This article questions the belief expressed in various histories of pharmacy that the tenth-century Arab physician Avicenna introduced the tradition of coating pills with gold and silver. Although an examination of his Canon documents Avicenna's interest in the medicinal application of gold and silver, no mention is made of coating pills. Nor do other Islamic physicians seem to have been familiar with this practice, any more than such medieval European authors as Arnaldus of Villanova, Raymund Lull or Johannes (...) de Rupescissa. The same is true of medicinal compendia representative of later periods, such as the Ortus sanitatis, Valerius Cordus' Dispensatorium or the Secrets of Alessio Piemontese. The earliest known mention of coating pills with precious metals occurs in a non-medical book, The Golden Fleece , and the earliest mention in the professional literature seems to appear only in the second half of the seventeenth century. The practice of coating pills with gold and silver was to be practiced in Europe into the first half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

After the question “how could Hobbes write the natural law, if it is nowritten law?” I’ll try to approach the relationship between natural and civil law after the instauration of the commonwealth. In this sense, I’ll pay attention to the hobbesian distinction among “written law” and “written register” of law and a few consequences after this distinction. For example, if, how Hobbes says, the correct interpretation of natural law doesn’t depend on philosophers, but only on the authority of commonwealth, would (...) include itself the legitimation of the formulation of the natural laws? The paradox of the first question seems to be important, however, negligenced from hobbesian critical literature. Its intent is to investigate this negligence into better understanding his philosophical postulate, that includes important points like the “silence of law”, the right of self-defense, foro interno and foro externo, State and government. (shrink)

Throughout recent discussions of race, gender, and identity, both sides of the political spectrum avoid addressing the central concept of what the “Other” is. Using the psychoanalytic insights of Slavoj Zizek combined with the philosophical writings of Jean Baudrillard and Albert Camus, this paper will argue for the rejection of left liberalism, political correctness, and conservative cultural theory due to their inability to allow the subject more freedoms in relation to the Other. In postmodern times we find that the left (...) has been duped into continuing the proliferation of conservative cultural ideology and that political correctness only works to continue capitalism as an acceptable economic structure. Finally, this paper looks at Zizek and Camus’ writings on possible solutions to this problem of identity being linked to capitalism. (shrink)

This paper examines the change of subject problem in conceptual engineering, focusing on Herman Cappelen's austere approach. We present two versions of the problem: the verbal disputes objection and the content instability objection. We analyze how Cappelen addresses these objections using the notions of "topic" and "topic similarity". We argue that while his response to the verbal disputes objection is satisfactory, his approach fails to adequately deal with the content instability objection. Specifically, Cappelen does not provide sufficient resources to identify (...) the incompatible content that grounds substantive disagreements in cases involving revised terms. We conclude that Cappelen's austere approach, despite its contributions, leaves important questions unanswered about how to characterize legitimate disagreements in conceptual engineering contexts. (shrink)

A discrição da presença do princípio de reciprocidade na formulação hobbesiana oblitera importantes dimensões na sua teoria. Entre estas, a necessidade intrínseca de que os súditos estejam instados a utilizar a sua capacidade de produzir juízos. Apresentam-se diversas circunstâncias que corroboram essa tese, o que mostra que a atividade de julgar não foi confiscada pelo soberano. Ao contrário, ela é mesmo necessária para o seu sistema.

The aragonese dominican Martin de Ateca is mostly known thanks to the works of Arnau de Vilanova.This paper edits, translates and analyzes one of the most significant fragments of Arnau de Vilanova’s Antidotum contra venenum effusum per fratrem Martinum de Atheca. Martinannouncement. The aragonese dominican appears to be the first Thomist from the Crown of Aragon tohave been explicitly designated as such.

Why was Eve created? In De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine notoriously gives the answer that it was only causa pariendi, “for the sake of childbearing.” Other late antique interpreters of Genesis emphasize the purpose of conjugal union and domesticity. But a fuller reading of Augustine’s thoughts on the subject reveals the moment between the creation of Eve and the fall as pregnant with extraordinary possibility. This moment, of indeterminate length—for humans had not yet fallen into time—provides an opportunity for Augustine (...) to unleash his theological imagination. This lecture is about paradise. It eschews the customary focus on Adam’s paradisal desire to think about Eve’s beginning. Augustine uses this beginning to emphasize the importance of sociality, and of marriage as its most perfect realization. He takes the quotidian miracle of childbirth as our closest intimation of God’s act of creation. And he imagines new meanings for the trinity of Villanova’s motto: ueritas, unitas, and caritas. (shrink)

As part of the 1995 IAPL meeting devoted to “Incorporations: Virtual Reality,” John Russon organized and chaired a session on the theme “Virtual Hegel.” Participants were asked to address the issue of Hegel and the postmodern, and to facilitate discussion their papers were circulated in advance.

