One of the most controversial areas of animal research is the use of nonhuman primates for fundamental research. At the centre of the controversy is the question of whether the benefits of research outweigh the harms. We argue that the evaluation of harms and benefits is highly problematic. We describe some common procedures in neurological research using nonhuman primates and the difficulties in evaluating the harm involved. Even if the harm could be quantified, it is unlikely that it could be (...) meaningfully aggregated over different procedures, let alone different animals. A similar problem arises for evaluating benefits. It is not clear how benefits could be quantified, and even if they could be, values for different aspects of expected benefits cannot be simply added up. Sorting harms and benefits in three or four categories cannot avoid the charge of arbitrariness and runs the risk of imposing its structure on the moral decision. The metaphor of weighing or balancing harms and benefits is inappropriate for the moral decision about whether to use nonhuman primates for research. Arguing that the harms and benefits in this context are incommensurable, we suggest describing the moral consideration of harms and benefits as a coherent trade-off. Such a decision does not require commensurability. It must be well-informed about the suffering involved and the potential benefits, it must be consistent with the legal, regulatory and institutional framework within which it is made, and it must cohere with other judgments in relevant areas. (shrink)

A central tenet of cognitive linguistics is that adults’ knowledge of language consists of a structured inventory of constructions, including various two-argument constructions such as the active, the passive and “fronting” constructions. But how do speakers choose which construction to use for a particular utterance, given constraints such as discourse/information structure and the semantic fit between verb and construction? The goal of the present study was to build a computational model of this phenomenon for two-argument constructions in Mandarin. First, we (...) conducted a grammaticality judgment study with 60 native speakers which demonstrated that, across 57 verbs, semantic affectedness – as determined by further 16 native speakers – predicted each verb’s relative acceptability in the bei-passive and ba-active constructions, but not the Notional Passive and SVO Active constructions. Second, in order to simulate acquisition of these competing constraints, we built a computational model that learns to map from corpus-derived input to an output representation corresponding to these four constructions. The model was able to predict judgments of the relative acceptability of the test verbs in the ba-active and bei-passive constructions obtained in Study 1, with model-human correlations in the region of r = 0.5 and r = 0.3, respectively. Surprisingly, these correlations increased when lexical verb identity was removed; perhaps because this information leads to over-fitting of the training set. These findings suggest the intriguing possibility that acquiring constructions involves forgetting as a mechanism for abstracting across certain fine-grained lexical details and idiosyncrasies. (shrink)

Deke Caiñas Gould (2021) argues that the possibility of future non-human-like minds who are not harmed by coming into existence poses a challenge to David Benatar's well-known Asymmetry Argument for anti-natalism. Since the good of these future minds has the potential to outweigh the current harms of human existence, they can be appealed to in order to justify procreation. I argue that Gould's argument rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Benatar's argument. According to the Asymmetry Argument, if a person experiences (...) any harm at all, then bringing them into existence is unjustified. It does not depend upon on-balance judgments about the relative harms and benefits of existence. It therefore remains impermissible to procreate right now in our world, regardless of the prospect of future humans contributing to the successful development of beings who are not harmed by existence. I conclude by addressing two alternate readings of Gould, which, for the sake of argument, permit such on-balance judgments, and show why they fail to rescue his case. Benatar's Asymmetry Argument might be unsound, but not for any reason identified by Gould. (shrink)

Although the field of bioethics usually emphasizes ethical dilemmas arising from contemporary biomedical research, at another level the foundation of ethical judgments can be explored in the light of evolutionary biology. Two scientific approaches illuminate the relationships between human nature, social environments, and standards of ethical judgment: first, ethology and the observational study of nonhuman primates; second, evolutionary theory and new developments in the understanding of natural selection. Ethology shows that humans, like the species most closely related to us, (...) are naturally both cooperative and competitive. Evolutionary theory can "explain" cooperation at diverse levels of social organization , suggesting which forms of social cooperation are to be expected in specific cases. By focusing on the emotions underlying the sense of justice, moreover, an evolutionary approach can provide a more realistic assessment of the motivations and intentions underlying ethical controversies. Because individuals inevitably have competing claims as well as competing moral obligations, evolutionary bioethics thus teaches the need for balance and judgment. Emotions elicited by the all-too-human tendency to engage in moralistic aggression need to be balanced by reasoned judgment of the consequences of our own actions. The ethicist, no more or less than any other human, needs to be aware of the risks of deceptions and self-deception. Or, to put it more simply, an evolutionary bioethics leads back to the humility of the Socratic injunction: know thyself. Im allgemein üblichen Sinne befaßt sich Bioethik meist mit ethischen Problemstellungen, die durch die Fortschritte der biologischen Forschung hervorgerufen werden. Unter einem anderen Blickwinkel kann sie aber auch die Grundlage ethischer Urteile im Licht der Entwicklungsbiologie untersuchen. Zwei Wissenschaftszweige befassen sich mit dem Verhältnis zwischen der menschlichen Natur, dem sozialen Umfeld und den Standards für ethische Urteile; erstens, die Ethologie und Verhaltensstudien an nichtmenschlichen Primaten; zweitens, die Evolutionstheorie und neue Entwicklungen beim Verständnis der natürlichen Selektion. Die Ethologie zeigt, daß Menschen genauso wie die Tiere, die ihnen am nächsten verwandt sind, von Natur aus sowohl zur Kooperation als auch zur Konkurrenz miteinander neigen. Die Evolutionstheorie kann die verschiedenen Weisen von Kooperation auf den verschiedenen Ebenen sozialer Organisation "erklären" und dabei Hypothesen aufstellen, welche Formen sozialer Zusammenarbeit in spezifischen Fällen erwartet werden können. Soweit sie sich mit den Emotionen befaßt, die dem Sinn für Gerechtigkeit zugrunde liegen, kann die Evolutionstheorie darüber hinaus eine realistischere Einschätzung der Beweggründe und Intentionen vermitteln, die hinter ethischen Kontroversen stehen. Weil Individuen unvermeidlich konkurrierende Ansprüche, aber auch konkurrierende moralische Verpflichtungen haben, zeigt die evolutionäre Bioethik das Bedürfnis nach Ausgleich und Schlichtung. Die Emotionen, die durch die allzu menschliche Neigung zu Aggression im Namen der Moral hervorgerufen werden, rufen nach Ausgleich durch begründete Urteile über die Folgen unserer eigenen Handlungen. Der Ethiker muß sich, nicht mehr und nicht weniger als jeder andere Mensch, des Risikos von Täuschung und Selbsttäuschung bewußt sein. Oder, um es einfacher auszudrücken, evolutionäre Ethik führt zurück zu der Bescheidenheit der Sokratischen Forderung: Erkenne dich selbst. (shrink)

