. This article argues that the amount of information required for r is physically impossible. Strong Emergence does not collapse. But the Collapse Problem does. Belief in Strong Emergence is strongly warranted. Strong Emergence occurs whenever it is physically impossible to deduce how components, in a specific relation, would combine to produce a whole with p. Almost always, that is impossible. Strong Emergence is ubiquitous. Word counts. (shrink)

I present and defend a new ontology for quantum theories (or “interpretations” of quantum theory) called Generative Quantum Theory (GQT). GQT postulates different sets of features, and the combination of these different features can help generate different quantum theories. Furthermore, this ontology makes quantum indeterminacy and determinacy play an important explanatory role in accounting for when quantum systems whose values of their properties are indeterminate become determinate. The process via which determinate values arise varies between the different quantum theories. Moreover, (...) quantum states represent quantum properties and structures that give rise to determinacy, and each quantum theory specifies a structure with certain features. I will focus on the following quantum theories: GRW, the Many-Worlds Interpretation, single-world relationalist theories, Bohmian Mechanics, hybrid classical-quantum theories, and Environmental Determinacy-based (EnD) Quantum Theory. I will argue that GQT should be taken seriously because it provides a series of important benefits that current widely discussed ontologies lack, namely, wavefunction realism and primitive ontology, without some of their costs. For instance, it helps generate quantum theories that are clearly compatible with relativistic causality, such as EnD Quantum Theory. Also, GQT has the benefit of providing new ways to compare and evaluate quantum theories. (shrink)

Our universe seems to be miraculously fine-tuned for life. Multiverse theories have been proposed as an explanation for this on the basis of probabilistic arguments, but various authors have objected that we should consider our total evidence that this universe in particular has life in our inference, which would block the argument. The debate thus crucially hinges on how Bayesian background and evidence are distinguished and on how indexical or demonstrative terms are analysed. The aim of this article is to (...) take a step back and examine these various aspects of Bayesian reasoning and how they affect the arguments. The upshot is that there are reasons to resist the fine-tuning argument for the multiverse, but the “this-universe-objection” is not one of them. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the thesis of Necessitism in modal ontology. I demonstrate how instances of the Barcan formula can be witnessed, when the modal operators are interpreted 'naturally' -- i.e., as including geometric possibilities -- and the quantifiers in the formula range over a domain of natural, or concrete, entities and their contingently non-concrete analogues. I argue that, because there are considerations within physics and metaphysical inquiry which corroborate modal relationalist claims (...) concerning the possible geometric structures of spacetime, and dispositional properties are actual possible entities, the condition of being grounded in the concrete is consistent with the Barcan formula; and thus -- in the geometric setting -- merits adoption by the Necessitist. (shrink)

I show that frequentism, as an explanation of probability in classical statistical mechanics, can be extended in a natural way to a decoherent quantum history space, the analogue of a classical phase space. The result is a form of finite frequentism, in which Gibbs’ concept of an infinite ensemble of gases is replaced by the quantum state expressed as a superposition of a finite number of decohering microstates. It is a form of finite and actual frequentism (as opposed to hypothetical (...) frequentism) insofar as all the microstates exist, in keeping with the decoherence-based Everett interpretation, and some versions of pilot-wave theory. (shrink)

Chronostratigraphy is the subfield of geology that studies the relative age of rock strata and that aims at producing a hierarchical classification of (global) divisions of the historical time-rock record. The ‘golden spike’ or ‘GSSP’ approach is the cornerstone of contemporary chronostratigraphic methodology. It is also perplexing. Chronostratigraphers define each global time-rock boundary extremely locally, often by driving a gold-colored pin into an exposed rock section at a particular level. Moreover, they usually avoid rock sections that show any meaningful sign (...) of paleontological disruption or geological discontinuity: the less obvious the boundary, the better. It has been argued that we can make sense of this practice of marking boundaries by comparing the status and function of golden spikes to that of other concrete, particular reference standards from other sciences: holotypes from biological taxonomy and measurement prototypes from the metrology of weight and measures. Alisa Bokulich (2020b) has argued that these ‘scientific types’ are in an important sense one of a kind: they have a common status and function. I will argue that this picture of high-level conceptual unity is mistaken and fails to consider the diversity of aims and purposes of standardization and classification across the sciences. I develop an alternative, disunified account of scientific types that shows how differences in ontological attitudes and epistemic aims inform scientists’ choices between different kinds of scientific types. This perspective on scientific types helps to make sense of an intriguing mid-twentieth-century debate among chronostratigraphers about the very nature of their enterprise. Should chronostratigraphers conventionally make boundaries by designating golden spikes, or should they attempt to mark pre-existing ‘natural’ boundaries with the help of a different kind of scientific type? (shrink)

It is plausible that the models of scientific theories correspond to possibilities. But how do we know which models of which scientific theories so correspond? This paper provides a novel proposal for guiding belief about possibilities via scientific theories. The proposal draws on the notion of an effective theory: a theory that applies very well to a particular, restricted domain. We argue that it is the models of effective theories that we should believe correspond, at least in part, to possibilities. (...) It is thus effective theories that should guide modal reasoning in science. (shrink)