D.C. Schindler reminds us that the motto of Villanova consists of three terms: Unitas, Caritas and Veritas. Postmodern philosophy is keen to malign good Veritas as an exercise in oppression, something which must be avoided if we truly want to reach universal care and unity. In opposition to this trend, Schindler illustrates how Desmond’s philosophy is capable of giving truth its dues against the assaults of Vattimo and others, but also and more importantly that truth serves as foundational for (...) unity and care. Building from Desmond’s Intimate Universal, Schindler illustrates how care and unity need an ontological grounding in truth in order to be more than merely superficial. (shrink)

The disease of love appears in an unbroken chain of medical treatises stretching from sixth-century Byzantium through the Middle Ages to post-Renaissance Western Europe. Lovesickness, known variously as amor eros, amor heros, or amor hereos in medieval Latin medical texts, has attracted the attention of literary scholars because many of its symptoms correspond to conventional signs of love in medieval literature. According to George Lyman Kittredge, “What to the physician were symptoms … became, in the chivalric system, duties — ideals (...) of emotion which the true lover must live up to, and which the hypocrite takes pains to counterfeit.” In the late thirteenth century the Catalan physician Arnald of Villanova explicitly compared the disease of love and feudal service in his Tractatus de amore heroico. He claimed that this love “is called heroic as though lordly , not only because it befalls lords, but also either because it dominates, subjugating the soul and ruling a man's heart, or because the acts of such lovers toward the desired object are similar to the acts of servants toward their lords.”. (shrink)

_The Verge of Philosophy_ is both an exploration of the limits of philosophy and a memorial for John Sallis’s longtime friend and interlocutor Jacques Derrida. The centerpiece of the book is an extended examination of three sites in Derrida’s thought: his interpretation of Heidegger regarding the privileging of the question; his account of the Platonic figure of the good; and his interpretation of Plato’s discourse on the crucial notion of the chora, the originating space of the universe. Sallis’s reflections are (...) given added weight—even poignancy—by his discussion of his many public and private philosophical conversations with Derrida over the decades of their friendship. This volume thus simultaneously serves to mourn and remember a friend and to push forward the deeply searching discussions that lie at the very heart of that friendship. “All of John Sallis’s work is essential, but [this book] in particular is remarkable.... Sallis shows better than anyone I have ever read what it means to practice philosophy on the verge.”—Walter Brogan, Villanova University. (shrink)

This article introduces and presents a transcription and annotated translation of a medical text in Ottoman Turkish authored by Mūsā Cālīnūs. The treatise is entitled Risāla fī Tabā’i‘ al-adviya va-isti‘mālihā. This article analyses the degrees of the qualities of various materia medica and how, on that basis, certain drugs affect, effect, and preserve health. There are three reasons why this brief, seemingly pedestrian text merits more extensive study. First, it refers to the medieval Latin physicians Bernard de Gordon and Arnaldo (...) di Villanova for perhaps the first time in Turkish literature. Second, Mūsā Cālīnūs must have believed that there was an audience at Beyazid II’s court for the contents of medical texts composed in Latin. Third, as Mūsā Cālīnūs is a probable conduit through which information about the astronomy of Islamic societies could have reached the Veneto around 1500, his interest in the contents of Latin medical texts meant that he was a scholarly intermediary who carried information in at least two directions. (shrink)

This essay, which was originally the opening presentation for the 2005 conference of the Venerable John Henry Newman Association on “Newman and the Laity” at Villanova University, discusses four areas where Newman’s ideas about the voice of the laity have lessons for American Catholic life today: his non-clericalized view of the Church, the lack of appreciation for the laity, his vision of an educated laity, and the need for consulting the laity about doctrinal matters.

