Although legal terms are conventionally considered to have self-referential, self-closed meaning independent of context, a legal term only acquires its meaning within a given context. As long as the context varies, the meaning of the same legal term as a signifier may change correspondingly. Based on case studies by applying semiotics, we argue that a legal term is just a sign within its sign system; a legal term as an individual sign (...) does not have any inherent meaning, and its meaning can only exist in the relationship with other signs or sign systems. In other words, a legal term only denotes in a particular temporal and spatial context. Through this study, we conclude four propositions about a legal term as a sign: first, the connection of a legal term with a legal concept is relatively arbitrary; second, the meaning of a legal term exists in a sign system; third, a legal term can be subject to multiple interpretations; fourth, the defining of a legal term may be affected by other sign systems. (shrink)

Legal terms have a special status at the interface between language and law. Adopting the general framework developed by Jackendoff and the concepts competence and performance as developed by Chomsky, it is shown that legal terms cannot be fully accounted for unless we set up a category of abstract objects. This idea corresponds largely to the classical view of terminology, which has been confronted with some challenges recently. It is shown that for legal terms, arguments against abstract (...) objects are not pertinent. As abstract objects are not natural, it is important to consider their creation. Two types of creation are distinguished and illustrated, one for new concepts and one for terms corresponding to existing general language concepts. In the latter case, it is important for the abstract object to remain close enough to the intuitive prototype. At the same time, legal terms as abstract objects are shown to have a natural place in relation to legal theory. (shrink)

It may be affirmed with some confidence that on this topic no generally accepted solution will be found in default of new evidence, for which we can only faintly hope. Against certainty on the matter it would seem that the Everlasting has fixed his canon: quis iustius induit arma scire nefas. Dogmatism is out of place; we must be content with whatever theory is least difficult to reconcile with the texts and with a reasonable interpretation of the course of events (...) at the time and the comments on them of contemporary observers. The thesis advanced in this paper is that there are strong reasons for supposing that the Lex Pompeia Licinia contained a date by which Caesar's command ended, that this date was not the end of February of the year 50 or the year 49 or the end of December of the year 50, that it did not contain a clause forbidding the discussion of a successor to Caesar before March 1, 50, and that if the date ending his command lies between the end of February and the end of December of the year 50, it may have been in fact the Ides of November in that year. (shrink)

Legal translation between English and Arabic is under researched. However, the growing need for it, due to immigration and asylum seeking, among other reasons, necessitates the importance of more research. The asymmetry between English and Arabic poses many difficulties for legal translators, be they linguistic-based, culture-specific or system-based. The aim of this research is to discuss ways of translating lexical items between English and Arabic. In this current discussion I will present, exemplify and analyse the common difficult areas (...) of translating English/Arabic legal texts and suggest ways of dealing with them. These areas involve culture-specific and system-based terms, archaic terms, specialised terms and doublets and triplets. With this aim in mind, the paper answers the following research questions: 1.What are the common difficulties of translating legal texts between English and Arabic? 2.What are the common lexical difficulties between English and Arabic legal texts? 3.What are the procedures of translating lexical legal terms between English and Arabic? The paper concludes that translating the above-mentioned lexical terms requires expertise, professional training, robust knowledge of the linguistic and legal systems of languages, as well as up-to-date electronic dictionaries and well-defined parallel corpora. (shrink)

This study aims to identify challenges related to the quality of legal terms translated from Arabic to English in laws pertaining to children in five countries in the Middle East and North Africa region: Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. The terms describe children’s behaviors that are considered legally and socially unacceptable and adult behaviors that violate laws meant to protect children’s rights in both domestic and foreign contexts. Using a blend of analytical and descriptive (...) methodologies, along with comparative legal research tools and critical discourse analysis, an analytical model called CCFND was developed. This model identifies three primary standards for evaluating translation quality, each with specific criteria for consistency, coherence, and general notes cover features, non-detrimental errors, and detrimental errors. The analysis of 72 legal terms revealed that the translation quality was high, with an equivalence rate of 93.29% for the standard of consistency, a slightly higher rate of 97.92% for the standard of coherence, and a standard equivalence rate along with eight features, one non-detrimental error, and seven detrimental errors. These findings indicate that using various strategies, the translations effectively gained high quality in rendering the terms from Arabic to English. It is suggested that the King Salman Global Academy for the Arabic Language should develop a bilingual contextual dictionary of effective legal translation strategies for terms and phrases related to children in both national and international laws. (shrink)

