Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. In this paper, (...) I will argue that these two enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also have bad cognitive consequences in furthering the spread of conspiracy theories and undermining trust in experts. I will then explain in more detail why we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter. Moreover, I will show what place this leaves for critical thinking and why it does not have the crazy consequences that the critics expect. (shrink)

Les politiques et l’administration sont les maîtres de la langue de bois. C’est pour eux une question de survie avec les risques que cela implique : la démocratie est dévoyée, les électeurs sont souvent trompés et le fonctionnement de l’État en pâtit. Pour remédier à cela, les think tanks – des organismes privés de recherche représentant la société civile – ont été créés. Leur rôle : dévoiler les discours ambigus des politiques, dénoncer la démagogie et les abus de l’État et (...) de l’administration, critiquer les mauvaises politiques publiques, proposer des solutions. Financés uniquement grâce à des dons privés, les think tanks se sont imposés dans la société américaine comme une force presque aussi importante que les médias.Politicians and bureaucrats are masters of doublespeak. To them, it is a matter of survival with all the risks this implies: democracy has gone astray, voters are frequently misled and the functions of the State are being corroded as a result. Think tanks – which are private research organisations representing civil society – have been set up in an attempt to remedy the situation. Their role is to reveal the ambiguity of political discourse, denounce demagoguery and the misuse of power by the State and its bureaucracy, criticise bad public policy and propose solutions. In the US, these think tanks are funded exclusively by private donations and have become, in American society, almost as powerful as the media. (shrink)

Abstract:Through an intercultural dialogue—Chinese and Western—this article explores the possibility of building cultural diversity and pluralism in philosophy. It focuses, first, on building a dialogue between Levinas' and Zhu Xi's apparent (philosophical) affinity for ethics at the level of meaning of the concept of transcendence in the Neo-Confucian and Levinasian ethical contexts and, second, on uncovering and analyzing the inapparent differences at the level of cultural presuppositions on which this apparent affinity is based. I offer that both Levinas and Zhu (...) Xi distinguish the impulse to care for the other—out of which the human relationship emerges—as rooted not in the ontological self but in an ethical transcendence: the other's face (Levinas) and the human authentic nature as mandate of heaven (Zhu Xi). The article comparatively interprets them and their cultural presuppositions. (shrink)

This article examines Heidegger’s thoughts on Nietzsche’s philosophy of eternal return and the self-overcoming power of thinking. Scholarly commentators argue that Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche reduces the open possibilities of thinking about temporality, becoming and difference into a rigid metaphysical framework of being as a whole. However, a close reading of Heidegger’s thoughts on the eternal recurrence shows that his interpretive attempt to disclose the metaphysical ground of Nietzsche’s thinking reveals a deeper, dynamic dimension of Nietzsche’s recurrent (...) efforts of self-overcoming. In this light, I argue that Heidegger’s interpretive thinking intends to uncover an empowering ground of Nietzsche’s philosophical struggle to overcome the metaphysical limit of human thoughts facing the lively unity of difference. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s thinking of the eternal recurrence is not to suggest a metaphysical doctrine of being but to grasp a determinate basis of one’s own existence, repeatedly seeking the greater possibility of being with others. (shrink)

If there is one lesson that Hannah Arendt drew from her encounter with Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem it was that the moral and political dangers of thoughtlessness had been grossly underestimated. But while thoughtlessness clearly “has its perils”, (LMT 177) as the example of Eichmann illustrates, thoughtfulness has its own problems, as the example of Heidegger illustrates. In the course of her 1964 interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt recalls her distaste for “intellectual business” that arose from witnessing the widespread and (...) “relatively voluntary” Gleichshaltung (co-ordination) of German “intellectuals” with the Nazis in 1933 (EU: 10). This was the year that Heidegger, Arendt’s former teacher and friend, “entered the Nazi Party in a very sensational way” (EU: 187). But Heidegger is for Arendt also a paragon of thoughtfulness who exposes the “incomprehensible triviality” (or banality) of “the they” and their “mere talk” (MDT: ix). This raises the following question: how can thoughtfulness, in the guise of Heidegger, and thoughtlessness, in the guise of Eichmann, both (though to a very different extent) lead to ‘co-ordination’ with the Nazis? What does this tell us about the relation between thinking and evil? (shrink)

This study investigates moments in which one participant in an interaction embodies that he is “doing thinking,” a display that is commonly referred to as “thinking face. ” From an interactional perspective, it is assumed that embodied displays of “doing thinking” are a recurring social practice and serve interactive functions. While previous studies have examined thinking faces primarily in word searches and storytelling, the present study focuses on argumentative activities, in which children engage in processes (...) of joint decision-making. The paper has two interrelated aims. The first aim is to describe how multiple modalities—beyond the face—are temporally coordinated to create multimodal gestalts of “doing thinking.” It is shown that thinking displays not only involve dynamic imaginative gaze but also stylized bodily postures. The second aim is to generate knowledge about the functions of thinking displays in children's argumentative activities. The analysis describes how both speakers and recipients use thinking displays in different turn positions and align them with verbal talk or silence. The data for this study comprise video recordings of decision-making processes in groups of older children. Drawing on a multimodal approach to situated interaction, it will be proposed that embodied displays of “doing thinking” provide a resource to shape participation frameworks, mark epistemic stances and create epistemic ecologies for collaborative reasoning. By investigating thinking displays in a particular conversational activity, the study sheds light on the diversity and context-sensitive functionality of thinking displays. It also contributes to recent research on children's collaborative reasoning as an embodied discursive practice. (shrink)

