This article explains Aquinas's attempt to show, within an Aristotelian framework, how the soul can be both a substance in its own right and the form of the body. I argue that although Aquinas' theory is logically consistent, its plausibility is weakened by the fact that it requires a significant modification of the Aristotelian conceptions of both substance and form.

Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worrall's and Ladyman's versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way in (...) which we can do justice to Worrall's original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedman's) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change. Planck against the heretics 1.1 Poincaré on the meaning of Maxwell's equations 1.2 Two responses: reification and structuralism On the road to structuralism 2.1 The microscope 2.2 Mathematization of the world picture 2.3 The 18th–20th century The new structural realism 3.1 From scientific realism to structuralism 3.2 The Ladyman variant: objectivity and invariance 3.3 How is structural realism supported? An empiricist structuralism 4.1 Royal succession in science 4.2 Defence of the empiricist version 4.3 Structure: an empiricist view. (shrink)

The paper addresses a problem for the unification of quantum physics with the new Aristotelianism: the identification of the members of the category of substance. I outline briefly the role that substance plays in Aristotelian metaphysics, leading to the postulating of the Tiling Constraint. I then turn to the question of which entities in quantum physics can qualify as Aristotelian substances. I offer an answer: the theory of thermal substances, and I construct a fivefold case for thermal substances, based on (...) the irreversibility of time, the definition of thermodynamic concepts, spontaneous symmetry breaking, phase transitions, and chemical form. (shrink)

Few works have had the impact on contemporary philosophy exerted by Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Twentieth-century philosophers in France were bound together by a reading of Hyppolite's translation and commentary. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, and Bataille were all shaped by Kojève's lectures on the book. Late twentieth-century philosophers such as Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze, and Irigaray all operate against a Hegelian horizon. Similarly, in Germany Heidegger, Adorno, and Habermas developed their philosophies in large part through an engagement with Hegel. In the United (...) States the book has had a profound influence on feminism and gender studies. Thinkers as diverse as Butler, Benhabib, Mills, and Honig have developed political theories as well as theories of sexual difference by rereading Hegel's reading of Antigone. As Derrida suggests, this text must be read. It lays out the infrastructures and architectures of life in the modern nation state. It unfolds a grand narrative of the ways of thinking and acting that comprise human experience in "our time." The purpose of the text is to effect a transformation in readers, so that they cease to think of themselves as particular humans and come to know that their existence inheres in membership in a complex community-social, cultural, economic, religious, aesthetic, and political infrastructures that form the culture of possibilities in which self-consciousness emerges and is sustained. Rawlinson's reading reveals how Hegel's politics of the "we" is undermined both by his effacement of sexual difference and by his misappropriation of art as a "betrayal of substance." Both of these gestures discount specificity in favor of a generic subject and a mutual recognition in which the other is the same. She uses Hegel's own critique of abstraction against him to rethink the "we" as a community of difference, figured materially in the differentiated styles or signatures of art, and in so doing argues that that the task of phenomenology is never completed and that the abstract concepts of logic will always be dependent on phenomenology's productive or generative movement. In her reading Hegel is neither a metaphysician nor a subjective idealist. He is a phenomenologist, analyzing experience to articulate the ways in which humans generate narratives and material infrastructures to sustain the complexities of life. (shrink)

It is argued that a concept of substance is possible which not only avoids metaphysical blind alleys but is worthy of serious philosophical attention. Starting with parker's notion of substance a conception is developed in which substance has the moments of haecceity, Logical independence, Causal independence, Causal efficacy, And conservation through change. Event and substance ontologies are compared and reasons for the superiority of the latter given. The results are related to the problem of personal identity, And it is suggested (...) that a person's body may be identifiable by him by means of his person rather than the converse. (shrink)