This study analyzes the theory of revenge through the perspectives of propriety (禮) and law (法), as well as private morality (私義) and public law (公法). It examines how the conflicts among these elements were interwoven in revenge cases and judgments during the reign of King Jeongjo 正祖. Additionally, it explores how King Jeongjo’s compassionate approach to criminal justice was demonstrated in these cases. The theory of revenge reveals the clashes between propriety and law, as well as between private (...) morality and public law. By instituting revenge laws that sanctioned acts of vengeance, the legal system aligned itself with the “duty of revenge” prescribed by propriety. The Joseon legal system actively incorporated the concept of revenge into its framework. The state not only facilitated public acts of revenge through legal judgments, integrating punitive power into the sphere of justice, but also pardoned private acts of revenge under the provisions of revenge laws. Notably, King Jeongjo applied these laws to issue pardons for acts of revenge and, in cases where applying such laws proved challenging, he relied on universal principles (天理) and human sentiments (人情) to justify forgiveness. This approach sought to realize the Confucian governance principle of propriety by actively honoring private moral obligations. It exemplified a ruler’s implementation of the moral standard of equity and balance (絜矩) in governance. (shrink)

Mainstream social psychology focuses on how people characteristically violate norms of action through social misbehaviors such as conformity with false majority judgments, destructive obedience, and failures to help those in need. Likewise, they are seen to violate norms of reasoning through cognitive errors such as misuse of social information, self-enhancement, and an over-readiness to attribute dispositional characteristics. The causes of this negative research emphasis include the apparent informativeness of norm violation, the status of good behavior and judgment as unconfirmable (...) null hypotheses, and the allure of counter-intuitive findings. The shortcomings of this orientation include frequently erroneous imputations of error, findings of mutually contradictory errors, incoherent interpretations of error, an inability to explain the sources of behavioral or cognitive achievement, and the inhibition of generalized theory. Possible remedies include increased attention to the complete range of behavior and judgmental accomplishment, analytic reforms emphasizing effect sizes and Bayesian inference, and a theoretical paradigm able to account for both the sources of accomplishment and of error. A more balanced social psychology would yield not only a more positive view of human nature, but also an improved understanding of the bases of good behavior and accurate judgment, coherent explanations of occasional lapses, and theoretically grounded suggestions for improvement. Key Words: Bayesian inference; biases; normative models; personality; positive psychology; rationality; reasoning; social behavior; social judgment; social psychology. (shrink)

The notion that the application of basic rights requires “balancing” is widely and increasingly accepted. Balancing judgments are ever more frequently used in judicial decisions, particularly in constitutional courts and especially in contemporary supra-national human-rights courts. Many jurists deem that balancing is the only possible method to arrive to a rational decision in cases of conflict between basic rights. I assert that this kind of conflict between principles has the same structure of moral conflicts. And, as is the case (...) with moral conflicts, the way conflicts are solved will depend on the underlying concept of practical reasoning. I describe the two basic patterns that practical reasoning may follow in situations of conflict between moral principles in general and argue against the idea that balancing is the most appropriate procedure to cope with the conflict, either in general terms or in juridical argumentation in particular. (shrink)

The role of academic satisfaction on persistence and successful academic behavior has been the focus of research for decades. Nevertheless, driven by positive educational psychology, subjective well-being has been highlighted as another central feature in the academic path of students. Studies aimed at identifying the variables that contribute to explain different aspects of academic performance have been widely investigated, although studies aimed at identifying the determinants of subjective well-being are still limited. The present paper examined the contribution of AS (...) class='Hi'>judgments on subjective well-being. To this end, it was hypothesized that SWB levels depend on the balance between positive/negative emotions and life satisfaction judgments. Furthermore, it was stipulated that AS has an indirect contribution on SWB, through life satisfaction, whereas the balance of emotions influences both AS judgments and life satisfaction. Using an analysis strategy based on structural equation modeling, the results indicated that the model fitted satisfactorily, explaining 32% of the variance of SWB. Particularly, it was observed that AS judgments contributed to life satisfaction judgments. Although no direct contribution of AS on SWB was reported, a total contribution partially mediated by life satisfaction judgments was revealed. These findings support the importance of academic satisfaction judgments, not only because of their importance in academic terms, but also because of their impact on university students’ subjective well-being and health. (shrink)