The Faces of Reason traces the history of philosophy in English Canada from 1850 to 1950, examining the major English-Canadian philosophers in detail adn setting them in the context of the main currents of Canadian thought. The book concludes with a brief survey of the period after 1950. What is distinctive in Canadian philosophy, say the authors, is the concept of reason and the uses to which it is put. Reason has interacted with experience in a new world and a (...) cold climate to create a distinctive Canadian community. The diversity of political, geographic, social, and religious factors has fostered a particular kind of thinking, particular ways of reasoning and communicating. Rather than one grand, overarching Canadian way of thinking, there are “many faces of reason,” “a kind of philosophic federalism”. The book has two dimensions: “it is a continuos story which makes a point about the development of philosophical reason in the Canadian context.... it is a reference work which may be consulted by readers interested in particular figures, ideas, movements, or periods.”. (shrink)

The project 'Facing Forward' started with a collaboration between five institutions: the Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam, the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis at the University of Amsterdam, De Appel arts centre, W139, the Stedelijk Museum Bureau Amsterdam and the art magazine Metroplis M. Having previously organized the lecture series and publications 'Right About Now: Art & Theory in the 1990s' (2005/2006) and 'Now is the Time: Art & Theory in the 21st Century' (2008/2009), the organizing committee decided to take the final (...) step in this timeline and turn its attention to the far horizon. Informed by a shared interest in the role that history, speculation, and utopianism play in the field of contemporary art and design (as well as the larger context of global, socio-economic and political developments), a selection of seven themes emerged from the conversations of the initial organizers. These would eventually shape the seven lecture and discussions events - collected in this volume of essays - publicized under the banner Art & Theory From a Future Perspective. A great number of internationally renowned speakers were invited to reflect on the proposed themes during often sold-out events, which were presented at the Oude Lutherse Kerk in Amsterdam in 2011/2012. Yet, however compelling our desire as organizers to go beyond the framework of contemporary events and the current interest, well-nigh obsession, with history, it is obviously an illusion to think that we can escape the past by means of a turn towards the future."--Page 8. (shrink)