This secondary analysis re‐examined stories of caregiving told by NICU nurses in the southeast US through a trauma theory lens expanding on research surrounding substance‐exposed pregnancies. Narrative analysis identified distress‐related experiences of nurses related to child custody decisions and outcomes, suggesting traumatic stress within this caregiving dynamic. Four distinct story types and three themes were identified across 23 stories, highlighting similarities and differences and illustrating how distress and trauma were experienced and may be manifested in care practices. Study findings suggest (...) cumulative and residual effects from traumatic experiences can impact NICU nurses' well‐being and care provision, in part by promoting anticipatory trauma. The role of relationship‐building with families, as part of family‐centered care, was also implicated in the intensity of distressful experiences and may increase nurses' vulnerability to trauma as well as create pathways to stigmatizing interactions. Incorporating principles of relational ethics into nurse practice guidelines, while recognizing how care work can influence and be influenced by the potential pathways from trauma to stigma, may provide valuable support for nurses. The application of such a framework could potentially reduce distressing and/or traumatic experiences for nurses caring for families with a substance‐exposed pregnancy. (shrink)

In practice, scientists must convey data in a “representational style”. Various authors seek to explain the epistemic role of scientific visual representation in terms of formal conventions. Goodman also tends to dismiss the epistemic relevance of human cognition. My position is that visual conventions are nonarbitrary, in that they play to scientists’ cognitive abilities and limitations. My account draws on Perini's formal analysis, scientific case studies, and empirical literature on global pattern detection in neurotypicals, autistics, and dyslexics.

The classical and scholastic view of things was of neutral substance to which qualities were attached as substantial adjuncts. Qualities could apparently not be conceived of otherwise than as entities: blueness, hardness, pliability, toughness, translucency, and so on. Noun substantives were the part of speech by which they could most properly be referred to. The use of adjectives did not imply that these qualities were not substantival entities, but emphasized their subordinateness to the thing itself, and were useful in giving (...) pliability, lightness, and elegance to speech. But qualities could not be conceived of otherwise than as something superadded to the neutral substance which carried them. (shrink)

Proceeding from a phenomenological perspective, the present study investigated the experiences of seven homeless women who had lived through childhood trauma and subsequent substance abuse, with specific focus on the recovery process experienced by each. Applying the analytical protocol of Giorgi to the written accounts obtained from the participants, 15 constituent themes of the recovery process were identified. In order to illuminate the participants’ experiences with minimal influence of any possible researcher bias, the researcher refrained from labelling, judging or diagnosing (...) the women’s life circumstances. Consequently, no treatment paradigm was applied to help explain, predict or judge the behaviour of the participants during the course of this research. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Extension and Extended Substance? Bodies and Extended Substances Bodies, Space, and the Ontology of Everyday Life Acknowledgments References and Further Reading.

Millikan's account of substance concepts is based on a notion of “substance” expanded from realist notions of individuals and natural kinds. Her metaphysical notion, based on “inductive potential,” is shown to be too puristic and needs to incorporate cognizing subjects. This could preserve the realist/nondescriptionist insight that the extension of substances is determined by the world.

Without any systematic data or evidence of a problem, or even a thoughtful analysis of costs and benefits, the application of the human participant review system within universities is overreaching at the same time that some risky experimentation on humans outside of universities is unregulated. This article questions the purpose, feasibility, and effectiveness of current IRB approaches to most "2 people talking" situations and proposes scaling back the regulatory system to increase respect accorded it by researchers and its ability to (...) protect human participants of research from real versus imagined harms. In too many cases, the focus is on form over ethical substance: counting what can be counted, rather than focusing instead on what counts. Some disciplines - oral history and journalism, for example - simply do not belong within the scope of institutional review board jurisdiction. Others, such as survey research, informational interviews, and informal interactions, call for a shift from centralized review to more departmentally based (i.e., rooted in disciplinary ethics) oversight, and clearer guidelines on what requires advance review as opposed to provision of post hoc complaint systems. (shrink)

This contribution to the debate over Marx's theory of value gives an account of his concept of ?abstract labour?. Contrary to Stanley Moore {Inquiry, Vol. 14 [1971]), Marx never abandons his early critique of the Hegelian ?Concept'; for he gives a material basis to the conception of social labour as concretely universal. If, in analysing the commodity form of the product of labour, Marx characterizes the labour that forms the substance of value as ?abstractly universal labour?, the priority of the (...) abstract over the concrete at this point is not due to the influence of Hegel's Logic on Marx's work, but reflects the material process of abstraction occurring in commodity exchange. We show that Marx takes up a critical stance to this reality. (shrink)