At the outset of this discussion, I undertook to present an argument from design which would follow Swinburne's example in making use of a priori judgments, while avoiding some of the objections which have been posed in response to his treatment of these issues. So we need to ask: how does this approach to the question of design compare with Swinburne's?Swinburne argues that a chaotic world is a priori more likely than an ordered world: this consideration provides one central (...) reason, on his account, for giving an explanation of some sort for the world's regularity. The other central argument he advances for this claim is the argument from analogy (in terms of the coins) which we noted earlier. The approach I have taken offers an alternative route to this same conclusion. In particular, it substitutes the simpler a priori judgments recorded in (i) and (ii) for the rather difficult and contentious claim that chaos is a priori more likely than order. In place of this claim, I have offered the judgment that order, or recurrence, is more likely given the activity of a common source or common kind of source than otherwise: this proposal does not commit us to a view either way on the question of whether order is a priori likely per se. Moreover, in place of Swinburne's analogical argument, I have offered an a priori approach, with the advantages I have noted.Given that recurrence is to be explained, we might ask: why offer an explanation in terms of design? On this point, Swinburne argues, for instance, that no other explanation of temporal regularity is even possible a priori. Again, the a priori principles which I have used, in (iv) and (v), may be less ambitious, but at the same time more persuasive. In support of this same idea, Swinburne also cites various ideas to do with the predictive power of the idea of design. I have tried to bring out the role of this sort of consideration in terms of my principle (v). Principle (iv) has no place in Swinburne's account, in view of his reliance on the principle of simplicity as a measure of prior probability.Lastly, we may ask: if we are to cite a designer, are there reasons for attributing to this agent more powers than are needed for the production of the effect to be explained? On this point, Swinburne cites the principle of simplicity. Again, my approach avoids what has proved to be a relatively controversial judgment about the nature of a priori probabilities, offering in place of the principle of simplicity the less ambitious principle recorded in (iii). At this point, I have moreover inverted the logical sequence of Swinburne's argument: it seems to me that, in the ways I have indicated, it is helpful to consider the extent of the powers of the source of recurrence before addressing the question of design.In these various ways, I hope I have made good my undertaking to present an argument which avoids some of the controversy surrounding the particular measures of a priori probability which figure in Swinburne's argument. Moreover, I hope that this approach provides an indication of how a priori judgments may function in a relatively unproblematic way within an argument from design, in so far as (i)–(v) are all rather modest proposals. In sum, the argument I have presented is distinguished by its explicit use of the a priori judgments recorded in (i)–(v), by its attempt to buttress in this fashion analogical forms of argument, and by the logical role it gives to the idea that the source of regularity possesses more powers than are required for the production of this effect.Lastly, we might ask: how persuasive is this argument? Of course, the cogency of the idea of design depends upon the balance of debate in other areas of the philosophy of religion, especially upon our ability to provide some account of the existence of evil. In this paper, I have been concerned to argue simply that recurrence by kind provides evidence for design: I have not addressed the question of whether other features of the world provide good evidence against the idea of (benevolent) design. However, if we confine our attention to this one phenomenon, there is it seems to me good evidence for the idea of design, (i) and (ii) suggest that recurrence surely calls for some explanation; (iii), together with the existence in nature of statistical irregularities, suggests that whatever provides this explanation could have brought about other effects besides; and design seems the only clear explanation of why this effect should have been brought about, if (as I have argued) analogies drawn from vegetable and animal reproduction fail, and if we cannot explain the effect satisfactorily by reference to the conditions of observation. Moreover, I have argued that there are reasons for supposing that the probability a priori of design is relatively high in relation to the probability a priori of any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. In brief, this is because the design hypothesis (unlike the hypothesis of theism) can cite an agent of relatively indeterminate power in order to account for the phenomenon to be explained. In this regard, it is less ‘precisely defined’ than any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. If all of this is so, then as philosophers from early times have supposed, temporal regularity provides the basis for a powerful argument in favour of design. It remains true, of course, that its import can be judged in full only when we have taken into account the relevance of other phenomena, many of which are apparently less favourable to the idea of design. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the implications of opposing domains theory for developing ethical leaders. Opposing domains theory highlights a neurological tension between analytic reasoning and socioemotional reasoning. Specifically, when we engage in analytic reasoning, we suppress our ability to engage in socioemotional reasoning and vice versa. In this article, we bring together the domains of neuroscience, psychology, and ethics, to inform our theorizing around ethical leadership. We propose that a key issue for ethical leadership is achieving a healthy (...) class='Hi'>balance between analytic reasoning and socioemotional reasoning. We argue that organizational culture often encourages too heavy a reliance on nonemotional forms of reasoning to arrive at moral judgments. As a result, leaders run the risk of suppressing their ability to pay attention to the human side of moral dilemmas and, in doing so, dehumanize colleagues, particularly subordinates, and clients. (shrink)

Experiences of moral distress encountered in psychiatric practice were explored in a hermeneutic phenomenological study. Moral distress is the state experienced when moral choices and actions are thwarted by constraints. Psychiatrists describe struggling ‘to do the right thing’ for individual patients within a societal system that places unrealistic demands on psychiatric expertise. Certainty on the part of the psychiatrist is an expectation when judgments of dangerousness and/or the need for coercive treatments are made. This assumption, however, ignores the uncertainty (...) and complexity of reality. Society entrusts psychiatrists to care for and treat those among its most vulnerable members: persons deemed to have a severely diminished capacity for autonomy due to a mental disorder. Simultaneously, psychiatrists are held accountable by society for the protection of the public. Moral distress arose for psychiatrists in their efforts to fulfill both roles. They described an ‘outsider/insider’ status and the ways in which they attempted to cope with moral distress. (shrink)

Recent studies have shown that making accurate passage of time judgments (POTJs) for long-time intervals is an important cognitive ability. Different temporal domains, such as circadian typology (biological time) and time perspective (psychological time), could have an effect on subjective POTJs, but few studies have investigated the reciprocal influences among these temporal domains. The present study is the first systematic attempt to fill this gap. A sample of 222 participants (53.20% females; 19–60 years) filled in the Zimbardo Time Perspective (...) Inventory for the measurement of time perspective, the reduced version of the Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (rMEQ) for chronotypes, and an ad-hoc questionnaire assessing sleep habits during weekdays and the weekend (for social jetlag). The POTJ was measured using a modified version of a pictorial timeline presented at five different moments. Also, participants judged how different temporal expressions were related to the past, present, and future along a 7-point Likert scale. After confirming the association between eveningness and present-hedonism orientation and morningness and future-orientation, we found that evening-types produced higher scores for future expressions. The subjective POTJ expressed in minutes was predicted by Deviation from Balanced Time (DBTP), present-fatalism orientation, and social jetlag. Finally, the rMEQ score, past-positive orientation, and DBTP predicted the difference between subjective and objective POT. The results are discussed offering an explanation in terms of the interconnections between circadian typology, individual time perspective, and the sense of the POT, suggesting the multicomponent nature of the concept of time. (shrink)

