As we approach the end of the twentieth century, the ways in which knowledge--scientific, social, and cultural--is produced are undergoing fundamental changes. In The New Production of Knowledge, a distinguished group of authors analyze these changes as marking the transition from established institutions, disciplines, practices, and policies to a new mode of knowledge production. Identifying such elements as reflexivity, transdisciplinarity, and heterogeneity within this new mode, the authors consider their impact and interplay with the role of (...) class='Hi'>knowledge in social relations. While the knowledge produced by research and development in science and technology is accorded central focus, the authors also outline the changing dimensions of social scientific and humanities knowledge and the relations between the production of knowledge and its dissemination through education. Placing science policy and scientific knowledge within the broader context of contemporary society, this book will be essential reading for all those concerned with the changing nature of knowledge, with the social study of science, with educational systems, and with the correlation between research and development and social, economic, and technological development. "Thought-provoking in its identification of issues that are global in scope; for policy makers in higher education, government, or the commercial sector." --Choice "By their insightful identification of the recent social transformation of knowledge production, the authors have been able to assert new imperatives for policy institutions. The lessons of the book are deep." --Alexis Jacquemin, Universite Catholique de Louvain and Advisor, Foreign Studies Unit, European Commission "Should we celebrate the emergence of a 'post-academic' mode of postmodern knowledge production of the post-industrial society of the 21st Century? Or should we turn away from it with increasing fear and loathing as we also uncover its contradictions. A generation of enthusiasts and/or critics will be indebted to the team of authors for exposing so forcefully the intimate connections between all the cognitive, educational, organizational, and commercial changes that are together revolutionizing the sciences, the technologies, and the humanities. This book will surely spark off a vigorous and fruitful debate about the meaning and purpose of knowledge in our culture." --Professor John Ziman, (Wendy, Janey at Ltd. is going to provide affiliation. Contact if you don't hear from her.) "Jointly authored by a team of distinguished scholars spanning a number of disciplines, The New Production of Knowledge maps the changes in the mode of knowledge production and the global impact of such transformations. . . . The authors succeed . . . at sketching out, in very large strokes, the emerging trends in knowledge production and their implications for future society. The macro focus of the book is a welcome change from the micro obsession of most sociologists of science, who have pretty much deconstructed institutions and even scientific knowledge out of existence." --Contemporary Sociology "This book is a timely contribution to current discussion on the breakdown of and need to renegotiate the social contract between science and society that Vannevar Bush and likeminded architects of science policy constructed immediately after World War II. It goes far beyond the usual scattering of fragmentary insights into changing institutional landscapes, cognitive structures, or quality control mechanisms of present day science, and their linkages with society at large. Tapping a wide variety of sources, the authors provide a coherent picture of important new characteristics that, taken altogether, fundamentally challenge our traditional notions of what academic research is all about. This well-founded analysis of the social redistribution of knowledge and its associated power patterns helps articulate what otherwise tends to remain an--albeit widespread--intuition. Unless they adapt to the new situation, universities in the future will find the centers of gravity of knowledge production moving even further beyond their ken. Knowledge of the social and cognitive dynamics of science in research is much needed as a basis of science and technology policymaking. The New Production of Knowledge does a lot to fill this gap. Another unique feature is its discussion of the humanities, which are usually left out in works coming out of the social studies of science." --Aant Elzinga, University od Goteborg. (shrink)

Barry Allen's Vanishing into Things discusses intellectual traditions of Chinese philosophy through the thematic thread of knowledge. The thread takes us chapter by chapter from Confucianism, Daoism, and The Art of War to Chan Buddhism and The Investigation of Things. The final chapter discusses "resonance" and the part it has played in Chinese intellectual history.It wouldn't be surprising if such an ambitious work, covering the range of intellectual traditions that Allen covers, became fragmentary and disparate. After all, such (...) traditions vary in significant ways and in certain respects are unrelated intellectually. What arrests this tendency is the commonality that Allen identifies in the treatment of knowledge.... (shrink)

The paper adopts the co-evolutionary perspective on the human society/natural environment relationship developed, particularly, by the economist Richard Norgaard. This implies that human environmental knowledge is necessarily dynamic and incomplete. By extension, it is also fragmentary, in the sense that what may hold true when considering particular spatial and/or temporal scales may otherwise be false. The paper briefly explores the implications for rationality and belief, focusing particularly on the powerful role of metaphor in our collective and individual sense-making. (...) The implications of one particular metaphor—that of natural capital—are explored. Tentative conclusions about useful educational design are proposed, drawing on recent research. (shrink)

This course on logic and theory of knowledge fell exactly midway between the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900-01 and Ideas I in 1913. It constitutes a summation and consolidation of Husserl’s logico-scientific, epistemological, and epistemo-phenomenological investigations of the preceding years and an important step in the journey from the descriptivo-psychological elucidation of pure logic in the Logical Investigations to the transcendental phenomenology of the absolute consciousness of the objective correlates constituting themselves in its acts in Ideas I. (...) In this course Husserl began developing his transcendental phenomenology as the genuine realization of what had only been realized in fragmentary form in the Logical Investigations. Husserl considered that in the courses that he gave at the University of Göttingen he had progressed well beyond the insights of the Logical Investigations. Once he exposed the objective theoretical scaffolding needed to keep philosophers from falling into the quagmires of psychologism and skepticism, he set out on his voyage of discovery of the world of the intentional consciousness and to introduce the phenomenological analyses of knowledge that were to yield the general concepts of knowledge needed to solve the most recalcitrant problems of theory of knowledge understood as the investigation of the thorny problems involving the relationship of the subjectivity of the knower to the objectivity of what is known. This translation appears at a time when philosophers in English-speaking countries have heartily embraced the thoughts of Husserl’s German contemporary Gottlob Frege and his concerns. It is replete with insights into matters that many philosophers have been primed to appreciate out of enthusiasm for Frege’s ideas. Among these are: anti-psychologism, meaning, the foundations of mathematics, logic, science, and knowledge, his questions about sets and classes, intensions, identity, calculating with concepts, perspicuity, and even his idealism. (shrink)

Modern thought would present only an incomplete and fragmentary picture of philosophy to us if we were to regard it as being completely disconnected from the elemental forces and sources of Greek philosophy. The corrective aspect that protects it from any such attempt at unmethodical isolation is, however, given within itself and in its own content. Its own inner progress necessarily leads it back to the principles and questions that distinguished Greek speculation, which it embodied in typical forms. The (...) thought of the modern age proves its specificity in the fact that, notwithstanding the richness of content that it gains, it remains conscious of its relatedness to these basic logical forms and strives to return to them of its own accord. They will thus themselves appear to us of their own accord and incite us to regard their contents, if we just allow ourselves to follow the course of the investigation. (shrink)

Recent trends in agricultural science have emphasized the need to make local people active participants in the research and development process. Working under the populist banner “Farmer First”, the focus has been on bridging gaps between development professionals and local people, pointing to the inadequate understanding of insiders' knowledge, practices, and processes by outsiders.The purpose of this paper is to expose the paradox of the prevailing populist conception of power and knowledge, and to challenge the simple notion that (...) social processes follow straightforward and systemic patterns and can thus be manipulated with a transfer of power from outside to inside. The authors view “knowledge” as a social process and knowledge systems in terms of a multiplicity of actors and networks through which certain kinds of information are communicated and negotiated, and not as single, cohesive structures, stocks or stores. The guiding phrase is “the analysis of difference”, which suggests that knowledge is multilayered, fragmentary, and diffuse, not unitary and systematized. It emerges as a product of the interaction and dialogue between different actors and networks of actors with conflicting loyalties who negotiate over “truth” claims and battle over contrasting images and contesting interests. The paper challenges those promoting Farmer First approaches to reassess how people in different agroecological and sociocultural contexts make sense of and deal with constraining and enabling processes related to research and extension; how they attempt, through recourse to various discursive means, to enroll one another in their various endeavors; and how they use relations of power in their struggles to gain access to and control of social and political space. (shrink)

With the resurgence in recent years of Hegelian studies a veritable spate of new translations have appeared of that philosopher’s works. For a long time we have had Wallace’s inimitable version of the lesser Logic and the main text of the Philosophy of Mind. We have had also Johnson and Struther’s translation of the greater Logic, Baillie’s Phenomenology, the History of Philosophy done by E. S. Haldane and The Philosophy of History by Sibree, not to mention various fragmentary editions (...) of the Introduction. Besides these there have been Sir Malcolm Knox’s excellent translations of the Rechtsphilosophie and, more recently, of Lectures on Aesthetics. But in the last few years A. V. Miller has given us a new and much improved version of the Science of Logic and the hitherto untranslated Philosophy of Nature as well as a new and revised edition of Wallace’s Encyclopaedia Logic and his Philosophy of Mind with the addition now of the Zusätze in English. At the same time another translation of the Naturphilosophie by Petry appeared, with voluminous historical and explanatory notes. Now attention is being given to the earlier works, and new translations have appeared, under the imprint of the State University of New York Press, of Hegel’s Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophic and Glauben und Wissen, by Walter Cerf and Henry S. Harris, supplementing the Early Theological Writings earlier provided by Knox and Kroner. (shrink)

