Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreement, extending all the way down to the most basic question:what is Hegel talking about?On the one hand, proponents of ‘metaphysical’ interpretations generally read Hegel as aiming to articulate the overall structure or organisation of reality itself, and the nature of a highest or most fundamental being. Particularly influential is the idea that Hegel is reviving and modifying a form of Spinoza's metaphysical monism, according to (...) which the organised whole of everything is the highest being, providing a ground or reason for everything real. On the other hand, proponents of ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations argue Hegel's topic is something else entirely. The idea is that Hegel agrees with Kant in finding pre-critical forms of metaphysics to be uncritical or dogmatic. And the topic of Hegel's positive project is supposed to be not the nature of reality itself, nor any most fundamental being, but rather ‘forms of thought’ akin to Kant's categories and the objectivity, legitimacy, or normative authority of those forms of thought.This is of course only a rough sketch of the most basic recent debate, about which there is more to say than can fit in this paper. My focus here is on what Hegel has to say about nature and natural kinds, in ‘Observing Reason’ from thePhenomenology, and also in similar material from theLogicandEncyclopedia. I intend to argue that this material suggests a surprising way of stepping beyond the fundamental debate sketched above. There can of course be no question of elaborating and defending here a complete interpretation of Hegel's entire theoretical philosophy. I will have to restrict myself to arguing for the unlikely conclusion that there is an approach that can combine and integrate the strongest points made by both sides in the most basic debate shaping recent Hegel interpretation. (shrink)

Within physics there are two ways of establishing the relative fundamentality of one theory compared to another, via two senses of reduction: "inter-level" and "intra-level" (Crowther, 2018). The former is standardly recognised as roughly correlating with the chain of ontological dependence (i.e., the phenomena described by theories of macro-physics are typically supposed to be ontologically dependent on the entities/behaviour described by theories of micro-physics), and thus has been of interest to naturalised metaphysics. The latter, though, has not been considered interesting (...) for metaphysics, because it is not thought to correlate either with ontological dependence, nor causal or dynamical dependence. I argue, however, that this is a mistake, and that actually, the intra-level relation does reflect ontological dependence (in the same sense as the inter-level relation) and thus should not be neglected by metaphysics of physics. This argument further supports the assertion that the same notion of fundamentality underlies both the inter- and intra-level claims of fundamentality in physics, and that this notion of relative fundamentality in physics correlates with that of metaphysics. (shrink)

_Philosophy for A Level_ is an accessible textbook for the new 2017 AQA Philosophy syllabus. Structured closely around the AQA specification this textbook covers the two units Metaphysics of God and Metaphysics of Mind, in an engaging and student-friendly way. With chapters on 'How to do philosophy', exam preparation providing students with the philosophical skills they need to succeed, and an extensive glossary to support understanding, this book is ideal for students studying philosophy. Each chapter includes: argument maps that help (...) to develop student’s analytical and critical skills comprehension questions to test understanding discussion questions to generate evaluative argument explanation and commentary of the AQA set texts ‘thinking harder’ sections for advanced study cross-references to help students make connections bullet-point summaries of each topic. The companion website hosts a wealth of further resources, including PowerPoint slides, flashcards, further reading, weblinks and handouts, all structured to accompany the textbook. It can be found at www.routledge.com/cw/alevelphilosophy. (shrink)

This paper has three objectives: arguing against levels of reality by employing the Lewis-Jackson method for doing metaphysics, also known as the Canberra plan; showing how this method renders the idea of levels of reality incoherent, but nevertheless leaves the conceptual space open for dualism; sketching out a concrete proposal for a dualism of mind and matter that relies on normativity and that employs ontic structural realism.

In this paper, I answer a fundamental question facing any view according to which natural selection is a population‐level causal process—namely, how is the causal process of natural selection related to, yet not preempted by, causal processes that occur at the level of individual organisms? Without an answer to this grounding question, the population‐level causal view appears unstable—collapsing into either an individual‐level causal interpretation or the claim that selection is a purely formal, statistical phenomenon. I argue that a causal account (...) of realization provides an answer to the grounding question. By applying this account of realization to the natural selection of melanism in rock pocket mice, I show how an alternative, formal account of realization, favored by proponents of the statistical interpretation, misses biologically important features. More generally, this paper shows how metaphysical issues about realization normally discussed in the philosophy of mind apply to debates in philosophy of biology. Thus, it is a first step toward fleshing out the oft‐noted similarities between debates in these areas. (shrink)

Metaphysical theories are beautiful. At the end of this book, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties and that these play a crucial role when it comes to theory evaluation and theory choice.Before we get there, the philosophical path the author proposes to follow starts with three discussions of metaphysical equivalence. Benovsky argues that there are cases of metaphysical equivalence, cases of partial metaphysical equivalence, as well as interesting cases of theories (...) that are not equivalent. Thus, claims of metaphysical equivalence can only be raised locally. The slogan is: the best way to do meta-metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics.To do this work, Benovsky focuses on the nature of primitives and on the role they play in each of the theories involved. He emphasizes the utmost importance of primitives in the construction of metaphysical theories and in the subsequent evaluation of them.He then raises the simple but complicated question: how to make a choice between competing metaphysical theories? If two theories are equivalent, then perhaps we do not need to make a choice. But what about all the other cases of non-equivalent "equally good" theories? Benovsky uses some of the theories discussed in the first part of the book as examples and examines some traditional meta-theoretical criteria for theory choice (various kinds of simplicity, compatibility with physics, compatibility with intuitions, explanatory power, internal consistency,...) only to show that they do not allow us to make a choice.But if the standard meta-theoretical criteria cannot help us in deciding between competing non-equivalent metaphysical theories, how then shall we make that choice? This is where Benovsky argues that metaphysical theories possess aesthetic properties – grounded in non-aesthetic properties – and that these play a crucial role in theory choice and evaluation. This view, as well as all the meta-metaphysical considerations discussed throughout the book, then naturally lead the author to a form of anti-realism, and at the end of the journey he offers reasons to think better of the kind of anti-realist view he proposes to embrace. www.jiribenovsky.org. (shrink)

