This paper examines the relation between epistemology and higher education. We shall start by briefly examining three classical texts on the understanding of knowledge at universities, as well as noting some others, and go on to sketch a version of our own. Our argument is as follows: the world is such that the relationship between the university and knowledge remains fundamental but that it needs to be reconceptualised. In particular, the 21st century is seeing the emergence of digital reason, which (...) could be said to be a form of non-reason. It may appear, therefore, that we are witnessing the dissolution or severing of the relationship between the university, on the one hand, and knowledge and truth on the other hand. To the contrary, we argue for what we term an ecological perspective on knowledge, with the concept of ecology being treated in the most generous way, partly as a way of rethinking the university into the future. The idea of knowledge as a defining concept of the university still has mileage in it. (shrink)

Critical realism is a philosophy of social science that analyses and aims to remedy current problems and gaps. Basic tenets of positivist and quantitative research tend to contradict those of qualitative and interpretive research, and critical realism proposes ways to resolve the contradictions. Vital themes in childhood research that are reviewed in this article include a comparison with feminist research, critical realism, being and thought, transitive and intransitive, theory/practice consistency, agency and structure, closed and open systems, micro and macro in (...) the global/local nexus, four planar social being, facts and values, and transformative change through the four-stage MELD dialectic. Critical realism aims to understand the world in order to be able move from coercion towards creative liberating power. (shrink)

Numerous exegeses have been written about the epistemologies of volunteered geographic information. We contend that VGI is itself a socially constructed epistemology crafted in the discipline of geography, which when re-examined, does not sit comfortably with either GIScience or critical GIS scholarship. Using insights from Albert Borgmann's philosophy of technology we offer a critique that, rather than appreciating the contours of this new form of data, truth appears to derive from traditional analytic views of information found within GIScience. This is (...) assisted by structures that enable VGI to be treated as independent of the process that led to its creation. Allusions to individual emancipation further hamper VGI and problematise participatory practices in mapping/geospatial technologies. The paper concludes with implications of this epistemological turn and prescriptions for designing systems and advancing the field to ensure nuanced views of participation within the core conceptualisation of VGI. (shrink)

The epistemological concept of “testimony” refers to the social practice of acquiring beliefs and knowledge from what others tell us. Disparaged by philosophers as incompatible with rational autonomy and by educationalists as a passive form of learning, it is nevertheless a source we rely on for formative learning as children and throughout our lives. Both traditionalist and progressivist educationalists have underestimated the cognitive achievement involved in comprehending and learning from testimonial speech acts and also the role such speech acts play (...) in argumentation. Since the Enlightenment debates about testimony have distinguished between reductionist and non-reductionist justifications for accepting beliefs from testimony. These, like the more recent trust-based theories of testimony, tend to conflate different testimonial speech acts, and fail to reconcile a notion of trust in epistemic authority with a convincing account of rational autonomy. The thesis confronts epistemological conclusions concerning rational trust in the epistemic authority of others with Austinian pragmatics and Bakhtinian dialogism to produce an account of responsible pedagogy as valuing both the repertoire of informative speech and the virtues and commitments inherent in producing and responding with epistemic and linguistic discrimination. Dialogistic and sociocultural theories of pedagogy need to be informed by a socialized epistemology that: a) is responsive to the pragmatics of language, b) incorporates a notion of autonomy founded on self-trust and integrity, c) emphasizes the role of intellectual conscientiousness and virtue in epistemic and linguistic achievements. Theories of dialogic pedagogy should recognize that valuing discussion and “student voice” requires us to acknowledge the importance, as a prerequisite of classroom dialogue, of teachers responding sensitively to students as knowers and testifiers with complex rational commitments of their own. (shrink)

