Results for 'doxastic judgment'

953 found
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  1. The Role of Judgment in Doxastic Agency.David Jenkins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):12-19.
    We take it that we can exercise doxastic agency by reasoning and by making judgments. We take it, that is, that we can actively make up our minds by reasoning and judging. On what I call the ‘Standard View’ this is so because judgment can yield belief. It is typical to take it that judgments yield beliefs by causing them. But on the resultant understanding of the Standard View, I argue, it is unclear how judgment could play (...)
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  2. Judgment aggregation, discursive dilemma and reflective equilibrium: Neural language models as self-improving doxastic agents.Gregor Betz & Kyle Richardson - 2022 - Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence 5.
    Neural language models (NLMs) are susceptible to producing inconsistent output. This paper proposes a new diagnosis as well as a novel remedy for NLMs' incoherence. We train NLMs on synthetic text corpora that are created by simulating text production in a society. For diagnostic purposes, we explicitly model the individual belief systems of artificial agents (authors) who produce corpus texts. NLMs, trained on those texts, can be shown to aggregate the judgments of individual authors during pre-training according to sentence-wise vote (...)
     
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  3.  22
    Suspension of Judgment as a Doxastic Default.Mark Satta - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-25.
    In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views—i.e., he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism—i.e., the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker’s arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those (...)
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  4. On Interrogative Inquiries Without Suspended Judgement and Doxastic Neutrality.Leonardo Flamini - forthcoming - Dialogue.
    It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one’s judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman’s perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without (...) neutrality. However, I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist. (shrink)
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  5.  59
    The Doxastic Zoo.Pascal Engel - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi, Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 297-316.
    The doxastic zoo contains many animals: belief, acceptance, belief in, belief that, certainty, conjecture, guess, conviction, denial, disbelief in, disbelief that, judgment, commitment, etc. It also contains belief’s “strange bedfellows”: credences, partial beliefs, tacit beliefs, subdoxastic states, creedal feelings, feelings of knowing, in-between believings, pathological beliefs, phobias, aliefs, delusions, biases, besires. How to order the zoo? I propose to distinguish doxastic attitudes from non-doxastic epistemic attitudes. The criterion is the existence of correctness conditions. Most bedfellows do (...)
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  6. Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2571-2591.
    In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role (...)
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  7. Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.
    In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended (...)
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  8. Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.
    Doxastic involuntarists have paid insufficient attention to two debates in contemporary epistemology: the permissivism debate and the debate over norms of assertion and belief. In combination, these debates highlight a conception of belief on which, if you find yourself in what I will call an ‘equipollent case’ with respect to some proposition p, there will be no reason why you can’t believe p at will. While doxastic involuntarism is virtually epistemological orthodoxy, nothing in the entire stock of objections (...)
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  9. Suspended Judgement Rebooted.Benoit Guilielmo - 2024 - Logos and Episteme (4):445-462.
    Suspension of judgment is often viewed as a member of the doxastic club, alongside belief and disbelief. In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that suspension is a commitment-involving stance on a par with belief and disbelief. Friedman's counterexamples to the traditional view that suspended judgement merely requires considering a proposition and being in a state of non-belief are criticized. I introduce a refined conception, emphasizing that suspension involves a proximal causal link between examining a proposition and (...)
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  10. Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to (...)
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  11.  93
    Suspending Judgment is Something You Do.Lindsay Crawford - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):561-577.
    What is it to suspend judgment about whether p? Much of the recent work on the nature and normative profile of suspending judgment aims to analyze it as a kind of doxastic attitude. On some of these accounts, suspending judgment about whether p partly consists in taking up a certain higher-order belief about one's deficient epistemic position with respect to whether p. On others, suspending judgment about whether p consists in taking up a sui generis (...)
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  12. Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility.Alix Cohen - 2013 - Kant Yearbook 5 (1):33-50.
    This paper sets out to show that Kant’s account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief. To support this claim, I argue that whilst we have no direct control over our beliefs, we have two forms of indirect doxastic control that are sufficient to ground epistemic responsibility: first, the (...)
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  13. Sources of Doxastic Disturbance in Sextus Empiricus.Diego E. Machuca - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 56:193–214.
    In his account of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus talks about the disturbance concerning matters of opinion that afflicts his dogmatic rivals and that he himself was afflicted by before his conversion to Pyrrhonism. The aim of the present paper is to identify the distinct sources of doxastic disturbance that can be found in that account, and to determine whether and, if so, how they are related. The thesis to be defended is that it is possible to discern three sources of (...)
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  14. The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker.Juliette Vazard - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):45-60.
