It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.

Proceeding from the assumption that moral discourse is best conceived of as a practice in the technical sense specified by John Rawls, this article discusses whether it is possible, adequate or even necessary to take up a legislative perspective on the constitutive rules of the said practice. There seem to be two principal legislative manoeuvres with respect to practices, namely rendering the practice under consideration compatible with a practice that is more important and evaluating the constitutive rules of the practice (...) with respect to its point, purpose or telos. I explore two projects in normative ethics that offer an affirmative answer regarding the possibility of moral legislation and that make use of the respective manoeuvres, namely neo-Hobbesian contractarianism and rule -consequentialism. I then inquire into the merits of a position that draws upon broadly Wittgensteinian considerations and denies the existence of such a thing as a legislative perspective on morality. (shrink)

This 1994 book constitutes a sustained, comprehensive, and rigorous critique of contemporary Hobbesian contractarianism as expounded in the work of Jean Hampton, Gregory Kavka, and David Gauthier. Professor Kraus argues that the attempts by these three philosophers to use Hobbes to answer current political and moral questions fail. The reasons why they fail are related to fundamental problems intrinsic to Hobbesian contractarianism: first, the problem of collective action arising out of the tension in Hobbes's theory between (...) individual and collective rationality; second, the classical problem of explaining the normative force of hypothetical action, a problem that can be traced to the conflicting strategies of hypothetical justification found in Rawls's and Hobbes's theories. Given the deep interest in Hobbesian contractarianism among philosophers, political theorists, game theorists in economics and political science, and legal theorists, this book is likely to attract wide attention and infuse life into the contractarian debate. (shrink)

Hobbes's defense of absolutism involves the dual claims that consent is the foundation of legitimate authority and that sovereignty is necessarily absolute. It is a paradoxical combination of claims: If absolute government is the product of choice how can it also be the sole possible constitution? While all of Hobbes's contractarian successors have rejected his preference for absolutism, his dual claims have become commonplace. Since Hobbes, contract thinkers routinely assert that people will choose their preferred constitution and that it is (...) the only possible one. The essay examines the genesis of this paradoxical argumentation: Hobbes's genius lay in merging Grotius's contractarian rationale with Bodin's analytic view that sovereignty must be absolute. The final section discusses related criticisms of Rawls's contract theory. Rawls inherited a genre already flawed by the impluse to combine voluntarist with non-voluntarist reasoning. (shrink)

Contemporary moral contractarianism originates with Hobbes’s moral theory. When considering the structure of Hobbes’s moral theory, however, it is often argued that moral contractarianism does not justify any specific moral demands concerning questions of climate change because currently no global Leviathan in Hobbes’s sense exists that could enforce any such demands in our world. I do not dispute the fact that currently no global Leviathan in Hobbes’s sense exists in our world. Nevertheless, I argue that Hobbesian moral (...) contractarianism offers an adequate moral framework to guide our considerations concerning questions of climate change. Methodologically, the approach is sufficiently pluralistic to consider ethical and economic considerations as well as political feasibility constraints. Conceptually, I argue that, despite the fact that currently no global Leviathan in Hobbes’s sense exists in our world, a Hobbesian-inspired modus vivendi is sufficient as a starting point to address some of the most pressing issues of climate change in our world. Specifically, I argue that the shift in climate change negotiations from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement could be considered to be guided by reasoning that underlies Hobbesian moral contractarianism. (shrink)

Epicurean contractarianism is an attempt to reconcile individualistic hedonism with a robust account of justice. The pursuit of pleasure and the requirements of justice, however, have seemed to be incompatible to many commentators, both ancient and modern. It is not clear how it is possible to reconcile hedonism with the demands of justice. Furthermore, it is not clear why, even if Epicurean contractarianism is possible, it would be necessary for Epicureans to endorse a social contract. I argue here (...) that Epicurean contractarianism is both possible and necessary once we understand Epicurean practical rationality in a new way. We are left with an appealing version of teleological, individualistic contractarianism that is significantly different from Hobbesian contractarianism. (shrink)

Hobbes’s political and ethical theories are rarely viewed as places by which those who protect the weak seek refuge. It would seem odd, then, to suggest that such a theory might be able to protect the weakest among us—non-human animals. In this paper, however, I will defend the possibility of a Hobbesian justification for animal rights. The Hobbesian response to the problem of compliance allows contractarianism to extend (at least some) normative protection to animals. Such protection, as (...) I will argue, has a similar justificational foundation as the protection we offer other humans. (shrink)

