I argue that realism about causal powers sublates the passivist, Humean-inflected free will problematic. In the first part of the paper I show that adopting what I call ‘powers-non-determinism’ reconfigures the conceptual terrain with respect to the causation component of the contemporary problematic. In part two I show how adopting ‘powers-non-determinism’ significantly alters the nature of the discussion with respect to the agency component of the problematic. In part three I compare ‘powers-non-determinism’ to an otherwise- Humean agent causal position.

Kant’s “transcendental” or “critical” philosophy is an instance of what can be called the “critique of immediacy.” As part of his critical project, Kant argues that one cannot merely assume that there is a reestablished harmony between thought and being. Instead, one must effect a “return to the subject” and examine the forms of thought themselves, in order to determine the extent to which thought and being are commensurable. As a result of his “transcendental turn,” Kant concludes that what at (...) first appears as immediately given to thought is always already (at least partly) the result of some kind of activity or mediation on the part of the thought itself. Hegel approves of Kant’s critical orientation: Kant correctly demanded to know “how far the forms of thought were capable of leading to the knowledge of truth,” and correctly concluded that “the forms of thought must be made into an object of investigation.” However, for Hegel, the problem with Kant was that he aimed to examine the forms of thought as if they were necessarily separated from being itself. Thus the Kantian strategy, for Hegel, led to a twofold absurdly. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate a new approach to transcultural postcomparative philosophy, which may be tentatively called “the method of sublation,” using the example of Adorno and Gong Sunlong’s respective views on the relationship between concepts and objects. The term sublation is a neologism commonly used to translate Hegel’s idea of Aufhebung. It is derived from the Latin term sublatio, for its original meaning covered all three crucial connotations of Hegel’s Aufhebung – to lift up, (...) to preserve and to eliminate. The method thus encompasses all three of these three notions that are crucial to any process of creating something new from the interactions between two or more distinct discourses. In this philosophical sense, it has the three meanings of producing, eliminating, and preserving arguments, propositions, or ideas. Moreover, unlike “synthesis” the term “sublation” refers to a process rather than a stage. The sublation method aims to develop new forms of transcultural philosophizing and to overcome the impasses of traditional comparative approaches through procedures of “conceptual comparison” rather than relying only on the “comparison of concepts”. It starts from similarities and differences identified in the basic paradigms of different culturally and semantically defined frames of reference, and uses the method of discursive translation to transfer meanings across different languages and ideational traditions. Through a contrastive analysis of the similarities and differences between Adorno’s and Gongsun Longs conceptions of concepts and objects (or names and realities, respectively), the paper demonstrates the importance of considering different culturally conditioned paradigms and frames of reference in order to gain new, more complex, and more pluralistic philosophical insights. (shrink)

It will be argued here that Marx returned to Hegel in a Hegelian spirit—with the intention of achieving the sublation of philosophy. The term has the same broad meaning for both thinkers. The abolition of philosophy occurs in a philosophic way only when its negation is shown to follow from its inner tendency. The negative result is therefore also positive; it is the fulfillment of philosophy. This movement occurs in the Hegelian system in the form of the sublation (...) of philosophy to science or absolute knowledge. In Marx it takes the form of the sublation of theory into practice. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to explore and demonstrate a specific mode of transcultural philosophical comparison by introducing an innovative theoretical model that I tentatively call the “method of sublation.” Through an illuminating case study centered around L i Zehou 李澤厚, a prominent figure credited with pioneering this method, its profound potential for generating creative innovation comes to light. L i Zehou skillfully combined Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Marx’s historical materialism, creating a unique synthesis that sublated traditional divides. This (...) sublation elevates the empirical, seamlessly integrating it into the transcendental domain. The foundation of this paper lies in providing a concise yet comprehensive overview of the method’s theoretical underpinnings, closely followed by a meticulous dissection of its operational structure. A tangible application of the method is then vividly demonstrated through L i Zehou’s adept process of seamlessly sublating static Kantian _a priori_ forms with the dynamic principles of Marxist social development theory, exemplifying the potency of this transformative approach in the realm of philosophy. (shrink)

In the Mengzi there is a hypothetical situation relating how the ancient sage-king Shun 舜 would respond if his father had committed murder. This has recently become a source of debate among Chinese philosophers. Here we will apply arguments made by Johannes de silentio (Kierkegaard's pseudonym) about the “teleological suspension of the ethical” related to the action of the biblical Abraham, and link them up to alternative interpretations of the actions of Shun. This challenges the current and traditional interpretations of (...) his actions, suggesting how this new approach can overcome ethical quandaries related to the Mengzian account of Shun's behavior. (shrink)

