The use of the Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) as a measure of the benefit obtained from health care expenditure has been attacked on the ground that it gives a lower value to preserving the lives of people with a permanent disability or illness than to preserving the lives of those who are healthy and not disabled. The reason for this is that the quality of life of those with illness or disability is ranked, on the QALY scale, below that of (...) someone without a disability or illness. Hence we can, other things being equal, gain more QALYs by saving the lives of those without a permanent disability or illness than by saving the lives of those who are disadvantaged in these ways. But to do so puts these disadvantaged people under a kind of double jeopardy. Not only do they suffer from the disability or illness, but because of it, a low priority is given to forms of health care that can preserve their lives. This, so the objection runs, is unjust or unfair. This article assesses this objection to the use of QALYs as a basis for allocating health care resources. It seeks to determine what is sound in the double jeopardy objection, and then to show that the defender of QALYs has an adequate response to it. (shrink)

Section 75 of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of 2003 overturned the principle in English law that a person cannot be retried for an offense of which he has been acquitted, recognizing advances in forensic science that uses modern analysis of DNA in adducing in evidence. The special plea of autrefois acquit can be overturned based on finding of compelling evidence after a previous acquittal of a suspect who can now be tried again for the same offense. The double (...) jeopardy arises only after a lawful acquittal or autrefois convict of the accused for the first offense and these principles have allowed exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy developed by the courts. There is an analogous rule in common law courts based on the unreasonable splitting of the case when there is a severing of indictments which overrides the bar on the accused being retried for the same offense. This paper examines the difficulty of trying a defendant fairly in the English courts when the defense has pleaded an abuse of process and there is no clear overall argument for trial. This question needs an appraisal of legal ethics in criminal courts because a retrial of the accused on the same charge breaches the autrefois acquit doctrine, and severing of an indictment can cause the fair trial process to be undermined. (shrink)

This paper discusses the attempt in this issue of the journal by Peter Singer, John McKie, Helga Kuhse and Jeff Richardson, to defend QALYs against the argument from double jeopardy which I first outlined in 1987. In showing how the QALY and other similar measures which combine life expectancy and quality of life and use these to justify particular allocations of health care resource, remain vulnerable to the charge of double jeopardy I am able to clarify (...) some of the central issues concerning the value of life. In particular, the idea that the value of a life varies with its life expectancy and with its quality, understood in terms of its richness, variety, success etc, is subjected to special examination. It is shown how defenders of QALYs are committed to the view that so far from all lives being of equal value, all lives are necessarily of subtly different value. The paper then analyses the use to which the notorious 'veil of ignorance' has been put both by Singer et al and by others and shows how this device of John Rawls's cannot do the work so often assigned to it. The paper then considers the issue of hypothetical consent and the role that it can play in justifying disposing of the lives of people who have not in fact consented to their lives being disposed of in particular ways. Finally, the paper makes some points about the comprehensive nature of the data collection and storage which would be required by QALY advocates and points out the independent problems attaching to licensing such comprehensive collection and use of personal data. (shrink)

In this study we aim to analyze the combined effect of age-based and gender stereotype threat on work identity processes (and in particular on authenticity and organizational identification) and on work performance (self-rating performance). The research utilizes an ample sample of over fifty-year-old workers from diverse organizations in Italy. Using a person-centered approach four clusters of workers were identified: low in both age-based and gender stereotype threat (N= 4,689), high in gender and low in age-based stereotype threat (N= 1,735), high (...) in age-based and low in gender stereotype threat (N= 2,013) and high in both gender and age-based stereotype threat (N= 758). Gender was significantly associated with these clusters and women were more frequently present in those groups with high gender stereotype threat. ANOVA results show that workers in the last two clusters score significantly lower in authenticity, organizational identification and self-rate performance. All in all, if ageism is undoubtedly problematic for older workers’ identity processes, ageism and gender-stereotypes represent a double risk for women over fifty in the workplace. The analysis of the results can be beneficial both for the theoretical advancement and for the practical insights offered in the organizational and management field, where new policies of HR management can be elaborated, in order to value and to improve the workers experience. (shrink)

Harris levels two main criticisms against our original defence of QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years). First, he rejects the assumption implicit in the QALY approach that not all lives are of equal value. Second, he rejects our appeal to Rawls's veil of ignorance test in support of the QALY method. In the present article we defend QALYs against Harris's criticisms. We argue that some of the conclusions Harris draws from our view that resources should be allocated on the basis of (...) potential improvements in quality of life and quantity of life are erroneous, and that others lack the moral implications Harris claims for them. On the other hand, we defend our claim that a rational egoist, behind a veil of ignorance, could consistently choose to allocate life-saving resources in accordance with the QALY method, despite Harris's claim that a rational egoist would allocate randomly if there is no better than a 50% chance of being the recipient. (shrink)