This article, which was originally presented at the annual conference of the Venerable John Henry Newman Association at Villanova University in July 2005, examines the “religious formation” of students at the Catholic University of Ireland as presented by Newman in his university sermons and discourses. Newman wanted the students to develop not only intellectually, but also religiously and morally. He saw tutors as critical to this process of formation.

This volume, entitled "Collectanea Augustiniana," commemorates the celebration at Villanova University of the sixteenth centenary of the conversion and baptism of St. Augustine. Subtitled "Augustine: -Second Founder of the Faith-," the volume is divided into six sections. In the first, 'Conversion in the "Confessiones"', five authors discuss aspects of Augustine's conversion. The second section, 'Literary Structure in the "Confessiones"', is devoted to six analyses of the arrangement of Augustine's spiritual autobiography. The third section, "The City of God," contains four (...) essays on Augustine's theology of history. The fourth section, 'Augustinian Biblical Exegesis', presents six studies of Augustine's interpretation of Holy Writ. The fifth section, 'Influences on Augustine', is given over to four examinations of Augustine's philosophical background. Finally, in the sixth section, "Augustinian Themes," three essays deal respectively with the Augustinian concepts of body and soul, evil, and juridicism.". (shrink)

Catholic Relief Services , the international humanitarian agency of the U.S. Catholic community, has worked in Rwanda since 1963. The 1994 Rwandan genocide killed five of its staff, countless co-workers, friends and relatives; its offices were looted and operations destroyed. The genocide marked a turning point in the agency’s history. Since then CRS has made justice, peacebuilding, and solidarity agency priorities, and has committed itself to fully integrate them into all of its partnerships and programming. The focus of this study (...) is an innovative microfinance methodology, Savings and Internal Lending Communities , which CRS recently introduced in Rwanda. While the purpose of CRS’ SILC programming in Rwanda is to promote greater economic security, particularly for Orphans and other Vulnerable Children , and women’s empowerment, this essay explores its peacebuilding potential in the country. It raises the question of whether it is possible to conceive of Rwanda’s SILC groups as social spaces for peace where a culture of peace and peacebuilding skills may already be being generated. It suggests that if identified as such and developed more intentionally, CRS’ SILC programming in Rwanda could play a more significant and integral role in securing the peace Rwandans long for.In July 2008 five Villanova University faculty members and I traveled to Rwanda, spending a total of eight days in country.1 The purpose of the trip was to learn more about the 1994 genocide, the effort to rebuild the country, and in particular, the U.S. Catholic community’s contribution to that effort through Catholic Relief Services . In addition to visiting memorials to the victims of the genocide and meeting with representatives from the Rwandan Catholic Church, the University of Rwanda, and the Rwandan government, we had the opportunity to observe some of CRS’ programming and meet with CRS’ small U.S. staff and its much larger Rwandan staff working with its Rwandan partner agencies. We visited a field hospital where patients were being treated for HIV/AIDS; agricultural projects aimed at containing cassava blight and improving yield; projects to teach orphans and other vulnerable children and the blind trades to enable them to earn income to support themselves and their families; elementary school classrooms; a retreat center where diocesan justice and peace animators were being trained in grassroots peacebuilding skills; and a Savings and Internal Lending Community group. In this article, I would like to focus on CRS’ SILC programming, and in particular, what I believe to be its potential to contribute to peacebuilding in Rwanda. (shrink)