The Eucharist, as a pillar of Christian life and faith, stands at the center of the Mass. It bears multi-dimensional meanings and functions, each of which addresses a different aspect of Christian life and mindset. The study resonates dialectically between the Eucharist as a unique religious affirmation of faith and philosophical strategies that are developed to meet its challenges, particularly the rational frameworks by which the believer affirms that the consecrated bread and wine are Christ’s body and blood. On the (...) one hand, the philosophical examination offers new perspectives to understand the Eucharist and its influence on the faithful; on the other hand, the Eucharist and the unique challenges it poses allow us to examine man’s relation to reality within the colors of faith. It will be argued that Edward Schillebeeckx’s discussion of the Eucharist, particularly his attempt to bridge between reality and the symbolic sphere, accords with Heidegger’s reevaluation of the question of Being. The present reading limits itself to the encounter between the mind and the phenomenon and does not proceed to the meaning of the Eucharist as part of the Mass and the crucifixion of Christ. However, the focus of the article is not on the phenomenon but rather on the existential position of the subject and his orientation toward reality. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION 1 GENERAL REMARKS 1 OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT 5 PART I: STRUCTURE 8 CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS 8 A. POSITIVE DEFINITIONS 8 Remark: On Translating Aufheben 13 B. NEGATIVE DEFINITIONS 15 1. Negation 16 2. Synthesis 18 3. Irony 21 CHAPTER 2: USAGE 24 A. FREQUENCY 24 Table 1. Number of Occurrences of the Various Forms 26 Table 2. Summary of the Information on the Different Volumes 26 Table 3. Results of the Regression Analysis 29 B. SYNTAX 35 C. CONTEXT (...) 38 Transition to Part II 41 PART II: FUNCTION 42 CHAPTER 3: BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING 42 A. BEING AND NOTHING 45 Remark: On the Transitions in Hegel's Logic 48 B. BECOMING 50 CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND CONTRADICTION 57 A. IDENTITY 59 1.Identity 59 2. Essential Identity 61 B. DIFFERENCE, DIVERSITY, AND OPPOSITION 65 1. Absolute Difference 65 2. Diversity 68 3. Opposition 70 C. CONTRADICTION 73 1. First Explanation 74 2. Second Explanation 84 CHAPTER 5: THE SYSTEM AND ITS MOMENTS 93 A. SYSTEM 93 B. IDEA 96 C. FORM AND METHOD 100 Transition to Part III 108 PART III: CRITIQUE 109 CHAPTER 6: INTERNAL CRITIQUE 109 A. DEFINITIONS 109 B. ANALYSIS 118 CHAPTER 7: EXTERNAL CRITIQUE 128 A. DEFINITIONS 128 B. ANALYSIS 139 Remark: On Transcendence 142 Phenomenological Examples 143 1. Anxiety 143 2. Trust 144 3. Hope 146 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 156 A. METHODOLOGY 156 B. OBJECTIVES 165 C. SIGNIFICANCE 169 PART IV: SUPPLEMENTAL 181 Data Tables: Frequency Analysis 181 Table 2. Summary of the Information on the Different Volumes 181 Table 3. Results of the Regression Analysis 181 A Comparison of the First and Second Editions 182 First Edition, Paragraph 1 182 Second Edition, Paragraph 1 182 First Edition, Paragraph 2 183 Second Edition, Paragraph 2 183 First Edition, Paragraph 2.5 183 First Edition, Paragraph 3 184 Second Edition, Paragraph 3 184 Aufheben: A Brief Historical Overview 185 General 185 Kant 185 Schiller 186 Marx 188 Bibliography 191 Notes On Citations 191 Works Cited 191 Works Consulted 193. (shrink)

Following thinkers of the archive such as Derrida, Foucault and Groys, among others, one of the ethical functions of the archive is to enable differentiation: to do archival work is to unlock difference. Yet how is one to deem the archival content outside of those moments in which we deliberately engage with it? More specifically, how is one to think the spectatorial relation to images that, assigned to the sequestered space of the archive, remain most of the time without spectators? (...) In approaching the archival mode through the philosophical lens of sublation and its Hegelian precursor of Aufhebung that performs alteration through preservation-as-cancellation, this essay sets out to articulate a phenomenology of the archived photograph as an image of, or in, sublation. Exploring the fragile dynamics at stake between the archived and its non-archived outside, emphasis is laid on the critical contradictions inherent in the logics of archivization: seeking to preserve its documents, the archive cannot do so without also provoking further differentiation. (shrink)