There have been recent concerns about an “epidemic of loneliness” during the pandemic, given the pervasiveness of loneliness in the population and its harmful effects on health and well-being. Therefore, it is important to establish the correlates of loneliness. The purpose of the current study was to explore how loneliness relates to a construct termed mattering, which is the feeling of being important to other people. Mattering was assessed with multiple measures in the current study (e.g., mattering in general, fears (...) of not mattering, and mattering to peers). A sample of 172 female psychology undergraduate students aged 18–25 years completed self-report measures of general mattering, mattering to peers, anti-mattering, fear of not mattering, and state and trait loneliness. As predicted, lower levels of both general mattering and mattering to peers were associated with higher state loneliness. Higher feelings of anti-mattering (feelings of being invisible and insignificant to others) and fears of not mattering were associated with greater trait loneliness, as well as a reduced sense of mattering to friends. The findings illustrate that feeling as though one does not matter to others (i.e., feeling insignificant and unimportant) is associated with increased state and trait loneliness among young women. Implications are discussed for loneliness theory and how these results can enhance both clinical understanding and practice. (shrink)

Research ethics committees ‘(RECs) members’ perceptions of their role in regard to the science of research proposals are discussed. Our study, which involved the interviewing of 20 participants from amongst the UK’s independent (Phase I) ethics committees, revealed that the members consider that it is the role of the REC to examine and approve the scientific adequacy of the research – and this notwithstanding the fact that a more competent body will already have done this and even when that other (...) body has the legal responsibility for this function. The problematic nature of this situation, tantamount to double jeopardy, is considered: it can delay research and so add to costs whilst offering no countervailing benefits, or the double jeopardy may be just the cost society imposes, through its RECs, on researchers as the price for research on human subjects. (shrink)

George C. Thomas III, Double Jeopardy: The History, the Law New York University Press, 1998,349 pp.

A second demonstration (more powerful because more subtle) of how a prevalent scope error can render a model invalid, and thus how difficult modeling really is. The prevalence indicates the difficulty, as the error is often built-in and very subtle and thus easily escapes notice.

The foundational conviction of contemporary liberal thought is that all persons possess equal moral worth and are entitled to equal concern and respect by others. At the same time, nation states, as the primary organs of our collective self-governance, frequently pursue policies that are strikingly partial towards the interests of compatriots over those of foreigners. A common strategy for justifying this national partiality is to view it as grounded in associative obligations that we incur by standing in special relationships with (...) our fellow citizens. For instance, according to familiar arguments from ‘fair play’, voluntarily partaking in and benefiting from cooperative relationships with our fellow citizens gives us reciprocal obligations to maintain these social institutions and care for needy compatriots. By contrast, we do not have corresponding associative obligations towards foreigners. I maintain that such arguments from associative obligations face an important stumbling block. I argue for the following “Boundary Principle”, according to which we cannot appeal to special relationships amongst members of a group to justify an attitude of partiality towards them unless the boundaries of this group, and the fact that they exclude other persons from membership, can also be justified. If this is right, arguments from associative obligations, by themselves, are necessarily incomplete. Most modern states severely limit the scope of economic migration, and thereby prevent many would-be contributors to the collective enterprises of affluent societies from entering into those special relationships with us that would give rise to associative obligations on our part. Not only are would-be immigrants excluded from the benefits that participation in the cooperative schemes of affluent nation-states would itself confer; in addition, the fact that they do not stand in such cooperative relationships with us is then appealed to in order to justify the fact that we assign significantly less weight to their interests in the formulation of state policy. The upshot of my discussion is not that a defense of national partiality in terms of associative obligations cannot succeed. It is rather that a successful defense of national partiality in these terms is more closely tied to the question whether principled restrictions can be placed on immigration than most political philosophers have hitherto assumed. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that prioritizing health care resources by their relative cost-effectiveness can result in lower priority for the treatment of disabled persons than otherwise similar non-disabled persons. I distinguish six different ways in which this discrimination against the disabled can occur. I then spell out and evaluate the following moral objections to this discrimination, most of which capture an aspect of its unethical character: it implies that disabled persons' lives are of lesser value than those of non-disabled persons; (...) it constitutes “double jeopardy” or violates Frances Kamm's non-linkage principle; it conflicts with equality of opportunity; it conflicts with fairness, which requires ignoring (some/most) differential impacts of treatment; it wrongly gives lower priority to disabled persons for equally effective treatment; it conflicts with giving all persons an equal chance to reach their full potential; and, it is in conflict with giving priority to the worse off. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the position of ethnic minority women in relation to their career-building in the Serbian higher education system and reaching decision-making positions. The author defines two hypotheses: that there are invisible biases in the sciences that put ethnic minority women in a challenging position when attempting to build a career in academia, and that these women encounter a glass ceiling when trying to reach more senior positions. The analysis is based on 16 semi-structured (...) interviews conducted with Hungarian, Slovak, and Romanian female teaching staff employed at two Serbian universities. Intersectionality as a theoretical framework and method was used in the analysis of interviews, along with narrative analysis. Analysis of the interviews showed that ethnic minority women adopt specific strategies when discussing and explaining their difficulties and opportunities in the higher education system of Serbia. The intersectional analysis indicates that ethnic minority women struggle with invisible biases at the individual level, and, due to the horizontal segregation in sciences, have to overcome a situation of double jeopardy in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics studies. The findings suggest that women from ethnic minorities face a glass ceiling in relation to obtaining decision-making positions. Namely, such positions are usually only guaranteed to them within their own ethnic enclaves at departments with majority female staff. However, positions higher than these are rarely attainable. (shrink)