Michael Levin challenges the methodological soundness of Robert Nozick’s argument for the minimal state, but supports his final result: The exclusive aims of the state must be the “protection against force, theft, fraud, [and the] enforcement of contracts”. To replace Nozick’s, Levin builds a Hobbesian defense of the minimal state. He claims that the hypothetical rational choice of the less extensive bargain by the individuals in the state of nature morally justifies a minimal, but no other state. I analyze (...) and seek to improve upon this Hobbesian defense of the minimal state. While Levin’s arguments can support the claim that any justified state has to be at least as extensive as the ultraminimal state, they also provide ground, contrary to his intention, upon which to build more extensive states. (shrink)

The examination of Aristotle’s conception of nature in his practical works attempts to face some charges, which seem to undermine the normativity of Aristotle’s ethical and political theory and thus the very attempt to attribute a theory of political obligation to him. These charges, which basically come down to numerous variations on the theme of the naturalistic fallacy, derive essentially from a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s handling of the connection between well-being and human nature—especially his discussion of the human function and (...) the theses that human beings are political by nature, that the polis exists by nature, and that the polis is naturally prior to its members. This chapter argues that Aristotle’s ethical and political naturalism is built upon a normatively safe foundation. Whereas Aristotle’s ethical naturalism is examined against the background of Kantian morality, his political naturalism is discussed vis-à-vis Hobbesian contractarianism. (shrink)

Political theory today has expanded its scope to debate business corporations, conceiving of them as political actors, not (just) private actors in the market place. This article shows the continuing relevance of Thomas Hobbes’s work for this debate. Hobbes is commonly treated as a defender of the so-called concession theory, which traces the legitimacy of corporations to their being chartered by sovereign state authorities for public purposes. This theory is widely judged to be anachronistic for contemporary business corporations, because these (...) can now be freely formed, on the basis of private initiative. However, a close reading of the crucial passages in Hobbes’s work reveals a more subtle view, which rejects this private/public dualism. Hobbes’s reflections on the companies of merchants of his day provide room for business corporations’ pursuit of private purposes, while keeping them embedded in a public framework of authority. Moreover, by criticizing the monopoly status of these companies, he opens up a way to integrate market failure arguments from modern economics into concession theory. The “neo-Hobbesian concession theory” emerging from this analysis shows how concession theory can accommodate private initiative and economic analysis, and thus be a relevant position in the debate about the modern business corporation. (shrink)

Feiffer expresses my deep feeling of unease with Scanlon’s view of morality. Scanlon claims that if I’m for something because it’s right, or against it because it’s wrong, the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are to be understood in terms of what we owe to each other. And I reject the idea that, at the deepest level, a core part of morality is to be understood in terms of what is owed. The fundamental moral idea, I think, is that of not taking (...) advantage—not bettering ourselves by worsening others without their consent. And that would be very misleadingly expressed in the language of moral debt. But having registered my unease with what is revealed in and by Scanlon’s title, I shall attend to more particular matters that fail to convince me. Scanlon has made what is surely the most powerful and plausible case we have for a broadly Kantian contractualism. But I still believe that what is really wanted is an Hobbesian contractarianism. (shrink)

Fifty years ago, two Princeton professors established game theory as an important new branch of applied mathematics. Game theory has become a celebrated discipline in its own right, and it npw plays a prestigues role in many disciplines, including ethics, due in particular to the neo-Hobbesian thinking of David Gauthier and others. Now it is perched at the edge of business ethics. I believe that it is dangerous and demeaning. It makes us look the wrong way at business, reinforcing (...) a destructive obsession with measurable outcomes and a false sense of competition. It falsely characterizes or insidiously advocates a style of human behavior that is utterly unacceptable. To put the matter quite crudely, a person who actually practiced the form of "rationality" advocated by game theory would be something of a monster. (shrink)

Darkness and light form in Hobbes a chiaroscuro around the idea of sovereignty, which the exercise of critical judgment will have to dispel. This chapter shows how the role given by Hobbes to translation in his critique of Scholastic philosophy is likely to support the idea that the Hobbesian Enlightenment is an Enlightenment by the state. The historical narrative through which Hobbes traces the genesis of Scholastic philosophy takes the form of an institutional history of ideas. To the obscurity (...) of Scholastic Neo‐Latin distinctions, Hobbes opposes the supposed clarity of ordinary languages, including classical Latin. The chapter also shows in what way the criticism of the apparently purely metaphysical thesis of the existence of separate essences belongs to a political context, that of the criticism of the domination over the minds of citizens by the Catholic Church. (shrink)

Despite an impressive philosophical pedigree, contractualism (or contractarianism) has only been properly developed in two ways: by appeal to the idea of an instrumentally rational bargain or contract between self-interested individuals (Hobbesian contractualism) and by appeal to the idea of a substantively reasonable agreement among individuals who regard one another as free and equal persons warranting equal moral respect (Kantian contractualism). Both of these existing models of contractualism are susceptible to apparently devastating objections. In this article, I outline (...) a third, `deliberative' model of contractualism, which is based on the idea of a deliberatively rational agreement and which, I argue, represents a significant improvement on the Hobbesian and Kantian models in certain important respects. Key Words: contractualism • contractarianism • deliberation • deliberative rationality • Scanlon • Gauthier. (shrink)