In his 1802 article for the Critical Journal, “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy,” Hegel attempts to articulate a form of skepticism that is “at one with every true philosophy.” Focusing on the priority that Hegel gives to ancient skepticism over its modern counterpart, Michael Forster and other commentators suggest that it is Pyrrhonism that Hegel views as one with philosophy. Since Hegel calls attention to the persistence of dogmatism even in the work of Sextus Empiricus, however, I argue that it (...) is only a sublated form of Pyrrhonism, what in the Phenomenology of Spirit he calls “self-completing skepticism,” that Hegel takes to be part of genuine philosophical cognition. In this way, I hope to show that the insight that motivates Hegel’s engagement with skepticism in the 1802 essay comes to inform the philosophical itinerary of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

The essay deals with problems encountered by Western researchers working in the field of Chinese philosophy. It begins with a discussion of intercultural and transcultural methodologies and illuminates some of the most common issues inherent in traditional intercultural comparisons in the field of philosophy. Taking into account the current state of the so-called postcomparative discourses in the field of transcultural philosophy and starting from the notion of culturally divergent frames of reference, it focuses upon semantic aspects of the Chinese philosophical (...) tradition and exposes the need for discursive translations. On this basis, a new postcomparative approach in transcultural philosophical studies of Chinese philosophy is suggested. In this context, the author proposes the application of an innovative principle, based upon what can preliminary be denoted as the method of sublation. (shrink)

In this paper, I will try to propose a general characterisation of the spirit in Hegel's Encyclopaedia. This characterisation is based on the opposition between nature and spirit. More precisely, in my view the Hegelian spirit can be defined as the activity of bringing the natural exteriority back to a living totality.

In this article I place Jurgen Habermas' recent turn to a "post-secular society" in the context of his previous defence of a "postmetaphysical" view of modernity. My argument is that the concept of "postsecular" introduces significant normative tensions for the formal and pragmatic view of reason defended by Habermas in previous work. In particular, the turn to a "post-secular society" threatens the evolutionary narrative that Habermas espoused in The Theory of Communicative Action, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity or Postmetaphysical Thinking, (...) according to which modern "communicative" reason dialecticlly supersedes religion. If this narrative is undermined, I argue, the claim to universality of "communicative" reason is also undermined. Thus, the benefits Habermas seeks to obtain from translation of religion are offset by a destabilization of tenets central to a "postmetaphysical" view of modernity. (shrink)

Perhaps one of the most difficult passages in Hegel's Science of Logic is his treatment of contradiction. If each moment of Hegel's logic is understood to constitute a sort of proof and since contradiction itself is presented as a moment of the logic, then in what sense can one comprehend a proof of contradiction as such? It is difficult to formulate this in any way that does not sound fundamentally incoherent, since it is not just at odds with our ordinary (...) way of thinking but also with the overwhelming majority of the Western philosophical tradition. The basic problem, essentially, is this: if Hegel's logic includes contradiction as one of its moments, then how is Hegel's entire philosophical project not simply incoherent? In the first part of this article, I will attempt to demonstrate one way in which Hegel's treatment of contradiction could in fact be considered coherent, through a close reading of the relevant passages. In this reading, I will particularly focus on the function of Hegel's dialectical concept of sublation (aufheben), and attempt to show (by example) how analysing Hegel's nuanced use of sublation can help us to work through some of his logic's complexities. The overall purpose here will be to present a systematic (as opposed to historical) exposition of Hegel's concept of contradiction and to illustrate the important role that this concept (as the contradiction of contradiction) plays in Hegel's logical method. (shrink)