The legal industry is characterized by the presence of dense and complex documents, which necessitate automatic processing methods to manage and analyse large volumes of data. Traditional methods for extracting legal information depend heavily on substantial quantities of annotated data during the training phase. However, a question arises on how to extract information effectively in contexts that do not favour the utilization of annotated data. This study investigates the application of Large Language Models (LLMs) as a transformative solution (...) for the extraction of legal terms, presenting a novel approach to overcome the constraints associated with the need for extensive annotated datasets. Our research delved into methods such as prompt-engineering and fine-tuning to enhance their performance. We evaluated and compared, to a rule-based and BERT systems, the performance of four LLMs: GPT-4, Miqu-1-70b, Mixtral-8x7b, and Mistral-7b, within the scope of limited annotated data availability. We implemented and assessed our methodologies using Luxembourg’s traffic regulations as a case study. Our findings underscore the capacity of LLMs to successfully deal with legal terms extraction, emphasizing the benefits of one-shot and zero-shot learning capabilities in reducing reliance on annotated data by reaching 0.690 F1 Score. Moreover, our study sheds light on the optimal practices for employing LLMs in the processing of legal information, offering insights into the challenges and limitations, including issues related to terms boundary extraction. (shrink)

Legal terms, such as “ownership,”“contract,”“validity,”“negligence,” are used as middle terms in legal deduction. The paper distinguishes two problems regarding this use. One is the logical function of terms for deduction within a normative system. Specific problems dealt with in this connection are meaning, definition, and economy of expression. The other problem connected with middle terms is the “moulding” and possible manipulation of the meaning of legal terms, for arriving at desired conclusions in a given scheme of inference. (...) It is indicated how the moulding of contested legal concepts, if not restricted, will obscure the ratio of legal rules. This problem is relevant, inter alia, to arguments ex analogia in the law. (shrink)

From the perspectives of foreign-Chinese bilingual law dictionaries, Chinese-foreign bilingual law dictionaries, and monolingual Chinese law dictionaries, this paper reviews the compilation and publication of law dictionaries in China over the past six decades following the founding of New China in 1949, especially over the past three decades after the policy of reform and opening up was adopted in 1978. This paper reevaluates the translated legal terms covered and defined in the Legal Dictionary of the Soviet Union, Law (...) Dictionary, Oxford Large Dictionary of Law, Chinese-English Glossary of Terms of Laws and Regulations of People’s Republic of China and English-Chinese Dictionary of Anglo-American Law to analyze the roles of law dictionaries on the standardization of the translated Chinese legal terms. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric Jahrgang: 45 Heft: 1 Seiten: 161-174.

Legal translation is viewed as “a category in its own right” (Weston in An English reader’s guide to the French legal system. Berg, Oxford, (1991, p. 2). It is a kind of translation of the language used for specific purposes (Zhao in J Transl Stud 4:28, 2000). Legal translation requires accuracy in relaying the substance of the message, while respecting the form thereof as well as the genius of the target language (Zhao in J Transl Stud 4:19, (...) 2000; Sarcevic in New approach to legal translation. Kluwer Law International, Hague, 1997, p. 52). As generally accepted worldwide, precision is deemed of paramount importance in legal translation. With this in mind, the present paper deals chiefly with the concept of how legal translation can correctly be tested in order to ensure precision and validity for application and implementation. The paper will argue that the main goal of legal translation and the major criterion against which the precision of legal translation should be tested is to reproduce the same legal effect in the target text as that conveyed in the source text regardless of the method(s) used in the translation process. (shrink)

The interdisciplinary notion picture of the world makes research works devoted to this area of studies challenging from the point of view of finding interconnections between linguistic and extra-linguistic factors in the process of structuring categories of words, including those functioning in terminological systems and subsystems. Legal pictures of the world are specific cultural phenomena that may differ in various countries due to the nationally specific features of law and legal culture development. One of the most complicated problems (...) of representing specific knowledge through linguistic, terminological, signifiers is the problem of linguistic categorization of concepts. The article considers the problem of forming legal categories based on word-building suffixes from the point of view of the development of the legal language ‘picture of the world’ [reflection of the world] closely associated with its conceptual picture. The conclusion is drawn that commonly used derivational suffixes transform their meanings in accordance with the legal taxonomies, forming the conceptual legal picture of the world. The results of theoretical studies in terminological conceptualization may be used in teaching legal English vocabulary in the form of systematic presentation of term-building patterns expressing certain conceptual categories. (shrink)

An essential aim of this study is to present principles of the legal interpretation of the term “building structure” for the needs of the imposition of a real estate tax. The analysis of both administrative courts’ judgments and the subject literature indicates lack of consistency in the scope of this term’s meaning. In my opinion, interpretative discrepancies are caused by incorrect legal interpretation of the legal definition. It should be noticed that numerous controversies connected with (...) the legal interpretation of the term building structure are connected with considerable tax burden of this type of building objects. Taxpayers, for obvious reasons, are therefore “interested” in not finding the objects owned by them to be building structures in the meaning of the Tax Law, or possibly in finding only those objects’ specified parts to be building structures. It is easily apparent particularly in the case of objects of complex structures. On the other hand, however, for many municipalities in Poland, income from building structures’ taxation creates municipal budgets. This way the practice of applying local tax law encounters numerous disputes between taxpayers and self-government tax authorities. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to analyze accounting and legal approaches to the definition of the term "accounts receivable" and to justify the need for its clarification to be fixed in regulatory documents. Scientific novelty: the definition of the term "accounts receivable" has been clarified using accounting and legal approaches, where it is proposed to understand the obligations of other legal entities and individuals to this economic entity for contributions to the authorized capital, for (...) advances issued, for bills of exchange receivable, for goods sold, monetary amounts issued under the report, arising on the basis of a law, contract or civil situation. As a result, the updated definition will make it possible to supplement Article 307 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, art. 3 of the Federal Law "On Accounting", Article 7 of the draft Federal Tax Service "Accounts Receivable and Payable ". (shrink)