This instructive work tries to avoid the parochialism and over-technicality characteristic of so much recent theorizing about ethics. The author examines each of the main current accounts of moral goodness and judgment, and then constructs a view of his own in their light--a view predominantly "naturalistic" in its conception of goodness but partially "non-cognitivist" in its treatment of moral judgment. The rest of the book defends and elaborates this view. Mr. Rice writes perceptively, and his accounts of contemporary ethical theories (...) are lucid and concise. His passion for non-technicality, however, makes the presentation of his own view less convincing than it might have been; his argument is sometimes elusive and fragmentary, and his writing, though vivid, often lacks clarity and precision. Still, this is a book of considerable significance; one hopes that it will mark the beginning of a broader, more constructive approach to the problems of ethical theory.--V. C. C. (shrink)

The article focuses on the key aspects (which are the principles of holism and evolution) of the integral approach of the modern American philosopher, Ken Wilber. The theory of Ken Wilber is analyzed in the framework of the new paradigm of science, which is being developed during the last decade of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. The advantages of the works of Ken Wilber are the following: firstly, the scientist was able to systematize and integrate dozens (...) of other theoretical approaches, most of which are relatively new and not well-known. Secondly, Ken Wilber’s theory is important for the reason that it can serve as a methodological and “practical” method, which can be applied to the study of any phenomenon, taking into consideration as many aspects of reality as possible, as well as those theoretical approaches, which are otherwise unrelated to each other. It makes possible to avoid reductionism and fragmentation of knowledge in the study of (religion). The article shows the importance of Wilber’s theory for the area of religious studies. I have built existing theories that study religion into a methodological “map”, which provides a basis for such kind of approach to religion that can integrate positivistic, phenomenological, functionalist, psychological and other theories in the area of religious studies. Such theories, taken separately, study only one aspect of religion, representing a fragmentary knowledge of this phenomenon, and this aspect is compensated by an integral approach. In addition, it can be hypothesizedthat antagonisms between religious bodies and religious persons can be interpreted and explained as a conflict between different structures of consciousness, (studied by K. Wilber in his works as well). (shrink)

Based on the standpoint close to that of philosophical functionalism, the paper addresses the history and present state of scientific research on artificial reconstruction of some of the rational thinking functions, and acquisition of valid knowledge of phenomenally given actuality, by way of engineering artificial intelligent automata. Thereby, the author examines the settings of emergence of an attendant basic ontology, and the place of logic in the process of knowing, by intelligent automata and humans, accordingly. Analysis and collations are (...) made by proceeding from the phenomenalistic logic and ontology presupposition in the theory of experience and knowing, as previously detailed by the author. Under this presupposition, the actual is considered temporally ordered facts with attached significance used to order them logically, in reciprocally defining them logical relations as a result of phenomenal statements on their identification and re-identification as such. The paper offers an overview of primary logical and ontological foundations for operation of intelligent automata classed as “expert systems” in their collation with a correspondent model of functionally determined meaningful activity of humans, while making the case for the observation on a sufficient functional parallelism between them, against the background of their noted specifics. By moving on to engineering intelligent automata classed as “machine learning systems” grounded on “connectionism”, prospects for overcoming the deficit of reflexive plasticity in “artificial intelligence”, and the effect of fundamental convergence between the human functional intelligence and an “artificial” intelligence, are clarified. Admitting a demonstrated functional success of such intelligent automata in the functional context, along with their logic being affined to that of humans, the notion of intelligence incurs significant de-humanization. Manuscript received 14.02.2020. (shrink)

An analysis of Paul Tillich's three‐volume Systematic Theology and Pitirim A. Sorokin's The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation reveals how a metaphysical dialogue on God and love contributes to scientific and theological scholarship on altruism. This article focuses on similarities and differences in Tillich and Sorokin. Similarities include a belief in the importance of the ontological/love connection and the conclusion that a special state, ecstasy, is integral to the experience of genuine love. Differences (...) serve to complement rather than negate. For example, Tillich's recognition that ecstatic connections with the divine within finitude are fragmentary balances Sorokin's view that these ecstatic peaks are reached only by the few. The similarities give resonance and point to the overall creation, while the differences often serve as counterpoint to balance the ideas of the scientist and the theologian. (shrink)

These fragmentary and often repetitious papers-some of them published before Schutz's death--are organized under three headings: 1) On the Methodology of the Social Sciences, 2) Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, and 3) Symbol, Reality and Society. Schutz elaborates the structures of the "natural attitude," earlier described by Husserl, and defends the irreducible reality of the Lebenswelt which is necessarily presupposed by science, knowledge, language, and the interpretation of signs. Intersubjectivity is at the core of the Lebenswelt and Schutz (...) ably criticizes the inadequate work done by Husserl, Scheler and Sartre on the problem of the other. The tone of all the papers is expository and critical rather than original, as if Schutz was preparing his own views by "working through" a host of other writers.--A. B. D. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge develops in an increasingly fragmentary way.A multitude of scientific disciplines branch out. Curiosity for thisdevelopment leads into quests for a unifying understanding. To a certain extent, foundational studies provide such unification. There is a tendency, however, also of a fragmentary growth of foundational studies, like in a multitude of disciplinaryfoundations. We suggest to look at the foundational problem, not primarily as a search for foundations for one discipline in another, as in some reductionist approach, but (...) as a steady revelation ofpresuppositions for individual scientific theories – which are boundto meet, sooner or later, in a common language. A decisive point hereis our holistic conception of language, as a whole of description-interpretation processes which are entangled(complementary) in the language itself. For every language there is alinguistic complementarity. We suggest this unique form ofentanglement as a unifying presupposition, ultimately foundational forall communicable knowledge. Involved is a linguistic realism, in terms ofwhich we critically examine ``language-world'' problems, as exposed byWittgenstein, and Russell, about a foundational interdependence of language andreality (world). Throughout, we attach to the developmentof foundational studies of mathematics, logics, and the naturalsciences. In particular, we study the interpretation problem foraxioms of infinity in some detail. We emphasize that the holistic concept of language contradicts Carnap's semiotic fragmentation thesis (thus, no clean cutbetween syntax, semantics, pragmatics). (shrink)

People use commonsense science knowledge to flexibly explain, predict, and manipulate the world around them, yet we lack computational models of how this commonsense science knowledge is represented, acquired, utilized, and revised. This is an important challenge for cognitive science: Building higher order computational models in this area will help characterize one of the hallmarks of human reasoning, and it will allow us to build more robust reasoning systems. This paper presents a novel assembled coherence theory of human (...) conceptual change, whereby people revise beliefs and mental models by constructing and evaluating explanations using fragmentary, globally inconsistent knowledge. We implement AC theory with Timber, a computational model of conceptual change that revises its beliefs and generates human-like explanations in commonsense science. Timber represents domain knowledge using predicate calculus and qualitative model fragments, and uses an abductive model formulation algorithm to construct competing explanations for phenomena. Timber then scores competing explanations with respect to previously accepted beliefs, using a cost function based on simplicity and credibility, identifies a low-cost, preferred explanation and accepts its constituent beliefs, and then greedily alters previous explanation preferences to reduce global cost and thereby revise beliefs. Consistency is a soft constraint in Timber; it is biased to select explanations that share consistent beliefs, assumptions, and causal structure with its other, preferred explanations. In this paper, we use Timber to simulate the belief changes of students during clinical interviews about how the seasons change. We show that Timber produces and revises a sequence of explanations similar to those of the students, which supports the psychological plausibility of AC theory. (shrink)

Dealing with fragmentary texts is an unavoidable task for anyone working on the Greco-Roman world with the awareness that only a tiny portion of the texts produced in antiquity has survived the perilous process of transmission. Since the Renaissance, generations of scholars have painstakingly collected and sifted quotations, paraphrases and allusions in later authors and grammatical sources, laying the foundation for our knowledge of large parts of that lost world. More recently a spectacular increase was made possible by (...) the papyrological discoveries. Even so, after centuries of explorations in this field, the evidence provided by the indirect sources and, in particular, by the still partly unpublished troves of medieval lexicographical excerpts and compilations is far from having been exhaustively exploited. (shrink)

This collection of articles and associated discussion papers focuses on a problem that has attracted increasing attention from linguists and psychologists throughout the world during the past several years. Reduced to essentials, the problem is that of discovering the character of the mental capacities that make it possible for human beings to attain knowledge of their language on the basis of fragmentary and haphazard early linguistic experience. A fundamental assumption running through all of these contributions is that people (...) possess strong innate predispositions that are critical for success in this task. (shrink)