As we know, the whole system of Hegel 's thought is based totally on the self-development process of the Geist. In other words, according to dialectical scheme of neoplatonism which Proclus systematized as a triad, μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή, Hegel says that the Geist remains in himself, comes out from himself, and then returns to himself. With this process of self-development of the Geist, Hegel tries to explain the realities in general such as nature, history, art, religion, and philosophy. This process of the (...) development of the Geist makes a circle mode with the triadic way of an sich - für sich - an und für sich, but itself as the final destination of the Geist after finishing the whole process, is not a mere itself at the beginning, but the completed itself filled with the self-consciousness and freedom in full bloom. The last moment when the Geist returns to itself, Hegel says it is ‘Ruhe in Gott’. This is the final moment which the Geist as reality of the world and the history arrives and also the conclusion of his philosophy. Then, what happens to this final stage of the return of the Geist to itself, and what does it mean? Most of all, Hegel saw that, as the goal of world history is the achievement of self-consciousness of the Geist on its freedom and the realization of the freedom, this goal was achieved in the self-return of the Geist. And he has seen that the finite and the infinite, which showed constant opposition in the history of Western thought, are united here. According to Hegel, the infinite and finite in the bad concept that came out of the intellect(Verstand) are confronted with each other, and existence and non-existence are substantially separated. However, in the true concept of the infinite derived from reason(Vernunft), is formed the unified moment, in which the confrontations of both parties has been resolved and everything had been included in itself. The transcendence that he advocates is not a transmundane transcendence that is separated absolutely from the finite sensory world in existence and then unreachable absolutely, but a ‘right transcendence’ in which the finite and the infinite are really inseparable and remain as moments of the process of the Geist. In his view, the former which Platonism represents in Western philosophy, is an 'empty transcendence,' but the transcendence that he speaks is a 'full transcendence' that encompasses all moments of the finite in itself. The return of the absolute idea to itself means not only the sublation (Aufhebung) of the finite but also the the sublation of the reality, of the other, of the outwardness, of the abandonment of history, and secures the opposites to those such as ideality, self-identity, inwardness, and trans-historicity. Hegel's Geist as returning to itself has self-consciousness recognizing that it negates and rules the world and the history at the same time. In other words, it is honored and then the glorifying of God has been achieved in the consciousness of itself as the Absolute that it has been the only subject and the sole ruler of world history. According to Hegel, this glorifying of God is the most valuable object of the Geist and history. The Geist that has completed the process of self-development in the return to the itself enjoys the serenity, which is not a 'vacant serenity' but a ‘full serenity’ integrating the finite and the infinite into its inner simplicity. Hegel regarded the transition from the other to being self-internal as a transition from necessity to freedom, and in this serenity the Geist enjoys the freedom that it has in its own nature, as possible as it can. That is to say, in this serenity, the Geist becomes absolutely free and became itself, negating and sublating all other-being(Anderssein). In his view, the "Serenity in God," where the Geist becomes itself and its absolute freedom is obtained, is the ultimate goal of the Geist, and the omega point of the history. (shrink)

Issues relating to the migration of entire populations and to religious and political integralism have thrown the paradigm of ‘inclusion’ into crisis by challenging the already fragile equilibrium. This necessitates a push for deeper answers, not merely those imposed by a passing need. Balbo’s current reflections allow us to re-think the dilemma of our relationship with the ‘other’ through the paradigm of the ‘dialectic integration’, which by referring to the ‘sublation’ or experiential ‘going through’ seems to promote integral human (...) development in a more efficient way. Thanks to this, ‘differences are unified without destroying each other’, and thus, are mutually enriched in being: each one can improve creatively, not against, but with, for, through, and thanks to the ‘other’. (shrink)

Uniquely among contemporary philosophies, Roy Bhaskar’s system of critical realism attempts to sublate (draw out the real strengths of and surpass) the philosophical discourse of modernity considered as a dialectically developing totality. This paper systematically expounds and comments on Bhaskar’s metacritique of that discourse and situates it briefly in relation to Jürgen Habermas’s earlier critique.

Since the crisis of Fordism, capitalism has been characterised by the ever more central role of knowledge and the rise of the cognitive dimensions of labour. This is not to say that the centrality of knowledge to capitalism is new per se. Rather, the question we must ask is to what extent we can speak of a new role for knowledge and, more importantly, its relationship with transformations in the capital/labour relation. From this perspective, the paper highlights the continuing validity (...) of Marx's analysis of the knowledge/power relation in the development of the division of labour. More precisely, we are concerned with the theoretical and heuristic value of the concepts of formal subsumption, real subsumption and general intellect for any interpretation of the present change of the capital/labour relation in cognitive capitalism. In this way, we show the originality of the general intellect hypothesis as a sublation of real subsumption. Finally, the article summarises key contradictions and new forms of antagonism in cognitive capitalism. (shrink)