We propose a distinction between two different concepts of time that play a role in physics: geometric time and creative time. The former is the time of deterministic physics and merely parametrizes a given evolution. The latter is instead characterized by real change, i.e. novel information that gets created when a non-necessary event becomes determined in a fundamentally indeterministic physics. This allows us to give a naturalistic characterization of the present as the moment that separates the potential future from the (...) determined past. We discuss how these two concepts find natural applications in classical and intuitionistic mathematics, respectively, and in classical and multivalued tensed logic, as well as how they relate to the well-known A- and B-theories in the philosophy of time. (shrink)

I develop an account of how mathematized theories in physics represent physical systems, in response to the frequent claim that any such account must presuppose a non-mathematized, and usually linguistic, description of the system represented. The account I develop contains a circularity, in that representation is a mathematical relation between the models of a theory and the system as represented by some other model --- but I argue that this circularity is not vicious, in any case refers in linguistic accounts (...) of meaning and representation, and is simply a consequence of the fact that we have no unmediated, representation-independent access to the world. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide two abductive considerations adducing in favor of the thesis of Necessitism in modal ontology. I demonstrate how instances of the Barcan formula can be witnessed, when the modal operators are interpreted 'naturally' -- i.e., as including geometric possibilities -- and the quantifiers in the formula range over a domain of natural, or concrete, entities and their contingently non-concrete analogues. I argue that, because there are considerations within physics and metaphysical inquiry which corroborate modal relationalist claims (...) concerning the possible geometric structures of spacetime, and dispositional properties are actual possible entities, the condition of being grounded in the concrete is consistent with the Barcan formula; and thus -- in the geometric setting -- merits adoption by the Necessitist. (shrink)

The new logic of partitions is dual to the usual Boolean logic of subsets (usually presented only in the special case of the logic of propositions) in the sense that partitions and subsets are category-theoretic duals. The new information measure of logical entropy is the normalized quantitative version of partitions. The new approach to interpreting quantum mechanics (QM) is showing that the mathematics (not the physics) of QM is the linearized Hilbert space version of the mathematics of partitions. Or, putting (...) it the other way around, the math of partitions is a skeletal version of the math of QM. The key concepts throughout this progression from logic, to logical information, to quantum theory are distinctions versus indistinctions, definiteness versus indefiniteness, or distinguishability versus indistinguishability. The distinctions of a partition are the ordered pairs of elements from the underlying set that are in different blocks of the partition and logical entropy is defined (initially) as the normalized number of distinctions. The cognate notions of definiteness and distinguishability run throughout the math of QM, e.g., in the key non-classical notion of superposition (= ontic indefiniteness) and in the Feynman rules for adding amplitudes (indistinguishable alternatives) versus adding probabilities (distinguishable alternatives). (shrink)

A deeper meaning for quantum theory is presented, integrating recent developments in participatory realist approaches to quantum mechanics with older ideas involving ineffability and nothingness. I argue that Schelling's notion of the Godhead serves as a useful way of interpreting a superposition which then grounds both our freedom and the indeterminacy of quantum phenomena that makes the theory function.

Review of Bryan W. Roberts: Reversing the Arrow of Time, Cambridge University Press, 2022.

As was recently shown, non-relativistic quantum theory can be derived by means of a projection method from a continuum of classical solutions for (massive) particles. In this paper we show that Maxwell's equations in empty space can be derived using the same method. In this case the starting point is a continuum of solutions of equations of motion for massless particles describing the structure of Galilean space-time. As a result of the projection, the space-time structure itself is changed by the (...) appearance of a new fundamental constant $c$ with the dimension of a velocity. This maximum velocity $c$, derived here for massless particles, is analogous to the accuracy limit $\hbar$ derived earlier for massive particles. The projection method can thus be interpreted as a generalized quantization. We suspect that all fundamental fields can be traced back to continuous sets of particle trajectories, and that in this sense the particle concept is more fundamental than the field concept. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the prospects of an effective metaphysics. By analogy with effective physics, an `effective metaphysics' describes non-fundamental ontology in its own terms and independently of those that describe the fundamental level. And an effective metaphysics will be said to have prospects if (i) there are metaphysical truths about non-fundamental ontology out there to be discovered, and (ii) these facts can be known prior to the emergence of a fundamental theory. This question is of whether effective metaphysics has (...) prospects is an important one. For one thing, if it does then many of the criticisms of analytic metaphysicians by naturalistic metaphysics might be tempered, since those criticisms are largely based on the classical presumptions underlying their worldview. But more significantly, if effective metaphysics does not have prospects then the value of engaging in metaphysics prior to a fundamental theory is far from clear. In this paper, I will argue that we should in fact be deeply sceptical about the prospects of effective metaphysics: sceptical about our ability to access metaphysical truths about non-fundamental ontology prior to the emergence of a final theory, and perhaps also about the very idea that there are any such truths out there to be discovered. (shrink)