This article proposes a unified framework for understanding creative problem solving, namely, the explicit–implicit interaction theory. This new theory of creative problem solving constitutes an attempt at providing a more unified explanation of relevant phenomena (in part by reinterpreting/integrating various fragmentary existing theories of incubation and insight). The explicit–implicit interaction theory relies mainly on 5 basic principles, namely, (a) the coexistence of and the difference between explicit and implicit knowledge, (b) the simultaneous involvement of implicit and explicit processes (...) in most tasks, (c) the redundant representation of explicit and implicit knowledge, (d) the integration of the results of explicit and implicit processing, and (e) the iterative (and possibly bidirectional) processing. A computational implementation of the theory is developed based on the CLARION cognitive architecture and applied to the simulation of relevant human data. This work represents an initial step in the development of process-based theories of creativity encompassing incubation, insight, and various other related.. (shrink)

How can we know what really happened in the distant past in places like ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Greece, and Rome, especially since the evidence is fragmentary and ancient cultures are so different from our own frame of reference? Scholars may examine historical documents and archaeological artifacts, and then make reasonable inferences. But in the final analysis there can be no absolute certainty about events far removed from present reality, and the past must be reconstructed by means of hypotheses (...) that coherently organize all available data. Knowledge claims about the past, and about many areas of science as well, rest on a network of interdependence between theory and evidence, and between interpretation and data. In this fascinating study of epistemology, philosopher Peter Kosso argues for a coherence model of epistemic justification. In the first part, the conceptual argument, he proposes a model of knowledge of the past. In the second part he presents three detailed case studies drawn from the work of historians and archaeologists. These studies are used to support and fine-tune the model outlined in the first part. Kosso presents many insights into the limits of knowledge and our ability to know the mental as well as the physical past. Historians, archaeologists, philosophers, and students interested in epistemology will find this accessible work to be of great value. (shrink)

Charles Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, was a thinker of extraordinary depth and range - he wrote on philosophy, mathematics, psychology, physics, logic, phenomenology, semiotics, religion and ethics - but his writings are difficult and fragmentary. This book provides a clear and comprehensive explanation of Peirce's thought. His philosophy is presented as a systematic response to 'nominalism', the philosophy which he most despised and which he regarded as the underpinning of the dominant philosophical worldview of his time. The book (...) explains Peirce's challenge to nominalism as a theory of meaning and shows its implications for his views of knowledge, truth, the nature of reality, and ethics. It will be essential reading both for Peirce scholars and for those new to his work. (shrink)

While a knowledge of Wordsworth's philosophical outlook would be quite helpful in understanding his poetry, it has proved difficult to re-construct this outlook from the fragmentary hints given in the poetry itself. Hirsch has found an adequate substitute in Schelling's early philosophy, notwithstanding the fact that neither was influenced by the other. The justification for linking Wordsworth with Schelling must be sought in the unity and inner coherence of the romantic perspective itself. Ignoring the vicissitudes in its development (...) as extraneous to his purpose, Hirsch presents a clear and vigorous outline accurately portraying the basic features of Schelling's philosophy up to 1806. The application of insights gleaned from this study of Schelling to the interpretation of specific poems is both instructive and convincing.--L. S. F. (shrink)

In conversations with Schlick and Waismann from June and December 1930, Wittgenstein began to turn his attention to the topic of games. This topic also centrally concerned Schlick. In his earliest philosophical output, Schlick had relied on the results of evolutionary biology in setting out an account of the emergence of the human species’ ability to play [Spiel] as a prerequisite for the genesis of scientific knowledge. Throughout his subsequent works one finds fragmentary appeals to this early view, (...) e.g. in his oft misunderstood claim that play constitutes the meaning of life. Wittgenstein’s turn to the topic of games in 1930 not only happened while Professor Schlick was in the room, but was also coupled with an explicit response to Schlick’s 1930 book Fragen der Ethik. Schlick here employs the example of chess to distinguish between rules and their application – a distinction which underlies his whole attempt to naturalise ethics as a descriptive psycho-sociological discipline. This paper investigates the relation between Wittgenstein’s and Schlick’s accounts of games in light of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Schlick’s ethics. Wittgenstein’s objections can be answered by taking Schlick’s theory of play into consideration. (shrink)

The classic logical positivist account of historical explanation, putting forward what is variously called the "regularity interpretation" (#Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation), the "covering law model" (#Dray, Laws and Explanation in History), or the "deductive model" (Michael #Scriven, "Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations"). See also #Danto, Narration and Knowledge, for further criticisms of the model. Hempel formalizes historical explanation as involving (a) statements of determining (initial and boundary) conditions for the event to be explained, and (b) statements (...) of general laws that imply that whenever events of the kind described in (a) occur, an event of the kind to be explained will take place. He admits that in practice historians rarely explain historical events in this way, but instead give only fragmentary "explanation sketches." Such sketches can, however, be "scientifically acceptable," providing it points to where "more specific statements" are to be found (351). An interesting aspect of the article is its "late" positivist, proto‑Kuhnian assertion that "the separation of 'pure description' and 'hypothetical generalization and theory construction' in empirical science is unwarranted" (356). But Hempel does not work out the wider implications of this important conclusion. It is also worth noting that he himself was not much interested in the philosophy of history; other authors took up his model and discussed it within that context. Usefully discussed by #Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1:112‑17. (shrink)

This chapter examines the fragmentary evidence derived from Timaeus' history of the city-states of Sicily and Southern Italy, with special attention to the account of a certain Apollonius preserved by Iamblichus in his work On the Pythagorean Way of Life. The analysis introduces the term, “exoteric” Pythagoreans, which appears to correspond with the mathematical Pythagoreans, on the grounds that both were considered heretical for having published/demonstrated the doctrines of Pythagoras—an act that corresponded with the advent of a “democratic” type (...) of Pythagoreanism. A comparative analysis of Timaean and Peripatetic histories of Pythagoreanism yields an account of how the “publication” of the doctrines of Pythagoras corresponds with the “democratization” of philosophical knowledge, an activity that serves as a model for the public use of reason in order to resolve disputes. (shrink)

In this paper, we have analyzed a number of solutions to the antinomy between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If we assume that God is temporal, then a sort of backwards causation of past divine beliefs by future human acts must be acknowledged. Since this solution runs into difficulties, we consider the prospects of the view according to which God is outside time. A timeless and omniscient God seems to imply a B-theory of time and, at least at first glance, (...) seems to jeopardize human freedom. Therefore, we have examined what happens when a non-standard A-theory of time like Fragmentalism is assumed. We demonstrate that in this case the prospects of a timeless view of God are much better: both human freedom and divine knowledge of the results of human choices are preserved if this metaphysics of time is adopted. The costs of this solution are, however, very high. From the logical point of view, it rejects bivalence; from the metaphysical point of view, the world is regarded as fragmentary and incoherent. However, if one is ready to accept these costs, this solution is one of the most successful in the search for a solution to the centuries-old problem of the conciliation between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the known evidence for Byzantine engagement with what are conventionally termed “alchemical” texts, theories, and practices of the Islamic world. Much of the evidence is difficult to date. Nevertheless, the aggregated direct, indirect, and circumstantial evidence suggests at least some engagement by Greek-speaking scholars throughout the Middle Ages. This engagement took various forms, from the use of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish terminology to the adaptation of whole Arabic treatises in Greek. Sometimes the Byzantine texts emphasize their Islamicate (...) sources, and sometimes they do not mention these sources at all. The resulting picture is still fragmentary, but it indicates that medieval Greek-speaking scholars were active in the circulation of chemical knowledge and techniques in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Byzantium, therefore, should no longer be left out of research into long-term patterns in the history of science. (shrink)

This essay argues for the philosophical standing of Walter Benjamin’s early work and posits a deeper continuity between this early work as a philosopher and the subsequent development of his work as a writer. When these fragments are read in proper relation to each other, they reveal for the first time many of the key innovations of Benjamin as a philosopher, as well as his points of influence on Horkheimer and Adorno. His early ‘Program’ critiques the Enlightenment conception of experience (...) as a means for gaining empirical knowledge, and announces the need for a new concept of experience. Benjamin follows through on this program with a method of philosophical enquiry that is by turns fragmentary and constellational, developing a series of provisional notions of experience, which form a constellation with one another: perception, mimesis, language as a medium of experience, observation and memory. (shrink)

Philosophy and Truth offers the first English translation of six unpublished theoretical studies written just after the publication of The Birth of Tragedy and simultaneously with Untimely Meditations. In addition to the texts themselves, which probe epistemological problems on philosophy's relation to art and culture, this book contains a lengthy introduction that provides the biographical and philological information necessary for understanding these often fragmentary texts. The introduction also includes a helpful discussion of Nietzsche's early views concerning culture, knowledge, (...) philosophy, and the Greeks. (shrink)