Laboratory animals, being vulnerable subjects, need the protection provided by adequate ethical review. This review falls primarily to Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees. A review committee's first duty is to identify which procedures ethically are unacceptable irrespective of any knowledge that might be derived. Examples are provided. These projects should be disapproved. Then, "on balance" judgments are assessed that weigh the animal harms against the potential benefits to humans. Several countries (but not the United States) use a (...) classification system for ranking the degree of animal pain and distress. This type of assessment is essential for careful ethical analysis. Another way to enhance ethical discussion is to strive for a more balanced perspective of different viewpoints among members of decision making committees. Inclusion of representatives of animal welfare organizations and a greater proportion on nonanimal researchers would likely achieve this objective. (shrink)

Despite the obvious link between spirituality, religiosity and ethical judgment, a definition for the nature of this relationship remains elusive due to conceptual and methodological limitations. To address these, we propose an integrative Spiritual-based model derived from categories presumed to be universal across religions and cultural contexts, to guide future business ethics research on religiosity. This article aims to empirically test in the context of Islam. It examines how different Muslims' views of God influence their ethical judgments in organizations, (...) and how this process is mediated by their religious practice and knowledge. Comprising focus group and vignette designs, the study was carried out with a random sample of 427 executives and management professionals from Saudi. After data collection, the study hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling. The findings confirmed that a view of God based on hope might be more closely associated with unethical judgments than a view based on fear or one balancing hope and fear. Furthermore, religious practice and knowledge were found to mediate the relationship between Muslims' different views of God and their ethical judgments. These results provide unique theoretical insights into religiosity's influence on ethical judgment, with important implications for management. (shrink)

The attempt to critique the profession of clinical ethics consultation by establishing the impossibility of ethics expertise has been a red herring. Decisions made in clinical ethics cases are almost never based purely on moral judgments. Instead, they are all-things-considered judgments that involve determining how to balance other values as well. A standard of justified decision-making in this context would enable us to identify experts who could achieve these standards more often than others, and thus provide a (...) basis for expertise in clinical ethics consultation. This expertise relies in part on what Richard Zaner calls the “expert knowledge of ethical phenomena”. (shrink)

The Eurotransplant Kidney Allocation System (ETKAS) emerged from the XCOMB model by Wujciak and Opelz (1993a,b), who applied computer simulation studies to create an allocation algorithm. The present study investigated how experts would allocate a donated organ to patients on the waiting list with respect to the five allocation factors proposed in the ETKAS (number of mismatches, mismatch probability, waiting time, distance, international exchange balance). The experts’ evaluations were compared to the ETKAS points as well as to factor weights (...) established in mandatory allocation guidelines which are based on the German law for organ allocation (Transplantationsgesetz). The investigation was carried out using a conjoint analysis. Overall, the results indicate a fairly high degree of agreement between the experts’ opinions and the existing allocation system ETKAS and even more so for the allocation guidelines, in particular, with respect to the factors Mismatches, Mismatch probability, and Waiting time. (shrink)

Several factors related to fetal risk render it more or less acceptable in justifying constraints on the behavior of pregnant women. Risk is an unavoidable part of pregnancy and childbirth, one that women must balance against other vital personal and family interests. Two particular issues relate to the fairness of claims that pregnant women are never entitled to put their fetuses at risk: relative risks and relatives' risks. The former have been used—often spuriously—to advance arguments against activities, such as (...) home birth, that may incur risk; the latter implicate the nature of relationships in determining the acceptability of coercing or precluding activities. Motivated reasoning by clinicians and judges leads to inaccurate risk assessments, and judgments based on false claims to objectivity. Such judgments undermine the moral and legal standing of pregnant women and do not advance the interests of fetuses, pregnant women, families, or states. (shrink)

In the Western classical tradition music criticism represents one of the most complex and influential forms of performance assessment and evaluation. However, in the age of peer opinion sharing and quick communication channels it is not clear what place music critics’ judgments still hold in the classical music market. This article presents expert music critics’ view on their role, function, and influence. It is based on semi-structured interviews with 14 native English- and German-speaking critics who had an average of (...) 32 years professional activity in classical music review. We present the first visual model to summarize music critics’ descriptions of their role and responsibilities, writing processes, and their influences. The model distinguishes six roles : consumer adviser, teacher, judge, writer, stakeholder, and artist advocate. It identifies core principles governing critical writing for music as well as challenges that arise from balancing the above six responsibilities whilst remaining true to an implicit code of conduct. Finally, it highlights the factors that inform critics’ writing in terms of the topics they discuss and the discursive tools they employ. We show that music critics self-identify as highly skilled mediators between artists, producers and consumers, and justify their roles as judge and teacher based on a wealth of experience as against the influx of pervasive amateur reviews. Our research approach also offers occupation-based insights into professional music review standards, including the challenges of maintaining objectivity and resisting commercial pressures. This article offers a new viewpoint on music critics’ judgments and recommendations that helps to explain their expectations and reflections. (shrink)

This open peer commentary examines the regulation of home birth in Australia from a relational autonomy perspective. The authors argue that rather than focusing solely on risk-based judgments or individual decision-making, a relational approach that emphasizes supportive relationships and communication between pregnant women and healthcare providers offers a better framework. Drawing on recent cases in Australia, the commentary suggests that fostering respectful dialogue and principled compromise between women and caregivers can help balance autonomy with safety concerns while keeping (...) women engaged with the healthcare system, even in high-risk situations. (shrink)