Gabriel Rockhill - Analytic Philosophy and the History of Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.4 678-679 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Gabriel Rockhill Villanova University Tom Sorell and G. A. J. Rogers, editors. Analytic Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 239. Cloth, $65.00. It has often been assumed that history is one of the major dividing lines between analytic and (...) continental philosophy. Participants in the latter tradition have primarily been preoccupied with deferent interpretations of the philosophical auctores, expressing their own ideas through a form of "exegetical thinking" by which present philosophical intuitions are validated when they are discovered.. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary and ecumenical collection of essays honors the transformative work of Margaret A. Farley, Gilbert L. Stark Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School, using it as a starting point for reflection on the contribution of feminist method to theology and ethics. Through a variety of perspectives, contributors show that by resisting classical oppositions between “interpersonal” and “social” ethics and by insisting that social, economic, and political realities be taken seriously in considerations of justice, feminist concerns challenge the (...) very categories of Christian ethics. With essays ranging from sexual ethics to human rights, medical ethics to freedom, _A Just and True Love_ offers a broad perspective on the last twenty-five years of feminist innovation in Christian ethics and a glimpse of its global future, particularly in continents such as Africa. “This book brings together a number of the most prominent thinkers in Christian theology and ethics today in a justly deserved tribute to the work and influence of Margaret Farley. The essays explicitly acknowledge and engage Farley in various degrees; one comes away appreciating both the integrity of her work and its versatility.” —_Darlene Fozard Weaver, Villanova University _ “Inevitably while listening to or reading Margaret Farley, we find her refrain, ‘I want to ask all over again.’ Reexamining, reframing, and rethinking is Farley’s method of engaging anew human experience and relationality. The authors of these essays capture that method as they reconsider feminism and sexuality, love and freedom, justice and truth, contraception and women’s rights. Like her own work, they reset the ethical agenda to recapture a more loving truth. A very successful collection for a most admired colleague. Ryan and Linnane are to be congratulated!” —_James F. Keenan, S.J., Boston College_ “In_ A Just and True Love,_ a host of distinguished scholars consider fundamental themes of feminist theological ethics and their significance for global justice, the meaning of Christian love, creative casuistry, and truthful life in the Church. I can imagine no higher praise than to affirm that these authors have succeeded marvelously in doing exactly what they set out to do: to produce a volume worthy of the theological work and wisdom of Margaret Farley.” —_William Werpehowski, Villanova University_. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS: A REPLY THEODORE J. KoNDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania I N A RECENT article in The Thomist William Lane Craig has discussed certain aspects of Saint Thomas's teaching on God's knowledge of creatures. While for Craig Saint Thomas's concept of God's knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) is not fatalistic, his concept of God's knowledge of approbation (i.e., God's causal knowledge) is.1 (...) Craig believes that this latter type of divine knowledge implies fatalism since, on his reading, its causality determines everything that takes place in this universe. In developing his argument Craig makes a number of statements (and arguments) which are not only at variance with Saint Thomas's expressed thought but which, I believe, are also clearly mistaken. Some of his errors are of a trivial sort and may in part be due to the fact that he occasionally misspeaks himself. One can single out in this regard his statement, on page 78, that "God's knowledge does not necessitate an effect because an effect may be impeded by its secondary cause," and also his observation, on page 79, that "God's knowledge is the cause of everything God knows." 2 However, there are a number of more 1 See William Lane Craig, "Aquinas on God's Knowledge of Future Contingents," The Thomist, 54 (January 1990): 33-79. For his discussion of Thomas's teaching on God's knowledge of vision see particularly pp. 32-67; on Aquinas's teaching on God's causal knowledge, pp. 68-79. 2 Contrary to Craig's way of stating this, Aquinas never speaks about an effect being impeded by its secondary cause. Rather, a contingent cause may be impeded from producing its effect by the intervention of another secondary cause. Examples would be frost preventing the production or development of the fruit of certain plants, or a drug preventing the development of a normal embryo. For Aquinas's discussion of a contingent cause see De veritate, q. 2, a. 12, c. and also Summa contra Gentiles, Book I, chap. 67. Concerning 117 118 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON serious errors to be found in his discussion of God's knowledge of creatures, and it is to these that I would like to address this reply. I. In discussing the topic of God's knowledge of future contingent singulars, Craig considers Saint Thomas's explanation as to how it is possible for God to know what is future and contingent (i.e., something which, from the standpoint of its proximate cause, can either come to be or not come to be). As generally known, his explanation points out that while what