BackgroundAs the use of AI becomes more pervasive, and computerised systems are used in clinical decision-making, the role of trust in, and the trustworthiness of, AI tools will need to be addressed. Using the case of computational phenotyping to support the diagnosis of rare disease in dysmorphology, this paper explores under what conditions we could place trust in medical AI tools, which employ machine learning.MethodsSemi-structured qualitative interviews with stakeholders who design and/or work with computational phenotyping systems. The method of constant (...) comparison was used to analyse the interview data.ResultsInterviewees emphasized the importance of establishing trust in the use of CP technology in identifying rare diseases. Trust was formulated in two interrelated ways in these data. First, interviewees talked about the importance of using CP tools within the context of a trust relationship; arguing that patients will need to trust clinicians who use AI tools and that clinicians will need to trust AI developers, if they are to adopt this technology. Second, they described a need to establish trust in the technology itself, or in the knowledge it provides—epistemic trust. Interviewees suggested CP tools used for the diagnosis of rare diseases might be perceived as more trustworthy if the user is able to vouchsafe for the technology’s reliability and accuracy and the person using/developing them is trusted.ConclusionThis study suggests we need to take deliberate and meticulous steps to design reliable or confidence-worthy AI systems for use in healthcare. In addition, we need to devise reliable or confidence-worthy processes that would give rise to reliable systems; these could take the form of RCTs and/or systems of accountability transparency and responsibility that would signify the epistemic trustworthiness of these tools. words 294. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the nature of insults—a subject that has been rather neglected in the philosophical literature. I claim that an insult has to do with causing us to lose face. We save face with regards to everybody else, and thus anybody is supposedly liable to insult us. In this sense, our interlocutor serves both as an individual encountering us face-to-face, and as an audience in front of whom our weaknesses are exposed. When the insult involves (...) something we know to be wrong, we can try and refute it. True insults are harder to tackle, and therefore might hurt more. But we cannot adopt a strategy of not caring about what others think because it is through interactions with them that we explore both our views and identity. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the contribution of theoretical resources to the transformation in my thinking about professional development and accountability, within an action research self-study of practice as a civil servant, in the context of participation on the Doctor in Education programme at Dublin City University in the period 2008-2012. It is at the intersection of these subject positions, between theory and practice, that professional development was explored through the ‘leadership problem’ of encouraging trainer colleagues to investigate the (...) educational potential of information and communications technologies for the development of their practice. Ultimately, this constituted a critical space for sustained dialogue between the self and the social in exploring professional subjectivity. The resources discussed supported the interrogation of social, cultural and historical conditions influencing self-understanding and narrative reasoning and movement from strategic to communicative reasoning. It is claimed that this has significance for the development of a more educational training practice, which expresses a concern for subjectivity and agency in the face of a growing ‘performativity’ in professional life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Good and Bad Ways to Think about Religion and Politics by Robert Benne, and: The Way of Peace: Christian Life in the Face of Discord by James M. Childs Jr.Bruce P. RittenhouseGood and Bad Ways to Think about Religion and Politics Robert Benne Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010. 127 pp. $14.00The Way of Peace: Christian Life in the Face of Discord James M. Childs Jr. Minneapolis: (...) Fortress Press, 2008. 149 pp. $19.00A comparison of Robert Benne’s Good and Bad Ways to Think about Religion and Politics and James Childs’s The Way of Peace illustrates the current divisions in political theology in the US Lutheran tradition. Benne’s book is a polemic aimed at the leadership of the mainline Protestant denominations and their mode of engagement with the American political process. In Benne’s account, these denominations draw too direct and exclusive a line between Christian faith and liberal political commitments; conversely, he sees greater agreement between core Christian norms and conservative political concerns. By contrast, Childs’s book provides an exegetical development of Christian norms of peace and peacemaking, followed by direct applications of Christian norms to public issues of economic justice and war that parallel the positions of secular liberals.Benne seeks to explore anew the issue of how Christians should interact with the political process. Unlike H. Richard Niebuhr, who undertook a similar project in Christ and Culture, Benne engages contemporary secular interpretations and critiques of religious engagement in politics. Benne rejects the strict separationist positions of the new atheists such as Richard Dawkins and the fusionist positions he attributes to Paul Tillich and the leadership of the contemporary mainline denominations in favor of a critical engagement model based on the Lutheran two kingdoms doctrine. Benne’s passion is not matched by the strength of his arguments. There is a straw man quality to his characterization of his antagonists. For example, Benne describes Tillich as seeing no difference between the demands of the Christian faith and democratic socialism. But Tillich explicitly recognizes the limitations of democratic [End Page 195] socialism in expressing Christian ideals and makes clear that his preference for this form of government is conditioned on a historical situation in which the alternatives are laissez-faire capitalism, fascism, and communism. Benne displays epistemological hubris when he questions mainstream scientific judgments. For example, he mocks the “alleged global warming consensus” (35) without offering any evidence that he possesses the necessary evidence or expertise to judge that consensus. He adds questionable historical claims, exaggerating Nazi persecution of Christians and minimizing the religious motivation of the European wars following the Reformation.Childs’s treatment of the question of how Christians are to engage in the US political process is even more problematic than Benne’s. His political prescriptions are written as if the problem did not exist, as if there existed a unified Christian polity fully faithful to its ideals that could express those ideals directly in the nation’s public policies. In this, there is a lack of the moral realism that Lutherans traditionally express through the doctrine that Christians are simul justus et peccator (at the same time justified and sinner). It is telling that the only sins that Childs acknowledges in the church are those that correspond to secular liberal norms: “racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of discrimination” (110). Childs’s representations of the church as holy, a community of peacemakers, and a sign of peace are normative not descriptive, effacing the traditional Lutheran distinction between the visible and invisible church. Childs also demonstrates a lack of political realism with respect to the influence of Christians in the American political process. In proposing that public policy be directed by Christian ideals, Childs either presupposes a significant conversion of our pluralistic society or he imagines that those not presently acting in the political process according to Christian moral principles can be persuaded to selflessness without conversion. The former position is not an empirical reality, and the latter contradicts the traditional Lutheran understanding of original sin, which holds that in the absence of faith human beings are curvatus in se, curved in upon themselves.Benne makes a... (shrink)

This study examines the dynamic relationship between face-saving mechanisms—proxied by age, income, and gender—and the peers’ safe-driving information on the driving behaviors of Chinese drivers. Using the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) and Granular Interaction Thinking Theory (GITT) to analyze data from 1,039 Chinese drivers, we uncover a complex interplay of factors. Our findings suggest that peers serving as role models and actively supporting careful driving positively influence drivers’ safe driving behaviors. The effect of role-model peers is strengthened among (...) drivers with higher age and income levels. In contrast, the impact of actively engaged peers is lower among these groups and male drivers (though the gender’s negative moderation effect is weakly reliable). These results highlight the crucial role of peer influence in promoting safe driving and underscore the dynamic effects of cultural values, particularly face-saving concerns, on drivers’ cognitive and behavioral processes in China. (shrink)

Thinking without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Many scientific disciplines treat non-linguistic creatures as thinkers, explaining their behavior in terms of their thoughts about themselves and about the environment. But this theorizing has proceeded without any clear account of the types of thinking available to non-linguistic creatures. One consequence of this is that ascriptions of thoughts to non-linguistic creatures have frequently been held to be metaphorical and not to be taken at (...) face value. Bermúdez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. Whereas existing discussions of thought at the non-linguistic level have concentrated on how such thoughts might be physically realized, Bermúdez approaches the problem by considering what is required in explaining behavior in psychological terms. In developing a positive account of non-linguistic thought he shows how the experimental tools used by developmental psychologists and students of animal behavior can be used to give a precise account of the way in which a human infant or non-human animal is representing the world. Much of the book is devoted to exploring the differences between thinking without words and language-based thinking. Bermúdez argues that there are clear limits to the expressive power of non-linguistic thought. Nonetheless, he identifies primitive analogues at the non-linguistic level that can be used to explain sophisticated non-linguistic behaviors. Thinking Without Words is the first full-length philosophical study of this important topic. It is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior. (shrink)