Poorly saturated colors are closer to a pure grey than strongly saturated ones and, therefore, appear less “colorful”. Color saturation is effectively manipulated in the visual arts for balancing conflicting sensations and moods and for inducing the perception of relative distance in the pictorial plane. While perceptual science has proven quite clearly that the luminance contrast of any hue acts as a self-sufficient cue to relative depth in visual images, the role of color saturation in such figure-ground organization has remained (...) unclear. We presented configurations of colored inducers on grey ‘test’ backgrounds to human observers. Luminance and saturation of the inducers was uniform on each trial, but varied across trials. We ran two separate experimental tasks. In the relative background brightness task, perceptual judgments indicated whether the apparent brightness of the grey test background contrasted with, assimilated to, or appeared equal (no effect) to that of a comparison background with the same luminance contrast. Contrast polarity and its interaction with color saturation affected response proportions for contrast, assimilation and no effect. In the figure-ground task, perceptual judgments indicated whether the inducers appeared to lie in front of, behind, or in the same depth with the background. Strongly saturated inducers produced significantly larger proportions of foreground effects indicating that these inducers stand out as figure against the background. Weakly saturated inducers produced significantly larger proportions of background effects, indicating that these inducers are perceived as lying behind the backgrounds. We infer that color saturation modulates figure-ground organization, both directly by determining relative inducer depth, and indirectly, and in interaction with contrast polarity, by affecting apparent background brightness. The results point towards a hitherto undocumented functional role of color saturation in the genesis of form, and in particular figure-ground percepts in the absence of chromatostereopsis. (shrink)

Transplantation programs commonly rely on clinicians’ judgments about patients’ social support (care from friends or family) when deciding whether to list them for organ transplantation. We examine whether using social support to make listing decisions for adults seeking transplantation is morally legitimate, drawing on recent data about the evidence-base, implementation, and potential impacts of the criterion on underserved and diverse populations. We demonstrate that the rationale for the social support criterion, based in the principle of utility, is undermined by (...) its reliance on tenuous evidence. Moreover, social support requirements may reinforce transplant inequities, interfere in patients’ personal relationships, and contribute to biased and inconsistent listing procedures. As such, accommodating the needs of patients with limited social support would better balance ethical commitments to equity, utility, and respect for persons in transplantation. We suggest steps for researchers, transplantation programs, and policymakers to improve fair use of social support in transplantation. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that when we trust the results of scientific research, that trust is inevitably directed at least in part at collective bodies rather than at single researchers, and that accordingly, reasonable assessments of epistemic trustworthiness in science must attend to these collective bodies. In order to support this claim, I start by invoking the collaborative nature of most of today’s scientific research. I argue that the trustworthiness of a collaborative research group does not supervene (...) on the trustworthiness of its individual members and point out some specific problems for the assessment of epistemic trustworthiness that arise from the specific nature of today’s collaborative research. Next, I argue that the social diffusion of trustworthiness goes even further; we always also need an assessment of the trustworthiness of the respective research community as a whole. Communities, I claim, play an essential role in the epistemic quality management of science. To see why this role is indispensible, we have to appreciate the full complexity of determining what is desirable in a method of inquiry. The relevant features of a method include three different dimensions: the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the method’s power. Every methodological choice involves a trade-off between these three dimensions. The right balance between them (the “distribution of inductive risks”, or DIR) depends on value judgments about the costs of false results and the benefits of correct ones. Conventional methodological standards of research communities impose constraints on admissible DIR and thereby harmonize the implicit value judgments. Trusting that the research community has set the limitations on DIR in a suitable way is thus always part of placing our trust in a scientific result. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts; Studien und TexteTimothy B. Noone, Ph.D., M.S.L.Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer, editors. Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts; Studien und Texte. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001. Pp. x + 1033. Cloth, DM (...) 498.00In this masterful volume of essays, we have one of the most thorough examinations of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 since the appearance of the groundbreaking study by Roland Hissette (Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277) in 1977. Presenting the work of some 38 contributors, the volume allows the reader to have access to a wide variety [End Page 339] of interpretations of the condemnation as well as studies devoted to its context and impact upon later thought. Indeed, the studies range from assessing the character of the period around the condemnation by comparing it with the thought of the early Scholastic author William of Auvergne to detailing rememberances of the condemnation among sixteenth century authors.Though no radically new approaches to the condemnation emerge from the volume, many of the new research findings presented modify and amplify the standard interpretations. For example, Prof. Marrone's article indicates that the period just prior to the condemnation may well be one that, on balance, was surprisingly receptive to Aristotelian learning, even in the case of an "Augustinian" author such as St. Bonaventure; consequently, Marrone argues, there may well be some truth in the now mainly discarded Duhemian thesis that the Church restored a more non-Aristotelian manner of thinking through the condemnation (297-98). Prof. Courtenay's study, moreover, suggests that the Parisian theological faculty may well have reached its institutional zenith, at least in terms of the independence of its judgments and the reverence shown its opinions, in the period just prior to the condemnation, inasmuch as in the succeeding period the faculty became increasingly an instrument in the hands of royal authority.Of the many fine studies included in the volume, the following especially deserve mention. Prof. Emery's detailed analysis of the image of God in the recesses of the mind (abditum mentis) in the teaching of Henry of Ghent gives an overarching and convincing account for Henry's eventual rejection of intelligible species and the continuity of his illuminationist theory from his earlier to his later writings. Prof. Pini shows in his study of Giles of Rome how Giles avoided explicit discussion of the eternity of the world following his 'exile' from Paris, but managed to advance his own metaphysical ideas on the nature of creatures as a result, a possibly happy, though doubtless unintended, consquence of the condemnation. Prof. Aertsen analyzes the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent regarding their views on whether God's essence may be an object of knowledge and their respective doctrines of the distinction between essence and existence. Prof. Dumont's study of the textual history of Scotus's doctrine of the will and his demonstration that the Subtle Doctor's later writings veer back towards a more voluntaristic position is a landmark contribution to Scotistic scholarship as well as a solid indication of how the autonomy of the will, a matter of tremendous concern in the condemnatory documents, remained a sensitive topic into the early fourteenth century at Paris.Significant additions to our knowledge of medieval authors and their works are also found in the volume. Profs. Goris and Pickavé present a partial edition of the anonymous Commentary on the Sentences found in Bruge, Stadtbibliothek, MS 491, showing how its discussion of angelic knowledge continued the earlier discussion of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, while itself serving as a principal source for William Peter Godinus's influential Lectura Thomasina. Prof. Brown's edition and study of the part of Prosper of Reggio's prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences also points to the importance of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, but this time apropos of one of their... (shrink)