Many recent commentators have noticed how Adorno, in his late works, borrows Kant’s definition of enlightenment to define key areas of his own critical practice. These discussions, however, have failed to notice how these late borrowings present an image of Kant’s enlightenment which is diametrically opposed to his previous discussions. By tracing the development of Adorno’s engagement with Kant’s essay, I discover Adorno deliberately sublating Kant’s definition as to enable its incorporation into his own works. Further, the article will examine (...) some problems which appear to arise for Adorno when borrowing Kant’s definition of enlightenment in his late works, which coalesce around the topics of negativism and the prospects for societal change. (shrink)

RESUMENLa filosofía del último Schelling debiera entenderse más bien como una hermenéutica de la libertad, cuyos soportes metódicos serían la dialéctica y la narración. La primera, al contrario de la hegeliana, se escendiría en un desequilibrio que pasa a tensión por contraposición de los extremos y que es al fin superada por un tercer término que se yergue libremente sobre los dos pasos anteriores: una dialéctica, pues, discontinua por superación, no por asunción. A su vez, y en una recuperación suo (...) modo de la filosofía kantiana de la historia, la narración corresponde a una dinámica de la historia, igualmente discontinua (sin posibilidad de ser predeterminada en su curso) y escandida por eventos, en un proceso de retroducción del sentido y de producción de narratividad: ya no «ciencia» (en el alto sentido del hegelianismo) sino un trabajoso quehacer libre de los hombres libres. Si se quiere: la búsqueda de una todavía impensable compenetración de filosofía y religión.PALABRAS CLAVESCRISTIANISMO EXOTÉRICO Y ESOTÉRICO, RELIGIÓN FILOSÓFICA, REVELACIÓN (OFFENBARUNG: ACCIÓN DE DEJAR EN FRANQUÍA LO IMPREPENSABLE), HERMENÉUTICA DE LA LIBERTAD, DIALÉCTICA DE LAHISTORIA, ÉXTASIS DE LA RAZÓN, QUERER (WOLLEN)ABSTRACTThe later philosophy of Schelling should be rather understood as a hermeneutics of freedom, with dialectics and narration as its methodological basis. Unlike Hegelian, Schellingian dialectics splits into an imbalance, that leads to a tension in which the extremes are opposed. This tension is ultimately overcome by a third term, that raises in its freedom over the other two: a case of discontinuous dialectics, in the sense of overcoming, not of sublating. On the other hand, in a recovery /suo modo/ of Kantian philosophy of history, narration would be a dynamics of history, also discontinuous (non-predeterminable in its course) internally scanned by events, in a process of retroduction of meaning and of production of normativity: not a «science» (in the high Hegelian sense) anymore, but a laborious free task performed by free men. In other words: a search of a still unthinkable compenetration of philosophy and religion.KEYWORDSEXOTERIC CHRISTIANITY AND ESOTERIC, PHILOSOPHICAL RELIGION,REVELATION (OFFENBARUNG), FREEDOM HERMENEUTICS, DIALECTICSOF HISTORY, ECSTASY OF REASON, WANT ( WOLLEN ). (shrink)

In my essay, I analyze Schelling’s and Rosenzweig’s commitment to the narrative philosophy as a unique method of telling a philosophical story. I want to understand what such “philosophical story” means and how it differs from the conceptual approach, here represented by Hegel. I also want to see how it connects with Schelling’s another project continued by Rosenzweig, of doing “positive philosophy”: in what way does positivity imply narrativity? Is this a necessary implication? And, last but not least, I want (...) to explore the theological dimension of the narrative project. I perceive Schelling’s, and then Rosenzweig’s goal as an attempt to oppose Hegel’s double manoeuvre of sublation – of temporal contingency and religion – by returning to the narrative which recovers the actuality of both elements and sees the necessary connection between them. The living experience of history is strictly linked to the religious stories telling the life of the “living God,” who is emphatically not the “God of the system.” Theosophy and its narrative way of creating a suspense and then inscribing it into a metaphysical drama which plays itself out on the arena of history reveals the deep connection between living historical temporality and religious imagery. (shrink)