The history of western philosophy is split to its core by a long-standing, fundamental dispute. On the one hand there are the so-called empiricists, like Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Russell, the logical positivists, A. J. Ayer, Karl Popper and most scientists, who hold empirical considerations alone can be appealed to in justifying, or providing a rationale for, claims to factual knowledge, there being no such thing as a priori knowledge – items of factual knowledge that are accepted on grounds other (...) than the empirical. And on the other hand there are the so-called rationalists, like Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Bradley, McTaggart, who hold that a priori knowledge does exist, and even plays a crucial role in science. This long-standing dispute is resolved by the line of thought developed in this essay. The empiricists were right to deny the existence of a priori knowledge where this means factual knowledge of apodictic certainty justified independently of any appeal to experience. They were wrong, however, to deny the existence of a priori knowledge where this means conjectural items of factual knowledge whose acceptance is justified independently of any appeal to experience. Science requires there to be a priori knowledge in this latter sense, and two items of such knowledge will be exhibited. In addition to resolving this empiricist/rationalist dispute, the essay also develops a new conception of science – aim-oriented empiricism – and solves the long-standing problem of what it means to say of a theory that it is unified or explanatory. Furthermore, aim-oriented empiricism does not just change our conception of science; it requires that science itself needs to change. Science needs to become much more like the 17th century conception of natural philosophy, intermingling consideration of testable theories with consideration of untestable metaphysical, epistemological and methodological ideas. The whole relationship between science and the philosophy of science is transformed. The philosophy of science, construed as the exploration and critical assessment of rival ideas about what the aims and methods of science ought to be, ceases to be a meta-discipline, and becomes an integral part of science – or natural philosophy – itself. (shrink)

We introduce a family of rules for adjusting one's credences in response to learning the credences of others. These rules have a number of desirable features. 1. They yield the posterior credences that would result from updating by standard Bayesian conditionalization on one's peers' reported credences if one's likelihood function takes a particular simple form. 2. In the simplest form, they are symmetric among the agents in the group. 3. They map neatly onto the familiar Condorcet voting results. 4. They (...) preserve shared agreement about independence in a wide range of cases. 5. They commute with conditionalization and with multiple peer updates. Importantly, these rules have a surprising property that we call synergy - peer testimony of credences can provide mutually supporting evidence raising an individual's credence higher than any peer's initial prior report. At first, this may seem to be a strike against them. We argue, however, that synergy is actually a desirable feature and the failure of other updating rules to yield synergy is a strike against them. (shrink)

We argue that the experience of knowing and having the truth about oneself known in the context of therapy is not an end in itself; rather, it is important because the trust engendered by this experience opens one up to learning about one’s social world and finding better ways to live in it. We consider the consequences of a lack of epistemic trust in terms of psychopathology.

If Jones buttered the toast at midnight, there is, according to Davidson, an event of Jones’ buttering of the toast. But what kind of temporal phenomenon is being referred to if Jones is in the midst of buttering the toast? By taking a Davidsonian events-based semantics as its starting point, this thesis seeks an answer to the question of “What account of temporal ontology is needed in order to explain the semantic features of the progressive aspect in English?”. In order (...) to answer the foregoing question, this thesis critically evaluates several contemporary accounts of the ontology of process, or, equivalently, the temporal ontology associated with the English progressive. These ontological accounts of process—namely those advocated by several notable neo-Davidsonians, as well as accounts by authors such as Taylor, Steward, Crowther, and Hornsby—will all be found to be wanting. By developing some remarks entered by Dummett concerning a famous passage by Frege on the notion of countability, this thesis ends by suggesting how it is that the comparatively austere temporal ontology associated with traditional Davidsonian semantics provides us with a plausible temporal ontology of the English progressive. (shrink)

The non-credit bearing and ongoing education and development of mid- to late-career corporate executives is known by the compound term executive education. Reductively stated, executive education, for its corporate consumers and its business school providers, is predicated on the relationship between an order and its execution ; a relationship I call the “order-execution cognate”. With the word execution derived from Greek for sequence, and with the sequence of an execution following-on from its corresponding order, sequentiality is the essence of execution, (...) and the cognate. Executive education involves the amelioration of this order-execution cognate, to the ends of increased profits and competitiveness for the corporation concerned, and increased career prospects for the individual executive. Concerning sequentiality, and as a thesis on the philosophy of executive education, I apply a strand of ontological reflection to examine this cognate, namely philosophy concerning time and temporal succession. To aid in this task I use the English translations of writings on time by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Emerging from Heidegger’s thought are two temporal types that acknowledge and critique temporal succession; chronological time and Kairotic time respectively. By associating Heidegger’s philosophic method with that of early German Romantic philosophy, I articulate how it is possible to reconceive the temporal sequence of the order-execution cognate as a productive oscillation between chronic and Kairotic time; I call this oscillation “ironic temporality,” and its productivity “ironic productivity”. My philosophical analysis of commercially lucrative and neoliberal executive education is at odds with traditional knowledge-based analyses, affording a critique of the capitalist order which the educative event serves. Disrupting temporal notions of that event then becomes a dangerous political act; becomes the means to frame the educative event for the management of our age; and becomes the new orders for executive education. (shrink)