I present aspects of causal set theory (a research programme in quantum gravity) as being en route to achieving a reduction of Lorentzian geometry to causal sets. I take reduction in philosophers' sense; and I argue that the prospects are good for there being a reduction of the type envisaged by Nagel. (I also discuss the prospects for the stronger functionalist variant of Nagelian reduction, that was formulated by Lewis.) One main theme will be causal set theory's use of a (...) physical scale (viz. the Planck scale) to formulate how it recovers a Lorentzian manifold. This use illustrates various philosophical topics relevant to reduction, such as limiting relations between theories, and the role of analogy. I also emphasise causal set theory's probabilistic method, viz. Poisson sprinkling: which is used both for formulating the reduction and for exploring its prospects. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an ‘explosion’ of work in metaphysics aimed at articulating ‘levels of reality’ – a structural aspect of the world both suggested and investigated by the sciences. And in that context, the relation of grounding has emerged as the preferred relation with which to connect the levels. This paper argues that we cannot take grounding to be the relation that connects levels, insofar as those levels are described by effective quantum field theories. This is a (...) problem for the grounding theorist, because effective field theory is taken to provide an explanation of why there seem to be levels in physics at all. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Arroyo and Arenhart in Found Sci 28:885–910, 2013) Arroyo and Arenhart presented a detailed critical analysis regarding some essential aspects of representational realism and the logos approach to Quantum Mechanics (QM) addressed in terms of (i) “a diagnosis of what is wrong with currently available solutions”; (ii) “a proposal of a new methodology for addressing the problem”; and finally, (iii) “a positive proposal to answer the question, which is arrived at by following the methodology suggested.” In (...) this work we provide a detailed reply to some deep misunderstandings that arise in this presentation due to Arroyo and Arenhart which, in turn, allows them to conclude that “contrarily to what de Ronde has suggested, his proposal is not a way to avoid commitment to uncritical images of reality, but rather, one further position in the already huge cart of options of quantum mechanics.” After providing a more accurate account of our diagnosis, we continue to address our methodology which—like that of Einstein, Heisenberg, Pauli and Schrödinger—goes back to the Greek-Modern account of physics. We then present our proposal grounded on the invariant-objective search for theoretical unity and discuss why intensive powers of action cannot be considered in dispositional or teleological terms with respect to actuality. Finally, we list some of the main results already accomplished by the logos approach and discuss the essential role of ‘intuition’ and ‘understanding’ within the realist setting. (shrink)

Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the (...) dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ. (shrink)

In her paper, 'The Open Universe: Totality, Self-reference and Time', Ismael argues that the agent experience of dynamic time, in which the world comes into being, is more than 'mere appearance'. The key to her argument is that the actual world includes agents (minds) and their corresponding agential (mental) activity, which Ismael describes as 'the crucial step down from 'mere appearance' to actuality'. We present here a model of an agent as a complex physical system with a view to providing (...) a tenable illustration of Ismael's schema for understanding the 'actuality' of time. The radical implication for physical time as a result is that there is, in Ismael's words, 'no pure... conception of the way [the] world is independently of ourselves and our representational activity', but rather only 'embodied and engaged' knowledge of the world. (shrink)

I provide an account of the physical appropriate to the task of the physicalist while remaining faithful to the usage of “physical” natural to physicists. Physicalism is the thesis that everything in the world is physical, or reducible to the physical. I presuppose that some version of this position is a live epistemic possibility. The physicalist is confronted with Hempel’s dilemma: that physicalism is either false or contentless. The proposed account of the physical avoids both horns and generalizes a recent (...) proposal by Vicente (2011). My account defines physicalism as the thesis that there are no objects that cannot be described by physical quantities. A dimensional account of physical quantities is given: quantities are determined by measurement procedures. (shrink)

The paper spells out the thesis that the crucial, substantial move of presentism should be to temporalize modality. The present is not simply actual, and the future not simply possible, but the present is becoming actual, and the present’s becoming actual is future’s becoming possible (and past’s becoming necessary). I will argue that by so temporalizing modality, as modes of becoming rather than of being, the presentists can make room for the future (and the past), can answer the triviality-objection raised (...) against them, and can provide a specific account of presentist change. (shrink)

This chapter defends a deflationary, or ‘quietist’ account of causation in science. It begins by laying out the elements of four central philosophical theories of causation, namely the regularity, counterfactual, probabilistic and process accounts. It then proceeds to briefly criticise them. While the criticisms are essentially renditions of arguments that are well-known in the literature, the conclusion that is derived from these is new. It is argued that the limitations of each of the theories point to a deflationary or quietist (...) approach to causation in science. The practical focus is on interventionist methods for causal inference in physics and biology, and on the extant debates within the philosophy of each discipline as to how best to approach such methods. It is then argued that none of the four central theories proposed can completely explain or reduce the methods of causal inference that appear in each science. Yet, each theory provides partial insights into some of the grounds of causal inference and causal discovery. It is consequently suggested that we should retain the various methodological lessons without committing expressly to any metaphysics of causation. (shrink)

Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that (...) in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity. (shrink)