Following modernization paradigm and some local dynamics conducive to development, some Asian countries emerged as economic tigers in the world. Conversely, other Asian countries including Bangladesh failed to taste economic development despite having monetary and technological aids from some developed nations. Drawing on some social and historical trajectories of the divergent contours of Asian development/ underdevelopment, the paper examines the state of development in Bangladesh. The study has found that Japan is the first country in Asia to achieve modernization, and (...) it was followed by other Asian tigers such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and currently China and India. We found that all these Asian tigers exert a developmental model which is characterized by ‘endogenous’ modernity and economic nationalism largely driven by, among other things, long-term economic vision and strong political leadership. While the history of Bangladesh has witnessed various cultural nationalisms, the nation has failed to generate any unified economic nationalism since its independence in 1971. We suggest that Bangladesh needs a long-term development vision—a key thrust for economic nationalism—focusing more on some socioeconomic and legal aspects that have historically become major impediments for development. (shrink)

In this work we study, design, and evaluate computational methods to support interpretation of statutory terms. We propose a novel task of discovering sentences for argumentation about the meaning of statutory terms. The task models the analysis of past treatment of statutory terms, an exercise lawyers routinely perform using a combination of manual and computational approaches. We treat the discovery of sentences as a special case of ad hoc document retrieval. The specifics include retrieval of short texts, specialized document types, (...) and, above all, the unique definition of document relevance provided in detailed annotation guidelines. To support our experiments we assembled a data set comprising 42 queries which we plan to release to the public in the near future in order to support further research. Most importantly, we investigate the feasibility of developing a system that responds to a query with a list of sentences that mention the term in a way that is useful for understanding and elaborating its meaning. This is accomplished by a systematic assessment of different features that model the sentences’ usefulness for interpretation. We combine features into a compound measure that accounts for multiple aspects. The definition of the task, the assembly of the data set, and the detailed task analysis provide a solid foundation for employing a learning-to-rank approach. (shrink)

This paper discusses the legal aspects of the activities of transnational corporations. The relevance of the subject matter is determined by the significant impact exerted by transnational corporations on the world economy in general and on the economic situation of the country in which such corporations are registered as a subject of legal form of ownership in particular. Quality functioning of transnational corporations is an effective factor for the formation of sustainable development. This study reveals and determines the (...) relationship between the scale of activity of transnational corporations and their legal status within the framework of both single countries and entire economic communities, the individual subjects of law of which are transnational corporations. The practical significance of this study lies in the possibility of identifying and stating key aspects that play a significant role in assessing the practical activities of transnational corporations in the context of existing legal law with the ability to use the identified patterns in specific legal practice. The results of this study can be of significant practical importance for employees in the field of legal support for the activities of transnational-scale corporations, who are faced with the need to deeply analyse the legal aspects of the activities of these organisations and provide management of such structures with timely, highquality legal recommendations regarding the correction of the activities of these organisations in the context of the existing legal field. (shrink)

This paper deals with translating legal terminology concerning child maintenance from Polish to Swedish. The analysis covers selected terms regulated in the Polish civil law and their possible Swedish equivalents. The method used is based on the parameterisation of legal terms, which allows the specification of terms by selected parameters, which are understood as mutually exclusive properties. The parameterised equivalents are analysed in the context of various types of recipients. This provides the basis for the choice of appropriate (...) translation strategies. The author also discusses pragmatic equivalents featured in Rikstermbanken, the Swedish national terminological database, and those used in practice. (shrink)

This article probes the usefulness of selected theories from Cognitive Linguistics in the context of statutory interpretation. The presumption of legal language is a well-established rule of statutory construction in Polish legal practice that comes from the internationally recognised theory by Jerzy Wróblewski. It rests on a controversial assumption that there are different levels of generality in legal language (i.e. the language of statutes) and a single term may be given different meanings depending on the level (...) of generality that is referred to. The authors use the notion of basic level categorisation from the cognitive theory of prototypes to explain this mechanism. Legal concepts, not unlike ordinary concepts, form hierarchical taxonomies. A single term may denote concepts that are situated at different levels in different conceptual taxonomies. In the absence of special circumstances, a legal term should be given the meaning that resides at a higher level of categorisation in the respective legal taxonomy. This way, the presumption of legal language is found to be justified on both linguistic and psychological grounds. (shrink)

