Abstract

The method of metaphysics of scientific practice consists in developing metaphysical claims on the basis of empirical information from and about scientific practice. This method stands in the tradition of naturalistic or scientific metaphysics on the one hand, and philosophy of science in practice on the other. In this chapter we draw on some of our own research to specify the method at work. We argue that the method is typically carried out in four steps: identifying the available empirical information that might be relevant to the metaphysical topic of interest; selecting the relevant empirical information; developing a preliminary metaphysical claim that the relevant empirical information supports; mutually adjusting empirical information and metaphysics. We reveal some major methodological challenges and present ways to overcome them. We conclude that when drawing metaphysical claims from scientific practicewe need to: first, make sure that our previous metaphysical views do not influence the empirical information or its selection in problematic ways; second, explain in what sense we are doing metaphysics, countering for instance the idea that metaphysical claims must be highly general and transdisciplinary. We end the chapter by pointing to the advantages of the method of metaphysics of scientific practice.