Introduction. The trial; the right to a lawyer; double jeopardy; the electoral college; the senate; presidential pardon; judicial review; lifetime appointment; campaign finance reform; the right to political leave; the democratized corporation -- The right to a lawyer -- Abolish double jeopardy -- Empower the jury -- The electoral college -- Abolish presidential pardon -- Abolish the Senate -- Limit the power of the Supreme Court -- Abolish lifetime tenure of Supreme Court justices -- Reduce private (...) money in election campaigns -- Expand the right to run for political office -- Expand employee rights -- The contradictions of libertarianism. (shrink)

The increase in ethnically and linguistically diverse older adults in Canada necessitates attention to their experiences and needs for healthy ageing. Arab immigrant women often report challenges in maintaining health, but little is known about their ageing experiences. This interpretive descriptive study uses a transnational life course framework to understand Arab Muslim immigrant women's experiences of engaging in health‐promoting practices as they age in Canada. Women's stories highlight social dimensions of health such social connectedness, social roles and social support that (...) are constructed and maintained within different migration contexts across the life course. Barriers and facilitators to healthy ageing in this population centred around five themes: (i) the necessity of staying strong, (ii) caring for self while caring for others, (iii) double jeopardy of chronic illnesses and loneliness, (iv) inadequate support within large social networks and (v) navigating access to health‐supporting resources. The findings point to transnational connections and post‐migration social support as major influencers in creating facilitators and barriers to healthy ageing for Arab Muslim immigrant women. (shrink)

This article addresses cultural memory’s ability to address past and present injustices by focusing on the artistic-political practices displayed by the professional actresses of Roma descent from the independent theater the Giuvlipen in Bucharest. The founders of this Romani women-centered theater also have ‘invented’ the word ‘Giuvlipen’ – ‘feminism’ in the Romani language – because there had previously been no word to connote both the forms of oppression and the consciousness raising politics performed by Romani women. By applying the lens (...) of intersectional feminism, the argument this article aims to put forth is that Giuvlipen’s artistic performances can foster the awareness raising of the Romani women’s ‘double jeopardy’. At the same time, the artistic performances displayed by the Giuvlipen Theater challenge the habits of historical remembering and its politics of oblivion, which can in turn promote experiential forms of knowledge and new structures and archives of feelings. (shrink)

Perhaps more than any other scholar, Michael Moore has argued that there are deep and necessary connections between metaphysics, morality, and law. Moore has developed every contour of a theory of criminal law, from philosophy of action to a theory of causation. Indeed, not only is he the central figure in retributive punishment but his moral realist position places him at the center of many jurisprudential debates. Comprised of essays by leading scholars, this volume discusses and challenges the work of (...) Michael Moore from one or more of the areas where he has made a lasting contribution, namely, law, morality, metaphysics, psychiatry, and neuroscience. The volume begins with a riveting contribution by Heidi Hurd, wherein she takes an unadorned and unabashed look at the man behind this monumental body of work, full of both triumphs and sadness. A number of essays focus on Moore's view of the purpose and justification of the criminal law, specifically his endorsement of retributivism and legal moralism. The book then addresses Moore's work in the various aspects of the general part of the criminal law, including Moore's position on how to understand criminal acts for double jeopardy purposes, Moore's claim that accomplice liability is superfluous, and Moore's views about the culpability of negligence, as well as the relationship between that view and proximate causation. Furthermore, the subject of defenses in criminal law is addressed, including self-defense, and also the intersection of psychiatry, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and the criminal law. Also discussed are features of morality, and Moore's work in general jurisprudence. Finally, Moore concludes the volume with an essay that defends and delineates the features of his views. (shrink)