    Checking is one of the most common compulsive actions performed by patients with Obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) (APA, 2013; Abramowitz, McKay, Taylor, 2008). Incessant checking is undeniably problematic from a practical point of view. But what is epistemically wrong with checking again (and again)? The starting assumption for this paper is that establishing what goes wrong when individuals check their stove ten times in a row requires understanding the nature of the doxastic attitude that compulsive re-checkers are in, as (...)
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  15. Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.
    Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are (...)
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  16. Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.
    How does rationality bind the agnostic, that is, the one who suspends judgment about whether a given proposition is true? In this paper I explore two alternative ways of establishing what the rational requirements of agnosticism are: the Lockean–Bayesian framework and the doxastic logic framework. Each of these proposals faces strong objections. Fortunately, however, there is a rich kernel of requirements of agnosticism that are vindicated by both of them. One can then endorse the requirements that belong to (...)
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  17. A Higher-Order Credal Account of Suspension (and Other Doxastic Attitudes).Peter Brössel & Eder Anna-Maria - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra, Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
    When is it (epistemically) rational to suspend judgment on a proposition? Before addressing this question, one has to clarify what suspension of judgment (in short: suspension) is and establish rationality standards for the attitudes that constitute suspension. Ideally, suspending can be reduced to attitudes for which one already has established rationality standards. This paper distinguishes two kinds of suspension, weak and strong, and offers a reductionist account of suspension based on credence. However, it does not reduce suspension to (...)
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  18. Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
    Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.
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  19. Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.
    If beliefs are subject to a basic norm of correctness—roughly, to the principle that a belief is correct only if the proposition believed is true—how can this norm guide believers in forming their beliefs? Answer: this norm guides believers indirectly: believers are directly guided by requirements of rationality—which are themselves explained by this norm of correctness. The fundamental connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic. Incorrectness comes in degrees; for beliefs, these degrees of incorrectness are measured by quadratic scoring rules, (...)
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  20. The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP. pp. 36-57.
    It is usual to distinguish between two kinds of doxastic attitude: standing or dispositional states, which govern our actions and persist throughout changes in consciousness; and conscious episodes of acknowledging the truth of a proposition. What is the relationship between these two kinds of attitude? Normally, the conscious episodes are in harmony with the underlying dispositions, but sometimes they come apart and we act in a way that is contrary to our explicit conscious judgements. Philosophers have often tried to (...)
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  21. Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.
    Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that the factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes are epistemic in the narrow sense of being factors that bear on the strength or weakness of one’s epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. (...)
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  22. Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
    Abstract In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third (...)
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  23. Suspension of judgment, non-additivity, and additivity of possibilities.Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.
    In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalized as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum (...)
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  24.  79
    Conflicting Appearances, Suspension of Judgment, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism without Commitment.Tamer Nawar - 2022 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 60 (4):537-560.
    By means of the Ten Modes, Pyrrhonian skeptics appeal to conflicting appearances to bring about suspension of judgment. However, precisely how the skeptic might do so in a nondogmatic manner is not entirely clear. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of the Modes face significant objections, and I defend an alternative account that better explains the logical structure, rational nature, and effectiveness of the Modes. In particular, I clarify how the Modes appeal to concerns about epistemic impartiality (...)
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  25. Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging.Z. Quanbeck - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2955-2975.
    According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, our beliefs can non-derivatively wrong others. A recent criticism of this view claims that proponents of the doxastic wronging thesis have no principled grounds for denying that credences can likewise non-derivatively wrong, so they must countenance pervasive conflicts between morality and epistemic rationality. This paper defends the thesis of doxastic wronging from this objection by arguing that belief bears distinctive relationships to inquiry and blame that can explain why beliefs, but (...)
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  26.  86
    (1 other version)Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony Booth & Rune Lomholt - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1-22.
    Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful. However, despite this, ordinary language use of locutions like “chose to believe” are common. In this article, we present new experimental data that shows that the prevalence of ordinary language talk of “chosen beliefs” is no obstacle to doxastic involuntarism in a standard sense. While we employ the methods of experimental (...)
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  27. Judgment's Aimless Heart.Matthew Vermaire - 2025 - Noûs 59 (1):3-21.
    It's often thought that when we reason to new judgments in inference, we aim at believing the truth, and that this aim of ours can explain important psychological and normative features of belief. I reject this picture: the structure of aimed activity shows that inference is not guided by a truth‐aim. This finding clears the way for a positive understanding of how epistemic goods feature in our doxastic lives. We can indeed make sense of many of our inquisitive and (...)
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  28. Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.
    Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as S ought to believe that p , or S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p . However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that (...)