"Against a backdrop of global change of every kind, from climate to demography, from national security to international terrorism, it is becoming increasingly evident that we live in a deeply interconnected world. However, our approach to leaders continues to be stuck in an individual-centred mindset that perceives the world from a disconnected and fragmentary perspective. And so it is critical that we make the shift to a new kind of global leadership. Such a leadership would be born out of (...) a deep sense of interconnectedness. Never before has it become more urgent for us to choose leaders and to become leaders who possess greater awareness and humanity. In this context, Africa has a vital role to play. Africa's gift to global leadership lies in its roots - in communally expressed humanity inspired by the collective wisdom and actions of all human beings. It takes the human being as the starting point, emphasizing the dignity and worth of all, and relying on the philosophical constructs of uBuntu and iSintu. These ideas call for all of us to be the kind of leaders who know that we are who we are because of other people. Personal growth, African style takes an approach to leadership which offers a path to personal development, dealing with leadership as a process of self-discovery and a journey to the centre of oneself and one's origins. It inspires leadership through the individual's reclaiming his or her wholeness as a human being, as an African, as a global citizen. It seeks to regenerate and ignite the less tangible aspects of leadership: those linked to higher purpose and self-awareness and to the good of a broader community. While focusing on personal growth, this approach not only calls upon you, the individual, to expand the level and depth of your self-awareness, but to honour and enrich the potential of those whose lives you touch. The book contains a variety of readings and tools as well as written exercises to help you to grow personally and to encourage you to begin to see yourself as a person who expresses the values, knowledge and behaviour which consciously embody uBuntu. It seeks to reclaim the possibility of a more human style of leadership. Not only for Africa, but for the world"--Cover. (shrink)

Most areas of the cognitive and social sciences assume that knowledge representations are constructed and used during communication and that much of its content is social. Those of us who build computer models of comprehension and conversation are forced to be explicit about the nature of these knowledge representations and affiliated processes. There are some conditions when knowledge is not sufficiently social, and other conditions when knowledge is overly grounded in social mechanisms. The argument is advanced (...) that constraints, coherence, and precision are very much at the heart of an explanation of the nature and amount of social knowledge. Asocial content reigns supreme when the referential world knowledge is highly constrained, coherently structured, and precisely specified. The social context of knowledge construction becomes progressively more influential to the extent to that world knowledge is vague, open-ended, imprecise, underspecified, and fragmentary. (shrink)

Erin Plunkett draws from both analytic and continental sources to argue for the philosophical relevance of style, making the case that the essay form is uniquely suited to address the sceptical problem. The authors examined here-Montaigne, Hume, the early German Romantics, Kierkegaard and Stanley Cavell-bring into relief the relationship between scepticism and ordinary life and situate the will to know within a broader frame of meaningful human activity. The formal features of the essay call attention to time, subjectivity, and language (...) as the existential conditions of knowledge. -/- In contrast to foundationalist approaches, which expect philosophy to reach empirical or rational certainty, Plunkett demonstrates through these writings the philosophical advantages of a fragmentary, non-dogmatic style of writing. A Philosophy of the Essay shows how this medium can help us come to terms with the contingency and uncertainty of life. (shrink)

The authors of the article with reference to the discussions about the status of knowledge in the postmodernism discourse and the "crisis of the intellectual" presented in the works by J.F. Lyotard and Z. Bauman, consider these issues in the context of other social challenges. Interpreting the conducted empirical research results, the research also focuses on the multidisciplinary theoretical analysis of philosophical, psychological and pedagogical literature. The authors note that in the absence of metanarratives, the phenomenon of intellectuals and (...) intellectual work is transformed: postmodern epistemology has changed the opportunities of mass education about how things should stand / what to have / how to act into the multiple / polyphonic / variable / fragmentary / collage dissemination of knowledge. As an argument in the "crisis of intellectuals" discussion, the authors analyze the educators` need and motivation sphere emphasizing constant knowledge enhancement to be a priority for them, which logically affects professional identity reconstruction carried out through self-reference. The paper presents an opinion that intellectuals lack self-perception as a reference social group. We conclude that in the information society, public interaction with the media affecting the reconsideration of the intellectual`s role and status serves as a basis for their legitimation. The results of the conducted survey enable us to conclude that raising educators` intellectual level affects their competences in professional practices. The status of the intellectual-educator is legitimized by their activity in training sessions, discussions, meet-ups and other events. The study presents an algorithm for constructing the intellectual-educator in the conditions of social reality challenges. The research substantiates demand for the intellectual-educator who is IT literate, capable of professional reflection, open to change, motivated for continuous self-development, ready for the reconstruction of professional identity from a knowledge transmitter to an erudite, a creative coach, a supervisor and a moderator. (shrink)

Let us start our analysis with a reference to a thesis formulated by Scholem under the general heading "Ten Unhistorical Propositions about Kabbalah." The ninth thesis reads as follows: "Totalities can only be conveyed [tradierbar] in an occult manner. God’s name is capable of being addressed in language but not of being uttered in language. For only its fragmentariness renders language utterable. The ‘true’ language cannot be uttered, just as the absolutely concrete cannot be realized." In the third thesis he (...) says, "Character of knowledge in Kabbalah: Torah is the medium in which all beings come to know.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Euripides' Escape-Tragedies: A Study of Helen, Andromeda, and Iphigenia among the TauriansHelene P. FoleyMatthew Wright. Euripides' Escape-Tragedies: A Study of Helen, Andromeda, and Iphigenia among the Taurians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. viii + 433 pp. Cloth, $125.Due to their putatively lighter tone, exotic foreign settings, and concluding "resolutions" of past misfortunes, Euripides' Helen, fragmentary Andromeda, and Iphigenia Among the Taurians (henceforth IT) have often been described (...) as proto-romances or tragi-comedies. Wright's study follows recent trends in defining ancient Greek dramatic genres above all through their performance context; he argues that the plays belong firmly in the tragic camp and develop serious philosophical and religious themes that deliberately leave their audience in a state of aporia. The plots of these plays share an escape from disaster/remote and threatening environments. Although we cannot firmly date IT, Wright tries to make the case that these apparently unique shared elements suggest that the plays were performed as a coherent trilogy in 412 B.C.E. The book does not [End Page 465] attempt to address in detail many aspects of these (relatively neglected) plays that have been extensively discussed by other critics. Instead Wright focuses on the plays' generic status, their possible mythical innovations, their remote settings, and their philosophy and theology.Although there are many unusual mythical elements in these plays, Wright makes a detailed case that Euripides most probably recombined elements previously known in the tradition to a novel effect, rather than inventing them. He casts considerable doubt on Stesichorus' palinode and Herodotus as origins for Euripides' innocent Egyptian Helen, however. Wright challenges previous assumptions by arguing that Euripides does not develop the plays' barbarian settings. Indeed, there is little ethnic or geographical detail beyond a few initial sketchy references, and the plays blur the differences between Greeks and barbarian "others." The Egyptians Proteus, Theoclymenus, and Theonoe are, genealogically speaking, Greek (183). After a lengthy discussion of the problems of defining philosophical elements in tragedy, Wright links the plays' extensive treatment of the unreliable nature of human language and knowledge of reality to discussions of comparable themes in the fragments of the Sophists, especially Gorgias and Democritus. Finally, Wright argues that the plays, by stressing the impossibility of understanding the divine forces that govern the universe, represent an unusually bleak theological picture. The dei ex machina that conclude Helen and IT belatedly outline mysterious divine patterns governing the confusing dramatic events, but humans can only repeatedly misinterpret their experience and name the divine forces governing their lives, erroneously in Wright's view, as tuche\.These issues, above all the themes of illusion and reality and the nature of divinity in the plays, have in fact been discussed before, but Wright attempts a fuller (with the exception of his attenuated discussion of ritual) and methodologically tighter discussion. This represents both the book's strength and weakness. Without its exhaustive review of dated and (putatively) weakly argued earlier critical views, the book could, and in my view ideally should, have made its positive case more forcefully in half the length. At the same time, by failing to engage with important earlier treatments of central topics, Wright leaves the reader with the impression that scholarly work on these issues is far less nuanced than it has in fact been. To give a few examples that he neglects altogether, his discussion of Aristophanes' parody of Euripides in Thesmophoriazusae (120, n. 196; see also 50–51) does not take advantage of Zeitlin's seminal article on the topic ("Travesties of Gender and Genre in Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazusae," published most recently in her Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature [Chicago, 1996], 375–416); he does not make use of John H. Finley's extensive study of Euripides, Thucydides, and the sophists (Three Essays on Thucydides, [Cambridge, Mass., 1967]); other important methodologically sophisticated work on philosophy and tragedy, such as that of Mary Whitlock Blundell (Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics [Cambridge, 1989]) or Christopher Gill (Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue [Oxford, 1996]), does not even appear in the notes. [End Page 466... (shrink)

This paper uses the proxy evidence of relic inventories and labels to explore the role of relics in medieval Christianity. By means of an examination of their material nature, it argues that their primary characteristics were their fragmentary and often amorphous nature; their lack of intrinsic identification; and their easy portability. By emphasising that relic collecting was a habit that contributed to establishing religious identities and affiliations, the paper clarifies relics' role in relocating knowledge of Christian history into (...) the homes and churches of medieval Europe. Finally, having noted that their dissemination followed established networks of travel and communication, it emphasises that relics rendered the essentials of Christianity tangible and portable. (shrink)