is future and contingent with respect to its proximate cause(s)-and thus also from our vantage point-is something indeterminate in being and therefore in truth and knowability, as falling within the scope of God's eternal knowledge it is something already present (and thus determined to one of two opposites) and, consequently, can be known with certitude.3 In this Thomistic view, then, there is no past or future in God's knowledge of created things; everything is known at once and as present. At this point in his discussion, when he has yet to consider Saint Thomas's position that God's knowledge of things is also a causal knowledge (i.e., a knowledge which involves God's will as First Cause of His creatures and their actions), Craig claims that Saint Thomas employs the Boethian notion of God's eternity, and thus of His timeless knowledge, in order to " defuse the threat of fatalism." ' He holds this view because, he argues, otherwise, i.e., if God's knowledge were something past with respect to a future contingent singular (so that God could be said to " foreknow " it), that future would be something which would necessarily come to be-either that or else God could be mistaken-and therefore not truly Craig's second observation, it is not true to say, even of God's causal knowledge, that God's knowledge is the cause of everything God knows since God knows many things He will never cause... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE START OF METAPHYSICS* THEODORE J. KoNDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania I N HIS RECENTLY published book, John F. X. Knasas seeks to answer this twofold inter-related question: What, according to Saint Thomas's expressed teaching, is the subject of metaphysics and how does the human mind proceed to attain it for the purpose of study? While he acknowledges a debt to Joseph Owens for certain of his (...) basic positions, Knasas will claim that the book's argument is original in the way in which it opposes what he takes as realistically the subject of metaphysics at its initial stage (or with the only understanding of beingens -metaphysics requires to begin) to what will become this science 's subject at its later, more mature stage. Moreover, although he may contradict himself on this point, he will reject, as Saint Thomas's view, the position that a physical demonstration can establish the existence of immaterial being, be it God or angels. He will also argue at some length what he evidently considers a crucial epistemic procedure for the start of metaphysics, viz., that a series of judgments relating individuals back to their acts of existence (from whence they were originally abstracted) is required for the "judgmentally constituted multitude" from which the mind attains common being. Finally, since he will insist that abstraction must be controlled by the data, he will allow no room in Thomistic metaphysics for a beginning metaphysical intuition in which being is seen as not necessarily linked to matter and motion, nor for an a priori approach to its subject which would start *John F. X. Knasas, The Preface to Metaphysics: A Contribution to the N eo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics. New York: Peter Lang, 1990. Pp. 193. 121 122 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON from the nature of the knowing subject, viz., the human intellect, as open to and directed toward infinite being and intelligibility. In what follows I will discuss (and critically assess) each of these features of this book as well as address myself briefly to certain things the author has to say about the Thomistic " five ways." In the first three chapters Knasas is primarily concerned with showing that metaphysics cannot begin with a notion of being understood in the sense of ens commune. This sense of the notion traditionally includes both material and immaterial being. However, he argues, since (according to his reading of Aquinas) only metaphysics can demonstrate the existence of immaterial being, its subject cannot, at least at its outset, encompass such being, not even as something conceivable. He therefore opposes the view of Neo-Thomists who, basing themselve? on the now famous and frequently cited text from Saint Thomas's Expositio on Boethius's De Trinitate (Question 5, article 3), insist that metaphysics begins with the recognition that being is something separate from matter and motion (and not merely so in the mind's consideration by abstraction). This separation is understood in the so-called negative judgment of separation: " it is not of the nature of being to be in matter and motion (even though it is sometimes found therein)." On this point Knasas finds fault with " Natural Philosophy" Thomists, among whom he includes the Dominicans L.-B. Geiger (although this writer is barely mentioned and only in a footnote discussion) and James Weisheipl, both of whom have argued that the subject of metaphysics presupposes a demonstration from natural philosophy that immaterial, unchanging being exists (otherwise, they maintain, the separation of which Saint Thomas speaks in the De Trinitate Commentary would have no fundamentum in re). Again, his main argument with these Thomists is that no textual justification can be found for their view-indeed there is counter-textual evidence against it-that physical philosophy proves the existence of immaterial being and that, in the eyes of Aquinas, metaphysics awaits such a demonstration in order to begin. He equally rejects the position, one which he at- THE START OF METAPHYSICS 123 tributes above all to Maritain, that, prior to any argument that would establish the actual existence of God, being can be understood -and this thanks to an existential judgment in which existence is restored to the essence... (shrink)