The theory presented here has implications for philosophy in respect of how concepts and words can be mechanically defined. For neuroscience the paper at least sets out a problem that has received little consideration and offers a possible solution. Also the theory may be relevant to robotics in terms of object manipulation. Concepts need to be separated from each other in the brain in order for an animal to act on one object in isolation. A possible solution is to inhibit (...) common feature neurons that are shared by two concepts. There are some problems with doing so, including the fact that each feature of every concept is shared with some others so all would have to be inhibited. This can be resolved if common feature neurons are only switched off while two concepts are active at the same time. Another problem is that while inhibiting the common features, the two active concepts cannot be related to each other and understood in each other's context. This can be addressed by division of the brain into relational and isolational areas. Associative thinking, proposed to be the only memory mechanism in the right hemisphere, produces poorly defined but well related concepts. In fact all concepts have associations to others and so in a purely associative brain region, everything forms one giant concept. In the left hemisphere it is speculated that differential or oppositional thinking cancels out the common features of live concepts, leaving only the differences, resulting in clear definition but lack of relationships to other concepts. (shrink)

There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner’s curse because they fail to extract information from hypothetical events—like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction perform better when the requirements for this cognitive issue—also denoted by contingent reasoning—are relaxed, leaving all other parameters unchanged. For my underlying research question, I used a lab experiment with two stages. In stage I, the subjects participate in a non-standard common value auction, called the wallet (...) game, in which a naïve bidding strategy can lead to both winner’s curse and loser’s curse. In stage II, the subjects in the treatment group learn whether their initial bid was the winning bid or not and they get the opportunity to change this bid. In this sense, the bidders face the same decision problems as in stage I again, but the need for hypothetical thinking is reduced in stage II. The overall pattern of the data suggests that the problem of irrational over- and underbidding can be weakened by giving the subjects ex ante feedback about their bid, but unlike related studies I also find negative effects of additional information. (shrink)

Some Thoughts on Thinking is a work dealing with the issues one faces when one attempts to construct non-arbitrary beliefs about ourselves and our surroundings. The text opens up with a discussion of the similarities and differences between science, theology, philosophy and tradition. This initial discussion provides the foundation for a deeper push into what is, and what is not, a recommendable and non-arbitrary belief. No previous exposure to philosophy is assumed and the language of the work is free (...) of complex philosophical terms. (shrink)

Some of us might think that a logician turned metaphysical has lost his way. Everyone else can enjoy the persistence and rigor of this daring book. The Faces of Existence demands that we find a place, within a physicalist ontology and a realist theory of knowledge, for many of the topics which normally baffle those theories. There are chapters or sections about subjectivity, value, God, and metaphor, all within a context where there is said to be no difference within these (...) domains without a conditioning physical difference. This is a non-reductionist physicalism: each of these faces is said to be an autonomous domain of meaning and truth. (shrink)

Among the claims made for online learning is its potential to foster critical thinking, particularly by engaging students in asynchronous discussions conducted in writing. This paper reviews and critiques these claims. It first examines the uses of writing and classroom discussion in modeling and encouraging critical thinking. It then reviews some of the arguments for the possible advantages of online interaction over face-to-face discussion. Finally, it critiques these claims by comparing the specific features, which distinguish the (...) experience of participation in asynchronous written discussions from synchronous oraldiscussion. This comparison illuminates the role of oral discussion in modeling and developing students’ critical thinking skills and points out difficulty of doing so through asynchronous computer-mediated discussions. (shrink)

While Minsky’s work is often identified with the critique of financial speculation, this paper argues that there is a different side to his work. We argue that Minsky can be read as offering a post-foundational perspective on political economy that recognizes the speculative dimension of all economic activity. This post-foundational reading allows for an understanding of neoliberal policymaking in terms of the provision of liquidity to too-big-to-fail constituencies. The article discusses how some segments of Western societies have been able to (...) participate in the inflationary logic of this too-big-to-fail dynamic, whereas others are locked out and face increasingly tight liquidity constraints. This differential access to liquidity is an increasingly central aspect of the stratifying rationality of contemporary capitalism. By connecting Minsky’s insights into the temporal logic of capital to key issues in social theory, the article presents a new theorization of (il)liquid life that advances on extant accounts. (shrink)

Despite huge advances in education, knowledge and communication, it can often seem we are neither well-trained nor well-practiced in the art of clear thinking. Our powers of reasoning and argument are less confident that they should be, we frequently ignore evidence and we are all too often swayed by rhetoric rather than reason. But what can you do to think and argue better? First published in 1939 but unavailable for many years, Susan Stebbing's Thinking to Some Purpose is (...) a classic first-aid manual of how to think clearly and remains astonishingly fresh and insightful. Written against a background of the rise of dictatorships and the collapse of democracy in Europe, it is packed with useful tips and insights. Stebbing offers shrewd advice on how to think critically and clearly, how to spot illogical statements and slipshod thinking, and how to rely on reason rather than emotion. At a time when we are again faced with serious threats to democracy and freedom of thought, Stebbing's advice remains as urgent and important as ever. This Routledge edition of Thinking to Some Purpose includes a new Foreword by Nigel Warburton and a helpful Introduction by Peter West, who places Susan Stebbing's classic book in historical and philosophical context. (shrink)

