Sensory cues provided by compression garments can improve movement accuracy and potentially reduce inter-limb balance asymmetries and the associated risk of injury. The aim of this study was to analyze the effects of CG wearing on inter-limb balance asymmetries. The hypothesis was that CG would reduce inter-limb balance asymmetries, especially in subjects with high level of asymmetries. Twenty-five sportsmen were recruited. They had to stand as motionless as possible in a one-leg stance in two postural tasks, while wearing CG or (...) not. Asymmetry indexes were calculated from center of foot pressure parameters. The effects of CG wearing were analyzed according to participants’ baseline level of asymmetry with correlation analyses. A qualitative analysis was also performed after a dichotomization procedure to check for a specific influence of CG on the dominant and non-dominant leg. Inter-limb balance asymmetries were reduced with CG in participants with high levels of asymmetries at baseline. However, asymmetries were increased with CG in participants with low levels of asymmetries at baseline. The dominant leg was more affected by this negative effect. CG wearing could reduce inter-limb balance asymmetries and the related injury risk in subjects with high levels of inter-limb balance asymmetries at baseline. Nevertheless, CG should not be used in individuals with low baseline balance asymmetries since it can increase asymmetries in these subjects, likely by confusing and overloading the sensorimotor processing on the dominant leg. (shrink)

O'Regan & Noë (O&N) argue that there is no need of internal, more or less picture-like, representation of the visual world in the brain. They propose a new approach in which vision is a mode of exploration of the world that is mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies. Data obtained in “change blindness” experiments support this assumption.

This is an important new book about human motivation, about the reasons people have for their actions. What is distinctively new about it is its focus on how people see or understand their situations, options, and prospects. By taking account of people's understandings, Professor Schick is able to expand the current theory of decision and action. The author provides a perspective on the topic by outlining its history. He defends his new theory against criticism, considers its formal structure, and shows (...) at length how it resolves many currently debated problems: the problems of conflict and weakness of will, Allais' problem, Kahneman and Tversky's problems, Newcomb's problem, and others. The book will be of special interest to philosophers, psychologists, and economists. (shrink)

I want in this paper to do two things. First, I want to respond to some studies that argue that people are often not rational: that people regularly and systematically depart from rationality. The conclusion itself does not worry me. I pressed for the same in a recent book. But the arguments seem to me wrong, and wrong in an interesting way. There may be something to be learned from seeing how and why they fail.

This devastating polemical critique of the existentialist philosophy of Martin Heidegger is a monumental study in Adorno's effort to apply qualitative analysis to the content and impact of cultural phenomena.

Plotinus, the father of Neoplatonism, lived in Rome during the third century AD. For many scholars -- not only classicists and philosophers but medievalists, renaissance specialists, Islamists, theologians, and students of religion -- he remains a figure.

« L’attitude posthume » revendiquée par son auteur à partir de 1855 définit un point de vue singulier sur la dernière philosophie d’Auguste Comte. Cet article se propose d’en caractériser les principaux aspects. La thématique de la « tombe anticipée»s’inscrit en effet tout d’abord dans le cadre de la doctrine positiviste de l’Humanité comme continuité subjective ; elle opère ensuite comme règle éditoriale en invitant à reconfigurer la production comtienne à l’aune d’une transmissibilité intégrale ; elle autorise enfin à questionner (...) la nature de la relation philosophique, en la constituant essentiellement comme une relation de confiance. « Parler comme un mort » apparaîtrait alors comme un registre d’énonciation épuré, entièrement soumis aux finalités didactiques de la doctrine positive. (shrink)

Individual identity and the multiplicity of cultural factors that “influence” the individual obviously raise the question of who we are as persons. But it is equally obvious that such individual reality is temporal, thereby constituting individual history. The latter seems to be like a Heraclitean flux where change is the only constant. In other words, since we never cease to change—even imperceptibly—shouldn’t we conclude that we never remain identical to ourselves in such a process of becoming? To use a concept (...) put forward by Ricœur, Idem-Identity, as stable and substantial sameness, appears to be an illusion, as we are the history of our actions and experiences, a history that continues to shape... (shrink)