The general aim of any social contract theory is to generate the terms of an agreement which the parties to the contract will accept and respect. In order to identify what terms are likely to be acceptable, the theorist needs to specify the character of the parties and the conditions in which they are making the agreement. A prior step is also needed. The theorist needs to show that the characteristics and conditions chosen are appropriate to the task of generating (...) an agreement. The theorist must have a defensible methodological framework for his or her project. ;In this dissertation I examine the different frameworks adopted by two contemporary political philosophers: John Rawls and David Gauthier. I argue that the neo-Hobbesian project undertaken by Gauthier in Morals by Agreement is flawed. His attempt to derive a general moral theory almost exclusively from a relatively uncontroversial conception of instrumental rationality is marred by his commitment to a description of the political subject as a discrete entity having an identity independent of its social relationships. ;I then argue that John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice and more explicitly in some more recent articles, supplies a more promising framework. He takes the considered judgements of socially situated individuals to be the base from which a theory of justice can be extracted. The connected ideas of "overlapping consensus" and "reflective equilibrium" are central to his project, and allow him to treat social agreements as flexible instruments which can accommodate and even facilitate political change. ;I defend Rawls against the charge that his theory cannot account for political stability, and also against the communitarian claim that his conception of justice undermines the crucial role that community membership plays in human life. I conclude by noting that the Rawlsian conception of justice does face certain limitations because it presupposes a particular definition of the political domain. I then consider how Rawls's framework might address this issue, and attempt to sketch a preliminary possibility. (shrink)

This article argues a case against the theory of the sacred put forward by the French anthropologist René Girard. In particular, Girard seems to have obliterated one of the tenets of Christian theology, namely, the doctrine of Christ's ascension, in accord with his critical reading of Paul's letter to the Hebrews, which contains a rare emphasis on Christ's departure from the world. This article adopts a 'neo-Hobbesian' perspective in understanding the return of the sacred and fosters a 'political theology (...) of the empty tomb', where the doctrine of Christ's ascension is called upon to again play a major theological role as a workable antidote to the contemporary resurgence of the sacred. (shrink)

In Strategic Justice, Peter Vanderschraaf introduces a “Baseline Consistency” criterion for Justice as Mutual Advantage. This criterion requires assessing how well individuals fare under existing conventions with how well they would fare under hypothetical social conditions. However, this comparison requires the impossible. Under different social conditions, individuals would have different preferences and different interests. As such, we cannot make any direct comparison between how well an individual fares across the two social conditions. The standard of assessment would change from one (...) context to the other. In order to apply the Baseline Consistency criterion, Vanderschraaf would need to justify an interpersonally valid standard for individual welfare, but this is incompatible with his Neo-Hobbesian method. If he abandoned the Baseline Consistency criterion, however, Vanderschraaf faces the “too many equilibria” problem. Conventions that are clearly objectionable would be considered just. (shrink)

It is generally remarked by critics and proponents alike that over the years Wilfrid Sellars has given us a broad philosophical system integrating a great many of the enduring concerns of philosophy. However, what the nature of that system is has not at all been clear. As with Peirce, upon whom Sellars often builds, a variety of positions can be ascribed to him by a careful selection of certain remarks from among his widely ranging articles. Cornman, for example, has argued (...) that Sellars’ claim that persons’ propositional attitudes and conceptual representations cannot be reduced to statements in neurophysiology commits him to a rejection of materialism. Yet, Sellars rejects “materialism” only as a crude form of philosophical typing not capable of characterizing the subtle evolution of conceptual structures embodied in our changing theories of the world, and in fact has himself articulated what he calls a “neo-Hobbesian” view on various occasions. Generally, he has been closely associated with materialism in its most recent and respectable form as Scientific Realism. (shrink)

The author examines Hobbes and Hume in the light of recent proposals of neo-Hobbesian political theories. Magri concludes that Hobbes and Hume's strategies would be plausible from the point of view of liberal thinking if they succeeded; the difficulty, however, is that both systems fail to overcome the barrier between individual interests and moral and political principles.