Metaphysicians of causation have long debated the existence of primitive causal modalities (e.g., powers), with reductionists and realists taking opposing stances. However, little attention has been given to the legitimacy of the metaphysical question itself, despite our longstanding awareness of Rudolf Carnap’s critique of metaphysics. This article develops a (broadly) Carnapian-pragmatist approach to causation as an alternative to existing metaphysical approaches. Within this pragmatist approach, metaphysical questions about causation are reinterpreted as practical questions about the choice of causal frameworks. To (...) motivate and justify this new approach, I argue that, in emphasizing the priority of ontology over methodology, metaphysical approaches to causation fail to adequately capture the interplay between causal ontology and causal methodology in scientific practice. In contrast, the Carnapian approach provides a more appealing alternative that emphasizes the mutual dependence and ‘balance’ between the two in an ongoing process of scientific inquiry. I use the recent controversy over ‘What counts as a cause’ in statistical causal inference as a case study to demonstrate how the Carnapian approach can help us better understand the role of ontological issues in methodological practices. (shrink)

Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. Non-racist versions of BRR have emerged recently based on sophisticated work in science and philosophy (Hardimon 2003; 2017; Spencer 2012; 2014; 2019a). In this paper, I examine Quayshawn Spencer’s version of BRR and argue that it fails to fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. To do so, I rely on the “science and values” literature and the notions of inductive, (...) epistemic, and ethical risk (Douglas 2000; Douglas 2009; Brown 2015; Biddle and Kukla 2017; Elliot and Richards 2017). Once one realizes the complex relationship between these types of risks and BRR, Spencer’s metaphysical arguments become less appealing than they might first seem. This analysis raises questions about what it means to do metaphysics of race in a socially responsible way. Hence, this paper aims at making these questions visible, inviting metaphysicians of race to directly engage with them. (shrink)

Many discussions in the metaphysics and philosophy of physics literature aim to use physics as a guide to elucidate what the world really, fundamentally is like. However, we don’t yet have a confirmed fundamental theory of physics—what’s the next best thing we can possibly say about the fundamental that is properly informed by our best theories of physics? This paper offers a starting point to address this question. It focuses on the literature on the ontology of quantum mechanics, where the (...) problem is especially salient: Many proposals aim at drawing the fundamental ontology of the world from quantum mechanics, even though they often focus on a non-fundamental theory such as nonrelativistic quantum particle mechanics. I argue that quantum mechanics can plausibly be informative about the fundamental if it is taken as a general framework theory, which covers a range of specific concrete theories, including nonrelativistic quantum particle mechanics, the Standard Model of particle physics, and string theory. I use Wavefunction Realism as an example to demonstrate what kind of ontological lessons about the world at the fundamental level the quantum framework may teach us. (shrink)

This essay offers a meta-level analysis in the sociology and history of physics in the context of the "Arrow of Time" or so-called "Two Times" problem. In effect, it argues that the two topics are intertwined, and it is only by coming to grips with the sociological aspects, involving adherence to certain metaphysical, epistemological and methodological beliefs and practices, that real progress can be made in the physics.

I describe the key features of pure process realism-realism about the processes that are identified by experimental dynamics structured by scientific models-showing that the view meets criteria for scientific realism. I argue that process realism resolves many of the worries of the antirealist, including the problems of idealization, underdetermination, contextuality, multiplicity, and the pessimistic meta-induction. I show this resolution in the context of a contentious model from physics: the Bohr model of the atom. I then generalize from this discussion to (...) a collection of upshots and constraints on process realism as a view, in order to further distinguish it from orthodox, substance-paradigmatic- or thing-realism. Therefore, pure process realism is shown to be a form of realism compatible with empiricism. (shrink)

A long-established consensus in the philosophy of biology holds that biological species are not natural kinds with intrinsic essences, despite what Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980) thought. This anti-essentialist consensus has recently been challenged by Michael Devitt, who insists that it rests on a mistake. According to Devitt, philosophers of biology have failed to recognise the distinction between two quite different questions one can ask about species: the Category question and the Taxon question. The various “species concepts” found in the (...) biological literature are attempts to answer the former but are silent about the latter, Devitt claims, so do not conflict with essentialism, pace what philosophers of biology believe. By carefully attending to the logical relation between the Category and Taxon questions, Devitt’s claim that the anti-essentialist consensus rests on a mistake is shown to be untenable. (shrink)

Many philosophers sympathetic with a Humean understanding of laws of nature have thought that, in the final analysis, the fundamental laws will include not only the traditional dynamical equations, but also two additional principles: the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical Postulate. The former says that the universe began in a particular very-low-entropy macrostate M(0), and the latter posits a uniform probability distribution over the microstates compatible with M(0). Such a view is arguably vindicated by the orthodox Humean Best System Account (...) (BSA). However, I argue here that recent developments of the BSA render the Past Hypothesis otiose. In particular, the trend among Humeans toward a more pragmatic view of laws — according to which the best system is the one that is maximally effective at helping creatures like us amplify our information about the world — does not support the idea that the Past Hypothesis is a law of nature. (shrink)

Contrary to Hume, science has found many ways in which things connect with other things in the world. Causal metaphysics, however, has failed to add anything factual to the relations discovered by science. It is at best an exercise in labeling that may have practical uses.

