Стаття присвячена найменш контрольованим і найбільш небезпечним загрозам сьогодення, а саме – біотероризму та біологічним війнам. Акцентується увага на тому, що на даний час наявна послідовність терористичних акцій із застосуванням збудників інфекційних хвороб і бактеріальних токсинів актуалізує проблему біологічної безпеки, яка набула глобального характеру і не залежить від державних кордонів. Відзначається, що розробки в галузі мікробіології використовуються в антигуманних цілях, що є істотним чинником, який загострює питання біобезпеки. Йдеться про створення новітніх видів біологічної зброї. Значну біологічну небезпеку для людини становлять (...) нові інфекційні хвороби, які викликаються раніше невідомими людству патогенами. Зокрема вірусами, бактеріями, а також пріонами. Наголошується на необхідності прийняття рішень політичного, економічного та філософського характеру, що включають посилення міжнародного контролю за роботою з особливо небезпечними збудниками, а також розробку конкретних програм протидії біотероризму. Підкреслюється, що на даний час вирішення проблем, пов'язаних з протидією біотероризму, є провідним завданням, яке безпосередньо стосується інтересів забезпечення безпеки не лише окремих країн, а й усієї планети загалом. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A recent approach for bioterrorism risk management calls for stricter regulations over biotechnology as a way to control subversion of technology that may be used to create a man‐made pandemic. This approach is largely unworkable given the increasing pervasiveness of molecular techniques and tools throughout society. Emerging technology has provided the tools to design much deadlier pathogens but concomitantly the ability to respond to emerging pandemics to reduce mortality has also improved significantly in recent decades. In its historical (...) context determining just how ‘risky’ biological weapons is an important consideration for decision making and resource allocation. Management should attempt to increase capacity, share resources, provide accurate infectious disease reporting, deliver information transparency and improve communications to help mitigate the magnitude of future pandemics. (shrink)

Before September 11, 2001, a mass-casualty terrorist attack on American soil was generally considered a remote possibility. Similarly, before October 4, 2001—the first confirmed case of anthrax caused by intentional release — widespread bioterrorism seemed implausible. Among the arguments that such a biological artack was unlikely included: the lack of a historical precedent; the technological and organizational challenges to acquiring and weaponizing a biological agent; and the almost universal moral opprobrium that would certainly accompany the use by (...) terrorists of such a weapon. In the wake of September 11th and October 4th, however, many are reconsidering the likelihood of a large-scale bioterrorist attack against civilians.The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines bioterrorism as the intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or toxins for the purpose of harming or killing civilian. One measurement of the public health system's level of bioterrorism preparedness is the quality and distribution of laws mandating the reporting of diseases caused by certain biological agents. (shrink)

There is perhaps no duty more fundamental to American government than the protection of the public's health, safety, and welfare. On September 11, 2001, this governmental duty was severely tested through a series of terrorist acts. The destruction of the World Trade Towers in New York City and a portion of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., presented many Americans with a new, visible reality of the potential harms that terrorists can cause. The staggering loss of lives damaged the national psyche (...) in ways far exceeding the physical scars to American institutions.As horrific as the images of destruction and loss of human lives may be, events that unfolded after September 11 revealed another dreaded, and potentially more catastrophic, threat to Americans sense of security and public health: bioterrorism. Unlike terrorists that use bombs, explosives, or other tools for mass destruction, a bioterrorist's weapon is an infectious agent. (shrink)

This article looks at the increasing prominence of bioterrorist threat scenarios in recent US foreign policy. Germ warfare, it argues, is being depicted as the paradigmatic threat of the post-Cold War era, not only because of its affinity for cross-border movement but also because it blurs the lines between deliberate attack and spontaneous natural catastrophe. The article looks at the possible implications of this move for understandings of war, strategy and public health. It also seeks to contextualize the US’s growing (...) military interest in biodefence research within the commercial strategies of the biotech and pharmaceutical industries. In its methodology, the article weaves together elements from defence literature, scientific perspectives on infectious disease, catastrophe theory and political economy. The conceptual underpinnings of the strategy of pre-emptive warfare, it argues, lie as much in the theory of biological emergence as in official US defence strategy. (shrink)

This article reviews the history of smallpox and ethical issues that arise with its threat as a biological weapon. Smallpox killed more people than any infectious disease in history-and perhaps three times more people in the 20th Century than were killed by all the wars of that period. Following a WHO-sponsored global vaccination campaign, smallpox was officially declared eradicated in 1980. It has since been revealed that the Soviet Union, until its fall in the early 1990s, manufactured tens (...) of tons of smallpox for military purposes. A worry is that some of this may have fallen into the hands of "rogue" nations or terrorists. Current U.S. debate questions whether smallpox vaccine should therefore be made available to the American public, which-like the rest of the world-now lacks immunity. Because the vaccine is considerably dangerous, public dialogue cannot resolve this matter if evidence material to the likelihood of attack is classified (i.e. secret). I conclude by recommending numerous future areas for ethics research related to the weaponization of smallpox. (shrink)