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  29. Hume on Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Suspension of Judgement.Verena Wagner & Scott Stapleford - 2024 - In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner, Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This paper examines Hume’s understanding of a third doxastic position distinct from belief and disbelief, arguing that his epistemology presupposes different forms of doxastic neutrality. While Hume does not explicitly discuss this third position, his Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding offer ideas relevant to contemporary debates on suspension of judgement and inquiry. Hume engaged with Pyrrhonian scepticism, finding its suspension of judgement excessive, yet acknowledging that the Pyrrhonian arguments are theoretically difficult to refute. Based (...)
     
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  30. Committing to Indecision: A Taxonomy of Suspension of Judgment.Verena Wagner - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra, Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Suspension of judgment or belief is often described as the neutral doxastic position or stance, alongside belief and disbelief. However, in this contribution, I will demonstrate that there is more than one way of being neutral. I will introduce paradigmatic cases involving cognitive neutrality and highlight significant differences in their nature, such as their relation to inquiry. I will argue that judgment suspension is an act of committing to indecision, leading to a qualified neutral state of mind. (...)
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  31. Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth, The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 38-58.
    In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, (...)
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  32.  43
    Acceptance, Belief, and Partiality: Topics in Doxastic Control, the Ethics of Belief, and the Moral Psychology of Relationships.Laura Soter - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Michigan - Flint
    This dissertation contains a philosophical project and a psychological project. Together, they explore two central themes, and the relation between them: (1) doxastic control and the ethics of belief, and (2) the moral and epistemic import of close personal relationships. The philosophical project (Chapters 1 and 2) concerns a central puzzle in the ethics of belief: how can we make sense of apparent obligations to believe for moral or practical reasons, if we lack the ability to form beliefs in (...)
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  33. Kant's Modalities of Judgment.Jessica Leech - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):260-284.
    Abstract: This paper proposes a way to understand Kant's modalities of judgment—problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic—in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference. Other interpretations have tended to understand these modalities of judgment in terms of one or other conventional notion of modality. For example, Mattey (1986) argues that we should take them to be connected to notions of epistemic or doxastic modality. I shall argue that this is wrong, and that these kinds of (...)
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  34.  58
    (1 other version)Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind.Lucy Campbell - forthcoming - .
    In Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind (BISCM), Eric Marcus analyses and responds to a core set of puzzles concerning belief and inference. Most centrally on offer are: an explanation of non-evidential/non-observational doxastic self-knowledge, an explanation of the unintelligibility of Moore-Paradoxical statements, an account of inference (built on an interpretation of the ‘Taking Condition’) fit to solve the Lewis Carroll regress, and an account of what constitutes the unity of the rational mind. Marcus’ answers depend on viewing beliefs as (...)
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  35. Responsibility in Descartes’s Theory of Judgment.Marie Jayasekera - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3 (12):321-347.
    In this paper I develop a new account of the philosophical motivations for Descartes’s theory of judgment. The theory needs explanation because the idea that judgment, or belief, is an operation of the will seems problematic at best, and Descartes does not make clear why he adopted what, at the time, was a novel view. I argue that attending to Descartes’s conception of the will as the active, free faculty of mind reveals that a general concern with responsibility (...)
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  36.  70
    Nietzsche's Attack on Belief: Doxastic Skepticism in The Antichrist.Jessica N. Berry - 2019 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 50 (2):187-209.
    Nietzsche's Antichrist is subtitled "A Curse on Christianity." In its last numbered section, he pronounces his "eternal indictment" of two millennia of tradition: —Now I have come to the end and I pronounce my judgment. I condemn Christianity, I indict the Christian church on the most terrible charges an accuser has ever had in his mouth. I consider it the greatest corruption conceivable, it had the will to the last possible corruption. [...] I want to write this eternal indictment (...)
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  37.  3
    Suspension of Judgment, Non-additivity, and Additivity of Possibilities.Aldo Filomeno - 2025 - Acta Analytica 40 (1):21-42.
    In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalised as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum (...)
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  38. (1 other version)Predication and Two Concepts of Judgment.Indrek Reiland - 2019 - In Brian Andrew Ball & Christoph Schuringa, The Act and Object of Judgment: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Routledge. pp. 217-234.
    Recently, there’s been a lot of interest in a research program that tries to understand propositional representation in terms of the subject’s performance of sub-propositional mental acts like reference and predication (e. g. Burge 2010, Hanks 2015, Soames 2010, 2015). For example, on one version of the view, for a subject to predicate the property of being a composer of Arvo just is what it is to perform the to the basic propositional act of judging that Arvo is a composer (...)
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  39. Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Rico Vitz - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:107-21.