Not the least noticeable is the fact that the ancient Greek compound euthanasia, formed by Francis Bacon, has retained its original terminological form since it was first used in the 17th century. Among all other controversial ethical issues, however, the conceptual notion of euthanasia categorically evokes rather important controversies. The questions that arise in this context are whether there is a definition, or at least a determination, of the term euthanasia and whether we are aware of its use in (...) scientific discourse, what exactly is euthanasia. The paper offers a terminological elaboration of the term euthanasia in a linguistic, but mainly legal and medical-procedural context, in order to examine the coherence in defining the term between these categories and, consequently, to determine the key determinants of euthanasia according to categorical sections. The key facts stated are the primary determination or the possible definition of the term for any further scientific study of euthanasia as one of the most controversial issues within bioethical doctrine. (shrink)

A provision’s legal meaning is thought by many to be a function of its literal meaning. To explain the appearance that lawyers are arguing over a provision’s legal meaning and not just over which outcome would be more prudent or morally preferable, some legal literalists claim that a provision’s literal meaning may be causally, rather than conventionally, determined. I argue, first, that the proposed explanation is inconsistent with common intuitions about legal meaning; second, that explaining (...) class='Hi'>legal disagreement as a function of the causally determined meanings of moral terms requires, but lacks, a causal semantics which is clearly consistent with the scope of moral disagreement. Finally, I suggest that an element of the theory of language invoked by ‘causal’ legal literalists might be better deployed as part of an intentionalist account of legal practice. (shrink)

This book develops a general theory of law, inclusive legal positivism, which seeks to remain within the tradition represented by authors such as Austin, Hart, MacCormick, and Raz, while sharing some of the virtues of both classical and modern theories of natural law, as represented by authors such as Aquinas, Fuller, Finnis, and Dworkin. Its central theoretical questions are: Does the existence or content of positive law ever depend on moral considerations? If so, is this fact consistent with (...) class='Hi'>legal positivism? The author shows how inclusive positivism allows one to answer yes to both of these questions. In addition to articulating and defending his own version of legal positivism, which is a refinement and development of the views of H.L.A. Hart as expressed in his classic book The Concept of Law, the author clarifies the terms of current jurisprudential debates about the nature of law. These debates are often clouded by failures to appreciate that different theorists are offering differing kinds of theories and attempting to answer different questions. There is also a failure, principally on the part of Ronald Dworkin, to characterize opposing theories correctly. The clarity of Waluchow's work will help to remove the confusion which has hitherto marred some jurisprudential debate, particularly about Dworkin's work. (shrink)

Legal academics are deeply involved in researching legal phenomena. Examining empirical research on legal education reveals a story of increasing sophistication in both the methods and the analysis used in this area. Due to different cultures of academic law, research into legal education finds that it is predominantly found in common law jurisdictions while there is very little research into legal education in civil law jurisdictions. Empirical research on legal education can be divided into (...) three main categories: work on legal pedagogy, work on the legal academy as an institution, and work on the students and staff who populate law school. This article presents research studies to highlight each of these three categories. While the quantity of empirical research in legal education is not great, it is an area that has developed exponentially in recent years in terms of sophistication and rigor. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes the conservative conception of passive or static human dignity in accordance with which human’s value is seen as value coming from the exterior (from God or from a biological human’s nature), or value seen as existing per se. In opposition to this conception, a conception of active or created dignity is being developed, which aims at treating human’s dignity not like a social relationship, but rather like a person’s individual ability to live properly in the society (...) (participate in barter relations on the ground of equivalence) and using this propriety to create own individual social value (dignity), as a personal contribution towards maintenance of concord and collaboration in the society. (shrink)

Pierre Olivier distinguishes between two radically different concep-tions of legal fictions: on the one hand, the conception of legal fiction developed by the commentators of the Middle Ages, which culminates in Bartolus’s defini-tion; on the other hand, the conception developed by the 19th Century German scholar Gustav Demelius, who was followed, among others, by Joseph Esser. The main difference between the two approaches is individuated by Olivier in the fact that, while the former consider legal fictions as (...) essentially implying an actual fic-tional element, the latter deny this. In other words, according to Demelius and those who follow him, the term “legal fiction” is a misnomer. In this article, I first provide an example of a legal fiction. In the second and third section, I rely on this example to analyze and assess the two competing accounts. Finally, in the fourth part, I advance a syncretistic account of legal fictions, which should thus point to a possible middle ground between the two competing positions. As it is often the case, there is probably some truth to both accounts; the problem – I will argue – is that both theories tell only a part and not the whole of the story. More precisely, it will be argued that legal fictions essentially involve the structure of “as if”-statements, and that the one-sidedness of the two competing accounts derives from the fact that one focuses too much on the “if”-component (the assumption), whereas the other focuses too much on the “as”-component (the comparison). (shrink)

아이리스 영은 개인의 책임을 넘어선 정치적 책임을 주장하면서 법적인 책임 모델과 사회적 연결 모델을 주장하였다. 그런데 이러한 구분은 실증주의 법개념에 근거한 것으로 보인다. 내용의 정당성까지를 고려하는 비실증주의 법개념론은 사회적 연결 모델과 유사하다. 비실증주의 관점의 확장된 법개념은 여성문제에 대한 법적인 책임을 묻고 법판단에서의 젠더정의를 실현하는 데 적합하다. 이 글은 위안부와 같은 여성문제를 해결하기 위하여 아이리스 영이 전제하고 있는 법의 개념을 비판적으로 다루면서 비실증주의 법개념론의 입장에서 사회적 연결 모델을 바탕으로 법적 책임까지 물을 수 있는 방안을 모색하였다.