Synthetic biology has emerged as one of the newest and promising areas of bio-technology. Issues typically associated to SB, notably in the media, like the idea of artificial life creation and “real” engineering of life also appear in many popular films. Drawing upon the analysis of 48 films, the article discusses how scientists applying technologies that can be related to SB are represented in these movies. It hereby discusses that traditional clichés of scientists in general tend to be sublated by (...) new stereotypical characterizations. These reflect real trends in bio-technological research such as SB, especially the increased relationship between science and industry. Frankenstein 2.0. looks less like the old, genius yet mad scientist, and follows a more entrepreneurial than academic spirit. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that the important philosophy of the future will increasingly be found neither in the “continental” nor in the “analytic” traditions but, instead, in the transcending sublation of (all) traditions I call “synthetic philosophy.” I mean “synthetic” both in a sense that encourages the bold combinatorial mélange of existing styles, traditions, and issues, and also in the Hegelian sense of sublating dichotomous oppositions, appropriating the distinctive insights of both sides while eliminating their errors and exaggerations, (...) and thereby creating new syntheses in which the old oppositions are transcended. (shrink)

[INTRODUCTION] Like the terms 'dialectic', 'Aufhebung' (or 'sublation'), and 'Geist', the term 'concrete universal' has a distinctively Hegelian ring to it. But unlike these others, it is particularly associated with the British strand in Hegel's reception history, as having been brought to prominence by some of the central British Idealists. It is therefore perhaps inevitable that, as their star has waned, so too has any use of the term, while an appreciation of the problematic that lay behind it has (...) seemingly vanished: if the British Idealists get any sort of mention in a contemporary metaphysics book (which is rarely), it will be Bradley's view of relations or truth that is discussed, not their theory of universals, so that the term has a rather antique air, buried in the dusty volumes of Mind from the turn of the nineteenth century. This is not surprising: the episode known as British Idealism can appear to be a period that is lost to us, in its language, points of historical reference (Lotze, Sigwart, Jevons), and central preoccupations (the Absolute). Even while interest in Hegel continues to grow, interest in his Logic has grown more slowly than in the rest of his work, with Book III of the Logic remaining as the daunting peak of that challenging text - while it is here that the British Idealists focussed their attention and claimed to have uncovered that 'exotic' but 'vanished specimen', the concrete universal. Finally, as the trend of reading Hegel pushes ever further in a non-metaphysical direction, it might be thought that the future of the concrete universal is hardly likely to be brighter than its recent past - for it may seem hard to imagine how a conception championed by the British Idealists, who were apparently shameless in their metaphysical commitments, can find favour in these more austere and responsible times. In this paper, however, I want to make a case for holding that there is something enlightening to be found in how some of the British Idealists approached the 'concrete universal', both interpretatively and philosophically. At the interpretative level, I will argue that while not everything these Idealists are taken to mean by the term is properly to be found in Hegel, their work nonetheless relates to a crucial and genuine strand in Hegel's position, so that their discussion of this issue is an important moment in the reception history of his thought. At a philosophical level, I think that the question that concerned Hegel and these British Idealists retains much of its interest, as does their shared approach to it: namely, how far does our thought involve a mere abstraction from reality, and what are the metaphysical and epistemological implications if it turns out it does not? As such, I will suggest, taking seriously what these British Idealists have to say about the concrete universal can help us both in our understanding of Hegel, and in our appreciation of the contribution Hegel's position can make to our thinking on the issues that surround this topic. (shrink)

Hegel and Speculative Realism has two main objectives. Firstly, to assess the speculative realist formulations of the real regarding the ‘withdrawn’ object, radical contingency, the absolute register of extinction, and the current interest in ‘powers philosophy’, with special attention to their possible relation to the absolute scope of Hegelian philosophy. Secondly, to invite the reader to reconsider Hegel in a new way; uncovering rare insights into his thoughts on astronomy, actuality, the concrete and non-being. Johns’ inclination is to not mistake (...) the necessary path to the absolute as the only path. Johns argues that Hegel describes the unique trajectory of the dialectical relationship between Nature and Idea as a Spirit oriented by both logical and physical (spatio-temporal) dimensions. Johns reads this as a theory of singularity and makes the bold claim that there may be other paths not taken by the Hegelian spatio-temporal path synonymous with the dialectic; synthesis, sublation and unfolding. In-fact, speculative philosophy should not be satisfied to study only “what exists” but also what “could exist” or what it means to “inexist” and should entertain multiple modes of potential becoming between Hegel’s initial triad of logical categories; Being, Non-Being and Becoming. (shrink)