Thereby, EIDs pose huge threats to health care infrastructures everywhere due to unprepared infrastructures and poor immunity levels of population. It discusses how key role players, the hospital administrator, would play a big role in managing EID infections as well as strategies related to infection control. Such vital factors include resource allocation, implementation of policies, training, and building a culture for safety as well as working under an interdisciplinary approach. COVID-19 pandemics are best used as case studies both where successes (...) occurred and where infection prevention lacked. Findings point toward robust surveillance, real-time data analytics, and the emotional support required for the healthcare workers involved in combating EIDs. The work discusses the socio-economic implications of EIDs and the utmost need to adapt strategies at resource-poor settings. Adding their recommendations with proper training, technological adaptations, and well-defined policymaking, they can decrease the impact of EID. By including technology, teamwork, and psychological impacts, the hospital administrators can develop such healthcare systems that can take on future challenges. It is a transformational effort that proactive leadership and innovation can make to combat the global health threat. (shrink)

Israel has a long history of concern with chemical and biological threats, since several hostile states in the Middle East are likely to possess such weapons. The Twin-Tower terrorist attacks and Anthrax envelope scares of 2001 were a watershed for public perceptions of the threat of unconventional terror in general and of biological terror in particular. New advances in biotechnology will only increase the ability of terrorists to exploit the burgeoning availability of related information to develop ever-more destructive (...) bioweapons. Many areas of modern biological research are unavoidably dual-use by nature. They thus have a great potential for both help and harm; and facilitating the former while preventing the latter remains a serious challenge to researchers and governments alike. This article addresses how Israel might best (1) prevent hostile elements from obtaining, from Israel’s biological research system, materials, information and technologies that might facilitate their carrying out a biological attack, while (2) continuing to promote academic openness, excellence and other hallmarks of that system. This important and sensitive issue was assessed by a special national committee, and their recommendations are presented and discussed. One particularly innovative element is the restructuring and use of Israel’s extensive biosafety system to also address biosecurity goals, with minimal disruption or delay. (shrink)

Increases in international travel and migratory flows have enabled infectious diseases to emerge and spread more rapidly than ever before. Hence, it is increasingly easy for local infectious diseases to become global infectious diseases (GIDs). National governments must be able to react quickly and effectively to GIDs, whether naturally occurring or intentionally instigated by bioterrorism. According to the World Health Organisation, global partnerships are necessary to gather the most up-to-date information and to mobilize resources to tackle (...) GIDs when necessary. Communicable disease control also depends upon national public health laws and policies. The containment of an infectious disease typically involves detection, notification, quarantine and isolation of actual or suspected cases; the protection and monitoring of those not infected; and possibly even treatment. Some measures are clearly contentious and raise conflicts between individual and societal interests. In Europe national policies against infectious diseases are very heterogeneous. Some countries have a more communitarian approach to public health ethics, in which the interests of individual and society are more closely intertwined and interdependent, while others take a more liberal approach and give priority to individual freedoms in communicable disease control. This paper provides an overview of the different policies around communicable disease control that exist across a select number of countries across Europe. It then proposes ethical arguments to be considered in the making of public health laws, mostly concerning their effectiveness for public health protection. (shrink)

Public health responses to emerging infectious disease rarely try to interrupt the mobility of goods and information. Rather, designed under the rubric of ‘‘public health security,’’ they extend the rationale of free circulation through efforts to intensify movement and communication between international agencies, national health departments, and the pharmaceutical industry. In this way, public health security extends postliberal modes of transnational regulation. This article examines an unfolding scenario which is testing public health’s fidelity to the ethos of international trade (...) agreements: Indonesia has withdrawn from the World Health Organization’s ‘‘virus-sharing’’ scheme because WHO has facilitated the use of Indonesian samples of H5N1 for the commercial development of potentially profitable vaccines without consultation with the Indonesian labs in which they originated. It has been argued that the Indonesian move is one that contests the current securitization of global health. However, I argue that what we are witnessing is the process of emergence of a distinct form of biological sovereignty in the form of rival global health security aggregates, each working to inject a new form of postliberal sovereignty into the field of global public health. (shrink)

In the past twelve to eighteen months, another perceived threat to the safety of America's blood supply has arisen. The fear is that Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease will join hepatitis, HW and AIDS in the public and medical consciousness as the 1990s next infectious disease epidemic. A particular kind of ethical dilemma has arisen causing much debate and consternation for hospitals, regulators, and blood suppliers, and has elicited a remarkably varied response.CJD is a rare but uniformly fatal neurological disease: it affects (...) the brain and the rest of the central nervous system. Its incidence in the population of the developed world is about one per million per year, although some geographic anomalies exist. CJD manifests itself in two broad ways. First, the disease is associated with symptoms of mental deterioration and dementia, including memory loss, anxiety, and cognitive impairment. Second, CJD is also associated with a range of neurological symptoms, including muscle rigidity, seizures, tremors, muscle twitching, and spasticity, as well as problems with muscle coordination and unsteady gait, sometimes resulting in total disability. (shrink)

The term ‘bioterrorism’ seems to have become a kind of shorthand for sowing terror through the use of other ‘unconventional’ weapons, especially chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons, or ‘dirty bombs’. The ethical problems associated with these other threats are closely associated with those raised by biological agents. Therefore, this article necessarily refers to these related potential terrorist technologies, all of them made more available to militant organizations through the spread of knowledge and material in the post-cold war era.