L’auteur du De Intellectu connaît le De Anima d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise et il offre une interprétation néoplatonicienne de ce texte dans sa considération de la doctrine noétique d’Aristote du De Anima 3.5. Cette interprétation révèle précisément cette autonomie philosophique par opposition à un examen purement philologique des textes aristotéliciens que le présent volume explore. Le De Intellectu, en raison de son caractère néoplatonicien, doit dater de quelque deux à quatre siècles après Alexandre. Il ne contient aucune référence à un Aristote de (...) Mytilène, maître d’Alexandre, contrairement à ce qui a été suggéré. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Kenneth Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution. I argue that one of the premises of Arrow's proof, that of the transitivity of indifference, is untenable. Several concepts of preference are introduced and counter-instances are offered to the transitivity of indifference defined along the standard lines in terms of these concepts. Alternate analyses of indifference in terms of preference are considered, and it is shown that these do not serve Arrow's purposes either. (...) Finally, it is argued that in the single special case in which indifference could plausibly be held to be transitive, Arrow's thesis is innocuous. (shrink)

Comment une phénoménologie de la vie doit-elle penser le monde? La phénoménologie de Michel Henry se constitue dans et par la thèse de l’acosmisme de la vie : la vie doit se penser comme hors monde et, du point de vue phénoménologique, elle représente un mode d’apparaître spécifique qui doit être distingué de l’apparaître ek-statique. Le rapport correspondant semble donc être avant tout un rapport d’exclusion parce que l’apparaître propre à la vie n’est pas dépendant de l’apparaître du monde...

Michel Henry’s critique of barbarism,1 understood as a flight from life, almost immediately raises the question of how life’s tendency to negate itself is then to be overcome. Undoubtedly, such a question refers to ethics. Although Henry not only provides an analysis of civilization and its malaise, but also targets the level of the individual through the concept of despair inspired by Kierkegaard, there is no systematic treatment of ethics to be found in his phenomenology of life.2,3 In light of (...) the diagnosis of barbarism, it is therefore necessary to investigate what ethics would be contained in, or follow from, Henry’s phenomenology. And if the essence of life is to be found in immanent affectivity, the questions thus become: is there an “ethics of affectivity” and, if so, which are its main aspects? The purpose of this article is to give an overview of ethics from the standpoint of Henry’s radical phenomenology and to discuss some of the main problems it implies. The opposition of barbarism and culture is essential in order to understand Henry’s distinction between ethos and normative ethics, but it is only intelligible if one refers to immanent affectivity as the key-concept of his phenomenology. As we will see, it is the lack of recognition of immanent life as fundamental phenomenality that makes barbarism possible, a recognition that is therefore central to phenomenology of life as ethics and to the concept of “second birth.” However, since phenomenology is, as theory, tied to intentionality, how can it become indicative of that which escapes intentionality, and how can it provide a truth-criterion for propositions that refer to affectivity as invisible? As the access to the transcendental becomes both an ethical and a theoretical problem, it is necessary to investigate how a radicalised reduction can be performed with regard to three interrelated aspects that are central to human life and therefore to ethics: community, personhood, and action. The analysis of action in particular shows Henry’s reductive move at work, while also facing the problem of articulating transcendence with immanence. His radicalised concept of personhood reveals the same features as those contained in his approach to action: they both combine affectivity and intentionality, but limit the reality of personhood and action to their affective core. (shrink)

新型コロナ対策でも注目された科学者の倫理とは? AI時代に科学とどう向き合うべきか? 最先端の研究をわかりやすく解説する。.