It is the prevailing paradigm in contemporary physics to model the dynamical evolution of physical systems in terms of a real parameter conventionally denoted as 't' ('little tee'). We typically call such dynamical models laws of nature' and t we call 'physical time'. It is common in the philosophy of time to regard t as time itself, and to take the global structure of general relativity as the ultimate guide to physical time, and so consequently the true nature of time. (...) In this paper we defend the idea that physical time, t, is rather better defined as an operational modelling parameter: we measure relations between changing physical quantities using bespoke physical systems---i.e. clocks---that coordinate local coincidences. We argue that the sorts of physical systems that make good clocks---what we call precision clocks---are those that exhibit self-sustained oscillations known as limit cycles, which are ubiquitous in open, driven, stable, dissipative systems. We develop the physical and philosophical ramifications of this conception of physical time, particularly the notion that physical time does not track something 'out there' in the world. As a result, we speculate that physical time is perhaps not as different from manifest time as many philosophers of time (and apparently general relativity) seem to suggest. (shrink)

Among advocates and critics of the “extended evolutionary synthesis” (EES), “reciprocal causation” refers to the view that adaptive evolution is a bidirectional phenomenon, whereby organisms and environments impinge on each other through processes of niche construction and natural selection. I argue that reciprocal causation is incompatible with the view that natural selection is a metaphysically emergent causal process. The emergent character of selection places reciprocal causation on the horns of dilemma, and neither horn can rescue it. I conclude that proponents (...) of the EES must abandon the claim that the process of natural selection features in cycles of reciprocal causation. (shrink)

It is supposed that any scientific theory (here we consider physical theories only) has an underlying logic, even if it is not made explicit. The role of the underlying logic of a theory T is mainly to guide the proofs and the accepted consequences of the theory’s principles, usually described by its axioms. In this sense, the theorems of the underlying logic are also theorems of the theory. In most cases, if pressed, the scientist will say that the underlying logic (...) of most physical theories is classical logic or some fragment of a set theory suitable for accommodating the theory’s mathematical and logical concepts. We argue that no physical theory and no philosophical discussion on the basis of the theory should dismiss its underlying logic, so the arguments advanced by some philosophers of physics in that certain entities (the considered case deals with quantum entities) can be only weakly discerned or be just ‘relationals’ and that they cannot be absolutely identified by a monadic property, are fallacious if one remains within a ‘standard’ logico-mathematical framework, grounded on classical logic. We also discuss the claim that some properties (as those that came from logic) would be ‘illegitimate’ for discerning these entities is not justifiable. Thus, this paper may be interesting for logicians, physicists, and philosophers. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.

If the mind of a sentient being would be reducible to its structure, any identical structure should be equally sentient. Based on physics, I prove that this thesis has two unexpected consequences: 1) There would be an inflation of minds, living in apparently different worlds. 2) The content of the mind would be independent of the properties of the external world. That is, minds would be unable to know anything about the world. Since this contradicts empirical observations, structure alone is (...) insufficient for sentient experience. This excludes the purely physicalist approaches to physics and consciousness. For physics to be as we know it, all physical properties have to be grounded in something sentiential. (shrink)

Much has been written on Newton’s concept of matter, as well as Newton’s laws. Meanwhile, the metaphysical and epistemological relationships between these two principal features of Newtonian philosophy are relatively unexplored. Among the existing accounts of the relationship between bodies and laws, two are especially compelling: the “law-constitutive” approach from Katherine Brading and the “formal-cause” approach from Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser. Both accounts argue that Newton’s bodies are (at least partially) metaphysically dependent on the laws. That is, according to (...) Brading, Biener, and Schliesser, Newtonian laws are ontologically prior to the bodies they govern. In this article, I reply to Brading, Biener, and Schliesser. I develop negative arguments against their approaches by closely examining three features of Newton’s ontology—forms, particles, and active principles—and their relationship to the laws. I also offer an explanation as to why “law-first” approaches have (understandably) dominated recent Newtonian exegesis. Finally, I present a positive argument for what I believe to be a superior alternative: Newton’s law-first approach is purely pragmatic. It is a feature of his experimental philosophy that we should begin our inquiry into the metaphysical constituents of the universe with the laws that arise from them. This does not entail, however, that Newton views laws as constituting or forming physical bodies. Newton’s metaphysics should be interpreted as “matter-first,” with bodies giving rise to laws, whereas his epistemology should be interpreted as “law-first,” with knowledge of laws giving rise to knowledge of bodies. (shrink)

We argue for an account of chemical reactivities as chancy propensities, in accordance with the ‘complex nexus of chance’ defended by one of us in the past (Suárez, 2017, 2020). Reactivities are typically quantified as proportions, and an expression such as “A + B → C” does not entail that under the right conditions some amounts of A and B react to give the amount of C that theoretically would correspond to the stoichiometry of the reaction. Instead, what is produced (...) is a fraction α < 1 of this theoretical amount, and the corresponding percentage is usually known as the yield, which expresses the relative preponderance of its reaction. This is then routinely tested in a laboratory against the observed actual yields for the different reactions. Thus, on our account, reactivities ambiguously refer to three quantities at once. They first refer to the underlying propensities effectively acting in the reaction mechanisms, and which in ‘chemical chemistry’ (Schummer, 1998) are commonly represented by means of Lewis structures. Besides, reactivities represent the probabilities that these propensities give rise to, for any amount of the reactants to combine as prescribed. This last notion is hence best understood as a single case chance and corresponds to a theoretical stoichiometric yield. Finally, reactivities represent the actual yields observed in experimental runs, which account for and provide the requisite evidence for / against both the mechanisms and single case chances ascribed. (shrink)