In this article I examine the problem of categorising dimensions of information quality, against the background of a serious engagement with the hypothesis that IQ is purpose-dependent. First, I examine some attempts to offer categories for IQ, and a specific problem that impedes convergence in such categorisations is diagnosed. Based on this new understanding, I suggest a new way of categorising both IQ dimensions and the metrics used in implementation of IQ improvement programmes according to what they are properties of. (...) I conclude the paper by outlining an initial categorisation of some IQ dimensions and metrics in standard use to illustrate the value of the approach. (shrink)

This chapter examines the French philosopher Raymond Aron’s Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire to establish how its historical epistemology informed his understanding of political commitment. Reflecting on a disagreement between its commentators as to whether the book’s relativism undermines its moderate political conclusions, it is argued that this controversy reflects a problematic epistemological agnosticism at the heart of Aron’s political thought. This is encapsulated in his description of a ‘transcendental relativism’ in the Introduction, which this chapter links to Aron’s (...) humanist reworking of Martin Heidegger’s theory of historicality. The recognition of this underacknowledged influence on the Introduction leads into a reconsideration of Aron’s more widely recognised, but somewhat misunderstood, intellectual debt to Max Weber. (shrink)

This thesis addresses a question that emerges naturally from some observations about contemporary mathematical practice. Firstly, mathematicians always demand proof for the acceptance of new results. Secondly, the ability of mathematicians to tell if a discourse gives expression to a proof is less than perfect, and the computers they use are subject to a variety of hardware and software failures. So false results are sometimes accepted, despite insistence on proof. Thirdly, over the past few decades, researchers have also developed a (...) variety of methods that are probabilistic in nature. Even if carried out perfectly, these procedures only yield a conclusion that is very likely to be true. In some cases, these chances of error are precisely specifiable and can be made as small as desired. The likelihood of an error arising from the inherently uncertain nature of these probabilistic algorithms can therefore be made vanishingly small in comparison to the chances of an error arising when implementing an equivalent deductive algorithm. Moreover, the structure of probabilistic algorithms tends to minimise these Implementation Errors too. So overall, probabilistic methods are sometimes more reliable than deductive ones. This invites the question: ‘Are mathematicians rational in continuing to reject these probabilistic methods as a means of establishing mathematical claims?’. (shrink)

Describes the collection of paintings, drawings, and prints of birds and fishes amassed by two founder-members of the Royal Society and used as a source of illustrations for their publications Ornithologiae libri tres and De historia piscium libri quartuor . Examines the motivations behind the collection, its arrangement, function, and use, and what this suggests about how natural historians valued pictures and their epistemological significance, especially as signifiers of the structural coherence of nature.

The work of the artist and the science of vision may seem distantly related as subjects.

Some possible reasons for the historical absence of psychoanalytic outcome research are examined, particularly the incompatibilities in the world view espoused by psychoanalysis and that of most of current science and the assumption of privileged knowledge on the part of many psychoanalysts and their training institutions. It is argued that the view that psychoanalysis offers an alternative epistemology to that of scientific research maintains psychoanalysis in its inferior position. The existing evidence for the effectiveness of adult psychoanalytic psychotherapy is reviewed (...) and the relevance of these findings to child psychotherapy outlined. Finally the author proposes a research agenda for both child and adult psychotherapy and outlines the changes that psychotherapists will need to make if they are to implement this agenda. (shrink)

Building on the breakthrough text Philosophy and Engineering: An Emerging Agenda, this book offers 30 chapters covering conceptual and substantive developments in the philosophy of engineering, along with a series of critical reflections by engineering practitioners. The volume demonstrates how reflective engineering can contribute to a better understanding of engineering identity and explores how integrating engineering and philosophy could lead to innovation in engineering methods, design and education. The volume is divided into reflections on practice, principles and process, each of (...) which challenges prevalent assumptions and commitments within engineering and philosophy. The volume explores the ontological and epistemological dimensions of engineering and exposes the falsity of the commonly held belief that the field is simply the application of science knowledge to problem solving. Above all, the perspectives collected here demonstrate the value of a constructive dialogue between engineering and philosophy and show how collaboration between the disciplines casts light on longstanding problems from both sides. The chapters in this volume are from a diverse and international body of authors, including philosophers and engineers, and represent a highly select group of papers originally presented in three different conferences. These are the 2008 Workshop on Philosophy and Engineering held at the Royal Academy of Engineering; the 2009 meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Technology at the University of Twente in the Netherlands; and the Forum on Philosophy, Engineering, and Technology , held in Golden, Colorado at the Colorado School of Mines. (shrink)

A prestigious series of lectures that are international and intercultural, and transcend ethnic, national, religious, and ideological distinctions.