Optimism is one human characteristic which for many years has been of central interest to psychology. This variable is usually treated as a one-dimensional human trait. This text presents a different view of optimism. It includes a discussion of a multidimensional questionnaire for the measurement of optimism: the Optimistic Attitude Questionnaire. The OAQ measures four dimensions of optimism: achievement orientation, incaution, positive thinking, and openness. The results of a k-means clustering procedure that was conducted on a group of 766 (...) adults are presented as well. The results of the analysis reveal five different profiles: global optimists, pessimists, cautious optimists, moderate optimists, and risk-takers. The obtained profiles are significantly different from each other - for example, with respect to the age of the participants and their evaluations of life satisfaction. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse called the preface to Hegel's Phenomenology "one of the greatest philosophical undertakings of all times." This summary of Hegel's system of philosophy is now available in English translation with commentary on facing pages. While remaining faithful to the author's meaning, Walter Kaufmann has removed many encumbrances inherent in Hegel's style.

According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations (...) that seem to be empirically substantiated. One virtue of my solution is that in addition to its theoretical apparatus it appeals to empirically substantiated considerations. (shrink)

The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. David Papineau argues that there is no real puzzle here. Consciousness seems mysterious, not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. Papineau exposes the confusion, and dispels the mystery: we see consciousness in its place in the material world, and we are on the way to a proper understanding of the mind.

This article analyzes the current political predicament of Hong Kong by examining Nightmare Wallpaper, an art project composed of a series of automatic drawings made by local artist Pak Sheung Cheun. He made them while attending the court cases of political activists on trial, and the article further explores his subsequent efforts to transform this work into wallpaper prints, a series of installations, and a book. This political work, which is also very private, vividly and honestly demonstrates the artist’s intense (...) struggles, along with the despair felt by many in the city. The earnest self-reflection shown in the art does not give his audience a way out of the blind alley of the present but invites us to express ourselves and to connect with others. It is both a work of abjection and intersubjectivity, with no naïve expectation to reconcile the tensions between them. It shows, rather, a determination to participate in an uncertain future, combining the artist’s and the city’s capacity of meaning production and imagination. The Nightmare Wallpaper project also reveals how this artist, as part of a protest community, struggles to overcome binary thinking through an affirmation of becoming. (shrink)

What do a short car trip, a pandemic, the wood-wide fungal web, a challenging learning experience, a storm, transport logistics, and the language(s) we speak have in common? All of them are systems, or multiple sets of systems within systems. What happens in any set of circumstances will depend on a mix of initial conditions, complexity dynamics, and the odd wild card (e.g., a chance event). While it is possible to model and predict what might or perhaps should happen, it (...) is impossible to be certain. "It depends" thinking needs to be applied. Future-focused literature identifies complex systems thinking as an essential capability for citizenship, and this book sets out to show teachers how they might foster it-for themselves as well as for their students. There are implications for pedagogy, curriculum, and assessment. Multiple examples show what changes might look like, for students of different ages, and in different subject contexts. This is a book of several layers: It is both practical and philosophical. There is explicit discussion of parallels between complexity science and indigenous knowledge systems (specifically mātauranga Māori in the New Zealand context). The many examples are designed to appeal to general readers with an interest in the complex challenges facing contemporary societies, as well as to teachers at all levels of the education system. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the philosophical apprehension of the face through art history in order to signal a moment of rupture in the contemporary times of the face and its signifying relationship to the subject. Drawing from Francis Galton’s nineteenth century photographic experiments on analytical portraiture, one sees how the face when conceived as an atlas, functions very differently for the subject and its recognition than when understood as a mere image. With the advent of futuristic (...) technology like AI and machine learning feeding in much of our technocratic imaginations, where does the face and its constituency lie? Modernist artists found in the face, various motivations of their own – it was a field to explore their own subjectivities and those inclined towards the transcendental managed to liberate the subject from its image i.e. the face. This manner of freeing the subject of its image and thinking of the face as a structure of the subject, has potential to help us imagine new kinds of polyvalent subjectivities, as can be seen in works of contemporary artist- philosophers like Hito Steyerl. This paper articulates this journey of the face which began its story as the constitutive technology of the subject in the 19th century but today find its best reckoning as an insufficient one, in our quest for understanding new post-humanist subjectivities. (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

Purpose: The purpose of the study was to assess the socio-economic challenges faced by CoG-Kenya in poverty alleviation in Emuhaya District, Western Kenya.Methodology: This study was a cross-sectional research that sought to give an examining and descriptive scrutiny of the CoG-K’s activities in Emuhaya District of Western Kenya. This study sampled a total of 312 respondents (1 Bishop, 1 General Secretary, 1 General Assembly Trustee, 1 General Assembly Treasurer, 16 Directors, 282 Pastors, and 10 Elders) through purposive sampling method. Oral (...) interviews, questionnaire methods and focus group discussion were used to collect data from the respondents. Observation method was used to validate the information obtained through oral interviews and questionnaires. Secondary data was sourced from published and unpublished literature. Data was analyzed using the theological method of induction (TMI).Results: The study concludes that as much as the CoG-K has made concerted attempts towards development in Emuhaya District by influencing the peoples thinking on legitimacy of wealth and education, and on the moral value of saving and investing. However some of its programs and ceremonial functions like ordination, baptism, marriage and weddings tend to retard these efforts of alleviating poverty. Although such programs and celebrations serve the poor at the grassroots level, they delay change in behavioural and institutional transformation capable of sustaining economic growth.Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: There is a need to change cultural practises that tend to retard development among the adherents of the CoG-K in Emuhaya District. The study posits that cultural practices surrounding marriage and death that are repugnant and detrimental to change should be discarded if development is to take place. (shrink)