The debate between ontological reductionists and emergentists in chemistry has revolved around quantum mechanics. What Franklin and Seifert (BJPS 2020) add to the long-running dispute is an attention to the measurement problem. They contend that all three realist interpretations of the quantum formalism capable of resolving the measurement problem also obviate any need for chemical emergence. I push their argument further, arguing that the realist interpretations of quantum mechanics actually subvert the basis for reduction as well, by undercutting the idea (...) that fundamental physical particles are actual parts of molecules. With both reduction and traditional synchronic emergence pictures ruled out, the only option for realists about quantum chemistry is strong Thomistic emergence. (shrink)

Intuitively, the totality of physical reality—the Cosmos—has a beginning only if (i) all parts of the Cosmos agree on the direction of time (the Direction Condition) and (ii) there is a boundary to the past of all non-initial spacetime points such that there are no spacetime points to the past of the boundary (the Boundary Condition). Following a distinction previously introduced by J. Brian Pitts, the Boundary Condition can be conceived of in two distinct ways: either topologically, i.e., in terms (...) of a closed boundary, or metrically, i.e., in terms of the Cosmos having a finite past. This article proposes that the Boundary Condition should be posed disjunctively, modifies and improves upon the metrical conception of the Cosmos’s beginning in light of a series of surprising yet simple thought experiments, and suggests that the Direction and Boundary Conditions should be thought of as more fundamental to the concept of the Cosmos’s beginning than classical Big Bang cosmology. (shrink)

What is the relation between metaphysical and psychological insights into temporal asymmetries? This chapter examines that question on the basis of a case study concerning the temporal Doppler effect (Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, & Ward, 2013). Caruso et al. propose that future events seem closer than past ones at an equal objective temporal distance because we experience subjective movement through time. I explore ways of interpreting their discussion in the light of the metaphysical debate between A- and B-theorists over whether (...) time really passes and whether the future is genuinely ‘open’ while the past is ‘fixed’. I argue for the following claims: (1) Caruso et al.’s talk of a subjective movement through time seems best interpreted as concerning our longer term cognitive relationship to time; (2) both A- and B-theoretic interpretations of their discussion are viable as interpretations; (3) if combined with Priorean arguments for the A-theory, it takes some work to make sure the A-theoretic interpretation respects Van Boven and Caruso’s constraint that the objective temporal distance cannot directly influence psychological outcomes without influencing psychological intermediaries; and (4) a third, less metaphysically loaded interpretation may be preferable to both the A- and the B-theoretic ones. (shrink)

Craig Callender’s What Makes Time Special? (OUP 2017) advocates and practices an innovative, thoroughly interdisciplinary approach to philosophical questions about time and temporal features of our lives. Grappling with it is of intrinsic philosophical interest; it is also part of responding to the methodological invitation the book issues to philosophers of time. This paper is motivated by the wish to clarify WMTS’s philosophical underpinnings. The main claim of the paper is that WMTS relies on an ambiguity between rejecting the A-theory (...) versus B-theory debate, and endorsing a position within that debate. This ambiguity leads to a somewhat unstable position on how a key feature of manifest time, namely our sense of time as flowing, arises from physical time. The paper ends with a suggestion for how to resolve the ambiguity, in a way that is in line with the gist of Callender’s overall vision for the field. (shrink)

Ever since its beginnings, standard quantum mechanics has been associated with a metaphysical view according to which the theory deals with non-individual objects, i.e., objects deprived of individuality in some sense of the term. We shall examine the grounds of the claim according to which quantum mechanics is so closely connected with a metaphysics of non-individuals. In particular, we discuss the attempts to learn the ‘metaphysical lessons’ required by quantum mechanics coming from four distinct roads: from the formalism of the (...) theory, treating separately the case of the physics and the underlying logic; from the ontology of the theory, understood as the furniture of the world according to the theory; and, at last, we analyze whether a metaphysics of non-individuals is indispensable from a purely metaphysical point of view. We argue that neither non-individuality nor individuality is to be found imposed on us in any of these levels so that it should be seen as a metaphysical addition to the theory, rather than as a lesson from it. (shrink)

Physical systems are characterized by their structure and dynamics. But the physical laws only express relations, and their symmetries allow any possible relational structure to be also possible in a different parametrization or basis of the state space. I show that, if observers are reducible to their structure, observer-like structures from different parametrizations would identify differently the observables with physical properties. They would perceive the same system as being in a different state. This leads to the question: is there a (...) unique correspondence between observables and physical properties, or this correspondence is relative to the parametrization in which the observer-like structure making the observation exists? I show that, if observer-like structures from all parametrizations were observers, their memory of the external world would have no correspondence with the facts, it would be no better than random guess. Since our experience shows that this is not the case, there must be more to the observers than their structure. This implies that the correspondence between observables and physical properties is unique, and it's manifest in the observers. This result applies to both quantum and classical physics, so it is independent of the measurement problem. It has implications for structural realism, philosophy of mind, the foundations of quantum and classical physics, and quantum-first approaches. (shrink)