Examines Bergson’s work from the perspectives of critical philosophy of race and decolonial theory, placing it in conversation with theorists from Africa, the African Diaspora, and Latin America. Building upon recent interest in Henri Bergson’s social and political philosophy, this volume offers a series of fresh and novel perspectives on Bergson’s writings through the lenses of critical philosophy of race and decolonial theory. Contributors place Bergson’s work in conversation with theorists from Africa, the African Diaspora, and Latin America to examine (...) Bergson’s influence on literature, science studies, aesthetics, metaphysics, and social and political philosophy within these geopolitical contexts. The volume pays particular attention to both theoretical and practical forms of critical resistance work, including historical analyses of anti-racist, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist movements that have engaged with Bergson’s writings—for example, the Négritude movement, the Indigenismo movement, and the Peruvian Socialist Party. These historical and theoretical intersections provide a timely and innovative contribution to the existing scholarship on Bergson, and demonstrate the importance of his thought for contemporary social and political issues. Andrea J. Pitts is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte. Mark William Westmoreland is a doctoral candidate and instructor of ethics and philosophy at Villanova University. (shrink)

These lectures, delivered as part of the 1962 St. Augustine Lecture Series at Villanova University, develop the Thomistic conception of man as an "intellectual soul" which itself is both a self-subsisting substance and a substantial form. So viewed, man's unity consists in being a composite reality, not in the sense of a soul and a body functioning as co-parts of a whole, but in the sense of an intelligible substance which requires an organic body to realize its own nature. (...) The lectures neither criticize nor explicitly defend these claims but rather present them as a novel interpretation of man. This Aquinas was able to construct by drawing the conceptual tools of form, matter and substance from Aristotelian metaphysics and the view of man as an historical pilgrim from Augustinian theology.--B. G. R. (shrink)

_The Verge of Philosophy_ is both an exploration of the limits of philosophy and a memorial for John Sallis’s longtime friend and interlocutor Jacques Derrida. The centerpiece of the book is an extended examination of three sites in Derrida’s thought: his interpretation of Heidegger regarding the privileging of the question; his account of the Platonic figure of the good; and his interpretation of Plato’s discourse on the crucial notion of the chora, the originating space of the universe. Sallis’s reflections are (...) given added weight—even poignancy—by his discussion of his many public and private philosophical conversations with Derrida over the decades of their friendship. This volume thus simultaneously serves to mourn and remember a friend and to push forward the deeply searching discussions that lie at the very heart of that friendship. “All of John Sallis’s work is essential, but [this book] in particular is remarkable.... Sallis shows better than anyone I have ever read what it means to practice philosophy on the verge.”—Walter Brogan, Villanova University. (shrink)

"Papers ... from the ... biennial conference of the Hegel Society of America, held at Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania, November 11-13, 1976." Includes bibliographical references.

In Hans Urs von Balthasar's 1947 Wahrheit, later republished as Theo-Logic I, he attempted to retrieve the notion that "truth is not just a property of knowledge but a transcendental quality of being as such". Villanova's D. C. Schindler enlists this retrieval in order to overcome "a metaphysics of presence," while also providing readers with an indispensable guide for navigating philosophical aspects of Balthasar's Werke. Although Schindler's text deals with notoriously dense subject matter, an undercurrent of pedagogical sense controls (...) his style and grants readers rewarding assimilation of a logic affirming both identity and difference within the concept of truth. (shrink)

This paper is a short commentary on Michelle Dempsey's contribution to a symposium on the work of John Finnis which took place at Villanova Law School in the fall of 2011. It focuses on Finnis's claim that there is a presumptive obligation to obey the law and some worries that Dempsey raises against this claim. It is forthcoming, along with several other papers from the symposium, in the Villanova Law Review.

Waterfowl--ducks, geese, and swans--are a pervasive, ubiquitous element in Etruscan art, just as they are in well-watered Etruria itself. From the formative Villanovan Period though the terminus of Etruscan culture, waterfowl are regularly depicted in a variety of plastic and glyphic media: pottery, painting, metalwork, and stone. Waterfowl are particularly frequent in funerary contexts. Minimal attention, however, has been accorded this unique branch of avians; waterfowl are generally assumed to have little more than decorative value in the present literature, Nonetheless, (...) it can be shown that ducks, geese, and swans were endowed with social, medicinal, magical, and religious significance in ancient culture and, indeed, in most cultures where waterfowl gather in large numbers. A goodly portion of Etruscan art, as well as comparanda from contemporaneous peoples with whom the Etruscans, directly or indirectly, enjoyed economic and cultural intercourse--the Hellenic lands, Asia Minor and Egypt, central and northern Europe--bears out the preceding statement. This study first examines the natural history of the waterfowl of Etruria, as critical an aspect in their deployment as symbols as are the natural behaviors of the snake and lion in their respective symbolisms. Next, the various roles of waterfowl in medicine, magic and mythology, as well as etymological studies of both Etruscan and Indo-European words for "waterfowl" are investigated and analyzed. Certain aspects of Etruscan conceptions of the afterlife that eventually prove germane are also discussed. Analysis of the combined data helps elucidate the meaning of a number of Etruscan monuments in which waterfowl appear, and simultaneously calls for a reassessment of others, e.g., Villanova and later armor (helmets, pectorals, shield); Orientalizing pieces such as the Regolini-Galassi fibula; Archaic and later bronze mirrors; the Aurora Krater; tomb paintings; and duck askoi. To be sure, there are representations of waterfowl in Etruscan art where the birds serve as decorative elements only -- their beauty is universally admired -- but, as have other cultures, the Etruscans saw considerably more in ducks, geese, and swans than just graceful birds gliding about the waters. (shrink)