This 1982 book is a history of the great age of scholastism from Abelard to the rejection of Aristotelianism in the Renaissance, combining the highest standards of medieval scholarship with a respect for the interests and insights of ..

Introduction. Francis Bacon was born in 1561, the fifth and last surviving son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper to Queen Elizabcth I, the second surviving child of his second wife. Left a widower in 1552, with six children under twelve to bring..

However, throughout his career he regularly lectured on a wide range of moral and political philosophers of the past. This volume collects these previously unpublished lectures.

In line with Bentham, who states that no one deserves punishment, not even the offender, this article argues for the development goal of criminal justice systems genuinely to achieve ‘justice’ for the greatest good of society and the offender. To this end, this article offers an ‘opportunistic interpretation’ of Bentham’s Panopticon writings.

This thesis presents a detailed investigation of Jaegwon’s Kim familiar analysis of events which holds that an event is the exemplification of a property by an object at a particular time. Despite its popularity across many areas of philosophy, the so-called Kimean view of events has been the subject of numerous criticisms, and is widely thought to be an implausible account of what events ontologically are. This thesis has two goals. First, I intend to relook at the common objections often (...) thought to signal the death-knell of the Kimean view of events; I will argue that these objections are either unconvincing or that they may be easily circumvented. Second, by drawing from numerous seminal writings on the semantics and ontology of events by Zeno Vendler, I intend to argue that Kimean view of events presents a far too crude analysis of what events in fact are. (shrink)

A detailed discussion of the philosophical ideas and context of Giordano Bruno's argument in his best known work, De la causa.

Systems engineering is unique in being characterised by its methods rather than its artefacts. Consequently, the scope of systems engineering is difficult to define. While some systems engineers contend that systems engineering is capable of addressing socio-technical problems, including climate change and terrorism, others argue that it is strictly a technical field. The paper presents the results of a discourse analysis of systems engineering textbooks, journal articles, and a qualitative questionnaire administered within the International Council on Systems Engineering United Kingdom (...) Chapter and University College London Centre for Systems Engineering. The analysis finds three parallel accounts of systems engineering in the sampled community. These representations are of systems engineering as something new, as good engineering, and as a meta-methodology. The three distinct discourses of systems engineering diverge on its concept, origin, scope, role, training, epistemological positions, and worldview. The paper shows that claims for and against the wider applicability of systems engineering techniques to complex socio-technical problems not only chart alternative courses for the future of the field but are also grounded in particular constructions of its origins, practices and worldview. While this brings circumspection to the recent rise to prominence of systems engineering within broader engineering discussion and debate, it also provides an opportunity for reflexivity within the field as it responds to demands for integrated solutions to complex socio-technical problems. (shrink)

An account of classical Greek and Latin ideas of the Soul from antiquity to the nineteenth century.

On Death, by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara, is among the most significant philosophical treatments of the theme surviving from the Greco-Roman world. The author was an influential figure in first-century B.C.E. Roman society, associated with poets such as Virgil and politicians such as the father-in-law of Julius Caesar. The surviving copies of his treatises were carbonized following the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 C.E. This edition contains the Greek text, newly reconstituted with the help of the infrared imaging (...) technology that has revolutionized the study of Philodemus’s works in the twenty-first century, and completely translated into English for the first time. An extensive introduction provides background on Philodemus and his writings, accompanying notes enrich the text, and forty-four pages of photographs illustrate the papyrus manuscript from which the translation is drawn. (shrink)