The article identifies a problem in socio-cultural-historical activity theory (SCHAT) with ignoring how hope and power constitute the theory itself, and suggests that this is why the tradition faces a bad choice between functionalist or utopianist reductions of its own social relevance. Currently, remedies for this kind of (perhaps shammed) innocence can be found in Foucauldian and Latourian approaches to knowledge. However, since these appear to presuppose the (often feigned) cynicism of a purely negative standpoint that fits all too smoothly (...) into the neoliberal management it describes, this presents us with an impossible choice or oscillation at another level. To get beyond it, we need the frankly self-reflected standpoint of ideology critique and the articulation of ‘concrete utopia’, i.e. real possibilities for social transformation. The approach is then realized and exemplified as part of an emergent practice research in the field of drug treatment. The field is broadly described as moving toward certain kinds of recognition of users’ standards, but also as filled with paradoxes that allow us to intervene with theory. One of these (sets of) paradoxes concerns the relations between state and civil (bourgeois) society that are played out in drug treatment. Contrary to the doxa of New Public Management, the (welfare) state’s normative power has not dissolved, only hides from itself. An immanent critique of practices and ideas in the field leads to the suggestion that its forms of recognition imply both submission of users, and the creation of positive standards and collectives. To intervene in this set of issues, we must expand the SCHAT reading of its own Hegelian-Marxist legacy, against the dominant liberal and scientistic trend, to engage with theories of recognition. A contemporary, participatory concept of recognition is sketched, which seeks to sublate (include and supersede) submission into the building of the generalizing ethics of a collective. (shrink)

Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing” and Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida are tragi-comic consternations. They are theatres of ethical panentheism: they present dramatic “absolute” ethical interpretations and actions, each of which is at once ungrounded and completely seeded. I start with the etymology of “consternation.” Then I discuss the comic vs. tragic interpretations of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, arguing it is a consternating tragi-comedy. I analyze the predicate “absolute” in terms of consternations, in a few passages of the book. I elaborate especially upon (...) phenomenological reasoning’s Sache selbst. In the Phenomenology, reason develops by thinking the absolute thing through culture, politics, morality, and religion, reaching completion in “Absolute Knowing.” That absolute is reason’s comprehensive insight into its phenomenological absolutes, and its own absolute sublating. Northrop Frye’s cited claim about myth can be understood in this phenomenological way. With all this in hand, Hegel’s science of experience is formally complete. But the experience of Absolute Knowing is still consternation. To capture the consternating essence of sublation – a consternation by which experience becomes something it was not before – I season this formal science with Shakespeare’s “comedy” Troilus and Cressida, revealing its structural roots to be consternations. (shrink)

I anledning af 50-året for udgivelsen af et af de mest betydningsfulde værker i det 20. århundredes filosofi, Emmanuel Lévinas' Totalitet og uendelighed, behandler artiklen et grundtema i værket, nemlig forholdet mellem etik og undervisning. Det sker under inddragelse af den pædagogiske model, som Lévinas anser for at stå i et modsætningsforhold til sin egen etiske forståelse af undervisning, den sokratiske maieutik. Den udførlige behandling af de to «positioner» skal imidlertid vise, at de har mere til fælles, end det kommer (...) frem i den første modstilling, hvilket giver mulighed for at formulere en mellemposition, der fastholder det etiske ved begge, og som er mere praktisk anvendelig i undervisning end nogen af dem taget hver for sig.Nøgleord: etik, undervisning, Lévinas, åbenbaring, Sokrates, maieutik, dialogEnglish summary: The Ethical Dimension of Teaching – Based on a Main Theme in the Work of Emmanuel LévinasOn the occasion of the 50th anniversary of one of the most important works in 20th century philosophy, Emmanuel Lévinas' Totality and Infinity, the article presents a main theme of this work, the relationship between ethics and teaching. The discussion draws on another pedagogical understanding, which Lévinas considers to be opposed to his own ethical understanding of teaching, Socratic maieutics. A thoroughgoing interpretation of the two «positions» shows, however, that they have more in common than what the opposition seems to elucidate at first. The sublation of the two will make it possible to sketch out a third ethical point of view, more applicable to teaching in practice than either of the two taken on its own. (shrink)

The meaning and validity of Kant’s Kant’s doctrine of schematism remains contested until today. In neo-Kantianism and post-War transcendental philosophy, Kant’s schematism of the pure concepts of understanding is transformed drastically. Kant’s thesis of heterogeneity is overcome by taking it back into the internal relationships of the structure of cognition. The spontaneity of thought, performing schematizations, is retained, but Kant’s project of conceiving of the foundations of knowledge in the fashion of a theory of apperception of the I as well (...) as the externality of the given and the determination of the given that goes along with it is sublated by an objective order of validity-noematic constitution and regulation. Kant’s doctrine of schematism, then, shows to be methodology. (shrink)