A variety of legal documents are increasingly being made available in electronic format. Automatic Information Search and Retrieval algorithms play a key role in enabling efficient access to such digitized documents. Although keyword-based search is the traditional method used for text retrieval, they perform poorly when literal term matching is done for query processing, due to synonymy and ambivalence of words. To overcome these drawbacks, an ontological framework to enhance the user’s query for retrieval of truly relevant (...) class='Hi'>legal judgments has been proposed in this paper. Ontologies ensure efficient retrieval by enabling inferences based on domain knowledge, which is gathered during the construction of the knowledge base. Empirical results demonstrate that ontology-based searches generate significantly better results than traditional search methods. (shrink)

The legal consensus that has evolved through adjudication and legislation since the Karen Quinlan case in 1976 is founded on the premise that there is a bright line between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia. Indeed, the term passive euthanasia is often eschewed in favor of less emotionally-laden terminology such as "forgoing life-sustaining treatment" or "terminating life support" so as to further sever any possible connection with active euthanasia. Legal approval has been bestowed upon passive euthanasia under certain (...) circumstances while active euthanasia is routinely condemned. This consensus was put to a test in 1990 when the United States Supreme Court ruled on the Cruzan case. However, the Court's narrow decision did not upset the consensus, and in the most significant appellate decisions handed down by state courts since Cruzan, there has been a reaffirmation-and possibly even an extension-of the consensus. Two other threats to the legal consensus about forgoing life-sustaining treatment have begun to manifest themselves: the increasing pressure for mercy killing and "futility" cases. Both of these challenge the fundamental premises on which the consensus is grounded. (shrink)

I shall compare two views of legal concepts: as nodes in inferential nets and as categories in an ontology (a conceptual architecture). Firstly, I shall introduce the inferential approach, consider its implications, and distinguish the mere possession of an inferentially defined concept from the belief in the concept’s applicability, which also involves the acceptance of the concept’s constitutive inferences. For making this distinction, the inferential and eliminative analysis of legal concepts proposed by Alf Ross will be connected to (...) the views on theoretical concepts in science advanced by Frank Ramsey and Rudolf Carnap. Consequently, the mere comprehension of a legal concept will be distinguished from the application of the concept to a particular legal system, since application presupposes a doctrinal commitment, namely, the belief that the inferences constituting the concept hold in that system. Then, I shall consider how concepts can be characterised by defining the corresponding terms and placing them within an ontology. Finally, I shall argue that there is a tension between the inferential and the ontological approach, but that both need to be taken into account, to capture the meaning and the cognitive function of legal concepts. (shrink)

In this article we describe two core ontologies of law that specify knowledge that is common to all domains of law. The first one, FOLaw describes and explains dependencies between types of knowledge in legal reasoning; the second one, LRI-Core ontology, captures the main concepts in legal information processing. Although FOLaw has shown to be of high practical value in various applied European ICT projects, its reuse is rather limited as it is rather concerned with the structure of (...) legal reasoning than with legal knowledge itself: as many other “legal core ontologies”, FOLaw is therefore rather an epistemological framework than an ontology. Therefore, we also developed LRI-Core. As we argue here that legal knowledge is based to a large extend on common-sense knowledge, LRI-Core is particularly inspired by research on abstract common-sense concepts. The main categories of LRI-Core are: physical, mental and abstract concepts. Roles cover in particular social worlds. Another special category are occurrences; terms that denote events and situations. We illustrate the use of LRI-Core with an ontology for Dutch criminal law, developed in the e-Court European project. (shrink)

In light of new threats in the field of human rights stemming from global geopolitical shifts, criminal law is facing a myriad of new challenges that require adequate responses. Given this context, it is crucial to develop and refine criminal legal measures (CLMs) in order to safeguard societal interests and maintain stability in social relations. This paper undertakes an analysis of contemporary problems in the area of legal regulation and CLMs, as well as assesses the effectiveness of CLMs (...) for individuals engaged in criminal misconduct. The research provides grounds for arguing that the absence of a clear definition of CLMs in Ukrainian legal science renders the term potentially problematic. Moreover, there are currently no taxonomic markers or criteria for classifying CLMs, nor methods for evaluating the effectiveness of specific measures. Within the framework of the announced reforms in Ukraine’s criminal law, it becomes imperative not only to revisit the concept of CLMs but also to develop robust methodologies for assessing their effectiveness. This measure appears necessary both in light of the need to legally formalize CLMs and to systematize them in the future. (shrink)