This thesis falls into two parts, a characterizing part, and an explanatory part. In the first part, I outline some of the core aspects of our ordinary understanding of visual perception, and how we regard it as a means of knowing. What explains the fact that I know that the lemon before me is yellow is my visual perception: I know that the lemon is yellow because I can see it. Some explanations of how one knows specify that in virtue (...) of which one genuinely knows, as opposed to merely believes, some content. Such explanations are epistemically satisfactory explanations. We think that visual perceptual explanations of knowledge can be epistemically satisfactory. I argue that that is what it is to regard visual perception as being among our means of knowing. In the second part, I explore how we might explain the fact that visual perception is a means of knowing (assuming that it is a fact). I ask what makes it the case that visual perception is a means of knowing (in the way we ordinarily think that it is)? I suggest that part of the answer to this question is that visual perception, given the nature it has, has a reason giving role. And that is just to say that the nature of visual perception is such that visually perceiving can ensure the satisfaction of some important condition on knowledge (namely, that if one knows that something is the case one must have a good reason to believe that it is the case). In concluding I suggest that giving this sort of explanation doesn't require a specific theory of perception. (shrink)

Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat (...) the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. (shrink)

We urgently need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of science – and of academic inquiry more generally. Instead of giving priority to the search for knowledge, universities need to devote themselves to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides. A basic task ought to be to help humanity (...) learn how to create a better world. Acquiring scientific knowledge dissociated from a more basic concern for wisdom, as we do at present, is dangerously and damagingly irrational. (shrink)

Critical examination of the processes by which we as nurses judge and reach clinical decisions is important. It facilitates the maintenance and refinement of good standards of nursing care and the pinpointing of areas where improvement is needed. In turn this potentially could support broader validation of nurse expertise and contribute to emancipation of the nursing profession. As pure theory, clinical decision-making may appear abstract and alien to nurses struggling in 'the swampy lowlands' (Schon 1983) of the realities of practice. (...) This paper explores some of the key concepts in decision-making theory by introducing, then integrating, them in a reflective case study. The case study, which examines a 'snapshot' of the patient and practitioner's journey, interwoven with theory surrounding clinical decision-making, may aid understanding and utility of concepts and theories in practice. (shrink)

Many complex systems maintain a self-referential check and balance. In animals, such reflective monitoring and control processes have been grouped under the rubric of metacognition. In this introductory article to a Theme Issue on metacognition, we review recent and rapidly progressing developments from neuroscience, cognitive psychology, computer science and philosophy of mind. While each of these areas is represented in detail by individual contributions to the volume, we take this opportunity to draw links between disciplines, and highlight areas where further (...) integration is needed. Specifically, we cover the definition, measurement, neurobiology and possible functions of metacognition, and assess the relationship between metacognition and consciousness. We propose a framework in which level of representation, order of behaviour and access consciousness are orthogonal dimensions of the conceptual landscape. (shrink)

Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the cosmos is (...) physically comprehensible. But this argument presupposes a widely accepted but untenable conception of science which I shall call standard empiricism. According to standard empiricism, in science theories are accepted solely on the basis of evidence. Choice of theory may be influenced for a time by considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory capacity, but not in such a way that the universe itself is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or physically comprehensible. In science, no thesis about the universe can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Granted this view, it is clear that science cannot have established that the universe is physically comprehensible. Standard empiricism is, however, as I have indicated, untenable. Any fundamental physical theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy two criteria. It must be sufficiently empirically successful, and sufficiently unified. Given any accepted theory of physics, endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted – disunified because they assert that different dynamical laws govern the diverse phenomena to which the theory applies. These disunified rivals are not considered for a moment in physics, despite their greater empirical success. This persistent rejection of empirically more successful but disunified rival theories means, I argue, that a big, highly problematic, implicit assumption is made by science about the cosmos, to the effect, at least, that the cosmos is such that all seriously disunified theories are false. Once this point is recognized, it becomes clear, I argue, that we need a new conception of science which makes explicit, and so criticizable and improvable the big, influential, and problematic assumption that is at present implicit in physics in the persistent preference for unified theories. This conception of science, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, represents the assumption of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As one goes up the hierarchy, the assumptions become less and less substantial, and more and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. At each level, that assumption is accepted which best accords with the next one up, and has, associated with it the most empirically progressive research programme in physics, or holds out the greatest hope of leading to such an empirically progressive research programme. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. One assumption in this hierarchy of assumptions, I argue, is that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – that is, such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified theory of everything is true. Hence the conclusion: improve our ideas about the nature of science and it becomes apparent that science has already established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – in so far as science can ever establish anything theoretical. (shrink)

... on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 978–0– 19–969152–4 Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, ..

This monograph proposes a new intercultural theoretical approach to translated literature with the Dutch author Cees Nooteboom as case study.

