On balance

Artificial Intelligence and Law 23 (1):23-42 (2015)
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Abstract

In the course of legal reasoning—whether for purposes of deciding an issue, justifying a decision, predicting how an issue will be decided, or arguing for how it should be decided—one often is required to reach conclusions based on a balance of reasons that is not straightforwardly reducible to the application of rules. Recent AI and Law work has modeled reason-balancing, both within and across cases, with set-theoretic and rule- or value-ordering approaches. This article explores a way to model balancing in quantitative terms that may yield new questions, insights, and tools.

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References found in this work

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
A factor-based definition of precedential constraint.John F. Horty & Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2):181-214.
Using argument schemes for hypothetical reasoning in law.Trevor Bench-Capon & Henry Prakken - 2010 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (2):153-174.

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