This article is a critical appraisal of the two-level model of Holger Thesleff as an interpretive paradigm for the philosophy of Plato. The primary emphasis is on the metaphysics of the model, which revolves around the idea of a single world composed of two levels. Conceived as an alternative to the dualism of worlds traditionally attributed to Plato, the levels in question complement each other in a symbiotic relationship between intelligible phenomena and sensible matter, which jointly account for (...) the whole of reality without the complications associated with a multiplication of worlds. The principal complication in the latter scenario is the difficulty of meaningful interaction under circumstances of radical separation, especially with a strict segregation requiring two different worlds: one for transcendent Forms, one for instantiating particulars. That difficulty does not even come up in the two-level model, which confines everything to a single world, where the possibility of interaction is not undermined by the reality of separation or the severity of segregation. The two-level model avoids that issue altogether by keeping everything together. A purported problem with this monistic alternative, on the other hand, is the inherent impediment to transcendence within a single world, where there would seem to be no room for the requisite ascension. How indeed can anything transcend the only place that exists? Promoting a solitary world as the intended framework for Plato’s metaphysics ostensibly requires retaining some semblance of transcendence, or else providing an acceptable alternative to it, while compressing everything into the same reality. The ultimate goal of the present article is to show why, given a natural challenge to both approaches, that is, despite an apparent obstacle to either perspective, the two-level model is preferable to the two-world alternative. Progress toward that end unfolds as an effort to illustrate and vindicate the way Thesleff meets the methodological challenge to his brand of monism with a philosophical vision originating with Plato himself. (shrink)

Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains (...) and microscopes are fundamentally different kinds of things - all constituted by, but not identical to, aggregates of particles. Baker supports her account with discussions of non-reductive causation, vagueness, mereology, artefacts, three-dimensionalism, ontological novelty, ontological levels and emergence. The upshot is a unified ontological theory of the entire material world that irreducibly contains people, as well as non-human living things and inanimate objects. (shrink)

Both the special sciences and ordinary experience suggest that there are metaphysically emergent entities and features: macroscopic goings-on (including mountains, trees, humans, and sculptures, and their characteristic properties) which depend on, yet are distinct from and distinctively efficacious with respect to, lower-level physical configurations and features. These appearances give rise to two key questions. First, what is metaphysical emergence, more precisely? Second, is there any metaphysical emergence, in principle and moreover in fact? Metaphysical Emergence provides clear and (...) systematic answers to these questions. Wilson argues that there are two, and only two, forms of metaphysical emergence of the sort seemingly at issue in the target cases: 'Weak' emergence, whereby a dependent feature has a proper subset of the powers of the feature upon it depends, and 'Strong' emergence, whereby a dependent feature has a power not had by the feature upon which it depends. Weak emergence unifies and illuminates seemingly diverse accounts of non-reductive physicalism; Strong emergence does the same as regards seemingly diverse anti-physicalist views positing fundamental novelty at higher levels of compositional complexity. After defending the in-principle viability of each form of emergence, Wilson considers whether complex systems, ordinary objects, consciousness, and free will are actually metaphysically emergent. She argues that Weak emergence is quite common, and that there is Strong emergence in the important case of free will. (shrink)

Philosophers have studied mechanisms in many fields in biology. The focus has often been on molecular mechanisms in disciplines such as neuroscience, genetics and molecular biology, with some work on population-level mechanisms in ecology and evolution. We present a novel philosophical case study of individual-level mechanisms, mechanisms in ecology and evolution that concern the interactions between an individual and its environment. The mechanisms we analyze are called Niche Choice, Niche Conformance and Niche Construction (NC3) mechanisms. Based on a detailed analysis (...) of biologists’ research practices, we develop metaphysical claims about the components and organization of NC3 mechanisms, the phenomena they bring about and how these phenomena relate to individual differences, a major explanatory target in the field. We provide reasons for why processes of niche choice, conformance and construction are mechanisms and how they differ from molecular mechanisms underlying individual differences. Finally, we demonstrate that a general representation of NC3 mechanisms is highly abstract, with more specific types of NC3 mechanisms in particular study systems exhibiting more complex components organized in more complex ways. Our case study highlights some distinctive features of individual-level mechanisms in ecology and evolution, such as complex and heterogeneous organization and multiple phenomena. (shrink)

This article introduces a model of levels of analysis applied to statements found in philosophical, scientific, and religious discourses in order to facilitate a more accurate description of the relation between science and religion. The empirical levels prove to be the most crucial for the relation between science and religion, because they include statements that are important parts of both scientific and religious discourse, whereas statements from metaphysical levels are only important in terms of religion and (...) are neutral in relation to particular scientific theories. In particular, the rejection of certain ontological assumptions behind special divine action logically entails the rejection of the literal meaning of empirical statements describing special open expression of supernatural factors in nature. Such a rejection also entails an essential revision of many religious systems of beliefs, including traditional Christian theism. (shrink)