It is argued that the truth status of emergent properties of complex adaptive systems models should be based on an epistemology of proof by constructive verification and therefore on the ontological axioms of a non-realist logical system such as constructivism or intuitionism. ‘Emergent’ properties of complex adaptive systems models create particular epistemological and ontological challenges. These challenges bear directly on current debates in the philosophy of mathematics and in theoretical computer science. CAS research, with its emphasis on computer simulation, is (...) heavily reliant on models which explore the entailments of Formal Axiomatic Systems. The incompleteness results of G¨odel, the incomputability results of Turing, and the Algorithmic Information Theory results of Chaitin, undermine a realist truth model of emergent properties. These same findings support the hegemony of epistemology over ontology and point to alternative truth models such as intuitionism, constructivism and quasi-empiricism. (shrink)

In management research, theory testing confronts a paradox described by Meehl in which designing studies with greater methodological rigor puts theories at less risk of falsification. This paradox exists because most management theories make predictions that are merely directional, such as stating that two variables will be positively or negatively related. As methodological rigor increases, the probability that an estimated effect will differ from zero likewise increases, and the likelihood of finding support for a directional prediction boils down to a (...) coin toss. This paradox can be resolved by developing theories with greater precision, such that their propositions predict something more meaningful than deviations from zero. This article evaluates the precision of theories in management research, offers guidelines for making theories more precise, and discusses ways to overcome barriers to the pursuit of theoretical precision. (shrink)

This volume comprises nine lively and insightful essays by leading scholars on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work.

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the (...) resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

The Anti-Christ. Martin. Liebscher.LAST SUNDAY OF AUGUST 1888 saw Nietzsche drafting the very last plan for his main philosophical work that was to have been entitled The Will to Power (Der Wille zur Macht).1 This was to be endowed ..

Objectives To conduct an independent evaluation of the first phase of the Health Foundation’s Safer Patients Initiative (SPI), and to identify the net additional effect of SPI and any differences in changes in participating and non-participating NHS hospitals. Design Mixed method evaluation involving five substudies, before and after design. Setting NHS hospitals in the United Kingdom. Participants Four hospitals (one in each country in the UK) participating in the first phase of the SPI (SPI1); 18 control hospitals. Intervention The SPI1 (...) was a compound (multi-component) organisational intervention delivered over 18 months that focused on improving the reliability of specific frontline care processes in designated clinical specialties and promoting organisational and cultural change. Results Senior staff members were knowledgeable and enthusiastic about SPI1. There was a small (0.08 points on a 5 point scale) but significant (P<0.01) effect in favour of the SPI1 hospitals in one of 11 dimensions of the staff questionnaire (organisational climate). Qualitative evidence showed only modest penetration of SPI1 at medical ward level. Although SPI1 was designed to engage staff from the bottom up, it did not usually feel like this to those working on the wards, and questions about legitimacy of some aspects of SPI1 were raised. Of the five components to identify patients at risk of deterioration—monitoring of vital signs (14 items); routine tests (three items); evidence based standards specific to certain diseases (three items); prescribing errors (multiple items from the British National Formulary); and medical history taking (11 items)—there was little net difference between control and SPI1 hospitals, except in relation to quality of monitoring of acute medical patients, which improved on average over time across all hospitals. Recording of respiratory rate increased to a greater degree in SPI1 than in control hospitals; in the second six hours after admission recording increased from 40% (93) to 69% (165) in control hospitals and from 37% (141) to 78% (296) in SPI1 hospitals (odds ratio for “difference in difference” 2.1, 99% confidence interval 1.0 to 4.3; P=0.008). Use of a formal scoring system for patients with pneumonia also increased over time (from 2% (102) to 23% (111) in control hospitals and from 2% (170) to 9% (189) in SPI1 hospitals), which favoured controls and was not significant (0.3, 0.02 to 3.4; P=0.173). There were no improvements in the proportion of prescription errors and no effects that could be attributed to SPI1 in non-targeted generic areas (such as enhanced safety culture). On some measures, the lack of effect could be because compliance was already high at baseline (such as use of steroids in over 85% of cases where indicated), but even when there was more room for improvement (such as in quality of medical history taking), there was no significant additional net effect of SPI1. There were no changes over time or between control and SPI1 hospitals in errors or rates of adverse events in patients in medical wards. Mortality increased from 11% (27) to 16% (39) among controls and decreased from 17% (63) to 13% (49) among SPI1 hospitals, but the risk adjusted difference was not significant (0.5, 0.2 to 1.4; P=0.085). Poor care was a contributing factor in four of the 178 deaths identified by review of case notes. The survey of patients showed no significant differences apart from an increase in perception of cleanliness in favour of SPI1 hospitals. Conclusions The introduction of SPI1 was associated with improvements in one of the types of clinical process studied (monitoring of vital signs) and one measure of staff perceptions of organisational climate. There was no additional effect of SPI1 on other targeted issues nor on other measures of generic organisational strengthening. (shrink)