A single defining question perennially intrigues scholars and practitioners interested in public heath: To what extent should human rights be limited to protect the community’s health and safety? The question achieved prominence in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 and with the intentional dispersal of anthrax spores through the U.S. Postal Systein. The conflict between security and public health intensified with the development of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, (...) drafted by the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at the request of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The Model Act grants states consiclernble powers to control persons and property in response to a public health emergency, defined to inclucle bioterrorism or the appearance of novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agents or biological toxins. (shrink)

Considering the role of human interactions in infectious disease outbreaks and cooperation in mitigating natural disasters consequences, ecological threats to human survival have been among proposed drivers of collectivism. Utilizing established and novel measures of parasite stress and natural disasters, we investigated their association with collectivism in a large sample of countries (N = 188). Linear mixed-effect models indicated that after controlling for national wealth, neither natural disasters nor infectious disease can predict collectivism scores. Null results were consistent (...) across different measures of threats, suggesting that previous findings can be attributed to small, non-representative samples of cultures. When universal patterns are a major concern, drawing conclusions based on small, nonrepresentative subsets of cultures risks promoting unreliable findings. Future cross-cultural research will benefit from data-driven exploratory methods to uncover factors previously unexamined in the theory-driven studies of collectivism. (shrink)

Environmental historians are not sufficiently aware of the extent to which mid twentieth-century thinkers turned to medical geography—originally a nineteenth-century area of study—in order to think through ideas of ecology, environment, and historical reasoning. This article outlines how the French–Croatian Mirko D. Grmek, a major thinker of his generation in the history of medicine, used those ideas in his studies of historical epidemiology. During the 1960s, Grmek attempted to provide, in the context of the Annales School’s research program under the (...) leadership of Fernand Braudel, a new theoretical framework for a world history of disease. Its development was inspired by several sources, most notably the French–American Jacques M. May, who was then pioneering an opening up of medical geography and movement towards the concept of disease ecology. The cornerstone of Grmek’s “synthetic approach” to the field was the notion of “pathocenosis”. The diverse uses of this notion in the course of time—from his early agenda focused on a longue durée history of diseases in Western Antiquity to his last, relating to the new epidemiological threat of emerging infectious diseases, specifically HIV/aids—enables us firstly, to note how concepts of ecology sat uneasily alongside those of medical geography; secondly, to assess the reach and limits of his theoretical contribution to historical epidemiology; and thirdly, to understand better the uneven fortunes of his concept of pathocenosis at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. (shrink)

Securitization of infectious diseases may involve suspension of ordinary human rights and liberties. In the event of an epidemic, therefore, it is important to limit the occasions upon which draconian disease control measures are implemented in the name of security. The term ‘security’, moreover, should not be used too loosely if it is to retain force and meaning in political discourse. It may be argued that the bar for disease securitization should be set high so that it is limited (...) to contexts involving rapidly spreading pathogens. Such an approach, however, would rule out securitization of more slowly spreading, endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS. An advantage of characterizing HIV/AIDS as a security threat in developing countries, where the burden of the disease is concentrated, is that this is likely to mobilize resources needed to improve the situation there. That is, if HIV/AIDS is convincingly framed as a security threat, then governments may recognize self‐interested reasons to ramp up control measures. Following consideration of arguments for narrow (excluding HIV/AIDS) versus broad (including HIV/AIDS) conceptions of security, we conclude that the legitimacy of ‘securitizing’ HIV/AIDS ultimately turns on empirical and semantic issues, and we emphasize the importance of distinguishing (1) the nature of the threat posed by HIV/AIDS and (2) the measures required to address that threat. (shrink)

This seminal collection on the ethical issues associated with infectious disease is the first book to correct bioethics’ glaring neglect of this subject. Timely in view of public concern about SARS, AIDS, avian flu, bioterrorism and antibiotic resistance. Brings together new and classic papers by prominent figures. Tackles the ethical issues associated with issues such as quarantine, vaccination policy, pandemic planning, biodefense, wildlife disease and health care in developing countries.