    In this paper, I clarify Descartes’s account of belief, in general, and of judgment, in particular. Then, drawing upon this clarification, I explain the type of direct doxastic voluntarism that he endorses. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate two claims. First, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that, on Descartes’s account, people have the ability to suspend, or to withhold, judgment directly by an act will. Second, I argue that there is weak and inconclusive textual (...)
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  40. The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment.Aldo Filomeno - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1327-1348.
    It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of (...)
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  41.  68
    Hannah Arendt’s doxa glorifying judgment and exemplarity – a potentially public space.Bethânia Assy - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (1):5-21.
    Através da leitura que Heidegger faz de Aletheia, Arendt vincula a noção de verdade à de aparência ao custo de desmantelar a conhecida dicotomia entre o ser verdadeiro e a mera aparência, deslocando a verdade do domínio dos noumena ao dos phenomena enquanto reino da visibilidade, o domínio doxástico da ação política. Doxa como desvelamento não mais nos conduz à adequação cognitiva do self interno, mas antes à dimensão arendtiana cognitiva interpessoal de seres humanos no mundo: quem nós somos no (...)
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  42.  52
    Vrijheid door scepticisme.Philip J. Nickel - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):19-36.
    In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a permissive conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, or to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that (...)
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  43. Suspension as a mood.Benoit Guilielmo & Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Suspension of judgment is a ubiquitous phenomenon in our lives. It is also relevant for several debates in contemporary epistemology (e.g., evidentialism/pragmatism; peer-disagreement/higher-order evidence; inquiry). The goal of this paper is to arrive at a better understanding of what suspension of judgment is. We first question the popular assumption that we call the Triad view according to which there are three and only three (paradigmatic) doxastic attitudes, namely, belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. We elaborate a (...)
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  44. Judging as Inviting Self-Trust.Edward Hinchman - 2007 - Center for 21st Century Studies Working Papers.
    [This draft is dated November 2007. I wrote it while I was a fellow at the Center for 21st Century Studies at UW-Milwaukee, in 2005-06, and published it only on the Center's website as a working paper. Many of the core ideas in this paper wound up in "Receptivity and the Will," Nous 2009, "Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge," Nous 2013, and "Assurance and Warrant," Philosophers' Imprint 2014 -- though formulated rather differently. What follows is the original abstract.] This working paper (...)
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  45. Suspensive Wronging.Chris Ranalli - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra, Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
    According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, we can wrong people in virtue of having certain beliefs about them. In this chapter, I motivate and defend a similar view, the thesis of suspensive wronging, that we can wrong people in virtue of bearing an indecision attitude towards certain questions that bear on certain people. I explore the extent to which the thesis of suspensive wronging fits with certain prominent conceptions of suspension of judgment, including the sui generis attitude, (...)
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  46. When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup, Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Recent work has argued that there may be cases where no attitude – including withholding – is rationally permissible. In this paper, I consider two such epistemic dilemmas, John Turri’s Dilemma from Testimony and David Alexander’s Dilemma from Doubt. Turri presents a case where one’s only evidence rules out withholding (without warranting belief or disbelief). Alexander presents a case where higher order doubt means one must withhold judgment over whether withholding judgment is rational. In both cases, the authors (...)
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  47.  22
    Doxastischer Voluntarismus bei Thomas von Aquin - Wille, Intellekt und ihr schwieriges Verhältnis zur Zustimmung.Rudolf Schussler - 2012 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 79 (1):75-107.
    Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that human beings can voluntarily decide what to believe in exactly the same way as they decide to raise an arm. Aquinas is often regarded as a proponent of this doctrine, which is widely rejected by modern philosophers. Modern defenders of Aquinas try to show that he in fact accepted a less problematic indirect doxastic voluntarism. However, some early modern scholastics ascribed more than an indirect doxastic voluntarism to Aquinas. The present article discusses (...)
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  48. Formal Epistemology.Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):651-662.
    Doxastic TheoriesThe application of formal tools to questions related to epistemology is of course not at all new. However, there has been a surge of interest in the field now known as “formal epistemology” over the past decade, with two annual conference series and an annual summer school at Carnegie Mellon University, in addition to many one-off events devoted to the field. A glance at the programs of these series illustrates the wide-ranging set of topics that have been grouped (...)
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  49. Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5205-5227.
    If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...)
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  50. How to judge intentionally.Antonia Peacocke - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):330-339.
    Contrary to popular philosophical belief, judgment can indeed be an intentional action. That's because an intentional judgment, even one with content p, need not be intentional as a judgment that p. It can instead be intentional just as a judgment wh- for some specific wh- question—e.g. a judgment of which x is F or a judgment whether p. This paper explains how this is possible by laying out a means by which you can perform (...)
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