IntroductionIn May 2006, the small group of doctoral students working on ecophilosophy at the Higher Institute of Philosophy at K.U.Leuven invited the Dutch environmental philosopher Martin Drenthen to a workshop to discuss his writings on the concept of wilderness, its metaphysical and moral meaning, and the challenge social constructivism poses for ecophilosophy and environmental protection. Drenthen’s publications on these topics had already been the subject of intense discussions in the months preceding the workshop. His presentation on the workshop and the (...) three critical responses by Wim Bollen, Glenn Deliège, and Richard Kover are published here in a thoroughly revised form on the basis of further and ongoing discussions about the issues involved. Three further contributions to the discussion are added: one by Nathan Edward Kowalski, a young Canadian philosopher who studied in Leuven and wrote his as yet unpublished dissertation on “Evil in Nature,” a second one by Kingsley Goodwin who is currently writing a dissertation on deep ecology at University College in Dublin and, finally, my own unsystematic thoughts inspired by Martin Drenthen’s provocative and stimulating hermeneutics of our postmodern understanding of nature and wilderness, as well as the diverse critical responses to Drenthen’s views by the other contributors. I owe gratitude to all of them for enriching my own ecophilosophical thought and enlarging its horizon although as my fragmentary reflections show at the cost of yet greater uncertainty and more questions about the possibilities of arguing for a radical environmentalist position. Such a position would somehow connect or ground our moral obligation to preserve genuine non-human otherness, wild and free nature, in the non-human meaning of such nature and in our essential need to be in direct and concrete contact with that field of wild non-human meaning because we ourselves belong to nature, because we are not only and purely civilized but are also and most fundamentally wild and free. Three fundamental questions need to be distinguished: the question about our moral obligations regarding nature and its preservation, the metaphysical question about the nature of nature or the meaning of nature, and the question of the metaphysical grounding of our morals in general, and of our moral obligation regarding nature in particular, in the nature or meaning of nature. The complex intertwinement between these three questions is at the heart of Martin Drenthen’s reflections.The authors contributing to the present discussion approach the various issues from markedly different philosophical backgrounds and concerns: critical theory, anthropology, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and deep ecology are all to some degree or other brought to bear on the question of what wilderness means for us, why we are fascinated by it and what it actually and in the first place is.Another interesting difference between the five respondents to Martin Drenthen’s wilderness-philosophy relates to the place from which they write: while the Canadians Richard Kover and Nathan Edward Kowalski have wilderness of some sort still close at hand, the Belgians Wim Bollen and Glenn Deliège write from a place which has been thoroughly domesticated, cultivated, and industrialised for a long time. Martin Drenthen himself, of course, writes from the same kind of place as these last two, which explains why he only refers to the wilderness that he has read about in novels, seen in movies, or experienced as recreated in the reserves of the Netherlands. The Irish Kingsley Goodwin writes perhaps from a third, intermediate place that is not wild anymore but still much more natural than Belgium or the Netherlands are.The differences in philosophical approach and concern combined with the difference of place generate a rich tapestry of perspectives and voices wrestling with the fundamental questions of our perceived homelessness and alienation from nature, our cultural discontent, our longing for and need for radical alterity, of immanence and transcendence, of who we are and where we belong, and more concretely of whether there is more to ground our efforts to preserve nature than enlightened self-interest and subjective preference. Martin Drenthen deserves praise for inaugurating this fruitful discussion with his intriguing and highly paradoxical effort to hybridize a postmodern deconstruction of the idea and ideal of wilderness as unspoilt and true nature on the one hand with a new metaphysics of wilderness on the other. Arne Naess, who is generally regarded as the founding father of deep ecology, pointed out the positive and stimulating role that vagueness in the expression of ideas can play in political and philosophical debate. Such general and vague but highly suggestive expressions as ‘all life is one’ are not empty at all, as is often claimed; they are rather full of possibilities of ‘precisation’ and differentiation. Drenthen’s wilderness-philosophy is certainly not vague to the degree of ‘all life is one,’ but his expositions are similarly pregnant with a wealth of further questions, precisations, distinctions, and conceptual clarifications. Good examples of different kinds are to be found in the contributions of Nathan Edward Kowalski and Richard Kover. Kowalski points out that Drenthen’s notions of culture and wilderness need to be made more precise by distinguishing them from the notions of civilization and wildness such that wild cultures become a conceptual possibility. Richard Kover takes the lead from Drenthen’s question about the reason for our postmodern fascination for wilderness to confront it with our primordial fascination in terms of the dependence in the evolution of our subjectivity and our consciousness on the focused perceptual attention on wild forms.Glenn Deliège situates Martin Drenthen’s wilderness-philosophy in its original context of the Dutch debate on the preservation of nature, in particular on the new wilderness paradigm. According to this paradigm, the nature to be preserved should be true and pure, truly natural and wild nature, that is nature outside of and free from the cultivating and domesticating influence of humans. In the Netherlands, however, such nature no longer exists; it can only be preserved after it has first been artificially recreated. Deliège gives an informative summary account of the highly charged three-cornered debate between the adepts of this wilderness-paradigm, the proponents of the more traditional form of conservation of remnants of the typical European landscapes created by pre-industrial farming practices and the modern technocratic functionalists. This debate makes obvious that there are quite different views of the nature of nature and its value. Enter social constructivism: the contested nature of nature is nothing more than a social construct, an idea in a collective mind. The contestation itself is a struggle for authority and power between different such social constructs, any claim to scientific objectivity and objective truth for one’s image of nature is an arrogation of a truth which doesn’t exist and is potentially oppressive by silencing other views. Nature then is up for the grabs of politics, political negotiation, and compromise between various interest groups who all want to get some benefit from nature, some use-value.The problem with Drenthen’s effort to articulate a normative concept of nature which cannot be deconstructed in this way is the extreme formality and emptiness of his metaphysical concept of wilderness as that which is always ‘beyond’, always ‘more’ and which can never be exhausted by any image and construction of nature. Any more concrete determination is mere appearance; the thing in itself is a border concept of that which in fact cannot be grasped conceptually. Glenn Deliège is critical of this formality and emptiness from which it will be impossible to derive any concrete guidance for our conservation practices. He then goes on to defend the Arcadian tradition of our appreciation of nature as giving us a historically well-grounded orientation for those practices. Of course that Arcadian tradition is obviously a cultural construction but that doesn’t make it completely arbitrary and contingent since it is itself ultimately grounded in and open to modification by our concrete sensuous experiences of nature.Deliège here raises the very important issue of the relation between our concrete perceptual and bodily experiences in and with nature and our concepts and metaphysical images of nature. Drenthen himself approaches this issue from the hermeneutical perspective of our need to make sense of our experiences and to articulate their meaning. His confrontation with social constructivism and his effort to salvage something from its relativizing acid lead him, however, into the direction of a highly abstract and empty concept of wilderness.Richard Kover shows that perception is, indeed, the key to a radical critique of social constructivism. He does this with the help of the ecological anthropology of Paul Shepard, the structuralist anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss and the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It needs to be said here that Kover takes his leave from an unpublished paper by Martin Drenthen with the title “How to appropriate wilderness appropriately?” – the paper is accessible though on Drenthen’s web-site - in which Drenthen comments and reflects upon three contemporary wilderness-tales, one of them being Werner Herzog’s much-discussed documentary on Timothy Treadwell, an American environmentalist drop-out who lived thirteen summers among wild grizzlies in the Alaskan wilderness before being killed together with his girlfriend by a grizzly bear.Kover tries to show that we are not imprisoned in the mirror-cabinet of our mind or of our human sociality. To make his case, he starts from Paul Shepard’s thoughtful observation that the evolutionary emergence of the mind did not remove us from the natural world but actually connected us deeper with it. Through our mind we evolved more fully into it because our mind is primordially in our senses and in the ability to articulate a perceptual world. The natural world in the form of the system of natural species and their relations is the primary model for perceptual discriminations, for the fundamental discovery of order with its twin-aspects of distinction and discontinuity on the one side and relations and continuity on the other side. Our cognition is essentially perceptually based, our subjectivity is primordially informed by our inherence in the sensible world. Perceptual cognition is inherently intentional and relational, it is not an autonomous mental construction, it is rather in the world and informed by that which is perceived. The other is always intertwined with the subject. We are always already hooked up with the world, with the others, before we start reflecting, thinking, and conceptualizing. This is one of the major themes in Shepard’s work: what this insight means with regard to our relations to non-human otherness, in particular to our perceptual encounter with wild animals. In our encounter with non-human otherness, we are confronted with an essentially ambiguous sense of both affinity and disjuncture. Wild animals demonstrate to us that we are not homeless or alien to this world, that we fundamentally belong to it and are part of it. Their difference, however, shows us that there are different perspectives and ways of being in the world. “Thus the encounter with non-human others inform humans that we are both of the world and simultaneously not the world and there are horizons of significance beyond our own perspective.”Nathan Edward Kowalski comes to a similar conclusion when he situates our morality in the larger moral order of wild nature. According to Kowalski it is indeed a moral order though not our own, an Other to our morality but not simply a negative one. It is, as Drenthen says, a highly paradoxical amoral morality. But what can it mean to speak of morality here? For Kowalski it means that the issue is not merely the theoretical recognition and acknowledgment of axiological transcendence, of non-human values out there, but whether we will appropriately conform to and comport ourselves towards that axiological transcendence so that we can find a human homeland in wild nature instead of turning it into a wasteland. The question then is, how to fit our own human morality into this larger order and greater reality, to subordinate it to that greater reality as a part of it and encompassed but not denied by it so that we can be moral and natural at the same time, tender carnivores hunting the sacred game. Indigenous people follow a moral protocol in their relationship with non-human others which acknowledge and respects their autonomy, their alterity, and the sacred mystery of their different ways of being. They are not befriended but some of them are hunted and eaten – as an exchange in the gift-economy of nature.The problem of the homelessness and alienation from nature is discussed by Wim Bollen from the radically different vantage point of critical theory. In Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment the human story unfolds as a tragic effort to liberate ourselves from nature and to become fully human through rational control when in the end this effort turns against ourselves and instead of liberation and human flourishing we get social domination and repression of our natural needs. The frustrations and mutilations imposed upon us by a repressive civilization give rise to the regressive desire for a return to a natural existence. Referring to the myth of Odysseus and Circe as interpreted by Adorno and Horkheimer, Wim Bollen equates such a natural existence with animal life. In the light of contemporary knowledge about primitive existence, however, this equation is highly problematic. Palaeolithic foragers were already fully human in all respects. A life without civilization need not be an animal-existence.According to Adorno/Horkheimer, our subjectivity and autonomy have to be wrested from animal-nature through an exertive struggle that cannot but proceed by a threefold strategy of domination: the domination of non-human otherness, of human others, and of our own inner nature. The siren song of nature consists in the temptation to give up that struggle for the promise of an unreflective, non-alienated natural existence without toil.When Odysseus’ men give in to Circe’s seduction they are, however, not transformed into wild animals but into swine. According to Bollen this signifies that we cannot re-wild ourselves, that we remain imprisoned in civilization, either as master-subjects or as domesticated animals. Bollen, by the way, like Drenthen, does not distinguish conceptually between civilization and culture. Since re-wilding for Bollen means the impossibility of returning to animal-existence, which is actually the impossibility of becoming another species since biologically we are animals already, to be imprisoned in civilisation means nothing else than to be imprisoned in our humanity. The fact that we cannot become wild animals again – according to Paul Shepard, however, we are still wild animals – is indeed, as Bollen stresses, a trivial form of alienation. A more meaningful concept of alienation which can be put to critical use must refer to a culturally and historically determined frustration and deficit inside the cultural order that is to be overcome not by an impossible regression but by progressive politics leading beyond the three intertwined forms of domination. Not back to nature but forward towards a reconciliation of culture with nature! Such a reconciliation would neither collapse culture into the immanence of nature nor submerge nature into the transcendence of culture. According with the three forms of domination it would be a three-dimensional form of reconciliation.Odysseus’ men did not got what they thought were promised them: the complete liberation from the burden of being autonomous subjects, of being civilized, but they got something worthwhile, namely a certain from of pleasure, a limited and provisional relief and escape. Bollen sees a critical potential in these piggish pleasures after all and consequently even in the siren song of nature since these pleasures were only experienced because Odysseus’ men gave in to it. But one has to give in to this siren song critically if it is to unfold its liberating potential. The problem with pleasure though in bourgeois society is that it is necessarily betrayed, instrumentalized and sold.Kingsley Goodwin’s paper starts by defending deep ecology against the charge of asserting a naïve and dogmatic metaphysics of nature. For convenience sake, but not quite unproblematically, he identifies deep ecology with the environmental thought of Arne Naess. A metaphysics of nature for Naess is always part of a personal worldview. Worldviews which are partly inspired by ecology Naess calls ecosophies. Naess always stresses the personal character of such a worldview and the irreducible plurality of them. It used to be a common misunderstanding of the platform of deep ecology which Naess conceived together with George Sessions that it expressed in a condensed form the metaphysical beliefs of deep ecology. Naess’ intention, however, was to try to articulate in a general fashion the basic viewpoints on which the supporters of the deep ecology movement agreed. It would be possible then to derive these viewpoints from quite different worldviews. In light of this, I think, that Goodwin’s characterisation of the platform as “pragmatic and activist” is not quite appropriate.Goodwin goes on to compare Drenthen’s conception of wilderness and wildness with the similar position developed by Neil Evernden in his book The Social Creation of Nature. He like Naess in his personal ecosophy stresses the crucial role of perceptual experience of wild otherness to find an antidote to the relativity and contingency of our interpretations of nature. Evernden refers to studies on child development to argue for a non-dualistic and relational conception of the self, similar to Naess’ relational ontology. According to Goodwin, Drenthen, in spite of his hermeneutical approach remains too much indebted to the Western subject/object-dualism. The object, in this case wild nature, is pure otherness.With regard to a compost heap, Goodwin shows that we are not separated from nature by an inseparable gulf, that nature is close at hand, and that we can experience and explore it, appreciate the complex play of identity and difference it consists of, the exchanges and transformations and that we can identify with the organisms involved in these exchanges.*The proceeding remarks only highlight some of the prominent themes and considerations in the various contributions to this topical issue of Ethical Perspectives. Hopefully the reader will feel invited and enticed to read the articles themselves, starting, preferably of course, with the essay by Martin Drenthen, who sparked off this lively discussion on the moral meaning of wild nature. I am honoured and pleased to be able to introduce these rich explorations by such talented young environmental philosophers who are eager to develop environmental philosophy further and lead it into new directions. They all have to wrestle with and find answers to the challenge postmodern deconstruction and social constructivism pose for environmental philosophy. In the face of that challenge, it is even more difficult than it already was to provide solid and convincing arguments for the defence of wild and free nature beyond merely pragmatic arguments in terms of its utilitarian value for us. The reason for that defence is not clear-cut and proves to be just as evasive as the moral meaning of nature itself. But neither that reason nor that meaning are mere phantoms and mirages that vanish when we approach them and try to grasp them. They are more substantial, even if they will never have the solidity of a mathematical proof or a scientific measurement. Their locale is the lifeworld which from the point of view of scientific and logical precision and clarity is a messy place where subject and object, reason and heart, fact and value, experience and thought and, yes, nature and culture cannot be clearly separated. This has important consequences for environmental philosophy and its methodology. Conceptual analysis and logical argumentation have to become sensitive to the richness of experience in the lifeworld and to the diverse efforts of its articulation: i.e., they have to open themselves up and maybe even to subordinate themselves to phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches. For me personally this is one of the most important conclusions I draw from the discussion presented here. (shrink)