Purpose – This paper aims to explore whether philosophical insights from Plato's dialogue “Parmenides” on the complex and often paradoxical nature of change can illuminate the nature of information retrieval (IR). IR is modelled as a dialectic process involving mutually dependent yet conflicting forces between the subjective and the objective. These forces operate to produce change in the subjective experience of users (becoming informed) through facilitating a relationship with objective documents. Accurately modelling, predicting and enabling this process remains a persistent (...) problem for IR and this paper seeks to examine the extent to which this is because of the nature of change. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is a conceptual analysis and literature review. Findings – The problem of change (what it is, how it happens and how we can know it has happened) is essential to our understanding of information as information normally implies some kind of change in knowledge state. Any process of change, however, on examination of its qualities, appears to necessitate the combination of irreconcilable and conflicting forces. The apparent contradictions within the existence of change as discussed in “Parmenides” also exist in IR on both a theoretical and a technical level. Research limitations/implications – Change is a central concept for information in general and IR in particular. A deeper understanding of the paradoxical nature of change can provide new insights into IR theory and practice. Originality/value – The paper presents a new historical philosophical perspective on the nature of change and applies it to current IR problems. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relationship between the process and product of participatory design. It argues that there is an unhelpful dichotomy that pushes the thinking and practice of participatory design through two separate schools of thought: planning versus design. This chapter suggests that advancements in overcoming such challenge can be reached by perceiving design through the lends of the capability approach. The concept of ‘capability space’ is proposed to explore the process and product components of freedom associated to participatory design. (...) The chapter then elaborates on a series of normative values based on concepts from radical democracy and social production of space literature that aims at supporting the application of the concept of capability space. Design is embedded in the processes of deepening democratic practices by revealing power relations and navigating through dissensus. (shrink)

Modern science began as natural philosophy. In the time of Newton, what we call science and philosophy today – the disparate endeavours – formed one mutually interacting, integrated endeavour of natural philosophy: to improve our knowledge and understanding of the universe, and to improve our understanding of ourselves as a part of it. Profound, indeed unprecedented discoveries were made. But then natural philosophy died. It split into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. This happened during the (...) 18th and 19th centuries, and the split is now built into our intellectual landscape. But the two fragments, science and philosophy, are defective shadows of the glorious unified endeavour of natural philosophy. Rigour, sheer intellectual good sense and decisive argument demand that we put the two together again, and rediscover the immense merits of the integrated enterprise of natural philosophy. This requires an intellectual revolution, with dramatic implications for how we understand our world, how we understand and do science, and how we understand and do philosophy. There are dramatic implications, too, for education, and for the entire academic endeavour, and its capacity to help us discover how to tackle more successfully our immense global problems. (shrink)