We discuss the ‘Consciousness Causes Collapse Hypothesis’ (CCCH), the interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which consciousness solves the measurement problem. At first, it seems that the very hypothesis that consciousness causally acts over matter counts as a reductio of CCCH. However, CCCH won’t go so easily. In this paper we attempt to bring new light to the discussion. We distinguish the ontology of the interpretation (the positing of a causally efficacious consciousness as part of the furniture of reality) from (...) metaphysics (the metaphysical character of that consciousness). That distinction allows us to map the philosophical theories of consciousness compatible with quantum mechanics under the tenets of CCCH. Also, it indicates that the problem will have to be discussed at a metaphysical level rather than at the physical level. Our analysis corroborates recent arguments to the effect that this interpretation is not ruled out so easily. (shrink)

Metaphysics is not often spoken of as a venue for dialogue about anything, let alone culture or religion, which are more readily associated with phenomenology or hermeneutics in contemporary thinking. This collection of essays, however, by the late Boston College philosopher Oliva Blanchette, maintains the absolute necessity of metaphysics as a prerequisite for examining any particular 'realm of being,' in all areas of human inquiry, from the particular sciences to historical cultures and religions. Blanchette proposes metaphysics as a fundamental and (...) necessary level of intelligence presupposed in any exercise of judgment, discourse, or dialogue, among rational beings. At the same time, he defends the idea that dialogue is the first and most fundamental form in which such reasoning takes place in human experience, on a radically intersubjective level through language. (shrink)

Philosophers and scientists often describe theories, laws, and explanations as applying to the world at different 'levels'. The idea of a 'level of application' is often used to demarcate disciplinary or sub-disciplinary boundaries in the sciences. For instance, stoichiometric laws and quantum mechanical laws might be said to describe chemical phenomena at different levels. More generally, the idea of levels is used to distinguish more fundamental laws or theories from less fundamental ones: more fundamental theories are those (...) that apply at more fundamental levels. (shrink)

The naturalized metaphysics promoted by Ladyman and Ross, among others, is often described as (neo)-Quinean metaphysics. This association with Quine's naturalism can, however, give a misleading impression of the aims and commitments of this kind of naturalized metaphysics. Contrary to Quine, these naturalized metaphysicians endorse metaphysical realism and offer wholesale arguments in favor of the epistemic standing of science-based metaphysics. Accordingly, this naturalized metaphysics comes closer to Roy Wood Sellars's evolutionary naturalism, especially since the theory of evolution is central (...) to the criticism that naturalized metaphysics levels at nonnaturalized metaphysics. The paper argues that Sellars's naturalism is furthermore helpful (1) for explicating the naturalism of naturalized metaphysics, (2) for theorizing a more general naturalist basis for naturalized metaphysics, and (3) for suggesting where naturalized metaphysics is perhaps not naturalist enough, especially when it comes to considering the implications of the theory of evolution for its positive program. (shrink)

Motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence combines broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that two and only two strategies for addressing this problem accommodate the genuine (...) emergence of special science entities. These strategies in turn suggest two distinct schema for metaphysical emergence---'Weak' and 'Strong' emergence, respectively. Each schema imposes a condition on the powers of entities taken to be emergent: Strong emergence requires that higher-level features have more token powers than their dependence base features, whereas Weak emergence requires that higher-level features have a proper subset of the token powers of their dependence base features. Importantly, the notion of “power” at issue here is metaphysically neutral, primarily reflecting commitment just to the plausible thesis that what causes an entity may bring about are associated with how the entity is---that is, with its features. (shrink)

Purpose. The article deals with the problem of mutual perception of individuals, which implies the analysis of the anthropological prerequisites for the study of interpersonal communication. The work emphasizes the need to identify the gnoseological lacuna of the possibility and relevance of knowing someone else’s "I". As well as the need to point out implicit metaphysical attitudes, universal for many worldviews, which are implicitly included in the theory of personal communication. Theoretical basis. The author proceeds from the logical consequences (...) of the evolutionary premise in anthropology. He compares the psychophysical goals of the interpersonal communication task with its ideological theory, monitors the impossibility of the realizing the communication level declared in the consciousness. As an opposite evolutionary premise, the author cites the postulates of the "philosophy of dialogue" by F. Rosenzweig, F. Ebner, M. Buber, and others. The correlation of these philosophical positions reveals the inconsistency of materialistic reduction in anthropology. Originality. The author identifies four levels of communication: background, obstacle, function and dialogue. He represents the rationale for the fact that the first three levels do not need the existence of an individual "I". The first three levels leave the existential "I" unnecessary and therefore unclaimed. The philosophy of dialogue with the Other raises an equally important question about the conditions for the possibility of a metaphysical continuum in ontology, and in turn, suggests the acceptance of a philosophical premise about God as the space of subjectivity in the "I-You" dialogue. Conclusions. Philosophical understanding of the communication of two existential "I" demanded in communication is possible only within the framework of religious discourse. The phenomenal consciousness can enter into communication with a specific other phenomenal consciousness only when there is a metaphysical space between them, allowing for the possibility of communication of such a level. The materialistic conditioning by the human evolutionary needs in all its conceivable forms produces a reduction of the communicative inquiry, which makes the mutual perception of the two "I" impossible. In this psychophysiological anthropological model, there is no space for the possibility of a dialogue of individuals. (shrink)