Ontologies aim to represent what is general, by means of universal statements. In contrast, dispositional predications capture knowledge about what is likely to happen if a certain set of circumstances obtain, which is crucial in investigative research such as in drug discovery and systems biology, where entities which are constitutionally dissimilar can nevertheless have similar behavior in a biological context. While such dispositional properties are increasingly included in biomedical ontologies, the circumstances under which the dispositions are realized are seldom explicitly (...) modeled, and doing so is problematic due to the necessary restriction to binary relations in OWL ontologies. In this paper we address this shortcoming, focusing on the bioactivity of small molecules at varying levels of concentration within a living organism as our problem domain, although our approach is generalizable to other problems. We discuss the ontological nature and representation of dispositions and their realization; consider the nature of concentrations and their representation; and finally we detail an approach to linking dispositions to the conditions for their realization which regards conditions as triggers for the process in which the disposition is realized. (shrink)

Bennett and Hacker’s _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), a collaboration between a philosopher (Hacker) and a neuroscientist (Bennett), is an ambitious attempt to reformulate the research agenda of cognitive neuroscience by demonstrating that cognitive scientists and other theorists, myself among them, have been bewitching each other by misusing language in a systematically “incoherent” and conceptually “confused” way. In both style and substance, the book harks back to Oxford in the early 1960's, when Ordinary Language Philosophy ruled, and Ryle and (...) Wittgenstein were the authorities on the meanings of our everyday mentalistic or psychological terms. I myself am a product of that time and place (as is Searle, for that matter), and I find much to agree with in their goals and presuppositions, and before turning to my criticisms, which will be severe, I want to highlight what I think is exactly right in their approach–the oft-forgotten lessons of Ordinary Language Philosophy. (shrink)

According to the standard view of his metaphysics, Leibniz endorses idealism: the thesis that the world is made up solely of minds or monads and their perceptual and appetitive states. Recently,this view has been challenged by some scholars, who argue that Leibniz can be seen as admitting corporeal substances, that is, animals or embodied souls, into his ontology, and that, therefore, it is false to attribute a strict idealism to him. Subtler accounts suggest that Leibniz begins his philosophical career as (...) an advocate of (some form of) the modern ‘mechanical’ philosophy and ends his career as an idealist, raising the issue when and why Leibniz adopts his monadological metaphysics. This article argues that, given a constellation of metaphysical, logical, and theological views, Leibniz is committed to the ontological primacy of mind or form even in his ‘middle years’. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking work, C. D. C. Reeve uses a fundamental problem--the Primacy Dilemma--to explore Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, dialectic, philosophy of mind, and theology in a new way. At a time when Aristotle is most often studied piecemeal, Reeve attempts to see him both in detail and as a whole, so that it is from detailed analysis of hundreds of particular passages, drawn from dozens of Aristotelian treatises, and translated in full that his overall picture of Aristotle emerges. Primarily a (...) book for philosophers and advanced students with an interest in the fundamental problems with which Aristotle is grappling, Substantial Knowledge's clear, non-technical and engaging style will appeal to any reader eager to explore Aristotle's difficult but extraordinarily rewarding thought. (shrink)

The core of the third chapter is the study of the P‐series. This theory is presented after a detailed discussion of the relationship of individuals to species and genus. A P‐series is a sequence of terms classified according to priority and posteriority starting from the most universal one. This theory is the result of the evolution of the Aristotelian doctrine of pros en done in order to fit with the not strictly Aristotelian notion of ‘genus’ of some Neoplatonic philosophers.

This paper discusses the nature of liberty from the point of view of value. Liberty is the highest value for liberals. The root of this liberal view is their particular conception of self. Rawls says 'the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it.' This is also the Kantian view of the self: the self is prior to its socially given roles and relationships. Therefore, no end is exempt from possible revision by the self. There is nothing (...) wrong with this basic idea. In fact, all theories agree on free choice of life plan or self-determination. But they disagree about what package of rights and resources best enables people to pursue their own conceptions of the good. However, the liberal view of liberty is based on a metaphysically reasoned idealism. This results in a conception of liberty that is absolute, supreme, and has infinite value compared with other things. Communitarians have several arguments against the liberal view. I consider the following two points to be of utmost import: The liberal view of the self is empty; The liberal view ignores our embeddedness in communal practices. My reasoning is not exactly that of the communitarians. I view 'emptiness' as freedom associated with the substance of an action, which has a value that does not lie in itself. (shrink)