We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. They have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Among the few scholars who have proposed formal approaches to illustrate how we-thinking arises, Bacharach offers one of the most developed theories from the game theoretic point of view. He presents a number of intuitions, not always mutually consistent and not fully developed. In this article, I propose a way to complete Bacharach’s theory, generalizing the interdependence (...) hypothesis and building on his intuition about vacillation. It is a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can come to mind in the face of a decision problem. The vacillation model makes we-reasoning more easily usable in game theory. (shrink)

The volume addresses a problem rarely discussed by philosophers - the question of provincialism in science (in the broadest sense of the term). There are only a few great centers of science, which attract funding and provide almost ideal opportunities for research and development. They also attract some of the best researchers. Some - but not all. For a variety of reasons, some of the best researchers, or ones who have that potential, may do science outside these centers, in the (...) provinces. The volume is devoted to the problems they face. What is an intellectual province? Who are the provincial thinkers? What is the mark of provincialism? Do provincial (or central) thinkers have any special duties? Are there ways of overcoming one's own provincialism? The authors address these questions across different disciplines, cultures, locations and time periods. -/- . (shrink)

Today’s managers face a competitive and globalized marketplace, with a multitude of stakeholders demanding their time and attention. The fast pace of this environment can overwhelm them and may interfere with their desire for meaningful work and an integration of their personal and professional values. This paper addresses this challenge by combining stakeholder theory and Catholic Social Tradition to form Catholic Stakeholder Thinking. Possessing values that are shared by managers of diverse faiths and beliefs, it explains how key (...) Catholic social tenets and the resulting normative obligations inform managerial responsibilities to stakeholders. Catholic Stakeholder Thinking is taught and reinforced through the open-ended case method, an approach which encourages managers to critically examine the complexities of an issue. This determines whether their decisions promote integral human development and the common good in solidarity with the poor. The open-ended case method approach anchored in Catholic Stakeholder thinking sharpens managers’ skills and may contribute to personal development. Because of its shared focus on integral human development and the common good in solidarity with the poor, it can be used by managers of good will who hold different (or no) religious affiliations. (shrink)

Mathematical thinking skills are very important in mathematics, both to learn math or as learning goals. Thinking skills can be seen from the description given answers in solving mathematical problems faced. Mathematical thinking skills can be seen from the types, levels, and process. Proportionally questions given to students at universities in Indonesia (semester I, III, V, and VII). These questions are a matter of description that belong to the higher-level thinking. Students choose 5 of 8 given (...) problem. Qualitatively, the answers were analyzed by descriptive to see the tendency to think mathematically used in completing the test. The results show that students tend to choose the issues relating to the calculation. They are more use cases, examples and not an example, to evaluate the conjecture and prove to belong to the numeric argumentation. Used mathematical thinking students are very personal (intelligence, interest, and experience), and the situation (problems encountered). Thus, the level of half of the students are not guaranteed and shows the level of mathematical thinking. (shrink)

More than half a century after Nigeria (like most African nations) gained Independence; there has been a lingering problem of finding a socio-political ideology that would suit perfectly with the peculiar nature of African traditions. Incidentally, it is this same problem that led African thinkers to start propounding socio-political ideologies. These include Leopold Sedar Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Modibo Keita, Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, and Nnamdi Azikiwe. The latter propose what he called Neo-Welfarism. A theory which has faced severe criticism over (...) the years. This work has two goals: to identify the criticisms against Nnamdi Azikiwe’ Neo-Welfarism and re-examine them; and to show how Azikiwe’s Neo-Welfarism could be suitable for tackling the socio-political and economic challenges of contemporary Nigeria. The paper maintains that despite some flaws, Azikiwe’s Neo-Welfarism still holds certain credible principles which when properly applied, could be beneficial to the Nigerian society, and Africa at large. (shrink)

As far as I’m concerned, Korean moral education is facing the new challenge and new era. I’m teaching Korean secondary school studens as an Ethic teacher in high school and EBS lecturer as well. I’m worried about Korean education especially in middle and high school. There was missing thinking those parts cause an entrance examination, only for university in Korea. In this a serious worry, I found some exits from significant experience. First, I’d like to mention about P4C (Philosophy (...) for children) Program which was learned from Professor Mattew Lipman of Mont Clair State University in New Jersey, U.S.A. This program is emphasizing upon thinking skill including creative, critical, and caring thinking. The huge shift from knowledge based education to thinking based education inKorea contemporarily. Also Student-based education is new stream of Korean education system. Teachers think students come to school to get knowledge, parents think children can learn judgment at school which was "lost area.”All this things come from philosophy, when we ask for reason it is a philosophical question. For example, "Why is he a hero?”, “He is brave.” "Why is he brave?" Which is philosophical conceptualization? Every day life gives us some questions and concepts like: love, freedom and philosophy gives us answers to those question so without philosophy we cannot have happy life. In reality of Korean education system there is no independent class for philosophy. So philosophy can be taught in Korean language classes or social studies. I started using P4C program from Lipman: I taught students making questions or making stories. These exercising result was remarkable and amazing. So questions are thebeginning of discovering new knowledge. Even if the knowledge is known by other people students can enjoy the process of discovering new knowledge. They could also get thinking skills. (shrink)