"THE central problem in moral philosophy is commonly known as the is-ought problem." So runs the opening sentence of the introduction to a recent volume of readings on this issue. [1] Taken as a statement about the preoccupations of moral philosophers of the present century, we can accept this assertion. The problem of how statements of fact are related to moral judgments has dominated recent moral philosophy. Associated with this problem is another, which has also been given considerable attention (...) - the question of how morality is to be defined. The two issues are linked, since some definitions of morality allow us to move from statements of fact to moral judgments, while others do not. In this article I shall take the two issues together, and try to show that they do not merit the amount of attention they have been given. I shall argue that the differences between the contending parties are terminological, and that there are various possible terminologies, none of which has, on balance, any great advantage over any other terminology. So instead of continuing to regard these issues as central, moral philosophers could, I believe, "agree to disagree" about the "is-ought" problem, and about the definition of morality, provided only that everyone was careful to stipulate how he was using the term "moral" and was aware of the implications and limitations of the definition he was using. Moral philosophers could then move on to consider more important issues. (shrink)

To study Judicial determinants of the ordered obstetrical and fertility interventions. Nature, corresponding laws, decisions upon the 37 expounded holdings at the Probate, Trial, District, Appellate, and Supreme Courts are studied in 92 published materials identified through the ACOG, RCOG, SOCG portals, and Legal Scholarship Repository. Hearings are held in the US (83.8 %), Canada (10.8 %) and U.K (5.4 %). Of all the hearings reviewed, 27 % concern mentally impaired, 37.8 %-maternal incompetence, and 21.6 % cases are of criminal (...) nature. The Judicial determinants vary from country to country. In Canada, the ordered medical interventions are effected by the child protection legislation, whereas in the US, by court orders. In majority of cases, orders are obtained by dismissing the patriae petitions for involuntary sterilizations of mentally impaired sui juris adults (57 %); coerced obstetrical interventions (33.3 %), fetal custody (50 %); enforcement of surrogacy contracts (62.5 %) in favor of the Common Humanity Benefit clause; and recognizing the rights to inherit in posthumously conceived children (80 %) pursuant to the Social Security Act, Law of obviousness, Law of inherent anticipation, and Intestacy statute. Current study prioritizes two questions: (1) whether it is justified to override the wishes of a competent patient purportedly in her best interests; and (2) whether the patient’s autonomy and competence is an absolute concept. With the law unsettled as to a woman’s right to assent a treatment and contradict her fetus, parties concerned with fetal rights should consider exercising of screening tools on maternal judgmental fitness jointly developed by medical and legal practitioners. Further, given the advances in gamete conservations, states consider enacting legislation in order to safeguard the orderly administration of estates disrupted by claims from posthumously conceived children. A balance must be struck between the child’s right to inherit, the state’s interest, as well as the interests of prior born children. (shrink)

Supernaturalism about meaning in life appears plausible insofar it is reasonable to think that a meaningful life can come only from a world in which there is a perfect value of some kind. Call the view that meaningfulness depends on perfection the ‘perfection thesis’. My aim in this chapter is to develop the contrasting ‘imperfection thesis’, the claim that a life that is significant on balance does not require any perfect value. I argue that principles that naturalists have offered (...) (or suggested) in the literature are all implausible. None fits the considered judgments that naturalists themselves would, upon reflection, have about which degree of value is sufficient for a person’s existence to be significant. Working within a naturalist mindset, I demonstrate that a new theory needs to be developed, and I indeed develop one that I believe should be weighed up against the perfection thesis in future work. (shrink)

Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices (...) in aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius. (shrink)

In the course of legal reasoning—whether for purposes of deciding an issue, justifying a decision, predicting how an issue will be decided, or arguing for how it should be decided—one often is required to reach conclusions based on a balance of reasons that is not straightforwardly reducible to the application of rules. Recent AI and Law work has modeled reason-balancing, both within and across cases, with set-theoretic and rule- or value-ordering approaches. This article explores a way to model balancing (...) in quantitative terms that may yield new questions, insights, and tools. (shrink)

When we discuss the value of a work of art we are confronted immediately with two difficulties: the terms we use, and the peculiar character of art. No one, to my knowledge, has ever doubted that an artist produces a form of some kind, and that in any discussion of art as art that form must somehow be considered; but the terms we use generally have no reference to form. We miss the form in various ways We use terms that (...) are nonartistic—that is, terms that refer to something external to the work, as when we speak of the subject of a painting, of what was depicted rather than the depiction of it, though we know full well that what we respond to is not what was depicted but the depiction of it. "This is a play about Oedipus— what does that tell us of the diverse forms produced by Sophocles, Seneca, Dryden, Voltaire, Gide, Cocteau? Or again, we use terms which are analogical, for example, the "rhythm" of a painting; the difficulty with these is that they are ambiguous and also that, while they may relate to the work, they can designate it only insofar as there is similarity between it and the analogue. Again, we use terms which seem to designate a single form when in fact they refer to forms of the utmost heterogeneity, as when we speak of "the novel"; this usually arises out of the indiscriminate application of the term over some considerable span of history, so that the "historical slippage" of meaning is gradual and goes unnoticed. As the term broadens in meaning to include more and more heterogeneous forms, the essence of each is lost, and the term comes to apply only to accidental analogies between the forms. In the end very little can then be said, involving only the most abstract and general accidents of likeness. Henry James' The Art of Fiction, Percy Lubbock's The Craft of Fiction, and E.M. Forster's Aspects of the Novel illustrate this condition perfectly. The complaint that it is impossible to discuss tragedy because the term has been diversely employed and its proffered justification stem from this condition. The complaint and the justifications are both trivial, and the solution of the difficulty is simple. All that is necessary is to distinguish the different senses of the term by distinguishing the different things to which it is applied. Language is ambiguous, and we use it ambiguously; this in no way implies that the ambiguities cannot be cleared up. Finally, we may use terms which indeed have reference to the form of the work but place the part for the whole; that is, terms which are elements in its definition but do not constitute the complete definition. Thus we designate something, not through the form proper but through the device or method used, as in "drama," "sculpture," "etching," "collage," or through the means or medium, as in "charcoal sketch," "watercolor," "oil painting." The point is not that the object is not, say, a drama or a watercolor; of course it is. The point is rather that these terms do not as such refer to the form and refer to it completely. If in fact they stipulated form, all charcoal sketches would be alike in form, and all oil paintings, and all dramas. One consequence of speaking in such a fashion is that we are likely to confuse the method with the form and talk of, say, "the nature of drama" as though all drama were of the same "nature," whereas the dramatic method is used in a wide variety of forms; or to confuse the medium or means with the form and to assure that the work can have no properties beyond those of its medium, as though artists did not exist and all art were simply nature.Elder Olson, poet and critic, has received numerous awards for his verse . Among his many works are Tragedy and the Theory of Drama, and The Theory of Comedy. His contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Poetic Process"" , Part 1 of a "Conspectus of Poetry", and Part 2 of a "Conspectus of Poetry". (shrink)