The global public health threat posed by infectious disease is well recognised. The obligation to treat whilst exposed to risk, and its limits, is debated with each novel serious and communicable pathogen. Within national jurisdictions, different responses are forthcoming. Some, like France in 2009, give government the power to require healthcare staff to work, and even to requisition staff, including retired professionals. Others rely on notions of solidarity and professional duty, with scope for individual discretion. Our research with staff (...) in the West Midlands in 2008/2009– including non-professionals – suggested a strong correlation between feeling a duty to work and willingness to work during a pandemic. This was more influential than removing other barriers to working. Medical military personnel can already be ordered into risky situations. Our research in 2015/16 with those who worked in the Ebola treatment unit in Sierra Leone suggested that their concerns about risk were complex: the perceived magnitude of the risk was only one factor, even though tolerance was high. The type of risk and circumstances requiring that risk to be taken were also influential.Against this background, it will be argued, with caveats, that:military medical personnel should be willing to accept greater risk than civilian medical staff;and that to maintain national health services during a communicable disease emergency:civilian medical staff ought to accept greater risks than they currently appear willing to tolerate;conscription – from civilian or military populations – is permissible, even though it may elevate personal risk. (shrink)

We propose a framework for the description of the effects of vaccinations on the spreading of an epidemic disease. Different vaccines can be dosed, each providing different immunization times and immunization levels. Differences due to individuals’ ages are accounted for through the introduction of either a continuous age structure or a discrete set of age classes. Extensions to gender differences or to distinguish fragile individuals can also be considered. Within this setting, vaccination strategies can be simulated, tested and compared, as (...) is explicitly described through numerical integrations. (shrink)

From a scientific standpoint, the world is more prepared than ever to respond to infectious disease outbreaks; paradoxically, globalization and air travel, antimicrobial resistance, the threat of bioterrorism, and newly emerging pathogens driven by ecological, socioeconomic, and environmental factors, have increased the risk of global epidemics.1,2,3 Following the 2002–2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), global efforts to build global emergency response capabilities to contain infectious disease outbreaks were put in place.4,5,6 But the recent H1N1, Ebola, and Zika (...) global epidemics have shown unnecessary delays and insufficient coordination in response efforts.7,8,9,10 In a thoughtful and compelling essay,11 Thana C. de Campos argues that greater clarity in the definition of pandemics would probably result in more timely effective emergency responses, and pandemic preparedness. In her view, a central problem is that the definition of pandemics is based solely on disease transmission across several countries, and not on spread and severity together, which conflates two very different situations: emergency and nonemergency disease outbreaks. A greater emphasis on severity, such that pandemics are defined as severe and rapidly spreading infectious disease outbreaks, would make them “true global health emergencies,” allowing for priority resource allocation and effective collective actions in emergency response efforts. Sympathetic to the position taken by de Campos, here I highlight some of the challenges in the definition of severity during an infectious disease outbreak. (shrink)

This seminal collection on the ethical issues associated with infectious disease is the first book to correct bioethics’ glaring neglect of this subject. Timely in view of public concern about SARS, AIDS, avian flu, bioterrorism and antibiotic resistance. Brings together new and classic papers by prominent figures. Tackles the ethical issues associated with issues such as quarantine, vaccination policy, pandemic planning, biodefense, wildlife disease and health care in developing countries.

In 2000 Bill Joy proposed that the best way to prevent technological apocalypse was to "relinquish" emerging bio-, info- and nanotechnologies. His essay introduced many watchdog groups to the dangers that futurists had been warning of for decades. One such group, ETC, has called for a moratorium on all nanotechnological research until all safety issues can be investigated and social impacts ameliorated. In this essay I discuss the differences and similarities of regulating bio- and nanotechnological innovation to the efforts to (...) regulate nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction. I then suggest the creation of a global technology regulatory regime to ensure the safe and equitable diffusion of genetic, molecular and information technologies, and point out the principal political obstacles to implementing such a regime. (shrink)

Over the course of the year 2020, the global scientific community dedicated considerable effort to understanding COVID-19. In this review, we discuss some of the findings accumulated between the onset of the pandemic and the end of 2020, and argue that although COVID-19 is clearly a biological disease tied to a specific virus, the culture–mind relation at the heart of cultural psychology is nonetheless essential to understanding the pandemic. Striking differences have been observed in terms of relative mortality, transmission (...) rates, behavioral responses, official policies, compliance with authorities, and even the extent to which beliefs about COVID-19 have been politicized across different societies and groups. Moreover, many minority groups have very different experiences of the pandemic relative to dominant groups, notably through existing health inequities as well as discrimination and marginalization, which we believe calls for a better integration of political and socioeconomic factors into cultural psychology and into the narrative of health and illness in psychological science more broadly. Finally, individual differences in, for example, intolerance of uncertainty, optimism, conspiratorial thinking, or collectivist orientation are influenced by cultural context, with implications for behaviors that are relevant to the spread and impact of COVID-19, such as mask-wearing and social distancing. The interplay between cultural context and the experience and expression of mental disorders continues to be documented by cultural-clinical psychology; the current work extends this thinking to infectious disease, with special attention to diseases spread by social contact and fought at least in part through social interventions. We will discuss cultural influences on the transmission, course, and outcome of COVID-19 at three levels: cross-society differences; within-society communities and intergroup relations; and individual differences shaped by cultural context. We conclude by considering potential theoretical implications of this perspective on infectious disease for cultural psychology and related disciplines, as well as practical implications of this perspective on science communication and public health interventions. (shrink)