Wolfhart Pannenberg's eschatological ontology has been criticised for undermining the goodness and reality of finite creaturely differentiation. Drawing on David Bentley Hart's recent ontological proposal, this article explores the critique of Pannenberg's ontology, and offers a defence of Pannenberg's depiction of the relationship between difference and totality, especially as it is presented in his 1988 work, Metaphysics and the Idea of God. In this work, Pannenberg articulates a structured relationship between difference and totality in which individual finite particularities are preserved (...) and affirmed within a coherent semantic whole. Creaturely differences are not sublated or eliminated in the eschatological totality, but they are integrated into a harmonious totality of meaning. This view of the semantic function of totality can be further clarified by drawing an analogy between Pannenberg's ontological vision and Robert W. Jenson's model of the eschatological consummation as a narrative conclusion to the drama of finite reality. (shrink)

Different conceptions of social philosophy were divided and polarized in different variants: from biological reductionism (the attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of biology) to sociocentrism. The approach V. A. Vazulin’s conception of “The Logic of History” makes it possible to concretize the dialectic of the natural (including the biological) and the social. The creative development of the method of scientific investigation made it possible to reveal the inner systematic interconnection of laws and categories of social theory which reflect (...) the structure of developed society; it also made it possible to outline thetheoretical periodization of human history (the objective laws of its “ascent” from the very beginning, emergence, formation, to maturity) through a prism of interconnections of natural and social factors. The conception of “The Logic of History” opens a stage in the successive dialectical development of social philosophy by sublating historical materialism and the formation approach. The structure of society as a whole is a multi‐level, hierarchical and subordinated system, the organic whole of interconnected elements, relations and processes. The historical process is regarded as a gradual transformation of the natural (including the biological) by the social, i.e., as a social “sublation” of the latter by the former. The stages in the process of development are analyzed here: as theunity of the natural (including the biological) and the social; as a process of emergence of the social from the natural; as the transformation of thenatural by the social. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis, in its purist mainstream sense, tends to be considered as an isolationist discipline that steers clear of interdisciplinary connections with other psychotherapies. Its drive for purity does not open up to influences that cast as alien and a threat to its core principles. We refer to Hegelian dialectics in an attempt to offer an alternative approach to interdisciplinarity in clinical psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis entertains a complex dialectical relationship with the major theories it opposes. In this dynamic, psychoanalysis begins by negating (...) the non-psychoanalytic theory as a part of self-negation (Hegel calls this phase self-alienation). But in its own process of growth, it negates this negation and reabsorbs the alienated self part. Reabsorbing the negated component, psychoanalysis does not revert to its original identity but becomes sublated into a different, more complex idea. In this epistemological process, psychoanalysis deals with its own practical and theoretical anomalies and lacunas. The paper illustrates this process using three central developments in the history of psychoanalysis: empathy in self psychology (connection with Rogers' humanist psychology), short-term dynamic psychotherapy (connection with short, intensive therapies), and mentalization-based psychotherapy (connection with cognitive-behavioral therapies). In all of these cases, psychoanalysis integrates components it previously opposed and changes these components to their own, specific characteristics. We address the epistemological shifts in the scientific status of psychoanalysis and show their connection to dialectics. Finally, we conclude that dialectical development is what allows psychoanalysis to remain relevant and up to date, to be open to interdisciplinary influences without its identity and tradition coming under threat. (shrink)

This paper offers an alternative perspective to the traditional interpretation of Hegel's philosophical reflection on history, departing from a reinterpretation of Hegel's reading of the tragic action of Antigone in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The customary interpretation of this text affirms that Hegel shows how the conflict of tragic action finds its truth and its end in the identity of spirit. Tragic conflict is left behind to the same extent that spirit sublates the Greek ethical substance. This (...) way, spirit can guarantee that our historical time is released from the past of the substance, or the spiritual movement of mediation from the immediacy of an ‘in-itself’. My reading, by contrast, finds under the tragic conflict of this text of Hegel's nothing but the ‘no’ of death that negates itself, or a principle that has the form of an original and irreducible conflict. Under this interpretation of Hegelian spirit, it becomes clear that it can neither fail to posit some form of ‘in-itself’ nor sublate its own tragic nature. This way it is shown that Hegel's reflection on the past does not reassure the superiority of the identity of the present, but rather illuminates its ‘broken’ nature. I thus offer an alternative view on Hegel's comprehension of the relation between present and past and between philosophy and time. (shrink)