In order to understand the reactions to the publication in 1893 of l’Action by Maurice Blondel, we should investigate the philosophical climate at the end of the 19th century both at French universities and in ecclesiastical circles. In the latter, Blondel was suspected of modernism because he criticised Thomist metaphysics as losing itself in abstractions because of its distance from life. Did this perhaps show contempt of the metaphysical abilities of the intellect? In his own philosophy, moreover, Blondel presented (...) the supernatural as absolutely necessary and yet as absolutely impossible. Was this overrating the intellect? If human reason in explaining human nature deals with the metaphysical level, does not this reduce the metaphysical to the merely natural level? Blondel’s philosophy did indeed owe a debt to the method of immanence, which he thought capable of speaking about what medieval man knew as desiderium naturale Dei . At French universities, on the other hand, the principle of immanence had been raised to a quasi-dogma. The neo-Cartesians agreed with the neo-Kantians that philosophy should limit itself to that part of worldly reality which reason can master. The criticism from both sides were due to a misunderstanding of Blondel’s intentions. He intended to work out a metaphysics of the will. Within this framework, it was his conviction that all forms of thinking are threatened by abstraction as soon as they refuse to acknowledge that thinking is related to the dynamics of the will, albeit different trom the act of volition. Blondel’s metaphysics of the will is based on an extensive phenomenology of action, whose existential impact goes together with a rigorous dialectical line of reasoning. As the dialectics of Hegel’s Phänomenologie searches for the adequacy between consecutive certainties and ultimate truth, so Blondel’s dialectics goes in search of the adequacy between the consecutive aims of the will and the ultimate goal of the will’s dynamics. We discuss this analogy in the awareness that Blondel is not a Catholic Hegel. As to the theological discussion of the supernatural within a philosophical perspective, Bouillard’s interpretation is succinctly presented. (shrink)

Levels-of-reality talk is common among practicing scientists and philosophers of science, yet such talk of levels has been criticized by Jaegwon Kim, Amie Thomasson, and Angela Potochnik, which I analyze into three objections of increasing strength. The first requires abandoning only some of the wilder claims about levels, while the second prunes off many biological uses, and the third poses serious challenges even for metaphysicians. Metaphysicians who wish to save realism about levels must be prepared to (...) make serious revisions. I argue for a novel approach which carves up levels using a neo-Aristotelian answer to the question of fundamental mereology which takes substances as the tiles of the world and uses metaphysical priority aconformities these generate in the mereological graph to identify levels. This emergentist account of levels is more coherent than varieties less connected to mereological structure, and places fewer constraints on that mereological structure than views like van Inwagen’s. While starkly revisionist, it fares better in recovering historical levels discourse than competitors like material atomism and priority monism. Further, the most painful revision is treating much of the biological levels discourse as representation and metaphor, but Potochnik argues that such talk was never a good candidate for metaphysics. (shrink)

Elucidating a metaphysics of medicine is vital for framing a coherent medical ethics. In this paper, I examine the historical case of Avicenna, the eleventh century physician-philosopher. Avicenna radicalizes the dissective power of reason using a logicized Aristotelian metaphysics to clarify concepts at the metaphysical level, which I call his anatomy of being. One of the practical consequences of Avicenna’s metaphysics is a dehumanizing eschatology of death. I outline the main elements of Avicenna’s thought that constitute his anatomy of (...) being. Through an examination of his logic, metaphysics, and psychology, I show how Avicenna develops a dissective logic. I conclude that one’s epistemology, as a method of knowing, entails a metaphysics, and, in turn, results in an ethical stance to the object of knowledge. For Avicenna, mental dissective logic applied to humans results in dehumanization, thereby destroying the humanistic impulse of medicine. (shrink)

This volume of new essays, written by leading philosophers of science, explores a broadly methodological question: what role should metaphysics play in our philosophizing about science? The essays address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and by more general methodological investigations.

What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is 'nothing over and above' some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I'll call "the semantic method" makes a reduction's truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses.

Edmund Husserl’s ultimate aim was to give an overall philosophical explanation of the totality of Being. In this endeavour, the term “absolute” was crucial for him. In this paper, I aim to clarify the most important ways in which Husserl used this notion. I attempt to show that, despite his rather divergent usages, eventually three fundamental meanings and coordinated levels of the “absolute” can be differentiated in his thought: the epistemological, the ontological, and the theological or metaphysical level. (...) According to Husserl, we can approach this ultimate level of the Absolute, through the method of phenomenological construction. A closer reading of Husserl’s texts shows that his conception of the absolute was astonishingly modern. The main features of the conception—on all three levels—were non-foundationalism, contextualism, openness, and circularity. Each level mutually founds and determines the others. It is a non-foundational Absolute, the moments of which constitute an organic and open totality which is essentially processual. In my interpretation, this theory opens a fruitful working area, which has enormous philosophical potential and is surprisingly up-to-date. (shrink)

Amie Thomasson challenges advocates of layered conceptions of reality to explain “how layers are distinguished” and “what holds them together” by “examining the world” (2014). One strategy for answering such questions is mereological, treating inter-layer relations as parthood relations, where layers exist whenever composition does, and the number of layers will be equivalent to the number of answers to Peter Van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question, while answers to his General Composition Question explain what holds the layers together (1987). Various answers (...) have been proffered for these questions, from the physicalist atomism of Richard Feynman (2015), Hilary Putnam (1958), and Kit Fine (1992) to the holism of Jonathan Schaffer (2010), the two-layer emergentism of Van Inwagen himself (1995), Tim Maudlin’s three-layered “flash ontology” (2011), and Rob Koons two-layered “thermal substances” (2019). In this PhD project, I seek to meet Thomasson’s challenge by identifying which of these proposals are compatible with plausible interpretations of quantum physics. Atomist answers may have difficulty with relativity, while holistic and emergentist models have trouble giving an account of experimental conditions. Maudlin and Koons’ views, meanwhile, may make testable predictions about the scope of entanglement. Examining the world can lead us to sharply winnow our theories about how layers are distinguished and what holds them together. (shrink)