This article proposes a typology of the epistemology of live blogging through an analysis of two live news blogs: Radio New Zealand News’ live blog of a significant earthquake in Aotearoa New Zealand in November 2016 and BBC News’ live blog of the Brexit referendum result in June 2016. We use these cases to draw out five features of the genre that we suggest may characterise other live news blogs. We demonstrate that these blogs tend to produce a fragmentary (...) narrative that reflects particular moments in time, curate an array of textual objects from a range of information sources to produce ‘networked balance’, gain coherence from an often informal authorial voice or voices and generate claims to knowledge of events which are simultaneously dynamic and fragile. This typology contributes to understanding journalism’s position within networked information spaces. (shrink)

São muitas e, até hoje, muito controvertidas as opiniões referentes à função e ao lugar sistemático da filosofia da história de Kant no todo do seu projeto crítico-transcendental; nem há consenso quanto à importância ou relevância filosófica dos diversos escritos em que Kant aborda e defende os seus teoremas histórico- políticos. – No presente trabalho, pretende-se interpretar a “doutrina” histórico-filosófica kantiana – não obstante o seu caráter fragmentário e até aparentemente nem sempre coerente – na perspectiva da sua possível homogeneidade (...) e compatibilidade com os elementos centrais da própria teoria-base transcendental. Isso significa, antes de mais nada, ler os respectivos teoremas não como resultados de um raciocínio dogmático baseado num saber do processo histórico, mas como um conjunto de teses e postulados baseados no mero suposto subjetivo-racional de um progresso, ou seja, na idéia não só da possibilidade mas da necessidade (subjetiva) da razão de implantar princípios racionais na história. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Kant. Filosofia transcendental. Sistema. Filosofia da história. ABSTRACT There are many different and controversial opinions about the function and the systematic place of Kant’s philosophy of history in the context of his critical-transcendental project on the whole, as well as about the philosophic relevance of his historical-political writings. – This paper aims to interpret Kant’s historical-philosophical “doctrine” – in despite of its fragmentary character and of some apparent incoherences – in the horizon of its possible homogeneity and compatibility with the central elements of the basic transcendental theory. That means, above all: read the theorems in question not as results of a dogmatic thought based on the knowledge of historical processes, but as a set of thesis and postulates based on the mere subjective- rational supposition of progress, that is, on the idea that it is not only possible, but a (subjective) need of reason to implant rational principles in history. KEY WORDS – Kant. Transcendental philosophy. System. Philosophy of history. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the dispute between the Academic Arcesilaus of Pitane (ca. 316–240 BC) and the philosophy of Zeno of Citium. Scholars typically claim that Arcesilaus set out to attack Zeno’s epistemology or theory of knowledge. The framework of epistemology prevails in the modern reconstruction of Arcesilaus’s arguments. Proponents of this framework usually contend that the epistemic possibility of Stoic “cognition” or “apprehension” (κατάληψις) is the principal aim of Arcesilaus’s attack. The aim of this article is (...) to contest the limited scope of the framework of epistemology in the interpretation of Arcesilaus’s attack, and reposition his critical arguments, in view of the fragmentary evidence, within the framework of an ontology of knowledge. (shrink)