Aurélien Djian | : L’ambition de cet article est double. Il s’agit d’abord de fixer le contexte philosophique qui sous-tend le débat entre Derrida et Marion en 1999, à l’Université de Villanova, et de réviser la perspective qui y est formulée selon laquelle le destin de la phénoménologie est intimement lié à une décision à prendre à l’égard du concept d’horizon : « il n’y a pas de phénoménologie sans horizon », affirme Derrida à Marion, il faut donc la (...) dépasser ; « la dernière étape en vue d’une véritable phénoménologie serait d’abandonner le concept d’horizon », rétorque Marion à Derrida. Cette révision de perspective nous conduira alors, dans un second temps, à restituer, en se servant de l’histoire du concept d’horizon comme fil directeur heuristique, le sens de ce que nous appellerons l’histoire française de l’herméneutique phénoménologique, dont l’unité, par-delà la multiplicité des étiquettes, réside dans le partage d’une même définition de l’activité philosophique, comme tentative de laisser se montrer soi-même à partir de soi-même le phénomène par excellence, et, avec et contre le second Heidegger, d’une même exigence de dépassement de l’horizon, solidaire de la métaphysique moderne de la subjectivité. Le principe d’une telle reconstruction permettra enfin d’envisager la possibilité d’une histoire différenciée des concepts alternatifs de phénoménologie et d’horizon, qui reste à écrire. | : The task of this article is twofold. First, it is meant to sketch out the philosophical context within which the Derrida/Marion debate that happened in 1999 at the university of Villanova took place, and to overhaul the perspective that it puts forward, that the destiny of phenomenology itself is linked at the abandon of the concept of horizon : “Without horizon there is no phenomenology”, argues Derrida against Marion ; “the last step for a real phenomenology would be to give up the concept of horizon”, answers Marion to Derrida. This overhaul will then leads us to use the history of the concept of horizon as a heuristical guiding thread to flesh out what makes the unity of what we can call the French history of hermeneutical phenomenology, that is to say, firstly, the sharing of the same definition of philosophy, as the attempt to let the distinctive phenomenon be seen as it shows itself by itself. And, secondly, with and against the second Heidegger, of the same requirement of overcoming the horizon, as it is committed to the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. The principle on which such a reconstruction is based will finally allow us to consider the idea of a differentiated history of the alternative concepts of phenomenology and horizon. History which is yet to come. (shrink)

Armando P. Ribas was born in Ciego de vila, Cuba, in 1932 and died in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2020. In 1956 he graduated as a Juris Doctor from Saint Thomas of Villanova University in Havana, Cuba. He later studied Law and Economics at Southern Methodist University and Columbia University in the United States. In Argentina, he worked as a journalist and economist and from 1889 to 1990 and was a Deputy in that country. This book clearly explains the (...) ethical and non-economic antagonism between socialism and the misnamed capitalism, as well as the importance of liberty for the individual to achieve prosperity with justice and solidarity. The " illuminism" fallacy clearly emerges from the work as a pretense of the course of reason in history. This explains how obscurantism arising from the confusion between reason and truth caused greater crimes in the West than the Manichean virtues of the Middle Ages. It explains the fundamental discrepancy between the reason of state, prevailing in Europe and the "rule of law" of Americans. The latter changed for the first time in history the relationship between the government and the citizen in defense of individual rights: to life, liberty, property and the search for their own happiness. Ribas also expands on the analysis of economic ideas, which, detached from private rights, have caused the recent failures of "democracies south of the Rio Grande." This book allows us to understand to a great extent the evolution and problems of the world that we have had to live, between the supposed globalization and the reality of terrorism. But just as he points out the problems, he also teaches the ways in which individual prosperity can be achieved for all men who know how to use their freedom. Armando Ribas has been pointed out as the most liberal of Cubans and also of Argentines, since he had two homelands in his life. (shrink)