The world’s scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this (...) framework should have reasoning at its center and, specifically, that forms of reasoning beyond deduction and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles, I have presented a case for treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of argument that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging disease. In this article, I want to extend that analysis by highlighting the unique features of these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions of uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent with the reasoning practices of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging infectious diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UK’s BSE crisis, a crisis that posed a significant threat to both human and animal health. (shrink)

Major disasters and public health emergencies constantly test the nation's resolve to rally and recover from tragedy. Public health crises stemming from prolonged threats like the 2009/2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic require sustained preparedness and response over many months. Even shorter-duration events, like tornados, earthquakes, or hurricanes, leave lasting impacts for which full recovery may take years. Telling examples include the displacement of thousands of persons across the Gulf Coast states following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and difficulties obtaining basic housing and (...) services that persisted in the Northeast months after Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Whether the result of natural disasters, infectious disease outbreaks, bioterrorism, or other causes, these events can change the societal landscape in affected regions.Despite the challenges of recovery across populations stemming from national or regional emergencies, Americans have consistently supported those directly affected. (shrink)

This paper provides an introduction to the history of the concept of “emerging infectious diseases” (EID) and reflects on how humanities and social science scholars have interacted with it. It starts with a chronological outline of the coinage of the concept in the early 1990s in the wake of the shocks provoked by Ebola and HIV/AIDS, which disrupted the idea that the West was transitioning from a period of infectious diseases to one of chronic diseases. We argue that (...) humanities and social science scholars in disciplines such as history, anthropology, STS, and literature studies have critically explored the concept, showing how entrenched it was in the perceptions of the US and Europe about threats posed by the rest of the globe. Moreover, we explore how scholars in the humanities have used the EID concept to comment on contemporary realities and mobilized it to create dialogues with scientists, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Subsequently, we explore how the growing contemporary interest in EID has pushed historians to research the ontological and epistemological factors that enabled the “emergence” of diseases long before the invention of the EID concept, such as plague, Chagas disease, and sleeping sickness, as well as the factors that transformed these and other emerging diseases into pandemics. We conclude by outlining a few neglected factors in the EID literature that could be addressed: the circulation and reception of the concept outside of the West, the examination of EID as a problem for wild animals and not just for humans, and global histories of disease emergence as an epistemological and social process. (shrink)

Plants from a handful of species provide the primary source of food for all people, yet this source is vulnerable to multiple stressors, such as disease, drought, and nutrient deficiency. With rapid population growth and climate uncertainty, the need to produce crops that can tolerate or resist plant stressors is more crucial than ever. Traditional plant breeding methods may not be sufficient to overcome this challenge, and methods such as highOthroughput sequencing and automated scoring of phenotypes can provide significant new (...) insights. Ontologies are essential tools for accessing and analysing the large quantities of data that come with these newer methods. As part of a larger project to develop ontologies that describe plant phenotypes and stresses, we are developing a plant disease extension of the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDOPlant). The IDOPlant is envisioned as a reference ontology designed to cover any plant infectious disease. In addition to novel terms for infectious diseases, IDOPlant includes terms imported from other ontologies that describe plants, pathogens, and vectors, the geographic location and ecology of diseases and hosts, and molecular functions and interactions of hosts and pathogens. To encompass this range of data, we are suggesting inOhouse ontology development complemented with reuse of terms from orthogonal ontologies developed as part of the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry. The study of plant diseases provides an example of how an ontological framework can be used to model complex biological phenomena such as plant disease, and how plant infectious diseases differ from, and are similar to, infectious diseases in other organism. (shrink)

The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease (...) is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being ‘tended to’ in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons. (shrink)

Professor Roderick John Flower, Biochemical Pharmacology, William Harvey Research Institute, St Barts and the London School of Medicine Queen Mary University of London Charterhouse Square, London EC1M 6BQ, UK; [email protected] O'Neill, a molecular biologist in Frank Herbert's 1982 novel ‘The White Plague’,1 seeks retributive justice for the death of his wife in a terrorist bomb blast by infecting those he holds responsible with an engineered pathogen that kills only women. The eponymous plague soon spreads uncontrollably with predictable catastrophic global consequences.When (...) the definitive history of armed conflict is written, the chapter on biological weapons will make for a long and disagreeable read. Now, happily, disavowed by most nations under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the presumption is that any future deployment would be at the hands of rogue states, criminal gangs or perhaps terrorist organisations, to whom they could appeal because of their apparent ease of preparation and dissemination coupled with their sinister reputation and potential for causing mass casualties.But Herbert's villain is different. He is a trained scientist possessing expert skills and with access to pathogens, reagents and cutting-edge technology. Such a person might appear outwardly to be part of the conventional academic establishment except that their motives impel them to act covertly outside the accepted ethical and legal boundaries of their profession. Such ‘outsiders’ evade detection because they act alone and can, through their privileged position, anticipate and thwart regulation or investigation. But is this frightening scenario more than just a plot for apocalyptic novels? Is it a credible threat?In reality, such occurrences seem to be rare. In a comprehensive analysis of 180 incidents involving the use of biological agents during the last century, for instance, Carus2 noted that none of the confirmed bioterrorist attacks by non-state actors …. (shrink)