How are we to think and act constructively in the face of today’s environmental and political catastrophes? Gail Stenstad finds inspiring answers in the thought of German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Rather than simply describing or explaining Heidegger’s transformative way of thinking, Stenstad’s writing enacts it, bringing new insight into contemporary environmental, political, and personal issues. Readers come to understand some of Heidegger’s most challenging concepts through experiencing them. This is a truly creative scholarly work that invites all readers (...) to carry Heidegger’s transformative thinking into their own areas of deep concern. (shrink)

The traditional view was that a concept must be immediate if anything is, i.e., it must be something possessed directly by my mind. To deny this seems to be saying "I think but I don't have ideas." This is of course what the proponents of the linguistic philosophy are in effect saying, and perhaps for them it is all right. Professor Price has argued ingeniously against the whole linguistic position: against the possibility of a purely linguistic solution to the problem. (...) Yet whether we follow Price or the language philosophers we are forced into a rather puzzling situation. One likes to say that one has ideas, thoughts, concepts, but there is a serious question as to whether we can ever actually cognize such entities. Indeed Price introspects and does not find them. Most of us--including our linguistic colleagues--would be quick to agree. A thought cannot be introspected like an image. There just does not seem to be anything there. As thinkers of thoughts, we are looking inward toward nothing; we are indeed living examples of "hollow men." So it is that we are faced with a dilemma. Either we say we think but do not really have ideas, or we must somehow show that such concepts are actually immediate after all. Neither alternative seems the least bit welcome. The latter seems utterly impossible. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a discussion of Levinas's views about Christianity. It then considers four important issues that do not fall along the fault line that divides Jews and Christians from each other but rather represent issues each community must face both internally and in dialogue with each other.