I propose a way to accommodate plausible examples of cyclic grounding chains that have been proposed in the literature while preserving a good measure of the metaphysical foundationalist’s grounding hierarchy with a foundational level. This precludes the need to adopt a strong form of coherentism, such as the view that everything grounds everything, or even the view that everything grounds everything other than itself. I do this by developing axiomatizations of grounding which allow for localized cycles of ground at (...) the non-foundational and foundational levels, but which still place certain foundationalism-like constraints on the grounds that grounded facts must have. In addition, I point to considerations, previously put forth in favor of foundationalism and a strong form of coherentism, that also help support the views I develop. (shrink)

We sketch the mechanistic approach to levels, contrast it with other senses of “level,” and explore some of its metaphysical implications. This perspective allows us to articulate what it means for things to be at different levels, to distinguish mechanistic levels from realization relations, and to describe the structure of multilevel explanations, the evidence by which they are evaluated, and the scientific unity that results from them. This approach is not intended to solve all metaphysical (...) problems surrounding physicalism. Yet it provides a framework for thinking about how the macroscopic phenomena of our world are or might be related to its most fundamental entities and activities. (shrink)

I argue that Mumford and Anjum’s recent theory of simultaneous causation among powerful meso-level objects is problematic in several respects: it is based on a false dichotomy, it is incompatible with standard meso-level physics, it is explanatory deficient, and it threatens to render the powers metaphysics incoherent. Powers theorists are advised, therefore, to adopt a purely sequential conception of causation.

Conducted almost exclusively at the epistemological level the scientific realism debate often ignores metaphysical niceties. In the face of the scientific realist’s systematic appeal to metaphysical notions like causation and natural kinds the neglect seems dissonant. Chakravartty aspires to overturn it with a bespoke metaphysics for scientific realism. In pursuing this aim, he undrapes a more comprehensive vision of the scientific realist viewpoint, including a distinctive epistemology.

his monograph examines the metaphysical commitments of the new mechanistic philosophy, a way of thinking that has returned to center stage. It challenges a variant of reductionism with regard to higher-level phenomena, which has crystallized as a default position among these so-called New Mechanists. Furthermore, it opposes those philosophers who reject the possibility of interlevel causation. Contemporary philosophers believe that the explanation of scientific phenomena requires the discovery of relevant mechanisms. As a result, new mechanists are, in the main, (...) concerned solely with epistemological questions. But, the author argues, their most central claims rely on metaphysical assumptions. Thus, they must also take into account metaphysics, a system of thought concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world around it. This branch of philosophy does indeed matter to the empirical sciences. The chapters investigate the nature of mechanisms, their components, and the ways in which they can bring about different phenomena. In addition, the author develops a novel account of causation in terms of activities. The analysis provides the basis for many further research projects on mechanisms and their relations to, for example, the mind-body problem, realization, multiple realization, natural kinds, causation, laws of nature, counterfactuals, and scientific levels. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify the relation between two types of grounding: metaphysical and conceptual. Metaphysical grounding relates entities at more and less fundamental ontological levels. Conceptual grounding relates semantically primitive sentences and semantically derivative sentences. It is important to distinguish these relations given that both types of grounding can underwrite non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims. In this paper, I argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual grounding, then it does (...) not involve metaphysical grounding. I then present two heuristics for deciding which type of grounding is relevant to a given case. These heuristics suggest that certain proposed cases of metaphysical grounding may not actually involve metaphysical grounding at all. (shrink)

How should thought and consciousness be understood within a view of the world as being through-and-through physical? Many philosophers have proposed non-reductive, levels-based positions, according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris's careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea - notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all (...) fail to articulate a viable non-reductive, levels-based physicalism. Challenging assumptions about the mind-body problem and providing new perspectives on the debate over physicalism, this accessible and comprehensive book will interest scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. (shrink)

American metaphysics of race In the 1990s, a debate about the race began in the United States, in which many philosophers are involved. In philosophy, this debate has become known as the metaphysics of race. The aim of this article is to outline positions that have formed in the area of the metaphysics of race as a separate, mainly American, current of philosophical thought - realism (naturalistic and constructivist) and anti-realism - and to indicate the most important arguments invoked by (...) their most outstanding proponents to justify their metaphysical positions, as well as the counter-arguments of their opponents. The article also discusses the normative aspect of this dispute, very important from the moral and social point of view, listing two main positions on this level: eliminativism and conservatism regarding the presence of racial terms and concepts in public discourses. In the final parts of the article, the relations between metaphysical positions and normative directives formulated by the participants of the debate are considered, and critical arguments concerning the philosophical value and social importance of this trend of thinking are presented. (shrink)

The function of Metaphysics is to furnish an intelligible and significant perspective. The tendency of recent speculation is to abstain from the attempt to give a total or absolute perspective of the world as a unit—there is some question as to whether we can think of the world as a whole—but rather to understand the objects about us, to bring values, formerly located in a transcendental realm, into life and conduct here and now, and to broaden our understanding and interests (...) to included related activities and other communities. To make our perspective within a single science intelligible it is necessary, as Professor Miller has demonstrated, to fill in the gaps between perceptual objects with inexperienceable “interphenomena” and to employ methodological concepts and principles derived by abstraction and inference. Then again, each of the special sciences selects certain aspects of the general perspective for intensive research leaving gaps between the sciences to be filled in by integrating concepts. Finally, values emerge at the various levels, and these need to be related to the conditions out of which they arise and to the fields of applied knowledge in which they function. (shrink)