With a large number of forcibly displaced people seeking safety, the EU is facing a challenge in maintaining solidarity. Europe has seen millions of asylum seekers crossing European borders, the largest number of asylum seekers since the second world war. Endemic diseases and often failing health systems in their countries of origin, and arduous conditions during transit, raise questions around how to meet the health needs of this vulnerable population on arrival in terms of screening, vaccination, and access to timely (...) and appropriate statutory health services. This paper explores the potential role of the principle of reciprocity, defined as the disposition ‘to return good in proportion to the good we receive, and to make reparations for the harm we have done’, as a mid-level principle in infectious disease screening policies. More than half of the European countries implemented screening programmes for newly arrived asylum seekers. Screening may serve to avoid potential infectious disease risks in the receiving countries as well as help identify health needs of asylum seekers. But screening may infringe upon basic rights of those screened, thus creating an ethical dilemma. The use of the principle of reciprocity can contribute to the identification of potential improvements for current screening programmes and emphasizes the importance of certain rights into guidelines for screening. It may create a two way moral obligation, upon asylum seekers to actively participate in the programme, and upon authorities to reciprocate the asylum seekers’ participation and the benefits for the control of public health. The authors argue that the reciprocity principle leads to a stronger ethical justification of screening programmes and help achieve a balance between justifiable rights claims of the host population and the asylum seekers. The principle deserves a further and more thorough exploration of its potential use in the field of screening, migration and infectious diseases. (shrink)

Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research (...) through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted immense work on the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Rapid, accurate, and consistent interpretation of generated data is thereby of fundamental concern. Ontologies––structured, controlled, vocabularies––are designed to support consistency of interpretation, and thereby to prevent the development of data silos. This paper describes how ontologies are serving this purpose in the COVID-19 research domain, by following principles of the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and by reusing existing ontologies such as the Infectious (...) Disease Ontology (IDO) Core, which provides terminological content common to investigations of all infectious diseases. We report here on the development of an IDO extension, the Virus Infectious Disease Ontology (VIDO), a reference ontology covering viral infectious diseases. We motivate term and definition choices, showcase reuse of terms from existing OBO ontologies, illustrate how ontological decisions were motivated by relevant life science research, and connect VIDO to the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO). We next use terms from these ontologies to annotate selections from life science research on SARS-CoV-2, highlighting how ontologies employing a common upper-level vocabulary may be seamlessly interwoven. Finally, we outline future work, including bacteria and fungus infectious disease reference ontologies currently under development, then cite uses of VIDO and CIDO in host-pathogen data analytics, electronic health record annotation, and ontology conflict-resolution projects. (shrink)

In March 2003, the world discovered, again, that I humanity's battle with infectious diseases continues. The twenty-first century began with infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, being discussed as threats to human rights, economic development, and national security. Bioterrorism in the United States in October 2001 increased concerns about pathogenic microbes. The global outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in the spring of 2003 kept the global infectious disease challenge at the forefront of world news for weeks. At (...) its May 2003 annual meeting, the World Health organization asserted that SARS is “the first severe infectious disease to emerge in the twenty-first century” and “poses a serious threat to global health security, the livelihood of populations, the functioning of health systems, and the stability and growth of economies.”. (shrink)

Healthcare workers carry a substantial risk of harm from infectious disease, particularly, but not exclusively, during outbreaks. More can be done by healthcare institutions to identify risks, quantify the current burden of preventable infectious disease amongst HCWs and identify opportunities for prevention. We suggest that institutional obligations should be clarified with respect to the mitigation of infectious disease risks to staff, and question the duty of HCWs to care while healthcare institutions persist with a reactive rather than (...) proactive attitude to infectious disease threats. (shrink)

Just like atomic physics seventy years ago, when it was realized that chain reaction could lead to medical applications as well as to the creation of atomic weapons, the life sciences have entered a grey zone. “Advances in biotechnology […]” a 2003 CIA document stated, “have the potential to create a much more dangerous biological warfare threat […] Engineered biological agents could be much worse than any disease known to man”. As sociologists of science have noted, contemporary life (...) sciences have dual use potential as they can be used to foster beneficial applications, for instance in health care, or generate harm, either intentionally or not, and possibly on an unprecedented.. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic prompted immense work on the investigation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Ontologies – structured, controlled, vocabularies – are designed to support consistency of interpretation, and thereby to prevent the development of data silos. This paper describes how ontologies are serving this purpose in the virus research domain, following the principles of the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology (OBO) Foundry and drawing on the resources of the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO) Core. We report the development of the (...) Virus Infectious Disease Ontology (VIDO), a reference ontology extending IDO Core covering viral infectious diseases. We examine newly minted terms, showcase ontology term reuse, and illustrate the use of VIDO by annotating selections from recent life science research on SAR-CoV-2, in the interest of supporting machine learning projects. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the topical collection Microbes, Networks, Knowledge: Disease Ecology in the twentieth Century, based on a workshop held at Queen Mary, University London on July 6–7 2016. More than twenty years ago, historian of science and medicine Andrew Mendelsohn asked, “Where did the modern, ecological understanding of epidemic disease come from?” Moving beyond Mendelsohn’s answer, this collection of new essays considers the global history of disease ecology in the past century and shows how epidemics and pandemics (...) have made “microbes complex”. (shrink)

