Abstract

This instructive work tries to avoid the parochialism and over-technicality characteristic of so much recent theorizing about ethics. The author examines each of the main current accounts of moral goodness and judgment, and then constructs a view of his own in their light--a view predominantly "naturalistic" in its conception of goodness but partially "non-cognitivist" in its treatment of moral judgment. The rest of the book defends and elaborates this view. Mr. Rice writes perceptively, and his accounts of contemporary ethical theories are lucid and concise. His passion for non-technicality, however, makes the presentation of his own view less convincing than it might have been; his argument is sometimes elusive and fragmentary, and his writing, though vivid, often lacks clarity and precision. Still, this is a book of considerable significance; one hopes that it will mark the beginning of a broader, more constructive approach to the problems of ethical theory.--V. C. C.