The three works to be examined here are concerned in their various ways with the rationality of ethics. Baier is concerned almost exclusively with bringing out the rationality of ethics, and in the process develops a new/old ethical theory. Ginsberg's concern with "the rational ethic" is rather subsidiary to his main themes, namely the unsoundness of cultural relativism and the truth concerning the relevance of the findings of sociology and other social sciences to ethics. Mackinnon is largely concerned with the (...) meta-ethical problem of the "different styles of reasoning" in ethics, and hence with the problem of the inter-relation of ethics and metaphysics on various levels, logical, historical and psychological. (shrink)

I argue that high level causal relationships are often more fundamental than low level causal relationships. My argument is based on some general principles governing when one causal relationship will metaphysically ground another—a phenomenon I term derivative causation. These principles are in turn based partly on our intuitive judgments concerning derivative causation in a series of representative examples, and partly on some powerful theoretical considerations in their favour. I show how these principles entail that low level causation can derive from (...) high level causation, and in particular that neural causation can derive from mental causation. I then draw out several important consequences of this result. Most immediate among these are the implications the result has for aspirations to reduce high level causation to its low level counterpart. But the result also bears on the possibility of downward causation, the relationship between counterfactuals and causation, and the idea—familiar from both the literature on the exclusion problem and the literature on proportionality constraints on causation—that causal relationships at different levels compete for their existence. (shrink)

The article examines main competing conceptions of the cor­respondence theory of truth. First, the author investigates pos­sible candidates for the role of truth-bearers. Among those he examines following entities: instances of sentences as concrete sequences of symbols (sounds or letters), which should satisfy wide scope of requirements, such as to be grammatical, mean­ingful, affirmative and so on; abstract propositions, which are ex­pressed by concrete sentences; utterances (either explicit or in lingua mentalis); beliefs of agents as their special mental states. Then (...) he turns to the study of possible candidates for the role of truth-makers, i.e. of those entities to which truth-bearers should correspond to be true. He observes states of affairs, situations, facts and mereological sums of individuals. Then he shows that a notion of correspondence is a functional relationship of interpre­tation of linguistic expressions, where certain fragment of real­ity is taken as a model, i.e. as a finite set of elements on which some functions and relations can be operationally defined. He shows how in some simple cases such interpretation function can be built in operationalist’s manner. After that, he considers some natural objections to this approach, which point that he has no direct cognitive access to the actual world, so it is not possible to take its fragments as a model for any theory. Such objections lead us to the coherentist’s approach, but he shows that the question about origin and status of so-called “specified set” implicitly either leads to infinite regress or requires certain correspondence on some level of investigation and reasoning. Finally, the authore presents some reflections on the meaning of correspondence approach for scientific realism and all other versions of realistic philosophy and metaphysics. (shrink)

"With its signal distinction between 'intuition' and 'analysis' and its exploration of the different levels of Duration, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_ has had a significant impact on subsequent twentieth century thought. The arts, from post-impressionist painting to the stream of consciousness novel, and philosophies as diverse as pragmatism, process philosophy, and existentialism bear its imprint. Consigned for a while to the margins of philosophy, Bergson’s thought is making its way back to the mainstream. The reissue of this important work (...) comes at an opportune time, and will be welcomed by teachers and scholars alike." --Peter A. Y. Gunter, University of North Texas. (shrink)

Analytic metaphysics is usually considered a contemporary form of traditional, pre-Cartesian metaphysics. This paper examines the epistemic legitimacy of analytic metaphysics in the face of scientific dominance. While naturalized metaphysics has found its place within science, analytic metaphysics remains challenged. To meet the challenge, I propose interpreting analytic metaphysics as a form of logical inquiry, positioning logic as its foundation, similarly to how science grounds naturalized metaphysics. The argument is developed through three key points: (1) tracing the historical connection between (...) science and naturalized metaphysics on the one hand, and analytic metaphysics and philosophical logic on the other hand, (2) highlighting similarities between logic and metaphysics, and (3) demonstrating that contemporary analytic metaphysics often operates as a logical inquiry. I show that this strategy preserves classical options at the meta-metaphysical level, arguing that a view of logic as grounded in language is in a better position to safeguard the autonomy from science and the collapse into naturalized metaphysics. (shrink)

It is a matter of continuing scholarly dispute whether Descartes offers a metaphysics of the material world that is “monist” or “pluralist.” One passage that has become crucial to this debate is from the Synopsis of the Meditations, in which Descartes argues that since “body taken in general” is a substance, and since all substances are “by their nature incorruptible,” this sort of body is incorruptible as well. In this article I defend a pluralist reading of this passage, according to (...) which there are indefinitely many bodies-taken-in-general, each of which counts as an incorruptible material substance. However, I also consider some surprising features of the argument in the Synopsis. One is that this argument conflicts with the implication in Descartes that any two “really distinct” substances can each exist without the other existing. Another is that the argument tends to undermine his suggestion that there is room at a fundamental metaphysical level for ordinary material objects. (shrink)