Humanity entered the twenty-first century with revolutionary achievements in biomedical research. At the same time multiple “dual-use” results have been published. The battle against infectious diseases is meeting new challenges, with newly emerging and re-emerging infections. Both natural disaster epidemics, such as SARS, avian influenza, haemorrhagic fevers, XDR and MDR tuberculosis and many others, and the possibility of intentional mis-use, such as letters containing anthrax spores in USA, 2001, have raised awareness of the real threats. Many great men, including (...) Goethe, Spinoza, J.B. Shaw, Fr. Engels, J.F. Kennedy and others, have recognized that liberty is also a responsibility. That is why the liberty to decide now represents an acknowledged necessity: biomedical research should be supported, conducted and published with appropriate measures to prevent potential “dual use”. Biomedical scientists should work according to the ethical principles of their Code of Conduct, an analogue of Hippocrates Oath of doctors; and they should inform government, society and their juniors about the problem. National science consulting boards of experts should be created to prepare guidelines and control the problem at state level. An international board should develop minimum standards to be applicable by each country. Bio-preparedness is considered another key-measure. (shrink)

Cytokines, also referred to as interleukins, are the major orchestrators of host defence processes, and, as such, are involved in insults, repair and restoration of tissue homeostasis. This review summarises recent findings on and emerging models of the biological roles of the double-edged sword interleukin-13 (IL-13), which have been principally obtained from studies in mice that are deficient for IL-13, or its components. IL-13-mediated functions not only contribute to the susceptible phenotype in Leishmania major infection but also seem to (...) play a protective role in chronic leishmaniasis. Moreover, IL-13 plays a key protective role in the expulsion of helminths from the gut while also actively contributing to the pathology in schistosomiasis. In allergic asthma, IL-13 has also been found to be a key factor. Therapeutic administration of an IL-13 inhibitor in mice successfully prevents both the allergic disease phenotype and schistosoma egg-induced lung pathology. If this scenario holds true in humans, we soon may have an efficient drug for treatment of IL-13-mediated diseases. BioEssays 22:646–656, 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Anthropologists have documented substantial cross-society variation in people’s willingness to treat strangers with impartial, universal norms versus favoring members of their local community. Researchers have proposed several adaptive accounts for these differences. One variant of the pathogen stress hypothesis predicts that people will be more likely to favor local in-group members when they are under greater infectious disease threat. The material security hypothesis instead proposes that institutions that permit people to meet their basic needs through impartial interactions with strangers (...) reinforce a tendency toward impartiality, whereas people lacking such institutions must rely on local community members to meet their basic needs. Some studies have examined these hypotheses using self-reported preferences, but not with behavioral measures. We conducted behavioral experiments in eight diverse societies that measure individuals’ willingness to favor in-group members by ignoring an impartial rule. Consistent with the material security hypothesis, members of societies enjoying better-quality government services and food security show a stronger preference for following an impartial rule over investing in their local in-group. Our data show no support for the pathogen stress hypothesis as applied to favoring in-groups and instead suggest that favoring in-group members more closely reflects a general adaptive fit with social institutions that have arisen in each society. (shrink)

Genetic resources are a key resource for much biomedical research. Pathogenic genetic resources are of value in the identification, surveillance, understanding, and development of vaccines, treatments, and other responses to major public threats such as pandemic influenza outbreaks. Significant attempts have been made to improve the international governance of infectious disease over the last decade, but the handling of pathogenic genetic resources remains contentious and problematic. The need to address the deficiencies in current arrangements (e.g., the World Health Organization's (...) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework) is urgent because future outbreaks are likely to revert to the past situation in which developed states secured vaccine supplies for their own populations while leaving developing countries vulnerable to the pandemic. Thereby, the collaboration of developed countries with vital international systems such as the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System is disincentivized. The current international approach to pathogenic genetic resources is based on the sovereign rights of states and access and benefit-sharing arrangements that stem from those rights. While this approach is consistent with international rules on other types of genetic resources, herein I argue that this is an inappropriate approach to pathogens on both political (serving public health goals) and ethical grounds (e.g., equity and justice). Instead I argue for a (modified) common heritage approach to pathogenic genetic resources, based on their intrinsic qualities (e.g., rapid mutation, easy transmissibility) and their value to global efforts to respond to disease outbreaks. I will further argue for de-linking access to these resources from benefit-sharing requirements; explaining that while there are strong justifications for both, their linkage (particularly for pathogenic genetic resources) is problematic and detrimental to the achievement of its intended goals (i.e., ensuring equitable benefit-sharing in return for access being granted). (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic forced us to reconsider our interactions with the world around us, shifting how we navigate public and private spaces every day. Most people in the United States previously thought nothing of touching railings or doorknobs, going to school or work while ill, or attending crowded events. Along with new health interventions and institutional practices, daily behaviors aimed at infection control, such as routine hand washing and wearing face masks when symptomatic, protected our communities from COVID-19. Many new (...) interventions and practices are here to stay, but it is unclear which personal behaviors to protect against COVID-19 and other infectious diseases we should continue. Intuitively plausible ethical arguments support individuals taking reasonable measures to avoid causing or propagating harm to other members of the community. As such, by failing to adopt easily implementable preventive behaviors, we live ethically suboptimal lives and violate our social contract to one another. As the world transitions from epidemic to endemic COVID-19, applying the lessons learned from the pandemic is crucial to mitigating old and new infectious disease threats. Along with the role of public health agencies to organize and communicate about communicable diseases, clinicians and public health workers have critical roles in establishing social norms for behaviors that prevent the spread of infectious diseases, given their professional responsibilities and statuses as trusted authority figures. (shrink)