The text considers the possibility of a mediatic historiography, that is, a form of historiographic writing in which the media, in this case images, participate. The central object of investigation is the strategy of reenactment that is traditionally regarded as a means of eventorientated historiography. Contemporary art has recently questioned these strategies and proposed to replace the totalizing or globalizing approach of history and historiography with a more fragmentary and critical perspective. On the backdrop of Michel Foucault’s methodological reflections (...) on history that he develops in Archeology of Knowledge, the text analyzes different forms of a politics of history of the images through three examples of reenactment taken from film, theatre and the fine arts. (shrink)

Starting from the peculiar tension between figure and writing in Walter Benjamin’s philosophical thought, my contribution aims to define the relevance of manuscripts, schemes, fragments and annotations for the definition of philosophical textuality. Analyzing Benjamin’s writings belonging to this genre, as well as the fragmentary observations belonging to Novalis’ Allgemeines Brouillon and Nietzsche’s Posthumous Fragments, the processual dimension of philosophical thinking will be emphasized. In this theoretical context the processual moment of textuality can be put in tension with the (...) moment defined by the work in its insular completeness. Finally, one wonders if the most appropriate form of philosophical thought in our era of digital production and transmission of knowledge does not really lie in the flow dynamics of textuality. In conclusion, it will remain to be clarified how the autographic moment of philosophy can be thought of in the digital age of knowledge. To this last extent, a good example would be eventually given by Walter Benjamin’s archive in Berlin that contains in fully digitalized form both edited texts and manuscripts. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the Neandertal bones 1856, the extremely old, fragmentary fossil remains of hundreds of man-like bodies have been discovered in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Even the oldest ones - usually the most incomplete - look man-like and „un-apish", even to a layman, if compared with a modem apish and human correlate. Sometimes, in the vicinity of these remains, primitive stone tools or the evidence of their production have been found. At present, it seems absolutely certain — (...) within the limits of our present physical and biological knowledge - that at least four million years ago, in Africa, some creatures resembling modern man were living, and that at least two and half million years ago, in Africa, stone tools were produced. In contrast with the firm, scientifically-arguable belief that all modem human tribes - however different they are - belong to a single species, in paleoanthropology an equally firm scientific belief is maintained that the extinct man-like forms belong to several different, „presapient", „prehuman'', more ape-like species. (shrink)

Megasthenes was the first Greek ambassador known to have been sent to the court of a Mauryan ruler. He wrote an Indica based on his travels and experiences in India, which survives in fragmentary form in the work of later authors. This was the first work to provide a Greek audience with first-hand knowledge of the Indian interior and Mauryan court. Traditionally, Megasthenes’ Indica has been excavated for information to reconstruct knowledge of Mauryan India, Seleucid-Mauryan relations or (...) other aspects of this period and the personalities involved, either by focusing on individual fragments or collating fragments thematically. In contrast, instead of treating Megasthenes’ work as a mine for information, I evaluate the remaining fragments chronologically, and according to the type and range of information derived from Megasthenes. The aim is to better understand the thematic differences and chronological changes in the way later authors consulted and used the Indica, and therefore, why certain parts of the Indica, and information about Megasthenes himself, have survived. (shrink)