Gendered socialization has prompted numerous attempts to redefine what counts as an autonomous choice. However, there is strong disagreement among feminist theorists over the criteria to identify cases of autonomy impairment _vis-à-vis_ the embeddedness of individuals in patriarchal cultures. I argue that this focus on choice and autonomy has often neglected the costs of non-compliance to social norms and the trade-offs that women make to flourish within their community. Even if we were to find an effective way to determine whether (...) a self-regarding choice calls for state interference because of its socialized nature, we would still lack a sufficient justification for interfering with women’s choices. To justify political action, my claim is that we should also look at the effects that preference interference would have on women within their societal context. Consequently, I develop a non-ideal feminist account aimed chiefly at analysing the costs of proposed feminist change. I shall focus in particular on women’s engagement with practices of body modification for the sake of conforming to gendered standards of appearance, such as cosmetic surgery and hymen restoration. In both cases, I argue that blanket bans risk backfiring into a form of double-jeopardy for those who are already the most vulnerable to gendered oppression, hence they are not justified. However, this does not imply passively accepting the status quo but urges us to reconsider new ways to offset transition costs, making resistance to social norms a collectively shared endeavour rather than a burden that exclusively befalls the most vulnerable. (shrink)

Freedom of information requests are increasingly used in sociology, criminology and other social science disciplines to examine government practices and processes. University ethical review boards in Canada have not typically subjected researchers’ FOI requests to independent review, although this may be changing in the United Kingdom and Australia, reflective of what Haggerty calls ‘ethics creep’. Here we present four arguments for why FOI requests in the social sciences should not be subject to formal ethical review by ERBs. These four arguments (...) are: existing, rigorous bureaucratic vetting; double jeopardy; infringement of citizenship rights; and unsuitable ethics paradigm. In the discussion, we reflect on the implications of our analysis for literature on ethical review and qualitative research, and for literature on FOI and government transparency. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that absent special circumstances, there are no moral, judicial procedural rights. I divide this essay into four main sections. First, I argue that there is no general moral right against double jeopardy. Next, I explain why punishing a criminal without first establishing her guilt via a fair trial does not necessarily violate her rights. In the third section, I respond to a number of possible objections. And finally, I consider the implications of my (...) arguments for the human right to due process. (shrink)

Hélène Cixous is perhaps best known for her paper, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ (1976) and her literary contributions outside academia. In this paper, we pick up a lesser known Cixous text, ‘Le Sexe ou la tête?’ that offers an interesting and provocative perspective on the traps associated with being feminine in a masculine environment. As we converse with Cixous, weaving our own words and experiences with hers, we link her work more closely with the feminine in modern-day academia. We (...) suggest that Cixous’s remarks on decapitation and voice offer a way forward for academic women to be; to speak; to recognise the double jeopardy of decapitation in the university; and to use laughter as a strategic, powerful, political act of resistance and subversion against oppressive masculine power structures. We draw on and seek to enact Cixous’s notion of écriture feminine—a disruptive style of writing that provides a mode of being, speaking, and writing that subverts the power of masculine norms in order to be heard and to bring possibilities for change. (shrink)

As the demand for healthcare rises, so does the need for priority setting in healthcare. In this paper, I consider a prominent priority-setting principle: proportional shortfall. My purpose is to argue that proportional shortfall, as a principle, should not be adopted. My key criticism is that proportional shortfall fails to consider past health.Proportional shortfall is justified as it supposedly balances concern for prospective health while still accounting for lifetime health, even though past health is deemed irrelevant. Accounting for this lifetime (...) perspective means that the principle may indirectly consider past health by accounting for how far an individual is from achieving a complete, healthy life. I argue that proportional shortfall does not account for this lifetime perspective as it fails to incorporate the fair innings argument as originally claimed, undermining its purported justification.I go on to demonstrate that the case for ignoring past health is weak, and argue that past health is at least sometimes relevant for priority-setting decisions. Specifically, when an individual’s past health has a direct impact on current or future health, and when one individual has enjoyed significantly more healthy life years than another.Finally, I demonstrate that by ignoring past illnesses, even those entirely unrelated to their current illness, proportional shortfall can lead to instances of double jeopardy, a highly problematic implication. These arguments give us reason to reject proportional shortfall. (shrink)

Bioethicists often present ‘saving lives’ as a goal distinct from, and competing with, that of extending lives by as much as possible. I argue that this usage of the term is misleading, and provides unwarranted rhetorical support for neglecting the magnitudes of the harms and benefits at stake in medical allocation decisions, often to the detriment of the young. Equal concern for all persons requires weighting equal interests equally, but not all individuals have an equal interest in ‘life-saving’ treatment.