This dissertation shows that Proclus provides a consistent reading of Plato's late dialogues, and develops a three level ontology which stands on its own. By augmenting the reserve of Platonist philosophy with Post Platonic developments of Greek mathematics and astronomy and physics, at points where Platonism ceased to provide operating principles, Proclus, reached for formulations which went beyond Plato. His own metaphysics, though sometimes obscured by theurgic allusions, grounds Being in an infinite One. ;One of the problems that Proclus attempts (...) to solve through the posit of three infinities, is that an iterative potential infinity, seen in the interval structure of the physical world, could divide to oblivion if uncolonized by Principle. The 'One Being', which brings Limit and noetic sameness, is itself entrapped in Self Reflexivity. An infinity of a third kind, one beyond all Limit and Unlimit is posed to solve this problem. This is Proclus' NeoPlatonic solution to the fact that Being alone, albeit under the rule of intellect, cannot guarantee itself. ;Platonism assumes a "universe" i.e. One grounding Many, which predetermines the place of all structure. $\rm A\nu\lambda o\gamma\iota\alpha$ is a principle of substitution which governs the visible cosmos and makes it comprehensible by mathematical formulations. Plato's emphasis on the self same as the epitome of Being, with circularity as the highest form for thought, helps Proclus provide a consistent account of: Creation ; Infinity as a Simultaneous Whole ; Soul and Nous, Dialectic is valorized over other forms of thought as most like $$ the eternal truth and a means to assimilation. Procession and reversion forms a circle which demonstrates a metaphysical successor of cosmic revolutions found to exist as the heavenly bodies carry out their noetic patterns. ;Finally Eternity encapsulates Time; but again its infinite circularity is only recouped by a One beyond all Limit which can carry out the Providence of a final cause. (shrink)

The article examines Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views on the world and human beings in it. It is emphasized that the philosopher, in addition to paying a lot of attention to the study of language, which determined the basis of his method of cognition, followed a number of worldview ideas about reality. They were supported by the achievements of physics of that time, although Wittgenstein himself argued that the study of reality is not possible without understanding the metaphysical issues concerning the (...) unspeakable, supernatural, spiritual, and so on. It shows how Wittgenstein interpreted the world and reality, distinguished between different levels of being, studied logical atoms, not laws, analyzed facts, not things, comprehended not only the macrocosm but also the microcosm, and as a result built a pragmatic ontological-cosmological conception, in which humans and the way of their being in the world occupied a significant place. (shrink)

A close observation on the rapid change in the mind of young cohort has been made. Our Surveillance is before and after pandemic periods compels us to re-write some pre-occupied conceptions in the core of Philosophy and Psychology. We have worked on mind-body & mind-soul relationship from three angles that are Medical Science, Psychology and Philosophy. It is seen that the level of confidence is gradually diminishing among the youth due to different impetus and as a result many powerful strengths (...) are going out. Proclamation of human values in a new way must be declared so that we can save a thankful number of creative lives. Discussions have been made on thoughts, distress, medical causes of suicide or suicidal attempts, personality disorders, neuropsychology to open up a new world before the present generation. Each and every characteristics of life has positive impact and here we have tried to establish this fact. Physical and metaphysical aspects are reciprocating our lives and this should be injected in the mind of present generation and an approach can be taken to incorporate the matter in the curriculum right now. We have the intention to explain metaphysical love and its high, intelligent values proclaimed strength of mind of youth to infuse our dear world with great moral values. It may also save the earth from natural decay with their surprising discoveries. (shrink)

This article offers a reading of Plato in light of the recent debates concerning the unique ‘ontology’ of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline. In particular, this article suggests that Plato’s metaphysical account of the integral connection between human individual, the domestic state, and world order can offer IR an alternative outlook to the ‘political scientific’ schema of ‘levels of analysis’. This article argues that Plato’s metaphysical conception of world order can not only provide IR theory (...) with a way to re-imagine the relation between the human, the state, and world order. Moreover, Plato’s outlook can highlight or even call into question the post-metaphysical presuppositions of contemporary IR theory in its ‘borrowed ontology’ from modern social science, which can in turn facilitate IR’s re-interpretation of its own ‘ontology’ as well as its distinct contributions to the understanding of the various aspects of the social world and human life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 267-268 [Access article in PDF] Myles Burnyeat. A Map of "Metaphysics" Zeta. Pittsburgh, PA: Mathesis Publications, 2001. Pp. x + 176. Paper, $25.00. Burnyeat's map is an ambitious attempt to establish two claims about Zeta: that Aristotle employs an unusual, non-linear form of argument in Zeta, and that the discussion in Zeta is on two levels, one abstract and "logical" (...) and another specific and "metaphysical." In addition to looking at Zeta, chapter by chapter, Burnyeat examines the other works that provide the context for Zeta—the Organon for the logical level of explanation and the rest of the Metaphysics for the metaphysical level. Burnyeat argues that Aristotle's metaphysical project culminates in the theology of'Lambda, for which the metaphysics of Zeta has prepared us. The goal is to "map" or sketch the evidence for these claims rather than provide definitive arguments for them.A brief introductory chapter presents the main themes of the book. This is followed by an even briefer chapter that sets out the four routes (or independent sections of Zeta), viz. Z 3; Z 4-6, 10-11 with Z 7-9, 12; Z 13-6; and Z 17 with H 1. On all four routes, a logical discussion moves to a metaphysical discussion of form and matter.The third chapter on "signposts" is the lengthiest of all and takes the reader through the chapters of Zeta in order. It is also the most map-like of the chapters, as it requires that the reader have a copy of the Metaphysics ready to hand. Burnyeat follows other commentators in treating Zeta 7-9 and Zeta 12 as later insertions; he does, however, argue that the former and probably the latter were added by Aristotle. Chapters 7-9 are integral to the argument of Zeta, as they provide a diachronic view of artifacts and substantial beings (37). [End Page 267] Rejecting the prominence assigned Z 13 by several recent commentators, Burnyeat reads Z 13 in context with chapters 14-6. "The task of Z 13-6 is to show how the idea that substantial being is a universal such as human leads eventually, after suitable refinements and restrictions, to the conclusion that substantial being is form" (54). Wrapping up the discussion of Zeta, Burnyeat concludes that the goal of Zeta's two-level approach has been to show how logical concepts should be used to search for form.This leads directly to a chapter on the Organon. Burnyeat argues that none of the treatises making up the Organon are metaphysical; all employ an abstract (logical) mode of analysis. Even if written at different times, these treatises belong together because they are all methodological. Since form and matter belong to the metaphysical level, in the Analytics Aristotle "follows a deliberate policy of excluding form and matter" (97).In the final chapter, Burnyeat returns to the Metaphysics and considers Zeta in the context of the other books. Three "chunks," viz. books ABGE, ZHQ, and MN are briefly surveyed. The topics of Zeta are then considered in relation to Lambda. Several chapters, viz. D1 and Z1; D3 and Z 7-9, are found to have the same concerns. Burnyeat concludes with a fanciful muqo~ (story) about a dying Aristotle hastily writing a culminating metaphysical treatise.Burnyeat gives us a map—a map to prompt questions; he does not attempt to delve into many of the interpretative puzzles that have exercised other interpreters of Zeta. Thus, this book stands as a helpful counterbalance to a certain kind of scholarship on Zeta. The two interpretative claims, however, that are at the heart of Burnyeat's enterprise stand in need of further justification. One of these, the non-linearity of Zeta, seems to be too weak to support substantive claims. Burnyeat defines non-linearity as holding when "it is not the case that the successive chapters build continuously upon the results of their predecessors" (4). He then cites a few examples of linearity, e.g., Physics II. Yet the vast majority of Aristotelian... (shrink)