The article studies a privately owned fragmentary manuscript of Moerbeke’s version of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The treatise was transmitted through a very intricate text tradition. It is shown that two of the remaining three parts of the manuscript belong to the so-called “Italian” or independent tradition, for which only six other manuscripts are extant. Although Vuillemin-Diem, the editor of the text in the Aristoteles Latinus series, did not use this manuscript, its text corroborates several of her hypotheses. Moreover, the manuscript (...) considerably adds to our knowledge of Moerbeke’s lost autograph. It also contains some interesting similarities with Albert the Great’s commentary on the same text. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ennius and the Architecture of the Annales by Jackie Elliott, and: The Annals of Quintus Ennius and the Italic Tradition by Jay Fisher, and: Shaggy Crowns: Ennius’ Annales and Virgil’s Aeneid by Nora GoldschmidtThomas BiggsJackie Elliott. Ennius and the Architecture of the Annales. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. xiv + 590. Hardcover, $110.00.Jay Fisher. The Annals of Quintus Ennius and the Italic Tradition. Baltimore: Johns (...) Hopkins University Press, 2014. x + 206. Hardcover, $69.95.Nora Goldschmidt. Shaggy Crowns: Ennius’ Annales and Virgil’s Aeneid. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. x + 258. Hardcover, $125.00.According to Aulus Gellius, Ennius claimed to have three hearts, each representing a part of his hybrid cultural identity (Gel. 17.71.1: Quintus Ennius tria corda habere sese dicebat, quod loqui Graece et Osce et Latine sciret). Matching his hearts in number, the three books under review delve into the various Greek, Italic, and Latin influences on Ennius’ eighteen-book Annales, exploring the epic’s literary heritage and reception. One might rightly claim that in the wake of these important contributions (1088 pages for 623 fragments), we have firmly entered an aetas Enniana. The elephant in the room for all those interested in the poem is, of course, its highly fragmentary state of preservation. Instead of serving as an insurmountable obstacle, the scholarly process of interpreting fragmentary texts actually emerges as a shared feature of the methodologies on display in these otherwise quite different works. While Fisher and Goldschmidt push the limits of what an incomplete epic can communicate, Elliott more skeptically tackles the nature of transmission and its impact on our knowledge of the text.Ennius’ Oscan heart, representing his Italic heritage, takes center stage in Fisher’s study. Many readers will find most original and striking his arguments for the epic resonance and formulaic quality of “traditional” Latin phrases and their links with languages such as Umbrian and Oscan. Fisher relies throughout on the meaningful co-occurrence of communicative words, “traditional collocation” (3), and the use of language from various “traditional” cultural fields such as ritual, prayer, kinship, and the military (he adopts Lowell Edmunds’ concept of “system reference,” 5). According to Fisher, Ennius’ use of these culturally marked forms of language, shaped during the period of the central Italian koine\ (seventh to fourth centuries b.c.e.), allows his epic to include and enact an elevated tone appropriate to the inherited demands of his genre. While Ennius’ revolutionary turn to the hexameter may initially suggest a decision to abandon all that is old (or perhaps old-fashioned) about “native” literary culture, the pervasive presence of the Italic militates against severing Ennius from the lifeblood pumped through his Oscan heart. In fact, the dialogue between “foreign and familiar” aspects of culture is key to Fisher’s demonstration of how the Italic past emerges as a ghostly mediator and occasional replacement of superficially Greek and Homeric elements (10, 56, 85).With a presumed audience of Latinists, it is somewhat surprising that the introduction, “Ennius and the Italic Tradition,” devotes little time to outlining his rather unique methodology. But Fisher prefers to show rather than tell. On page 5 he jumps right into an analysis of Skutsch Ann. 232 (non semper vostra [End Page 713] evortit nunc Iuppiter hac stat), the language and context of Jupiter Stator in Cicero Cat. 1, and the Oscan Jupiter Versor: he convincingly connects Oscan Iovi Versori with Ennius’ evortit... Iuppiter (8). While the particulars of the argument take a winding course through various temples and texts, it is the act itself of probing seemingly commonplace language to reveal linguistic and cultural significance that highlights the best of what Fisher has to offer.Chapter 2, “The Annals and the Greek Tradition,” traces the Italic features of the epic through what one might call cross-lingual window-allusion. For example, Ann. 1 (Musae quae pedibus magnum pulsatis Olympum) contains a well-known substitution of the Greek Musae for his predecessors’ Camenae, but Fisher draws our attention to the “native Latin tradition” of the Salian priests’ tripudium behind pedibus... pulsatis: “if the collocation pedem pulsare is a traditional expression for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Way to Ethical CultureThe Meaning of Art as Oscillating between the Other, Il y a, and the ThirdRossitsa Varadinova Borkowski (bio)Who can suppose that a poet capable of effectively introducing into his scenes rhetoricians, generals and various other characters, each displaying some peculiar excellence, was nothing more than a droll or juggler, capable only of cheating or flattering his hearer, and not of instructing him?Are we all (...) agreed that the chief merit of a poet consists in his accurate representation of the affairs of life? Can this be done by a mere driveller, unacquainted with the world?The excellence of a poet is not to be measured by the same standard as that of a mechanic or a blacksmith, where honor and virtue have nothing to do with our estimate. But the poet and the individual are connected, and he only can become a good poet who is in the first instance a worthy man.— Strabo, The Geography of StraboAfter Emmanuel Levinas showed the need for radically positing the Ethical as the original structure of human inwardness and as art is a fundamental aspect of being human, a reexamination of the meaning of the Artistic and its relation with the Ethical is necessary.1 Throughout [End Page 195] the history of Western thought and culture, the meaning of art has been regarded either as imitation of the world and nature (Plato and Aristotle), objective self-expression of the Absolute Spirit (Hegel) or Being (Heidegger), a subjective “free play of imagination” and judgment (Kant and the Romanticists), or as inevitable engagement with social issues and political position (the Marxists and Sartre). In spite of the variety of theories and views about the essence and value of art, it is unquestionable that the Artistic has transformational power over humans, which points to art’s connection with ethics. Therefore, following Levinas, instead of asking the general ontological questions about the gist of art “What is art?” or “Why is there art instead of something else?” we should seek an answer to the ethical question about the meaning of art: “How can the existence of art be justified?”The answers could be sought in two directions. The first already quite well beaten path explores Levinas’s own vision on art, which most critics find hesitant or even ambiguous.2 The impression of this hesitation is significant on the background of Levinas’s rigorous clarity about the Ethical. Overlooking this impression would lead to conclusions that would deviate our attention from the main question about how the existence of art can be justified. A possible explanation would be that Levinas’s seemingly fragmentary thoughts about art are woven into the fabric of his ultimate meta-ethical project — that is, his approach to art is instrumental, subjected to the Ethical. For example, commentators agree that Levinas’s early article “Reality and Its Shadow” (1948) is the only one exclusively focused on art and use it as a starting point to assemble the fragments of his aesthetic views into an aesthetic theory. Although this move might be justified methodologically, Levinas is clear that the discussion of art in this article is subordinated to the more general (and more serious) question about the nontruth of being (LR 132). Positing art as mythological and mystical, thus incapable of transmitting a meaningful message if separated from philosophical criticism (142), Levinas puts “in brackets” the discussion about the artistic and focuses on the reason qua knowledge (philosophy) and its relation with the Other. The impression of his hesitation about art’s [End Page 196] independent capability to dephase the instant, to breach the ontological gravity, and to expose the human spirit to the Ethical comes from those texts where Levinas applies his own vision about the integrative role of philosophical criticism — i.e., texts that work as philosophical criticism of art: “Transcendence through poetry — is this serious?”3 (PN 175n12), “if poetry can contain teachings” (165; emphasis added). Therefore, on one hand, Levinas exhaustively scrutinizes all possibilities of ethics of philosophy and comes to the clear position that in order for reason to function humanly it should be dethroned by the Other. He is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclipsing Art: Method and Metaphysics in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria *Tim MilnesColeridge’s PredicamentIn his self-addressed “letter” which precipitates the abrupt end to the thirteenth chapter (and with it, the first volume) of the Biographia Literaria, Coleridge likens the current state of his argument to “the fragments of the winding steps of an old ruined tower.” 1 The suggestion of intellectual ascent in this is revealing and is echoed a few (...) years later by his explanation of the pedagogical function of the “Landing-Places” between the essays in The Friend (1818). 2 The underlying idea, as usual with Coleridge, is akin to that of an exercise in intellectual and spiritual mountaineering. The thinker, having established a safe base camp in fixed first principles, gradually ascends to higher truths, which are at the same time taken to be foundational and which form the ground of the whole process. The logical return here is what Coleridge elsewhere explains as the “seeming argumentum in circulo, incident to all spiritual Truths.” 3 In the Biographia, however, this process of simultaneous levitation and descent remains notoriously incomplete, left over for the projected but never completed “great book on the constructive philosophy.” 4 Thus, the procedure initiated in the philosophical [End Page 125] theses of chapter twelve having been arrested, the project of chapter thirteen, “in which the results [of the theses] will be applied to the deduction of the imagination, and with it the principles of production and genial criticism in the fine arts,” 5 is left as a fragmentary exposition in the hugely influential but attenuated and gnomic sequence of distinctions between primary and secondary imagination, and fancy.Consequently, students of Coleridge have been left to puzzle over the “missing” argument for themselves and to explain why Coleridge seems to give up at this point. At least since Thomas McFarland’s Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition it has been accepted that a significant part of the problem lies with the “counter-pull” 6 exerted upon Coleridge’s thought at this point in time between Kant and Schelling (or, as McFarland sees it, between Kant and Schelling / Spinoza). In other words, it is the pull between a system in which free will is preserved at the price of being declared noumenal and one in which free will is imperilled but set against the goal of a system of total and undivided philosophy at ease with the infinite. The difference between the methodologies of Kant and Schelling, as Gian Orsini noted, is the product of their contrasting first postulates, or philosophical starting-points. While Kant sets out from the epistemological problem of to what extent objects can be said to conform to human knowledge, Schelling asks, “do we deduce Mind from Nature or Nature from Mind?” 7 Each of these presumes a completely different kind of enquiry from the other, and thus a different method; a fact Coleridge appears to have fully appreciated only during the composition of the Biographia.The Biographia’s problems have provoked a diverse range of critical responses over the years. 8 Among these, however, there is a more or less settled [End Page 126] opinion that Coleridge’s failure at this stage to come to terms with the Kant / Fichte / Schelling debate merely added to the difficulty of a work which, having begun its life as a reply to and a rebuttal of Wordsworth’s empirical and associative definition of imagination as set out in the Preface to his Poems (1815), had already far exceeded its initial plan both in scope and size. As the statement of his poetic principles and critique of Wordsworth had turned into a literary life, and this into a broader exploration of his developing views on epistemology, religion, and the history of language, so the “Preface” to the Sibylline Leaves (as it had originally been conceived) now dwarfed that work. Coleridge’s printer’s decision to produce the Biographia in two volumes only served to emphasize the break between its “philosophical” and literary-critical planes and the failure of Coleridge’s declared intention to apply the rules of art, “deduced from philosophical principles, to poetry and criticism.” 9Yet there was always something... (shrink)

RESUMEN Sobre la filosofía es una obra exotérica que se conserva de forma fragmentaria. Se cree que tenía tres libros. En los dos primeros Aristóteles habría realizado un compendio sobre las diferentes concepciones de la filosofía y su respectivo objeto; en el tercero habría presentado sus propias concepciones sobre los temas abordados en los libros precedentes. Los escasos fragmentos conservados y la disparidad de las fuentes por las cuales estos son transmitidos representan una dificultad para establecer cuáles son esas concepciones. (...) En este sentido, en este trabajo intentaremos demostrar que en Sobre la filosofía Aristóteles presentaba muchas de las tesis vinculadas con la concepción de la filosofía primera como el estudio de los primeros principios y causas. Para ello nos centraremos en el análisis de los fragmentos 8b, 16, 17, 27a y27b. El examen de estos fragmentos a la luz del resto del corpus nos permitirá demostrar que en Sobre la filosofía Aristóteles identifica la sabiduría con el conocimiento, los principios y las causas. ABSTRACT On Philosophy is an exoteric work that is preserved in a fragmentary mode. It is assumed that it had three books. In the first two, Aristotle would have made a compendium of the different conceptions of philosophy and its respective object. In the third book he would have presented his own conceptions on the topics approached in the previous books. The few preserved fragments and the disparity of the sources by which they are transmitted represent a difficulty for establishing which would have been these conceptions. In this sense, in this paper we will try to demonstrate that in On philosophy Aristotle presented many of the theses related to the conception of the first philosophy as the study of the first principles and causes. With this end, we will focus on the analysis of the fragments 8b, 16, 17, 27a y27b. The examination of these fragments in light of the rest of the corpus will allow us to demonstrate that in On philosophy Aristotle have identified wisdom with the knowledge of these principles and causes. (shrink)

By recovering the dependent, often enslaved, laborers who helped to make European medicines commercially available in the New England colonies, this article offers a new history of early American pharmaceutical knowledge and production. It does so by considering the life and labor of an unnamed, enslaved assistant who was said to make tinctures, elixirs, and other common remedies in a 1758 letter between two business partners, Silvester Gardiner, a successful surgeon and apothecary in Boston, Massachusetts, and William Jepson, his (...) former apprentice, in Hartford, Connecticut. Using strategies from slavery and critical archive studies, as well as from social history and the history of medicine, this article emphasizes the materiality and embodiment of pharmaceutical production and follows fragmentary evidence beyond the business archive to reverse the systemic erasure of enslaved and indentured laborers from the records of eighteenth-century manufacturers of medicines. The medicine trades of men like Gardiner and Jepson appear more reliant upon dependent laborers – named and unnamed – who not only performed rote tasks but brought their experience and judgment to their labors as well. Their contributions could be obviously medical (preparing remedies) or more ambiguous (stoking fires, shipping goods), but these actions together constituted early modern pharmacy, enabled the expansion of the transatlantic medicine trade, and laid the foundations for the more self-sufficient and industrialized pharmacy that developed in the nineteenth century. Centering the skill and knowledge among subordinated laborers in one facet of an emergent transatlantic care economy affirms the entanglement of slavery and science and underscores the necessity of asking new questions of old sources. (shrink)