It is an underappreciated fact within the philosophical literature on laws of nature that many scientific laws require the aid of a supporting cast of additional modelling ingredients (such as boundary conditions, material parameters, interfacial stipulations, rigidity constraints, and so on) in order to perform their traditional role in scientific inquiry. In this paper, I suggest that this underappreciated fact spells trouble for some recent reformulations of David Lewis's Best Systems Account (BSA) of laws of nature. Under the auspices of (...) 'pragmatic Humeanism,' several philosophers have recently argued that the criteria of strength and simplicity that lay at the heart of Lewis's original formulation should be replaced with alternatives that are more sensitive to the role that laws play in scientific practice. Although the criteria that these philosophers put forward differ in a variety of ways, they are primarily concerned with the ability of laws to furnish us with predictions and encode information. This, I suggest, is a problem. If it is true that many scientific laws do not on their own perform some of the roles with which they are traditionally associated, then they are unlikely in isolation to make meaningful contributions to the predictive strength of a system or encode information about particular systems. Such laws are thus unlikely to end up in the best system, and so these accounts will have trouble conferring lawhood upon them. (shrink)

The notion of multi-functional kind is introduced to explain how social scientists may be able to draw inferences across historically unrelated societies or cultures. Multi-functional kinds are neither eternal nor purely historical, support non-trivial inductive generalisations, and allow to overcome scepticism about the inductive potential of multiply realised (functional) properties. Two examples, from monetary economics and anthropology, provide support for a pluralistic ontology of the social world.

We argue that Hamiltonian mechanics is more fundamental than Lagrangian mechanics. Our argument provides a non-metaphysical strategy for privileging one formulation of a theory over another: ceteris paribus, a more general formulation is more fundamental. We illustrate this criterion through a novel interpretation of classical mechanics, based on three physical conditions. Two of these conditions suffice for recovering Hamiltonian mechanics. A third condition is necessary for Lagrangian mechanics. Hence, Lagrangian systems are a proper subset of Hamiltonian systems. Finally, we provide (...) a geometric interpretation of the principle of stationary action and rebut arguments for privileging Lagrangian mechanics. (shrink)

This paper delves into the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism concerning the success of scientific theories. The no miracle argument posits that the ability of theories to make accurate predictions is due to their reflection of the true structure of the world. This argument suggests that mature and well-confirmed scientific theories approximate truth, leading to the existence of unobservable entities, such as electrons, in the world. On the other hand, anti-realists attribute the success of science to natural selection, likening (...) unsuccessful theories to extinct species and successful theories to adaptable survivors. According to this view, success is determined by social consensus and pragmatic considerations, rather than truth. Wray argues in favor of selectionism, emphasizing the relative nature of success and its dependence on changing standards within the research community. While some realists align selectionism with their perspective, Van Fraassen raises skepticism about the connection between truth and success. Wray presents three reasons for the incompatibility of realism and selectionism, although alternative justifications exist. The paper further examines the flawed analogy between scientific evolution and natural selection, highlighting the continuous need for theory-based explanations in experimental successes. Additionally, the process of scientific evolution is shown to involve revolutionary changes rather than a continuous convergence towards truth. Finally, the role of observation in realist explanations is questioned, as observations are theory-laden and influenced by specific conceptual frameworks. The paper concludes that Wray's argument for the incompatibility of anti-realism and realism appears reasonable, considering the complexities of scientific practice and the diverse perspectives within different scientific disciplines. (shrink)

The representational theory of measurement provides a collection of results that specify the conditions under which an attribute admits of numerical representation. The original architects of the theory interpreted the formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representations are conventional. There have been a number of recent efforts to reinterpret the formalism to arrive at a more metaphysically robust account of physical quantities. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the (...) representational theory of measurement require careful scrutiny as one moves toward such an interpretation. To illustrate why, we show that there is a sense in which the very number system in which one represents a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. We argue that this result does not undermine the project of reinterpreting the representational theory of measurement for metaphysical purposes in general, but it does undermine a certain class of inferences about the nature of physical quantities that some have been tempted to draw. (shrink)

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well‐known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that (...) we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful. (shrink)

Mathematical modelling of nature, due to its accuracy and universality, plays a key role in the scientific inquiry of the world. So important its function is that some authors have defended the existence of an ontological burden in the mathematical formalism used by scientists. According to this opinion, the appeal to certain formalism would entail an implicit commitment to the type of entities that populate the material world. In this paper, the aforementioned thesis will be analysed, as well as other (...) versions of mathematical Platonism, with the conclusion that there are no reasons to support it and that, therefore, it does not pose a threat to a realistic metaphysics in any of its modalities, such as structural realism. (shrink)

According to the multiple realization argument, mental states or processes can be realized in diverse and heterogeneous physical systems; and that fact implies that mental state or process kinds cannot be identified with particular kinds of physical states or processes. More specifically, mental processes cannot be identified with brain processes. Moreover, the argument provides a general model for the autonomy of the special sciences. The multiple realization argument is widely influential, but over the last thirty years it has also faced (...) serious objections. Despite those objections, most philosophers regard the fact of multiple realization and the cogency of the multiple realization argument as plainly correct. Why is that? What is it about the multiple realization argument that makes it so resilient? One reason is that the multiple realization argument is deeply intertwined with a view that minds are, in some sense, computational. But we argue that the sense in which minds are computational does not support the conclusion that they are ipso facto multiply realized. We argue that the sense in which brains compute does not imply that brains implement multiply realizable computational processes, and it does not provide a general model for the autonomy of the special sciences. (shrink)

I review Charles Pence's recent contribution to the Cambridge Elements in The Philosophy of Biology. Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science.