In this contribution we are building on a long-term work conducted within the framework of an intervention-research with Guillemette, a young professor of history- geography working in a “difficult” college. At the time of our first meeting she suffers from not being able to build professional stability needed to consolidate its activity and organizing working conditions and student learning. We show how it is appropriate dialogic device mobilized during the intervention research to make its business development tool. Causing it to (...) revive classroom situations already experienced and increasing social contact with herself, he helped revive the many debates which its activity is the seat and opened the possibility for her to “do something thing “of his concerns, recycling in” occupations “based on compromise renewed and more effective in their dual objective and subjective dimension. The confrontation of the “case Guillemette” in other cases products at other interventions-research, and its subsequent alterations resulting horizontal reconfigurations within this collection of cases, allow us to consider it as a clinical prototype on based on which we sketch the outline of a model of the organizers of career paths through which develops the teaching activity in the nascent state. (shrink)

This book is a guide to working with social science concepts. Concepts are the prisms through which we see the social world. They are foundational to the social science enterprise, and the quality of investigations hinges in part on how well researchers make use of them. Most social science concepts are drawn from ordinary language used in everyday ways; however, many social scientists "reconfigure" ordinary words to meet their research needs. They tinker with the meanings of words to fit their (...) theoretical aims and make them precise, useful tools of measurement and comparison. This book examines social science concepts through an interpretivist lens with the aim of providing concrete conceptual guidance for future research. Specifically, this book seeks to: 1) identify characteristic dangers that attend the making and use of reconfigured concepts; 2) lay out ways in which a select number of interpretivist approaches have been used to mitigate these dangers; 3) introduce practical tools that rework these interpretivist approaches into explicit and useable research methods; 4) show concretely how these elucidation tools can be gainfully used by social scientists working both within and outside of the interpretivist tradition. It will be an essential guide for social science research. (shrink)

Aristotle considered the plot the most important element in tragedy. By μῦθυς--from which our word "myth" comes--he meant an imitation of action--of action in the "real world," that is. Here, as elsewhere in Greek literary criticism, "imitation" does not mean simply "exact reproduction." To what extent it may mean something like "symbolic," or otherwise "oblique," representation, is hard to determine. It will be enough, for our purposes, to think of "imitation" as exact reproduction with allowance made simply for the transference--always (...) radically transforming--into another medium: from life into art. What, then, did Aristotle mean by "action"? The noun πρᾶξις takes us back to the verb πράττω. Action meant a "doing" to Aristotle, rather as poetry meant to him a "making." Such a "doing," then, is a time-crossing event, in fact an event whose nature is closely involved with its temporal status. Such an event has a personal agent, or vehicle, and transacts with other persons, or more generally, with the "other." In fact, the notion of a transaction is especially fitting to describe action, for that notion emphasizes the dialogue-like structure of action, which always involves its agent with "the world," whether of people or of things. Plot, for Aristotle, was the turning of such action into art. (shrink)

España, inicios del siglo XX. José Ortega, armado de razón, busca un ideal que guíe su vida, oriente su acción pública e ilumine lo que le rodea. En su demanda se enfrentará con Don Quijote, Unamuno o Baroja; descifrará el neokantismo, la fenomenología, el psicoanálisis; investigará la leyenda milenarista, la prehistoria del criticismo, la anatomía del alma; descubrirá la mujer, la política, el compromiso; predicará el socialismo, la construcción de Europa, la recreación de España y recorrerá Castilla, Marburgo o Asturias (...) para asentarse en El Escorial, donde ya estaba. Los edificios conceptuales se asientan sobre vidas concretas; bajo toda construcción universal transpira una biografía particular. El joven José Ortega propone un recorrido atento por el pensamiento de juventud de Ortega y Gasset, reconstruyendo sus peripecias intelectuales hasta encontrar la razón vital de la razón vital. (shrink)

Les énoncés spécificationnels à nom sous-spécifié du français peuvent se réaliser sous une forme non prototypique qui réalise deux fois le verbe être : le problème est c’est que… Les données indiquent que ces constructions sont peu fréquentes ; elles semblent toutefois suffisamment bien attestées - notamment avec certains lexèmes tels que preuve, fait, problème - pour qu’on puisse y voir une structure grammaticale et non la simple manifestation d’« accidents » de performance. Au plan grammatical, nous avons proposé de (...) les analyser comme des structures qui superposent deux emplois distincts du verbe être : d’abord, un emploi copulatif dans lequel la forme verbale a la particularité de pouvoir varier en temps ; en second lieu, la forme c’est, à laquelle nous accordons la valeur d’un auxiliaire de dispositif, comme on en trouverait dans les énoncés clivés ou pseudo-clivés. (shrink)