Recent rapid technological and medical advance has more than ever before brought to the fore a spectrum of problems broadly categorized under the umbrella of ‘ethics of human enhancement’. Some of the most con...

The relationship between religiosity and ethical behavior at work has remained elusive. In fact, inconsistent results in observed magnitudes and direction led Hood et al. (The psychology of religion: An empirical approach, 1996 ) to describe the relationship between religiosity and ethics as “something of a roller coaster ride.” Weaver and Agle (Acad Manage Rev 27(1):77–97, 2002 ) utilizing social structural versions of symbolic interactionism theory reasoned that we should not expect religion to affect ethical outcomes for all religious individuals; (...) rather, such a relationship likely depends on specific religious attitudes including religious motivation orientation (intrinsic RMO vs. extrinsic RMO), perceived sacred qualities of work (job sanctification), and views of God (VOG, loving vs. punishing). We examined the effects of these three religious attitudes on participants’ judgments of 29 ethically questionable vignettes. Consistent with symbolic interactionism theory, intrinsic RMO and having a loving view of God were both negatively related to endorsing ethically questionable vignettes, whereas extrinsic RMO was positively related to endorsing the vignettes. Unexpectedly, job sanctification was positively related to endorsing the vignettes. However, both intrinsic and extrinsic RMO moderated this relationship such that sanctifying one’s job was related to ethical judgments only for those who were: (a) low in intrinsic RMO or (b) high in extrinsic RMO. We reasoned based on symbolic interactionism theory that intrinsically motivated participants, in contrast to extrinsically motivated participants, may have utilized their religious beliefs as a guiding framework in making ethical judgments. (shrink)

The volume contains almost thirty papers by Kazimierz Twardowski , the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The papers are published in English for the first time. The papers concern fundamental problems of philosophy: the methods of philosophizing, the boundary of psychology and semiotics, the conceptual apparatus of metaphysics, ethical skepticism, the question of free will and ethical obligation, the aesthetics of music and so on. The systematic considerations are complemented by concise but excellent sketches of the philosophical views of Socrates, (...) Aquinas, Leibniz, Spencer, Nietzsche, and Bergson. (shrink)

The volume contains almost thirty papers by Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The papers are published in English for the first time. The papers concern fundamental problems of philosophy: the methods of philosophizing, the boundary of psychology and semiotics, the conceptual apparatus of metaphysics, ethical skepticism, the question of free will and ethical obligation, the aesthetics of music and so on. The systematic considerations are complemented by concise but excellent sketches of the philosophical views of Socrates, Aquinas, (...) Leibniz, Spencer, Nietzsche, and Bergson. (shrink)

We experimentally investigate whether donation motive attribution influences individual investors' judgments of the donating firm's future earnings prospects and whether individual moral orientation, that is, perceived importance of social goodwill (PISG), moderates this effect. We find that investors forecast higher future earnings per share (EPS) when the donation motive is believed to be altruistic or win–win rather than egoistic; the EPS forecasts for altruistic and win–win motives are not different. However, this motive attribution effect holds only for higher-PISG investors. (...) A further examination finds that when the donation motive is believed to be egoistic and/or when investors have lower PISG, doing good is no better than doing nothing, but no backfire effect occurs. Our findings indicate that the positive effect of corporate donation on investors' judgments is generated only when higher-PISG investors believe that the donation motive is not purely egoistic; corporate donation will not generate negative effects on investors' judgments even under less favorable conditions. (shrink)

The paper argues that much of Kant’s largely formalistic account of aesthetic appreciation stands on the idea that the judger is able to engage with the object of her judgment purely sensibly and hence non-conceptually or non-cognitively. This is to say that the judger must be able to ground her judgment on the immediate sensory affection by the object or on the object’s sensible form. The paper also argues that these two purely sensible grounds, accessible in the aesthetic examination of (...) objects, underlie the feeling involved in such judgments. In broader terms, the paper outlines how Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment suggests what might be called a contemplative model of perception. (shrink)

Gender, age, and culturally specific beliefs are often considered relevant to observed variation in social interactions. At present, however, the scientific literature is mixed with respect to the significance of these factors in guiding moral judgments. In this study, we explore the role of each of these factors in moral judgment by presenting the results of a web-based study of Eastern (i.e., Russia) and Western (i.e., USA, UK, Canada) subjects, male and female, and young and old. Participants ( n (...) = 659) responded to hypothetical moral scenarios describing situations where sacrificing one life resulted in saving five others. Though men and women from both types of cultures judged (1) harms caused by action as less permissible than harms caused by omission, (2) means-based harms as less permissible than side-effects, and (3) harms caused by contact as less permissible than by non-contact, men in both cultures delivered more utilitarian judgments (save the five, sacrifice one) than women. Moreover, men from Western cultures were more utilitarian than Russian men, with no differences observed for women. In both cultures, older participants delivered less utilitarian judgments than younger participants. These results suggest that certain core principles may mediate moral judgments across different societies, implying some degree of universality, while also allowing a limited range of variation due to sociocultural factors. (shrink)