How should contractualists seek to accommodate and respond to the existence of radical pluralism within contemporary liberal states? Ryan Muldoon has recently argued that a) the dominant Kantian liberal model of contractualism is hopelessly ill equipped to do so but that b) there is a particular kind of Hobbesian contractualism that can do much better. I raise some problems concerning the capacity of Muldoonian contractualism to respond appropriately to the problem of radical pluralism. I then propose a very different (...) kind of solution that involves embracing an advice model of contractualism. Keywords: contractualism; contractarianism; pluralism; diversity; disagreement . (shrink)

This chapter identifies three main sources of the Stoic elements in Hobbes's philosophy: the early Christian‐Stoic Tertullian, the modern “Neo‐Stoic” school of Justus Lipsius, and the natural philosophers of the Cavendish Circle he frequented. Perhaps the most direct Stoical impact on Hobbes was the second/third century Church Father Tertullian. Hobbes and Cavendish are at bottom kindred Stoic spirits, though their systems diverge on the precise nature of material activity. The chapter explores the Stoic character of Hobbesian space, time, causality, (...) and God, especially as these notions are employed in his natural philosophy. Hobbes's quasi‐realism about imaginary space is highly reminiscent of the Stoics' conception of pure space as one of the problematic “incorporeals.” The chapter shows that Hobbes's metaphysical views, though quite unorthodox in his day, served to buttress his overall materialist, empiricist, and mechanist program in natural philosophy. (shrink)

Pettit's and Skinner's stimulating books are open to historically-minded objections. Pettit's reading of Hobbes is Rousseauian, but he rejects the Hobbesian/Rousseauian belief that some modern people are driven by amour-propre/“glory”. If Hobbes is right, there is, in Pettit's sense, no “common good”. Skinner's treatment of the neo-Roman “theorists” over-estimates their self-consciousness and their consistency. Leviathan chapter 21 is not a response to neo-Romanism; it treats civil liberty as non-obligation, not as non-interference.

As the premier early modern advocate of an Epicurean alternative to the prevailing neo-Scholastic framework of Aristotelianism, Pierre Gassendi promoted not only ancient but also innovative reasoning on behalf of atomism, probabilism, empiricism, psychological hedonism, social contractarianism, and a range of other stances associated with the philosophy of the Garden. Much commentary has focused on the extent to which Gassendi ‘baptizes’ Epicurean thought. Beyond this aspect of his Epicureanism are questions as to whether, and how, Gassendi is true to (...) core Epicurean thinking, and what he preserves and promotes as valuable to philosophical and natural investigations of his time. Indeed, much subsequent modern philosophy builds on or reacts to an Epicurean legacy bequeathed by Gassendi, comprising his adjustments to, constraints on, or corrections of, the canonical views. Yet, for all his amendments, he retains as a primary philosophical motivation the Epicurean goal of striving for ataraxia. In this, he signals his firm commitment to philosophy in the tradition of the canonical Epicurean views. And, as with Epicurus’ own notion, his account of the centrality of attaining tranquility directs us to a better understanding of our nature and that of the world around us; amenable, in Gassendi’s framework, to Christian thought and contemporary natural philosophical investigations. (shrink)

The primary aim of this work on Hobbes is to present a new construction of his moral and political views. I argue for a reading of the text which dramatically recasts his theory as a deontological contractarianism rather than a consequentialist contractarianism. This reading of the text pays serious attention to Hobbes's usually neglected rejection of prudential calculation and his commitment to the method of Reason which he explains as what we would now call analytical deduction from the (...) meaning of words. ;I argue for the centrality of three theses: that obligation arises from assent, that there is always an obligation to obey the Laws of Nature, and that one is obliged to obey one's sovereign. In explicating Hobbes's theory I present a more complex picture of the authorization of the sovereign than is standardly given in the accounts that characterize the sovereign as the third party beneficiary of a contract between individuals in the State of Nature. Instead, my complex account depicts the sovereign as a duty bound contractor with obligations to the commonwealth. Furthermore, I contend that Hobbes's distinction between the natural and the artificial can be seen to organize and explain important elements in his view. ;Parts 3 and 4 of Leviathan, where Hobbes discusses the obligation of Christian citizens to their civil sovereign and the supposed powers of the Kingdom of Darkness, are then used as a test for verifying the coherence and validity of my novel interpretation. Because my reading of the first two parts of Leviathan conforms with the ideas and method presented in parts 3 and 4, I conclude that the deontic reading, and not the egoist reading, best captures Hobbes's intended meaning. I then go on to defend my interpretation against today's most prominant advocates of the egoist readings, Gauthier, Hampton and Kavka. ;In the final chapter of this work I present three arguments on currently important moral questions: benevolence, infidelity, and abortion. These arguments, which all employ what I have shown to be the Hobbesian approach, show the usefulness of Hobbes's theory in addressing contemporary questions of ethics. (shrink)