Neuroscientific evidence requires a monistic understanding of brain/mind. Truly appropriating what this means confronts us with the vulnerability of the human condition. Ca‐muss absurd and Tillich's despair are extreme expressions of a similar confrontation. This crisis demands a type of courage that is consistent with scientific truth and does not undermine the spiritual dimension of life. That dimension is not a separate substance but the process by which brain/mind meaningfully wrestles with its crisis through aesthetic symbols, religious faith, and ethical (...) affirmation. The validity of these activities does not depend upon human autonomy but instead upon the fact that they exist. Furthermore, they constitute the self, which Dennett calls a “center of narrative gravity.”. (shrink)

The aesthetics of tea, in some practices, seems to focus on appreciating the mental effects of tea — the altered states of mind. Wine aesthetics, on the other hand, seems to actively exclude any inebriative effects. Wine experts are supposed to spit, in order to avoid inebriation when they judge wine. Why? The answer, I suggest, lies deep in several key suppositions in the traditional model of aesthetic experience: that aesthetic experience needs to be accurate of its object, and that (...) it needs to be inseparable from the particular details of its object. But, I argue, that model is not really incompatible with an aesthetics of drugs. The problematic presupposition is that the aesthetics of drugs is either an aesthetics of the world, as experienced while drugged, or an aesthetics of the physical substance itself. The aesthetics of some drugs, such as LSD, will turn out, instead, to be a self-reflective aesthetics — one in which the primary object of appreciation is the alteration of one’s own cognitive faculties. This can be valuable as a humbling aesthetic vision, of one’s own cognitive fragility. But the aesthetics of gastronomical drugs, such as wine and tea, will turn out to be even more complicated. Gastronomical drugs demand that we bridge the inwardly-focused aesthetics of inebriation and an outwardly focused gastronomical aesthetics. They open the door to the possibility of an aesthetic reconciliation between our capacity to get onto the world, and our fears about the fragility of that capacity. (shrink)

In a 1990 lecture Alasdair MacIntyre identified a number of difficulties in dialogue between philosophers of the Aristotelian and Thomist schools and those of certain modern schools. An examination of various interpretations of Aquinas reveals not only difficulties for inter-school dialogue but for intra-school dialogue as well. Even on foundational topics such as the notion of being, the proper method by which to study being, and the notion of substance, there are divergent opinions about what Aquinas held. This essay argues (...) that certain concepts from Gadamer can be helpful on these disputes. In particular, Gadamer’s ideas that to be is to be manifested, that a perspective-free metaphysics is impossible, and that the relationship between text and performance can serve as a model for understanding the relationship between substance and accident may help to resolve certain internecine disputes within the Aristotelian and Thomist schools as well as to foster philosophical conversation between these approaches and some contemporary schools of thought. (shrink)

The classical and scholastic view of things was of neutral substance to which qualities were attached as substantial adjuncts. Qualities could apparently not be conceived of otherwise than as entities: blueness, hardness, pliability, toughness, translucency, and so on. Noun substantives were the part of speech by which they could most properly be referred to. The use of adjectives did not imply that these qualities were not substantival entities, but emphasized their subordinateness to the thing itself, and were useful in giving (...) pliability, lightness, and elegance to speech. But qualities could not be conceived of otherwise than as something superadded to the neutral substance which carried them. (shrink)

a. 'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. ' Thus Kant formulates his attitude to morality (Critique of Practical Reason, p. 260). He draws a sharp distinction between these two objects of admiration. The starry sky, he writes, represents my relationship to the natural, empirical world. Moral law, on the other hand, is of a completely (...) different order. It ' . . . begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which is traceable only by the understanding and with which I discern that I am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary connection (. . . ). ' (p. 260). So Kant sees morality as a separate metaphysical order opposed to the world of empirical phenomena. Human beings belong to both worlds. According to Kant, the personality derives nothing of value from its relationship with the empirical world. His part in the sensuous world of nature places man on a level with any animal which before long must give back to the rest of nature the substances of which it is made. (shrink)