“Inventing AIDS.” “Constructing cancers.” Relax; no bioterrorist mischief is implied. Like “Construction of nature,” “Social construction of illness,” “Social construction of scientific facts,” and many others, these are titles of scholarly books and projects in science, technology, and medicine studies. They express a fashion shared by doctrines loosely known under the rubric of postmodernism. It is recognizable by the frequent scare quotation marks around words such as truth, reality, scientific, and objectivity. The scare quotes convey the message that scientific knowledge (...) is so permeated by politics and cultural biases that it cannot be true and any claim to objectivity is illusory. (shrink)

In teasing out the diverse origins of our “modern, ecological understanding of epidemic disease” Greater than the parts: holism in biomedicine, 1920–1950, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), historians have downplayed the importance of parasitology in the development of a natural history perspective on disease. The present article reassesses the significance of parasitology for the “invention” of medical ecology in post-war France. Focussing on the works of microbiologist Charles Nicolle and on that of physician and zoologist Hervé Harant, I argue that (...) French “medical ecology” was not professionally insulated from some major trends in parasitology, especially in Tunis where disciplinary borders in the medical sciences collapsed. This argument supports the claim that ecological perspectives of disease developed in colonial context but I show that parasitologists such as Harant built on the works of medical geographers who had called attention to the dynamic and complex biological relations between health and environment in fashioning the field of medical ecology in the mid-1950s. As the network of scientists who contributed to the global emergence of “disease ecology” is widening, both medical geography and parasitology stand out as relevant sites of inquiries for a broader historical understanding of the multiple “ecological visions” in twentieth-century biomedical sciences. (shrink)

In the fall of 1950, eleven San Francisco residents were admitted to Berkeley Hospital with rare bacterial infections. Nearly thirty years later, a Senate subcommittee hearing revealed that the military deliberately released Serratia marcescens, a known opportunistic pathogen, from a naval ship in San Francisco Bay just days before the outbreak, which resulted in the death of Edward J. Nevin. Over the next twenty years, a court case and numerous investigations uncovered an alarming truth about the United States biological (...) weapons program. Government and military personnel have repeatedly and publicly defended the safety and ethics of the research program, insisting that the released substances were "harmless simulants", and that their activities did not qualify as human experimentation. These claims contradict not only official project reports, but the knowledge of civilian scientists and the experiences of the exposed populations, which document the widely ignored human dimensions of the project. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Biological Weapons Convention Experiments of Concern Dual‐Use Research: The Ethical Issues Dissemination of Dual‐Use Research Results The Regulation of Dual‐Use Research An Independent Authority Conclusion.

Leishmania major infection of inbred mice leads to a major dichotomous response—death or survival—that depends on the strain of mice. This finding has motivated efforts to locate genetic determinants of disease susceptibility. Genotyping studies have confirmed a complex multilocus trait, but studies directed at the biology of the response suggest identifiable components of susceptibility that may direct the genetic investigations. A confluence of parasite variables—residence in macrophages, class II-dependent immunity, and avoidance of early IL-12 induction—with host factors—a prominent helper T-cell (...) precursor frequency to a dominant parasite epitope and a bias in IL-4 gene activation—conspires to drive an aberrant immune response in animals that suffer fatal disease. These insights may lead to an understanding of factors that focus responses on dominant antigens and that mold the naive T-cell repertoire. Collectively, such factors might contribute to the pathogenesis of other infectious and autoimmune diseases. BioEssays 21:510–518, 1999. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Biotechnology is the use of living systems and organisms to develop or make products, or any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms or derivatives to make or modify products or processes for specific use. Biotechnology is a constantly evolving field of modern science. New tools and products developed by biotechnologists are useful in research, agriculture, industry and healthcare. Although it has many benefits including lowering our environmental footprint, and helping in diagnosis and treatment of diseases, it comes (...) with its all-possible disadvantages. The four main societal concerns revolve around are ethical, safety, bioterrorism and environmental issues. This paper aims to describe those societal concerns raised by applications of biotechnology and possible regulations related to biotech innovations and policy implementation. (shrink)

At the start of the twenty-first century, warnings have been raised in some quarters about how - by intent or by mishap - advances in biotechnology and related ...