This work shows how systematically studying people’s use of emotion concepts (what people think emotions are), can inform debates regarding the nature of emotion (what emotions are). As such, it makes a contribution both in terms of method and content. In regards to the methodological approach, this work constitutes the first experimental philosophy Intuitions Project approach (see Article 4) to general questions regarding the nature of emotion. It does not only bring together the philosophical and scientific literature on emotion (as (...) much research has already done) but directly combines philosophical analysis and empirical research methods to study emotion. Articles 1 – 3 use quantitative (inferential statistics) and qualitative (text analysis) methods on data from surveys whose design was guided by philosophical analysis. And Article 4 considers the use of neuroimaging methods in philosophy. Finally, Article 2 builds bridges between analytic philosophy and the scientific study of concepts. In particular, by considering concepts’ internal structure (typicality, weight, and dependency relations). In regards to the content, the main contribution of this work consists in testing the premises used in arguments for (and against) emotion theories. This helps us discriminate between sound and unsound arguments, and select the appropriate conclusions regarding the nature of emotion. Figure 1 graphically represents the state of the debate after this contribution (see Figure 5 in the Introduction for a comparison point). In the following, I will detail the contribution of each of the articles in this work, and how they converge and complement each other to provide a coherent picture of emotion (concepts). Figure 1. Arguments from conditional and problem cases as applicable for both Cognitive / Perceptual theories and Somatic / Attitudinal theories. Solid black arrows indicate support, dashed red arrows indicate opposition. Claims challenged in this work are flagged using dashed lines. Claims not tested are flagged using transparency. -/- The studies presented in Article 1 tested the Subtraction Argument in favor of Somatic theories of emotion. The results of these studies showed that people apply emotion concepts (fear, anger, sadness) in cases of absence of bodily feelings. This questions the claim that bodily perceptions (attitudes) are necessary for emotion (see Introduction §4.1.) and supports the existence of “calm” cases of emotion (see Introduction §4.3.2.). As we saw in the introduction, these two claims are incompatible. The first one supports the Subtraction Argument in favor of Somatic (Attitudinal) theories, while the second one supports arguments against them. With these results in hand, we can conclude that the Subtraction Argument is unsound (its main premise is likely false), and the argument from calm emotions is sound (see Figure 1). This poses a problem for Somatic and Attitudinal theories of emotion, but also Hybrid theories of emotion, as they are also committed to the claim that felt bodily changes constitute emotions. The studies presented in Article 2 went beyond those in Article 1 by testing people’s use of emotion concepts in cases where the presence (absence) of bodily feelings, cognitive evaluations, and action tendencies is independently manipulated. The results show that people consider that bodily feelings are non-necessary for emotion, in line with the results in Article 1. Action tendencies were also regarded as non-necessary, which poses a problem for Motivational theories of emotion (see Introduction §5.2.1.). Finally, cognitive evaluations were considered non-necessary in two out of three studies. However, across all studies, cognitive evaluations were the most important factor in determining people’s use of emotion concepts. Thus, it seems like we should not give up the claim that “When someone does not [value perception/belief], she is not emotion]” (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the results show that bodily changes and action tendencies depend on cognitive evaluations. These last two results square well with the core tenets of Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories of emotion. Thus, the results presented in Article 2 support these theories. Article 3 complements Article 1 and 2 by testing the weight of yet another factor in people’s use of emotion concepts. Namely, the value of the situation in which the emotion is experienced. The results of Article 3 show that this factor significantly influences people’s use of emotion concepts. This poses a challenge for theories of emotion as non-intentional states (Morag, 2017; Whiting, 2011). According to these accounts, emotions are only causally related to the situation in which they are experienced, but they are not about that situation. Thus, they seem unable to explain why differences in the value of the situation influence the use of emotion concepts even when the reaction of the agent is the same. By stressing the importance of the intentionality of emotion and the (normative) connection between emotion and value, these results (as those in Articles 1 and 2) favor Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories. As we saw in the Introduction, these theories are especially well-suited to explain the intentionality of emotions and their relation to value. Finally, the main goal of Article 4 is to analyze the prospects of using fMRI to inform philosophically relevant questions concerning emotion. First, we saw that there are no brain areas specifically associated with emotion. The brain correlates of emotions are also involved in other psychological processes, so we cannot infer emotion from localized brain activity. Second, and against the predictions of Basic Emotion theories (see Introduction §5.2.), we saw that patterns of brain activity are not significantly different across emotion types. This provides evidence against this particular Componential account. However, other Componential theories (e.g. Appraisal theories) are compatible with the results. Note that the same approach used to test the claims of Basic Emotion theories (Ontology testing) could potentially be used to inform questions regarding the role of evaluative cognitions / bodily feelings in emotion. In particular, we could test the degree of overlap between the neural correlates of emotion and evaluative cognitions vs. the degree of neural overlap between emotion and bodily feelings. Future research should consider this approach to further investigate what constitutes emotions. To sum up, Articles 1 to 4 challenge Somatic, Attitudinal, Hybrid, Motivational, and Basic Emotion theories, and instead favor Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories. But before declaring winners, some limitations should be taken into account. First, it is important to note that Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories still face challenges. Cognitive theories have to account for the emotions of non-human animals as well as the phenomenology of emotion. Appraisal theories have to account for the problem of integration. And all Cognitive, perceptual, and appraisal theories have to account for cases of recalcitrant emotion. The work presented here provides an independent motivation to develop and defend such accounts. Second, as it has been noted in the discussion of Article 1, one could account for mismatches between theoretical and ordinary uses of emotion concepts by appealing to factors that are orthogonal to emotion. For example, it might be that people’s use of emotion concepts is heavily influenced by pragmatic factors. Thus, although the results presented in this work demand proponents of Somatic, Attitudinal, Hybrid, and Motivational theories to develop and empirically support such hypotheses, it doesn’t preclude the possibility to protect these theories from the evidence. Third, note that important issues around the nature of emotion, such as those concerning emotions’ representational (see, e.g. Grzankowski, 2016) or reason-responsive nature (see, e.g. Maguire, 2017), were not treated in this work. Arguably, these questions are better addressed using philosophical analysis alone. However, future work should consider the prospects of using empirical research methods to illuminate these issues. In general, future work should continue to explore the possibilities of combining philosophical analysis and empirical research methods to inform questions regarding the nature of emotion, so we can further advance long-standing debates in emotion theory. Hopefully, this work sets a precedent for this. (shrink)

In a challenge to current thinking about cognitive impairment, this book explores what it means to treat people with intellectual disabilities in an ethical manner.

The objective of the present essay is to show that the traditional dilemma of philosophy, namely, does science think or does not think, has today become the problem that science itself has to solve. To assert that science thinks means first that science, when it thinks, constructs its object in an always specific manner; second, in construing its object, it adds to it the real, i.e., a reference, external to the scientific construction itself, which science then discovers as the basis (...) and source of its construction. This article argues that it is for strictly scientific reasons that science is today faced with the task of affirming itself as a domain of thought in both aforementioned meanings. Affirming the view that science thinks is a scientific struggle for the existence of politics of emancipation. (shrink)

The life-changing principles of Stoicism taught through the story of its most famous proponent Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius was the final famous Stoic philosopher of the ancient world. The Meditations, his personal journal, survives to this day as one of the most loved self-help and spiritual classics of all time. In How to Think Like a Roman Emperor, cognitive psychotherapist Donald Robertson weaves the life and philosophy of Marcus Aurelius together seamlessly to provide a compelling modern-day guide to the Stoic (...) wisdom followed by countless individuals throughout the centuries as a path to achieving greater fulfillment and emotional resilience. How to Think Like a Roman Emperor takes readers on a transformative journey along with Marcus, following his progress from a young noble at the court of Hadrian--taken under the wing of some of the finest philosophers of his day--through to his reign as emperor of Rome at the height of its power. Robertson shows how Marcus used philosophical doctrines and therapeutic practices to build emotional resilience and endure tremendous adversity, and guides readers through applying the same methods to their own lives. Combining remarkable stories from Marcus's life with insights from modern psychology and the enduring wisdom of his philosophy, How to Think Like a Roman Emperor puts a human face on Stoicism and offers a timeless and essential guide to handling the ethical and psychological challenges we face today. (shrink)