For forty years I have argued that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the basic task becomes to seek and promote wisdom. How did I come to argue for such a preposterously gigantic intellectual revolution? It goes back to my childhood. From an early age, I desired passionately to understand the physical universe. Then, around adolescence, my passion became to understand the heart and soul of people via the novel. But I never discovered how (...) to tell stories in order to tell the truth. So, having failed to become a physicist, and failed to become a novelist, I studied philosophy at Manchester University and then, in six weeks of inspiration, discovered that the riddle of the universe is the riddle of our desires. Philosophy should be about how to live, and should not just do conceptual analysis. I struggled to reconcile the two worlds of my childhood ambitions, the physical universe and the human world. I decided they could be reconciled with one another if one regarded the two accounts of them, physics and common sense, as myths, and not as literal truths. But then I discovered Karl Popper: truth is too important to be discarded. I revised my ideas: physics seeks to depict truly only an aspect of all that there is; in addition, there is the aspect of the experiential features of the world as we experience it. I was immensely impressed with Popper’s view that science makes progress, not by verification, but by ferocious attempted falsification of theories. I was impressed, too, with his generalization of this view to form critical rationalism. Then it dawned on me: Popper’s view of science is untenable because it misrepresents the basic aim of science. This is not truth as such; rather it is explanatory truth – truth presupposed to be unified or physically comprehensible. We need, I realized, a new conception of science, called by me aim-oriented empiricism, which acknowledges the real, problematic aims of science, and seeks to improve them. Then, treading along a path parallel to Popper’s, I realized that aim-oriented empiricism can be generalized to form a new conception of rationality, aim-oriented rationality, with implications for all that we do. This led on to a new conception of academic inquiry. From the Enlightenment we have inherited the view that academia, in order to help promote human welfare, must first acquire knowledge. But this is profoundly and damagingly irrational. If academia really does seek to help promote human welfare, then its primary tasks must be to articulate problems of living, and propose and critically assess possible solutions – possible actions, policies, political programmes, philosophies of life. The pursuit of knowledge is secondary. Academia needs to promote cooperatively rational problem solving in the social world, and needs to help humanity improve individual and institutional aims by exploiting aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the real progress-achieving methods of science. We might, as a result, get into life some of the progressive success that is such a marked feature of science. Thus began my campaign to promote awareness of the urgent need for a new kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity create a wiser world. (shrink)

Whilst it is often maintained that a person comes under a 'secondary' legal duty to compensate a victim of his wrong, this is mistaken. The wrongdoer has a moral obligation to compensate, but only a legal liability to do so.

This is an ideal text for students studying jurisprudence for the first time.

Criticism of Dagan's pragmatic concept of property forms.

A critical survey of the evolution of property rights debate, focusing in particular on recent work by Krier.

James E. Penner ponders with much insight both the notion of property and its place in the legal system, and his musings prove fascinating.

In this lecture Professor Penner examines the structure of trust doctrine to consider the question, “What sort of knowledge and understanding does a trusts lawyer have?”, and proposes that the most telling analogy is with the kind of knowledge and understanding that a practitioner of a ‘special science’ like civil engineering has. A trust is a facilitative device that subjects of the law can use to create structures of beneficial property interests, and the law is shaped around the creative structures (...) that have been found popular, and the problems which can arise from its use. This characterisation makes sense of the way trust doctrine is structure in treatises and textbooks, but also raises demanding questions about the legitimacy of trust law. In particular, it suggests that the authority of the law in this area must draw at the same time upon two sources of authority that Joseph Raz’s theory of authority identifies, the ability to solve co-ordination problems and the authority of the expert, sources of authority which are normally regarded as mutually exclusive. (shrink)

If one examines the structure of trust doctrine to consider the question, “What sort of knowledge and understanding does a trusts lawyer have?”, it is proposed that the most telling analogy is with the kind of knowledge and understanding that a practitioner of a ‘special science’ like civil engineering has. A trust is a facilitative device that subjects of the law can use to create structures of beneficial property interests, and the law is shaped around the creative structures that have (...) been found popular, and the problems which can arise from its use. (shrink)

It is controversial what needs to be proved in order to benefit from the presumption of resulting trusts, whether all resulting trusts arise by operation of law, and whether resulting trusts are restitutionary or not. The author shows that a claimant need not prove an absence of consideration before benefitting from the presumption, and argues that, whilst presumed resulting trusts respond to intention, they arise by operation of law. Finally, the author argues that one argument for a restitutionary analysis of (...) resulting trusts, i.e. that a transferor cannot retain a beneficial interest in property title to which he has transferred, is misconceived. (shrink)

Restitution lawyers commonly speak of the 'transfer' of value; this is misconceived. Values are realised, not transferred, only property rights are transferred. This realisation distinctly illuminates the relationship between the law of restitution and the law of tracing, strongly suggesting that trusts of traceable proceeds are not examples of restitutionary entitlements which reverse unjust enrichments.

The paper starts with brief biographical details of John Rawls’s life, and indications regarding the significance of his proposal. The most relevant part of the article is dedicated to the discussion of the concept of democracy as it is included in Rawls’s theory of Justice. Rawls tries to find a solution to the incompatibility of two different motivations for democracy: the instrumental and the intrinsic defence. It followsfrom Rawls’s proposal that the two defences need not necessarily to be incompatible. Participation (...) in public decision procedures helps citizens to improve their capacities. According to the author of the paper, the main criticisms of Rawls come not so much from doubts about the validity of these arguments, but from questioning the realism of his proposals. (shrink)