Doxastic Correctness

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234 (2013)
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Abstract

If beliefs are subject to a basic norm of correctness—roughly, to the principle that a belief is correct only if the proposition believed is true—how can this norm guide believers in forming their beliefs? Answer: this norm guides believers indirectly: believers are directly guided by requirements of rationality—which are themselves explained by this norm of correctness. The fundamental connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic. Incorrectness comes in degrees; for beliefs, these degrees of incorrectness are measured by quadratic scoring rules, such as the so-called Brier score. This account is defended against objections; and its implications for suspension of judgement are explored

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Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.
Isolating Correct Reasoning.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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