Hobbes's central insight about ethics was that it should not be understood to require that we make ourselves a prey for others. It is this insight that both varieties of contractarianism [Hobbesian and Kantian] respect. Consider a relationship between two human beings that exists for reasons of either love or duty; let us also suppose that it is a relationship that can be instrumentally valuable to both parties. In order for that relationship to receive our full moral endorsement, (...) we must ask whether either party uses the duty or the love connecting them in a way that affects the other party's ability to realize the instrumental value from that relationship. To be sure, good marriages and good friendships ought not to be centrally concerned with the question of justice, but they must also be, at the very least, relationships in which love or duty are not manipulated by either party in order to use the other party to her detriment. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this article I defend the view that all feminists should be contractarians. Indeed, I argue that feminists should be Hobbesian or rational-choice contractarians at that. The argument proceeds by critically examining some of the main reasons why feminists have been resistant or even hostile to contractarian moral theory, and showing that the criticisms are misguided against Hobbesian versions of the theory. I conclude with a brief positive argument to the effect that contractarianism provides a plausible (...) explanation of what is wrong with patriarchy and so can serve as the theoretical basis for feminist ethics.RÉSUMÉ: Cet article propose que les féministes de toutes tendances se doivent d'être contractualistes de type hobbesien ou de choix rationnel. L'argument débute par une critique de quelques-unes des raisons principales pour lesquelles les féministes ont résisté ou se sont opposées à une morale contractualiste et établit que leurs critiques n'atteignent pas leur cible lorsqu'elles sont dirigées contre les versions hobbesiennes de cette doctrine. Un argument positif vient brièvement conclure le tout, en montrant que le contractualisme rend compte, fort plausiblement, des défauts du patriarcat, et qu'il est donc à même de fournir une base théorique à une éthique féministe. (shrink)

This article argues the following points. The Hobbesian hypothesis, which we define as the claim that all people are better off under state authority than they would be outside of it, is an empirical claim about all stateless societies. It is an essential premise in most contractarian justifications of government sovereignty. Many small-scale societies are stateless. Anthropological evidence from them provides sufficient reason to doubt the truth of the hypothesis, if not to reject it entirely. Therefore, contractarian theory has (...) not done what it claims to do: it has not justified state sovereignty to each person subject to it by demonstrating that they benefit from that authority. To be justified in contractarian terms, states have to do something to improve the living standards of disadvantaged people under their rule. (shrink)

With our state-guaranteed or internationally recognized human rights, liberalism is rather a common basis of political discussion today. John Rawls’s theory of justice, which set a framework for liberal theory of justice in the last decades of the twentieth century, is notably contractarian. Martha Nussbaum, although claiming to be a neo-Aristotelian, argues that her capabilities approach (hereafter CA) can upgrade the liberal theory of justice, particularly that of political liberalism, to deal with unsolved problems of justice, namely, disability, nationality, and (...) species membership. However, this paper argues that her proposal issuccessful only when her CA-based theory proves its affiliation with political liberalism in more detail. As defined by Rawls, political liberalism produces “free-standing” political conceptions and rejects any metaphysical or religious ideas. It halts conceptions of justice that promote conceptions of good derived from particular comprehensive doctrines. I do not believe a mere convergence between CA and contractarianism is sufficient enough to secure the rational acceptability of her CA-based theory. I suggest that if she wishes to maintain her CA-based theory’s being politically liberal, she either has to prove more of the public, in particular the global public, acceptability of her intuitive ideas of human dignity without relying on her intuitions or alter the meaning of political liberalism itself so that it allows a room for some sort of comprehensive doctrine. (shrink)

Renowned philosopher Mary Midgley explores the nature of our moral constitution to challenge the view that reduces human motivation to self-interest. Midgley argues cogently and convincingly that simple, one-sided accounts of human motives, such as the 'selfish gene' tendency in recent neo-Darwinian thought, may be illuminating but are always unrealistic. Such neatness, she shows, cannot be imposed on human psychology. She returns to Darwin's original writings to show how the reductive individualism which is now presented as Darwinism does not derive (...) from Darwin but from a wider, Hobbesian tradition in Enlightenment thinking. She reveals the selfish gene hypothesis as a cultural accretion that is just not seen in nature. Heroic independence is not a realistic aim for Homo sapiens. We are, as Darwin saw, earthly organisms, framed to interact constantly with one another and with the complex ecosystems of which we are a tiny part. For us, bonds are not just restraints but also lifelines. (shrink)

Introduction -- Coercion, rational self-interest, and obligation -- The authority of law -- Political obligation -- Contractarianism -- The Hobbesian analysis of contracts under coercion : a critique -- Final remarks.