Research on the Spatial Quantity Association of Response Codes (SQUARC) has documented associations between spatial position and mental representations of quantity. Large quantities are associated with right and top, small quantities are associated with left and bottom. Resulting compatibility effects have largely been documented for response speed and judgment accuracy. Recently, employing luminance as quantity, Löffler et al. (2022) generalised such SQUARC compatibility effects to affective judgments, showing that horizontally SQUARC-compatible stimulus arrangements (i.e. bright on the right, dark on (...) the left side) are liked more than SQUARC-incompatible arrangements. The present Experiment 1 (N = 296) replicated this horizontal compatibility effect, dz =.18, and generalised it to vertical luminance SQUARC compatibility (i.e. bright on the top, dark on the bottom), dz =.22. Experiments 2a-b (total N = 259; Experiment 2b preregistered) employed stimulus arrangements tilted by 45° to manipulate horizontal and vertical (in)compatibility simultaneously within the same stimulus, finding robust horizontal compatibility effects, but mixed evidence regarding vertical compatibility. (shrink)

Deontological and teleological evaluations are widely utilized in the context of consumer decision-making. Despite their use, the differential effect of these distinct types of evaluations, and the conditions under which they hold, remains an unresolved issue. Thus, we conduct a meta-analysis of 316 effect sizes, from 53 research articles, to evaluate the extent to which deontological and teleological evaluations influence ethical judgments and intentions, and under what circumstances the influence occurs. The effect is explored across three categories of moderators: (...) (1) contextual elements of the ethical issue, (2) stakeholders, and (3) methodological characteristics of primary studies. We find that the overall effect of deontological evaluations on ethical judgments and intentions is stronger than for teleological evaluations; however, the magnitude of the effect is contingent on several moderators. Deontological evaluations are weaker in offline consumer contexts and stronger when there are financial implications of the ethical issue. Conversely, the effect of teleological evaluations is relatively stable across ethical consumer contexts. Teleological evaluations are stronger from a utilitarian perspective than from an egoist one. Furthermore, the effect of deontological evaluations is weaker, but the effect for teleological evaluations is stronger, when the decision-maker has a personal relationship (as compared to an organizational relationship) with the victim of the unethical act. Findings validate the effect of both deontological and teleological evaluations on ethical judgments and intentions and highlight their importance in consumers’ ethical decision-making. Implications for developing programs to prevent consumer unethical behavior are discussed. (shrink)

Balanced time perspective is associated with optimal social functioning and facilitates adaptation to pressure and changes in the environment. Previous studies have found that mindfulness is positively associated with and might promote balanced time perspective. However, the mechanism through which mindfulness affects balanced time perspective remains unexplored. The purpose of the present study was to investigate the mediating role of self-compassion and subjective well-being in the relationship between mindfulness and balanced time perspective. A total of 754 Chinese college students, aged (...) 17–27 years, completed the Chinese versions of the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, Self-Compassion Scale, Subjective Well-Being Scale, and Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory. There were significant positive correlations between mindfulness, self-compassion, subjective well-being, and balanced time perspective. Structural equation modeling indicated that in addition to the direct influence of mindfulness on balanced time perspective, self-compassion and subjective well-being played a partial mediating role. On the basis of these findings, we conclude that mindfulness has an important positive influence on balanced time perspective, and highlight the crucial role of the self-compassion in cultivating an individual's balanced time perspective. Limitations of the present study are also discussed. (shrink)

Dimensions of the ethical work climate, as conceptualized by Victor and Cullen (1988), are potentially important influences on individual ethical decision-making in the organizational context. The present study examined the direct and indirect effects of individuals' perceptions of work climate on their ethical judgments and behavioral intentions regarding an ethical dilemma. A national sample of marketers was surveyed in a scenario-based research study. The results indicated that, although perceived climate dimensions did not have a direct effect on behavioral intentions, (...) there were significant moderating effects. Climates perceived as emphasizing social responsibility and rules/codes moderated the individual ethical judgment-behavioral intentions relationship such that individuals were less likely to say that they would engage in a questionable selling practice even when they themselves did not believe the practice to be unethical. Respondents were somewhat more likely to form intentions consistent with their judgment that the questionable practice was morally acceptable when the ethical climate was characterized by an emphasis on team/friendship. (shrink)

Relativism in psychology unravels the truth-claims and oppressive\npractices of the discipline, but simply relativizing psychological knowledge\nhas not been sufficient to comprehend and combat the discipline\nas part of the ‘psy-complex’. For that, a balanced review of the contribution\nand problems of relativism needs to work dialectically, and so\nthis article reviews four problematic rhetorical balancing strategies in\nrelativism before turning to the contribution of critical realism. Critical\nrealism exposes positivist psychology’s pretensions to model itself\non what it imagines the natural sciences to be, and it grounds (...) discursive\naccounts of mentation in social practices. The problem is that those\nsympathetic to mainstream psychology are also appealing to ‘realism’\nto warrant it as a science and to discredit critical research that situates\npsychological phenomena. Our use of critical realism calls for an\naccount of how psychological facts are socially constructed within\npresent social arrangements and for an analysis of the underlying historical\nconditions that gave rise to the ‘psy-complex’. Only by understanding\nhow the discipline of psychology reproduces notions of\nindividuality and human nature, a critical realist endeavour, will it be\npossible to transform it, and to socially construct it as something different. (shrink)

This chapter explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, the paper argues for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about someone is to be oriented toward them, (...) or to see them through a particular mental lens, in a way that produces a particular pattern of salience and silence. That is: caring about someone (at least ideally) has the effect of making some features of that person particularly salient, and silencing or screening off other features from one’s consciousness. One is aptly described as judgmental when one’s thoughts do not display this sort of pattern, indicating a failure to fully adopt the orientation that constitutes properly caring about the person. (shrink)

It is to misunderstand the nature of moral reasoning to suppose, As does andrew oldenquist in his "universalizability and nondescriptivism" (the journal of philosophy. Xlv, 3, Feb. 8, 1968, Pp. 57-79), That a distinction obtains between moral judgements and moral principles to the effect that a moral judgement requires supportability by reasons as a necessary condition, Whereas a moral principle is exempt from this condition. Four arguments are given against the view that there can be a sort of moral statement, (...) Here called a "moral principle," that is exempt from the requirement of supportability. (shrink)