Translations of legal contracts into formal specifications that can be used for assisted reasoning are currently gaining considerable attention in AI and law. Yet, the conceptual intricacy of some of the normative notions involved in legal contracts continues to provide significant challenges to formalization; in accordance with this, there is a need for developing general logic frameworks which allow for an appropriate analysis of the fundamental components of a contractual situation. In the present work, we focus on the (...) representation of decisional and operational roles played by possibly distinct contracting parties. We provide a flexible framework, which extends term-modal logic, where such roles can be effectively formalized and emphasized. (shrink)

Legal rationalist: law claims to give its subjects reasons for action. Normative reasons intuition: Reasons for action being key, the obvious way to establish that law makes a practical difference in people's deliberations is by arguing that the law claims to give reasons for action to its subjects. Explanatory Reasons Intuition: "And while it is possible to be confused about our normative reasons, it seems unlikely that everyone is confused all the time; so the fact that people consistently take (...) the law as their motivating reason and guide their conduct by the law does seem to suggest that the law does provide normative reasons for its subjects." And if it’s a necessary feature of law that it claims authority, then the argu- ment seems to establish that law claims to provide reasons for its subjects. Schematically the argument as a whole goes like this: The law claims to be a legitimate authority. If a legitimate authority directs a subject to φ the subject is obligated to φ ). The fact that an agent is obligated to φ is a reason for her to φ. So the law claims that its directives are reasons......Obligations as Reason-Giving : the fact that A is obligated to φ is itself a reason for A to φ. Unfortunately for the Legal Rationalist, OAR is false. Legal obligation has certain features which mean that the fact that a certain action’s being legally obligatory cannot itself constitute a reason to perform that action." Will explain away the intuitions in terms of triggering, and show how law can make a normative difference that is consistent with the falsity of OAR. Law's claim, and normative impact, can be captured exclusively in terms of second-order reasons. PartofwhatHartisafterhereistheideathatdeliberationon the matter of whether or not to φ is closed or settled by the obligation. But deliberation is cut off because the law has reached some sort of conclusion or answer or verdict on the question of whether or not to φ. The legal obligation not to φ contains a practical verdict about φing: it is not to be done. This idea – that the legal obligation not to φ provides or contains a verdict that φing is not to be done – is the idea that legal obligation is verdictive. For something to be verdictive is for it to express or embody a verdict or conclusion as to what ought to be done. It is plausible to say that wrongness is verdictive. So to say that such-and-such an action would be wrong is to express a verdict on that action – it is one which should not be done. To get a handle on the idea of the verdictive it helps to contrast it with the contributory. A contributory consideration is one which contributes to the verdict, by increasing the weight on the verdict’s side. So that φing would harm someone, or would cause extreme suffering, or would have costs that vastly outweighed any benefits, say, would be contributory considerations on the side of the verdict that φing would be wrong." "Wrong" is verdictive, and so it cannot itself be a reason for the action - it cannot be a reason for itself. Obligation and wrong in law are very close, and obligation should be treated as verdictive. This shows us that OAR is false. (shrink)

An enduring question in political and legal philosophy concerns whether we have a general moral obligation to follow the law. In this paper, I argue that Philip Soper’s intuitively appealing effort to give new life to the idea of legal obligation by characterising it as a duty of deference is ultimately unpersuasive. Soper claims that people who understand what a legal system is and admit that it is valuable must recognise that they would be morally inconsistent to (...) deny that they owe deference to state norms. However, if the duty of deference stemmed from people’s decision to regard the law as valuable as Soper argues, then people who do not admit the value of the state would have no duty as such to defer to its norms. And, more importantly, people who admit the value of the state would have a duty not to defer to particular norms, namely those norms which violate the values that ground their preference for a state. This critique of Soper operates within his parameters by accepting his claim that moral consistency generates reasons to act. Even on those terms, Soper’s defence of legal obligation as a duty of deference is unpersuasive. (shrink)

This paper identifies a volitional theory of meaning common to speech act theory and legal positivism, represented by Hart and Kelsen. This model is compared and contrasted with the model of social operations developed by Reid, a Common Sense Enlightenment philosopher. Whereas the former subscribes to the view that meaning is generated by acts of will, the latter finds meaning to consist of the dual elements of sign and 'directedness'.The ability of positivist theories to provide a structural account of (...) the difference between legal rules and other rules is inextricably linked to this commitment to the volitional theory of meaning. The commitment to the volitional view however leads to problems in requiring that some kind of authority be presupposed in for plain rules to attain legal force. Such authority can only be established with recourse to further rules or must be accepted as a matter of faith. Reid's criterion of direction however vitiates the need for an authority, instead accounting for social communication in general, and rules in particular, in terms of sociological factors. Although no comprehensive critique of the volitional theory is proposed, Reid's model is preferable on the grounds of explanatory richness.The core claims of the paper are that: legal positivism necessarily subscribes to the volitional theory of meaning; rejection of the volitional theory necessarily entails rejection of the positivist view that legal and non-legal rules can be differentiated on structural grounds another counter-model exists which avoids some of the pitfalls of the volitional theory; if the volitional theory is rejected then the existence of rules can only be accounted for in a 'strong' sociological sense and legal theory must accordingly accept the dominant role of sociology in conceptualising the nature of rules. (shrink)