For more than a decade, activists, scholars, journalists, and politicians of various stripes have been discussing and decrying mass incarceration. This collection of voices has mostly focused on contingent features of the phenomenon. Critics mention racial disparities, poor prison conditions, and spiraling costs. Some critics have alleged broader problems: they have called for an end to all incarceration, even all punishment. Lost in this conversation is a focus on what is inherently wrong with mass incarceration specifically. This essay fills that (...) void and supplies an answer, drawing on the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. On the Hobbesian account developed here, mass incarceration is always wrong because it is always inconsistent with having a free society. (shrink)

This book tells the story of modern ethics, namely the story of a discourse that, after the Renaissance, went through a methodological revolution giving birth to Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s new science of natural law, leaving room for two centuries of explorations of the possible developments and implications of this new paradigm, up to the crisis of the Eighties of the eighteenth century, a crisis that carried a kind of mitosis, the act of birth of both basic paradigms of the two (...) following centuries: Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. The new science of natural law carried a fresh start for ethics, resulting from a mixture of the Old and the New. It was, as suggested by Schneewind, an attempt at rescuing the content of Scholastic and Stoic doctrines on a new methodological basis. The former was the claim of existence of objective and universal moral laws; the latter was the self-aware attempt at justifying a minimal kernel of such laws facing skeptical doubt. What Bentham and Kant did was precisely carrying this strategy further on, even if restructuring it each of them around one out of two alternative basic claims. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century critics of the Enlightenment attacked both not on their alleged failure in carrying out their own projects, but precisely on having adopted Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project. What counter-enlightenment has been unable to spell out is which alternative project could be carried out facing the modern condition of pluralism, while on the contrary, if we takes a closer look at developments in twentieth-century ethics or at on-going discussions on practical issues, we might feel inclined to believe that Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project is as up-to-date as ever. -/- Table of Contents -/- Preface I. Fathers of the Reformation and Schoolmen 1.1. Luther: passive justice and the good deeds; 1.2. Calvin: voluntarism and predestination; 1.3. Baroque Scholasticism; 1.4. Casuistry and Institutiones morales -/- II Neo-Platonists, neo-Stoics, neo-Sceptics 2.1. Aristotelian, neo-Platonic, neo-Epicurean and neo-Cynic Humanists; 2.2. Oeconomica and the art of living; 2.3. Neo-Stoics; 2.4. Neo-Sceptics; 2.5. Moralistic literature -/- III Neo-Augustinians 3.l. The Jansenists on natura lapsa, sufficient grace, pure love; 3.2. Nicole on the impossibility of self-knowledge; 3.3. Nicole on self-love and charity; 3.4. Nicole against civic virtue, for Christian civility; 3.5. Malebranche on general laws and necessary evil; 3.6. Malebranche on Neo-Augustinianism and Platonism. -/- IV Grotius, Pufendorf and the new moral science 4.1. Grotius against Aristotle and the sceptics; 4.2. Mersenne and Gassendi; 4.3. Descartes on ethics as the last branch of philosophy’s tree; 4.4. Hobbes on scepticism and the new moral science; 4.5. Spinoza on the new moral science as a descriptive science;4.6. Locke on voluntarism and probabilism; 4.7. Pufendorf on natural law as an exact science; 4.8. Pufendorf on physical and moral entities; 10. Pufendorf on self-preservation -/- V The empiricist version of the new moral science: from Cumberland to Paley 5.1. Cumberland against Hobbesian voluntarism; 5.2. Cumberland and theological consequentialism; 5.3. Cumberland on universal benevolence and self-love; 5.4. Shaftesbury on the moral sense; 5.5. Hutcheson on natural law and moral faculties; 5.6. Gay, Brown, Paley and theological consequentialism. -/- VI The rationalist version of the new moral science: from Cudworth to Price 6.1. The Cambridge Platonists; 6.2. Shaftesbury on the moral sense; 6.3. Butler and a third way between voluntarism and scepticism; 6.4. Price and the rational character of moral truths; -/- VII Leibniz’s compromise between the new moral science and Aristotelianism 1.Leibniz against voluntarism; 2.Leibniz against the division between the physical and the moral good; 3.Leibniz on la place d’autrui and theological consequentialism; 4.Thomasius, Wolff, Crusius -/- VIII French eighteenth-century philosophers without the new moral science 8.1. The genealogy of our ideas of virtue and vice; 8.2. Maupertuis and moral arithmetic 8.3. The philosophes and the harmony of interests; 8.4. Rousseau on corruption, self-love, and virtue; 8.5. Sade on the merits of vice -/- IX Experimental moral science: Hume and Adam Smith 9.1. Mandeville’s paradox; 9.2. Hutcheson on the law of nature and moral faculties; 9.3. Hume on experimental moral philosophy and the intermediate principles; 9.4. Hume’s Law; 9.5. Hume on the fellow-feeling; 9.6. Hume on natural and artificial virtues and disinterested pleasure for utility; 9.7. Adam Smith’s anti-realist metaethics; 9.8. Adam Smith on self-deception and the paradox of happiness; 9.9. Adam Smith on sympathy and the impartial spectator; 9.10. Adam Smith on the twofold criterion for moral judgement and its paradox; 9.11. Reid on the refutation of scepticism and the self-evidence of duty -/- X Kantian ethics 10.1. Kantian metaethics: moral epistemology; 10.2. Kantian metaethics: moral ontology; 10.3. Kantian metaethics: moral psychology; 10.4. Kantian normative ethics; 10.5. Kant on the impracticability of applied ethics; 10.6. Kantian moral anthropology; 10.7. Civilisation and moralisation; 10.8. Theology on a moral basis and the origins of evil; 10.9. Fichte and the transformation of theoretical philosophy into practical philosophy XI Bentham and utilitarianism 11.1. Bentham’s linguistic theory; 11.2. Bentham’s moral ontology, psychology, and theory of action; 11.3. The principle of greatest happiness; 11.4. The critique of religious ethics; 11.5. The new morality; 11.6. Interest and duty; 11.7. Virtues; 11.8. Private ethics and legislation -/- XII Followers of the Enlightenment: liberal Judaism and Liberal Theology 12.1. Mendelssohn; 12.2. Salomon Maimon; 12.3. Haskalā and liberal Judaism; 12.4. Liberal Theology. -/- XIII Counter-Enlighteners 13.1.Romanticism and the fulfilment of individuality as the Summum Bonum; 13.2. Hegel on history as the making of liberty; 13.3. Hegel on the unhappy consciousness and the beautiful soul; 13.4. Hegel on Morality and Sittlichkeit; 13.5. Marx on ideology, alienation, and praxis; 13.6. Schopenhauer on compassion; 13.7. Kierkegaard on faith beyond ethics. -/- XIV Followers of the Enlightenment: intuitionists and utilitarian 14.1 Whewell‘s criticism of utilitarianism; 14.2 Whewell on morality and the philosophy of morality; 14.3 Whewell on the Supreme Norm; 14.4 Whewell on the conflict between duties; 14.5 Mill and the proof of the principle of utility; 14.6 Mill’s eudemonistic utilitarianism; 14.7 Mill on rules -/- XV Followers of the Enlightenment: neo-Kantians and positivists 15.1. French spiritualism; 15.2. Neo-Kantians: the Marburg school; 15.3. Neo-Kantians: the Marburg school; 15.4. Comte’s positivism and the invention of altruism; 15.5. Social Darwinism; 15.6. Wundt and an ethic of humankind -/- XVI Post-enlighteners: Sidgwick 16.1. Criticism of intuitionism; 16.2. On ethical egoism; 16.3. Criticism of utilitarianism -/- XVII Post-enlighteners: Durkheim 17.1. Sociology as physics of customs; 17.2. Morality as physics of customs and as practical science; 17.3. On Kantian ethics and utilitarianism; 17.4. The variability of moralities;17.5. Social solidarity as end and justification of morality; 17.6. Secular morality as “sociodicy”; XVIII Post-enlighteners: Nietzsche 18.1. On the Dionysian; 18.2. On the deconstruction of the world of values 18.3 On the twofold genealogy of moralities; 18.4. On ascetics and nihilism; 18.5. Normative ethics of self-fulfilment -/- Bibliography / Index of names / Index of concepts -/- . (shrink)

