Mechanistic Levels, Reduction, and Emergence

In Stuart Glennan & Phyllis McKay Illari, The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 185-97 (2017)
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Abstract

We sketch the mechanistic approach to levels, contrast it with other senses of “level,” and explore some of its metaphysical implications. This perspective allows us to articulate what it means for things to be at different levels, to distinguish mechanistic levels from realization relations, and to describe the structure of multilevel explanations, the evidence by which they are evaluated, and the scientific unity that results from them. This approach is not intended to solve all metaphysical problems surrounding physicalism. Yet it provides a framework for thinking about how the macroscopic phenomena of our world are or might be related to its most fundamental entities and activities.

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Author Profiles

Mark Povich
University of Rochester
Carl F. Craver
Washington University in St. Louis

References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Paul Oppenheim & Hilary Putnam - 1958 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:3-36.

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