Electronic commercial transactions have become a vital part of digital economies around the world. However, the countries need to upgrade their policy frameworks and related legal provisions amid a fragile cyber security environment. The authentication of electronic signatures is a complex phenomenon that needs attention for authentication and recognition. This research presents a comparative analysis of the two countries Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. This study analyzes the related legal statutes to figure out differences and compatibility with (...) reference to their recognition and ability to execute safe electronic transactions in the minimum time. Two legislative enactments have been analyzed in this study that is Jordanian electronic transactions law of 2015 and the United Arab Emirates Electronic transactions and trust services law of 2021. The study concludes that UAE laws are better recognized to verify and authenticate the electronic-signature-based commercial transaction in comparison with the enactments of Jordan in terms of categorizing different levels of security of the electronic signatures and legal preventive measures in case of falsification of data, content, and signatures and breach of the trust. (shrink)

The article aims to provide a semiotic interpretation of the sign of the Ecclesiastical Court within the legal framework from temporal and spatial perspectives. The starting point of the research is the idea that the history of the Russian Ecclesiastical Court is inextricably linked to the history of Russian society and secular court. Consideration of the pre-revolutionary ecclesiastical and secular law helps us explore principles of the ecclesiastical proceedings and organization, identify contradictions in understanding modern Ecclesiastical Court. Its sign (...) is not only limited to the legal interpretation. In his novel The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky F. M. gave the sign of the Ecclesiastical Court symbolic meaning and, thus, expanded it beyond the existing legal framework. The Ecclesiastical Court is one of the symbols of Russian spirituality which is reflected in the concept of “Russian soul”. Rational elements of the sign of Ecclesiastical Court as well as its sensual and metaphorical components, are analyzed using the category of Truth. Clearly, the Cross is sign-symbol for Christianity. But if applied to the concept of Ecclesiastical Court, the Orthodox Cross becomes a sign-index. As a result, several semantically heterogeneous meanings of the sign of Ecclesiastical Court are revealed and described. (shrink)

Peirce defines the legal expression proximale cause and effect as an “obscure term like most of the terms of Aristotelianism.” He says that students of law and logic should be shocked by thc practicc of justifying the payment of damages in law by reference to a “term in Aristotelian logic or metaphysics.” That such practice does occur underscores and “illustrates the value of PRAGMATISM.” Peirce reminds usthat in English law the term “witness” does not mean a (...) person who testifies to his own experience, “but to facts which he knows by the immediate testimony of others” .Practical law, Peirce suggests, results from persons whose knowledge of the facts of experience are formed in dialogue with others whose experience confirms their own. The dialogue is immediate; the knowledge is mediated through signs. From the viewpoint of Peirce’s pragmatism which he sees as an integral part of his semiotic Methodology or Speculative Rhetoric this paper will assurne that there are distinct types of legal cultures and that each may be regarded as a method of inquiry for the purpose of realizing social values. The relation between Laws and Societies-systems of legalities and legitimacies-will be regarded as culture-specific modes of dialectic. I propose here that Peirce’s Methodology-his method of methods-may account for the way that “patterns of conceptual change retlect the presuppositional structures of conceptual systems” . Within the framework of a semiotics of law I will be looking at various ways the idea of the Legal System has been interpreted. (shrink)

Individuals sometimes do things that they know will violate the terms of a statute. Most scholars deny that such actions are always morally wrong, but a coherent theoretical account of the relationships between 1) moral obligation, 2) legal obligation, and 3) criminal wrongdoing that can robustly classify hard cases has been elusive. This article starts with a Kantian account of the relationship between law and morality, and it proposes two closely related standards: one for legal obligation, and another (...) for criminal wrongdoing. It then tests the plausibility and resilience of these standards by using them to generate illuminating new analyses of classic hypothetical cases involving alleged crimes committed under circumstances of necessity. These analyses offer reason to believe that the standards proposed in this article can anchor a Kantian theory of criminal responsibility that is simultaneously rigorous and humane. (shrink)