Liberalism, or at least twentieth century liberalism, is today out of fashion amongst the electorate of the United States and Britain. Even within the academy—often, contrary to liberalism itself, one of the last institutions to reflect major shifts in ideology—it appears to be losing its grip. The rise of neo-contractarianism in social and political philosophy and neo-conservatism in economics are only two pieces of evidence of its demise. Nevertheless, reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated in some quarters (...) of social philosophy; in particular, it still thrives as the received opinion whenever the issue of paternalism is raised. And, of course, the single most important liberal standard-bearer here is John Stuart Mill. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of the nature and development of "modern" political thought, typical features of which include the "state of nature" and "social contract." Specifically, I argue that modern thought is constructive, which is to say that thinking is seen as, at least to some extent, generative of its objects. I focus primarily on Hobbes and Marx as liminal thinkers in the development of modern political thought. I begin with a discussion of the nature of construction in modern (...) thought generally, and in Hobbes specifically. I then ground the claim that Hobbes's texts are originary for modern political thought in two ways. First, I show how many of the methodological principles explicitly adopted by Hobbes are implicitly assumed by Locke. Then, I differentiate Hobbesian metaphysical and epistemological assumptions from two alternate sets of assumptions which Hobbes viewed himself as opposing: Machiavellian virtu; and Christian, medieval neo-Platonism. I then read Hobbes's texts in their relation to Bacon's usage of construction and Hobbes's own development of the social contract. I then transition, via Hegel, to a study of Marx. After providing an account of Marx's early reaction to Hegel, I attempt to show that many of the objections Marx makes to Hegelianism are also made against modern political thought in general. I thus read sections of Marx's early works to illustrate his engagement with early modern thought, and to show how he characterizes this thought as a "despotism" because of its reliance on a "manufactured originary state." I then provide readings of Marx's dissertation critique of Democritus to develop more carefully what Marx means by an atomic or originary state; and of sections of the Holy Family to explore Marx's understanding of "history," and to show how that understanding differs from Hegel's. I conclude with an extended reading of sections of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, in order to develop more fully his critique of modern political thought, and to sketch his early understanding of what an alternative way of thinking politics might incorporate. (shrink)