Heraclitus accepts as a principle that any particular insight into things is necessarily partial and perspectival. Edward Halper has discussed how, for this reason, it is in principle impossible for a particular thinker to attain the perspective of the Logos by which the whole can be made intelligible. So, metaphysics itself tells us that metaphysics is impossible. According to Halper, Heraclitus was wrong to take the Logos as applying to itself, as the Logos should properly be understood as applying only (...) to what is not a product of human agency. I argue that Halper’s move cannot serve as a corrective patch to Heraclitus’ metaphysical thought, since it posits a distinction between the human and the rest of reality which Heraclitus could never accept. Although not a radical monist who denies the reality of all multiplicity, a fundamental principle of his thought is that all distinctions and oppositions are grounded in a more fundamental unity. I instead approach the Heraclitean paradox by appealing to the strategy, familiar from a number of ancient Greek philosophers, of making a distinction between different levels of knowledge inherent within the same knower. (shrink)

Most philosophical work on social ontology continues to be done without much connection to social scientific concerns. This special issue, however, calls for attention to a naturalized metaphysics, one based on the best science we have. It follows that a naturalized social metaphysics should begin with the best social science available. In contrast with the physical sciences, however, the best social science is not so clear. Thus, this paper acquaints professional philosophers with some of the prominent metaphysical views extant (...) in the social sciences; the ways that more philosophically oriented social scientists engage them; and how professional philosophers might contribute.In particular, the paper covers several arguments especially relevant to a naturalized social metaphysics. One argument suggests that folk intuitions cannot be excluded from consideration. In fact, in the social sphere, it may be that scientific concepts not only cannot always trump folk conceptions but actually must be constrained by them. The paper further introduces arguments defending not only metaphysically real levels of being but also the metaphysical reality of the categories of social science. Finally, the paper will introduce an argument that beyond culture and individual agency, social being also includes structure as a distinct category. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam's famous model-theoretic arguments have the virtue of presenting metaphysical realists with a clear challenge. On pain of embracing either an implausible antifallibilism or the radical indeterminacy of reference, metaphysical realists must appeal to metalinguistic levels of interpretation richer than our own in order to fix meaning. And sense must be made of this appeal. In this paper I begin the task of developing a version of metaphysical realism that takes up this challenge.

The metaphysical possibility of agency at the phenomenal level, given the truth of a nomological and binding causal force, has long been a moot point in both Indian and western philosophical traditions. While an underlying implication of fatalistic resignation hangs over the possibility of phenomenal freedom within the ambit of the classical Indian interpretation of the Law of Karma, which forms the basis of the assumption that a fatalistic nexus of vāsanā (cravings for mundane achievements) and the ensuing karma (...) (action-tendencies to reach a mundane goal) circumscribes an agent’s choices, the western thought on the question of the freedom of choice has rather been preoccupied with the putative threat posed by the deterministic law of various nuances, such as theological determinism and logical determinism. A close analysis of the western philosophical debate surrounding free will reveals that the kind of linear causation that determinism supposedly entails is the primary reason for its being conflated with fatalism. The source of all the misgiving about determinism’s free will subduing influence is the oversight that it renders the agent’s rational endeavour a futile exercise in the same way as fatalism does. In this paper, therefore, an attempt has been made to disentangle determinism from fatalism. A key proposal advanced in this paper is that the causative force of the karmic law, admitted by most of the classical schools of Indian philosophy, may prima facie have a circumscriptive effect on agentic rational pursuits and choices. However, an intimate study reveals that this law does not preclude phenomenal freedom, although of a higher echelon. The classical Indian schools of philosophy admitting the undeniable presence of this karmic law allow the possibility of this seemingly inexorable causative force of the law being overridden by a more reason-guided pursuit, adopted by the agent, after an overhaul of his egoistic cravings. The model of agency developed in this paper is based on the claim that it is by way of undergoing self-determination that phenomenal freedom reaches its pinnacle. Drawing on the theories of volition and self advanced by some prominent classical Indian philosophical schools and the classical western philosophical theories of free will in the light of the deterministic threat, an attempt has been made to bring into harmony the rhetoric of both worlds, exploring the possibility whether phenomenal freedom can be salvaged through agentic self-determination and self-development. (shrink)