The study of legal transplants provides a vital critical supplement to mainstream theories about legal change. Legal transplants are not exceptional or isolated occurrences, despite the economic, social, political and cultural barriers that separate the world’s legal systems. This Article goes beyond traditional approaches to the study of transplants by substituting the figurative language of transplants with explicit theory about how legal change is produced. It first provides a brief account of what the literature on (...) legal transplants has achieved so far in terms of "macro" explanations of legal change currently available. It then argues that legal transplants as social acts performed by individuals call for a study of the "micro" level of engagement with legal change by individuals. The key notion that is advanced to explore this dimension is the notion of mediated action, which denotes action that is performed by individuals making use of features of the environment as tools to interact in a specific setting. The notion of mediated action was first introduced in cultural-historical psychological investigations of the social formation of the mind. As social acts, legal transplants represent instances of mediated action. The last part of this Article highlights how legal transplants raise questions of justice and discusses briefly how the new approach to the study of transplants advocated here relates to them. (shrink)

Following the 100th anniversary of Pashukanis' General Theory of Law and Marxism (1924), this volume aims to breathe new life into the main category of Pashukanian legacy, the concept of legal form. This book offers new, deeper and more general, ways in which the concept of legal form can be used to push forward Marxist - post-Marxist or hauntingly Marxist - legal theory. Accordingly, this book does not pledge allegiance to reconstructing and reconsidering the official interpretative legacy (...) of the legal form. Instead, it mobilises the revolutionary conceptual potentialities that this term contains. When investigated thoroughly, and in many dimensions, the legal form becomes a privileged vantage point not only into the greatest law-related riddles of Marxism (such as the relation between economy and the state or withering away of statal apparatuses), but the whole of modernity as the epoch determined by - if not overlapping with - capitalism. This book aims to think with the legal form rather than explain this concept. In so doing, it offers a panoply of theoretical perspectives that address legal subjectivity, abstraction, autonomy of the law and, last but not least, withering away of the law. This contemporary interrogation of the relevance of the concept of legal form will be of considerable interest to scholars and students of legal and political theory. (shrink)

Across a number of countries including Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, incumbent presidents in Latin America have recently sought to amend their constitutions to eliminate or weaken presidential term limits. In some cases, these efforts to extend terms have been part of broader projects to consolidate power, weaken other state institutions, and tilt the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents. From a legal perspective, these cases are interesting because they highlight the limits of (...) tools limiting constitutional change, such as eternity clauses and the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, to constrain potentially anti-democratic or anti-liberal forms of constitutional change. Although constitutional texts in most of these cases gave courts ample ammunition to reject attempts to eliminate term limits or at least to force those changes down more demanding paths, courts did not stand in the way of most of these efforts and in some cases even used the doctrines to eliminate rather than protect term limits. The case studies highlight the extent to which the “superficial” spread of doctrines controlling constitutional change may fail to block, and indeed may promote, forms of constitutional change that threaten liberal democratic constitutionalism. It also suggests possibilities for deepening the effectiveness of transnational dialogue on these issues. (shrink)

In this paper I take it for granted that legal institutions are artifacts. In general, this can very well be considered a trivial thesis in legal philosophy. As trivial as this thesis may be, however, to my knowledge no legal philosopher has attempted an analysis of the peculiar reality of legal phenomena in terms of the reality of artifacts, and this is particularly striking because there has been much discussion about artifacts in general philosophy (specifically analytic (...) metaphysics) over the last twenty years. In particular, the concepts of intention, function, plan of action, and history are in competition to explain the ontology of artifacts, and a similar competition can be found at the core of legal theory. Such a striking parallelism between the domain of artifacts and that of legal institutions is a clue for legal ontology that deserves further attention: I will offer my own interpretation of this parallelism in the first part of this paper (Sections 2 and 3). In providing a theory of legal institutions as artifacts, one could be led to the conclusion that law is essentially an artificial phenomenon, something which does not bear any significant relationship to the natural domain. However, I think that such a conclusion would be mistaken. In fact, this is the second thesis I want to explore in this paper: not only that legal institutions are artifacts, but also that they can be artifacts which in some sense "mirror," or imitate, some descriptions of the natural, pre-social reality we live in. What I would like to show is not that legal institutions are "natural" in the sense that they have some feature which is not human-dependent, as some natural law theorists would say, but rather that their conceptual content can depend on our conceptualization of the natural domain despite being entirely artifactual. This is what I will call the "institutional mimesis" behind several important instances of legal artifacts, and I will deal with it in the second part of this paper (Sections 4 and 5). (shrink)

A leading expert in informal logic, Douglas Walton turns his attention in this new book to how reasoning operates in trials and other legal contexts, with special emphasis on the law of evidence. The new model he develops, drawing on methods of argumentation theory that are gaining wide acceptance in computing fields like artificial intelligence, can be used to identify, analyze, and evaluate specific types of legal argument. In contrast with approaches that rely on deductive and inductive logic (...) and rule out many common types of argument as fallacious, Walton’s aim is to provide a more expansive view of what can be considered "reasonable" in legal argument when it is construed as a dynamic, rule-governed, and goal-directed conversation. This dialogical model gives new meaning to the key notions of relevance and probative weight, with the latter analyzed in terms of pragmatic criteria for what constitutes plausible evidence rather than truth. (shrink)