This article gives a conceptual review of the e-value, ev(H|X) – the epistemic value of hypothesis H given observations X. This statistical significance measure was developed in order to allow logically coherent and consistent tests of hypotheses, including sharp or precise hypotheses, via the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST). Arguments of analysis allow a full characterization of this statistical test by its logical or compositional properties, showing a mutual complementarity between results of mathematical statistics and the logical desiderata lying at (...) the foundations of this theory. (shrink)

Here, we deal with the question of under which circumstances can scientists achieve a legitimate understanding of defective theories qua defective. We claim that scientists understand a theory if they can recognize the theory’s underlying inference pattern(s) and if they can reconstruct and explain what is going on in specific cases of defective theories as well as consider what the theory would do if non-defective –even before finding ways of fixing it. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of this approach to (...) understanding the meta-metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, specifically with regard to Quasi-set theory. We illustrate this by employing Quasi-set theory to structure a defective scientific theory and make possible the understanding of the theory. (shrink)

I investigate the intrinsic/extrinsic nature of stemness in muscle stem cells (MSC) by relying on recent research on quiescence, with the aim of shedding light on the nature of dispositions and deriving some consequences about stem cells. First, I argue why the study of quiescence is the best available way to establish any claim about the intrinsicness/extrinsicness of stemness at least is some stem cells. Drawing on that, I argue that MSC’s stem capacities result from the combination of intrinsic cues (...) plus extrinsic factors from the stem cell niche, making stemness an extrinsic disposition in MSC. Importantly, it is shown that the niche allows the instantiation of stemness in MSC by acting as a masker of its manifestation. This shows that stemness is, at least in MSC, what I call an extrinsically structurally masked disposition (SMD); that is, a disposition whose instantiation requires, as a condition of possibility, the interaction between the bearer and a masker. Finally, I conclude by suggesting some potential consequences of this observation for the philosophical study of dispositions and for stem cell research. (shrink)

Lakatos held that science proceeds by means of competing research programme, each with its own “hard core” or paradigm. He intended this view to reconcile the competing views of Kuhn and Popper. But what Lakatos overlooked is that science needs to be construed to be one gigantic research programme with, as its “hard core”, a metaphysical thesis that asserts that the universe is such that there is an inherent unity in the laws that govern the way physical phenomena occur. The (...) conception of science that emerges from this insight succeeds in doing what Lakatos’s own view fails to do; it has fruitful implications for science itself, and solves the problem of induction. (shrink)

In this paper, I use the evidential function of chances and counterfactuals to develop accounts of these relations. Chances are objective worldly probabilities that allow us to reason from the state of a system at one time to the state of a system at another time. Counterfactuals are used to reason about what evidence we would have in hypothetical cases—and so, I’ll argue, are evaluated by considering ‘branch points’ where the counterfactual antecedent had a reasonable chance of coming about. An (...) upshot is that counterfactuals play a distinct role from causal relations—and it was a mistake to look for a single set of probabilities that would determine both how we should reason about the world (counterfactuals) and how states of the world depend on others under conditions of manipulation (causal relations). These evidential accounts do better than nearby statistical-mechanical accounts in identifying the function of distinctly modal relations and justifying why we reason about the world in modal terms. They also do better at identifying the source of the temporal asymmetries in these relations—they are due to a probability gradient of the universe, rather than to a special initial state. (shrink)

There is an extensive philosophical literature on the interrelated issues of identity, individuality, and distinguishability in quantum systems. A key consideration is whether quantum systems are subject to a strong form of individuality termed ``haecceity'' (from the Latin for ``this-ness''). I argue that the traditional, strong form of haecceity does not apply at the quantum level, but that in order to properly account for the need for symmetrization in quantum systems, a weaker kind of haecceity must be involved, which I (...) call quantum haecceity. In the process, I also question some generally accepted tenets of the current debate, such as the idea that symmetrization of states for identical quanta must be postulated and reflects permutation invariance. Instead, I note that a perturbative Hamiltonian is required for exchange effects, which suggests that the need for symmetrization arises from specific physical conditions. (shrink)

The finitude or infinity of the universe divided the ancient philosophers fueling a debate intertwined with the subtleties of the very concept of infinity and the plausibility of its realization in the physical world. While the 19th century took the first steps in the formal domain of mathematical infinity, the question of the size of the cosmos remained open pending better empirical evidence. At the end of the 20th century, the observational data of cosmology seemed to favour an infinite volume, (...) although the delicate physical and metaphysical problems that such an option implies have rarely been highlighted. (shrink)