This article presents reasons to believe that the following two statements are true of at least some of the laws that established criminal quaestiones in the Late Roman Republic: 1. Once a verdict was given, the defendant could not (with certain exceptions) be put on trial again under that law for acts that he had committed before the trial. 2. The prosecutor was not limited by any list of charges submitted at the beginning of the trial, as to the charges (...) he was allowed to bring before the jurors in his oration(s) and presentation of testimony. (shrink)

The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within (...) our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. (shrink)

Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory (...) to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed. (shrink)

Confidence ratings have often been integrated into reasoning and intelligence tasks as a means for assessing meta-reasoning processes. Although it is often assumed that eliciting these judgements throughout reasoning tasks has no effect on the underlying performance outcomes, this is yet to be established empirically. The current study examines whether eliciting CR from participants during a fluid-reasoning task influences their performance and how this effect is moderated by their initial self-confidence in their own reasoning abilities. In a first experiment, we (...) found that participants performing CR during Raven's Progressive Matrices significantly outperformed a control group who did not provide ratings. Additionally, a second experiment demonstrated that CR only facilitated performance in participants who have a high level of initial self-confidence in their reasoning ability, whereas they were detrimental to participants low in self-confidence. (shrink)

The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...) logically necessary and sufficient conditions for free will, but rather give us answers that agree with our intuitions regarding paradigms of free and unfree decisions. The Irrelevancy reply completed our reply to incompatibilists who continue to object that determinism per se destroys the R-S program. It may be debated whether my autonomy variable account is a satisfactory way to spell out the Irrelevancy reply, but I think that this type of approach suggests the way to vindicating the R-S view from an important type of objection. (shrink)

In "The Illusion of Conscious Will," Daniel Wegner (2002) argues that our commonsense belief that our conscious choices cause our voluntary actions is mistaken. Wegner cites experimental results that suggest that brain processes initiate our actions before we become consciously aware of our choices, showing that we are systematically wrong in thinking that we consciously cause our actions. Wegner's view leads him to conclude, among other things, that moral responsibility does not exist. In this article I propose some ways that (...) traditional philosophical defenders of moral responsibility, both compatibilists and libertarians, might accept Wegner's empirical premise regarding the will but amend their theories so that they may reject his conclusion regarding moral responsibility. (shrink)

The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are (...) correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question. (shrink)

Psychologists and common sense recognize blaming the victim as a cognitive error (fallacy) that many of us use to support the just-world hypothesis — the view that life is basically fair. In this article Richard Double compares a related phenomenon, blaming the culprit. When we commit the fallacy of blaming the culprit we mistakenly conclude that judging a culprit to deserve blame for an action exonerates everyone else from blame for that action. Double provides several examples of the (...) fallacy. (shrink)

John searle has recently claimed to have dissolved what daniel dennett calls 'hume's problem'--The question whether the explanation of behavior by appeal to mental representations can be done without circularity or infinite regress. Searle argues that a careful analysis of the concept of an intentional state shows that mental representations do not require intentional "homunculi" to explain how intentional states have their contents, And, Hence dennett's worry is groundless. I argue that searle's conceptual analysis of intentional states, Even if correct, (...) Provides no clue of an answer to the worry underlying hume's problem. (shrink)

Philosophy teachers converse with troubled students who suffer from what I dub “intelligent collegiate depression” (ICD): a lack of self‐esteem, feelings of futility and pessimism about their futures, a distrust of academic values, and a lack of conviction that their lives matter. Students express their values and their resignation with what approaches conventional wisdom for them: They must be allowed to act as they wish so long as they do not hurt anyone; otherwise it does not matter what they do (...) with their lives. I argue here that students' endorsement of this near‐nihilistic version of Mill's harm principle shows that they are committed to believing in more values than they realize. I then show how to parlay this commitment into a rejection of the worst effects of ICD—all the while holding in abeyance the question of metaethical objectivism vs. subjectivism. My approach shows that accepting a popular ICD premise logically undermines much of the unhappy ICD worldview. (shrink)