Buchanan and Powell develop a concept of moral progress, and build a middle-range theory of how moral progress comes about. They argue on the basis of their view of the evolutionary origins of normative thought that further moral progress towards more inclusive moral and political systems is possible. In doing so they rebut a conservative reading of the evolution of normative thought: a reading that regards the hope for inclusive moral systems as utopian. Buchanan and Powell argue that this ‘evoconservative’ (...) argument overlooks overwhelming evidence of the adaptive plasticity of normative thought. I agree with their rejection of that evoconservative position, but give an alternative account of the evolutionary foundations of normative cognition and its plasticity. But I also argue that there is a gap in their defence of their view of moral progress: it begs the question against exclusive, relational conceptions of the naturalistic foundations of normative obligations and rights. Their account is less fully naturalistic than they seem to suppose, for it lacks a developed account of the natural facts which make normative claims true, and it is not clear that there is an account to be given that would vindicate their inclusive liberal intuitions about the norms we should have. (shrink)

Research has shown that individuals with high levels of psychopathic personality traits are likely to cause harm to others in the workplace. However, there is little academic literature on the potentially adaptive outcomes of corporate psychopathy, particularly because the “boldness” psychopathy domain has largely been under-acknowledged in this literature. This study aimed to elaborate on past findings by examining the associations between psychopathy, as operationalized using scales from the relatively new triarchic model of psychopathy, and both adaptive and maladaptive workplace (...) behaviors. Participants were 343 working community adults who completed a series of self-report questionnaires that measured psychopathy and various workplace behaviors, including counterproductive work behaviors, tactics of influence, unethical decision-making, leadership strategies, team play, and creativity. Structural equation modeling was used to estimate the associations between latent constructs of boldness, meanness, and disinhibition, and the eight different constructs related to workplace behaviors. It was found that boldness preferentially predicted the use of soft tactics of influence, adaptive leadership, and team play, and negatively predicted passive leadership. Meanness predicted unethical decision-making, poor team play, and hard tactics of influence. Disinhibition positively predicted CWB and passive leadership. Meanness also moderated the association between disinhibition and CWB, in that greater scores on both psychopathy domains indicated greater levels of CWB. These findings provide conceptual support for the triarchic model, including the “boldness” domain, which measures adaptive aspects of psychopathy in addition to maladaptive ones, as well as suggest that not all individuals high on psychopathy would be an overt menace to the workplace. The different psychopathy traits may also interact with each other to predict different types or levels of workplace behaviors. (shrink)

The administration or recognition of religious courts is a form of religious accommodation present in many constitutional states today commonly analysed in legal pluralism terms. This article contributes to the further analysis of the relationship between legal pluralism and rights in religiously diverse societies by examining the status of state religious courts and their interaction with state non-religious courts. In particular, I examine what Cover calls “jurisdictional redundancies” between the courts and conceptualize the allocation of power between religious and non-religious (...) courts as a potentially productive site of interlegality. In doing so, I support concurrent jurisdictional allocations, arguing that exclusive jurisdiction could result in what I call an interlegal gap, whereby instead of inter-penetration of norms and production of reconciliatory principles, there is a justice gap whereby litigants may find themselves unable to obtain appropriate legal recourse including when neither court is willing to assume jurisdiction over the matter. This requires us to see the relationship between religious courts and non-religious courts through the more mundane but more practical lens of jurisdictional overlaps and competition, rather than through the more abstract framing of normative or even civilizational clashes. Accordingly, I argue that concurrent jurisdiction and interlegality have greater potential to strike a balance between individual and group rights and could be more protective of religious diversity. In other words, I argue for a closer, rather than a more separate, relationship between religious and non-religious courts, while denying that a hierarchical relationship where religious courts are subordinated to non-religious courts is the only way to protect rights. (shrink)

Facing the possibility of a surge of COVID-19-infected patients requiring ventilatory support in Intensive Care Units, the Singapore Hospice Council and the Chapter of Palliative Medicine Physicians forward its position on the guiding principles that ought to drive the allocation of ICU beds and its role in care of these patients and their families.