Professor Errol E. Harris, past-President of The Hegel Society of America, accepted the invitation of the Philosophy Department of Villanova University to occupy their Chair of Christian Philosophy for the 1982 spring semester. The following paper was presented as his inaugural address to that department.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 325-337 Hume's Aesthetic Theism JOHN IMMERWAHR When it comes to religion, Hume's motto is corruptio optimi pessima, "the corruption of the best things gives rise to the worst" (NHR 338,339, SScE 73).1 He warmly endorses what he calls "true religion" and strongly attacks false religion, superstition and priestcraft. Hume's distaste for false religion is obviously sincere, but scholars have sometimes (...) wondered how seriously to take Hume's "veneration for true religion" (DNR 219). Are his favorable comments about true religion honest or is this just one more smokescreen?2 In fact, Hume tells us very little about what he calls "true religion," "true theism" or "genuine piety." At one point Hume even drafted an apology to readers of his History of England for the fact that "the Mischiefs which arise from the Abuses of Religion, are so often mentioned, while so little in comparison is said of the salutary Consequences which result from true & genuine piety."3 In what follows I look at a number of the passages where Hume does discuss true religion, in an attempt to ask what makes true religion true.4 In brief, his answer is that the superiority of genuine theism results from its moral qualities rather than its epistemological warrant.5 Unlike other forms of religion, true religion is based on the calm passions rather than the violent ones and as such it alone is able to perform "the proper Office of religion" which is to reinforce and support morality.6 While Hume never wavers from his position that morality does not require any religious or theological commitment, he does feel that at least this one approach to religion has a positive moral contribution to make. John Immerwahr is at the Department of Philosophy, Villanova University, Villanova PA 19085-1699 USA. Email: [email protected] 326 John Immerwahr True religion in Hume's writings Scattered through Hume's writings are a number of references to a minimalistic religion that is immune from the usual Humean critiques. The exempted form of religion is what Gaskin describes as an "attenuated Deism," which includes a conviction of the existence of God as the cause of order in the universe, together with a commitment to a secular human morality.7 Here are a few passages where this form of religion is mentioned: The Natural History of Religion: The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion. (NHR 309) History of England: In every religion, except the true, [the diligence of the clergy] is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion. (HE III 135) Dialogues concerning Natural Religion: Philo: All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism. (DNR 165) It is, of course, dangerous to take anything Hume says about religion at face value. On the one hand, Hume's religious works, such as his essay on miracles, were a major force in attracting the kind of literary reputation which he so much desired. On the other hand, he lived with the constant possibility of persecution by the ultra-conservative wing of the Scottish church.8 One of his self-protective techniques is to criticize one religious position only from the framework of another. This allows him a certain "deniability" in that he can always say that he was only criticizing a specific form of religion, not religion generally.9 At least some of what he says about true religion can probably be written off as protective coloration. Nonetheless, if we take seriously what Hume says about the "suitable notions of [God's] divine perfections" (DNR 88) we come up with a model of true religion that is compatible with Hume's overall perspective. The justifiability of true theism What makes true religion true? Hume tells... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi MorisatoLance H. Gracy (bio)Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond. By Takeshi Morisato. England: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019. Pp. viii + 269. Hardcover $116.00, isbn 978-1-350-09251-8.Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi Morisato is an informative and (...) insightful read on metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and relevant areas of interest. Morisato's stated objective in the introduction is (a) to investigate the possibility of comparative philosophy through William Desmond's metaxological way of thinking, and (b) to examine how the "absolute dialectic" in Tanabe Hajime's metanoesis can help us understand the relationship between one framework of thinking and another (p. 16). Morisato's book proceeds in five parts. Part One orients the reader to the scope of the project through an overview of comparative philosophy and its methodological frameworks--namely, the metaxological methodology of William Desmond, which deals importantly with the (modern) predicament of religion as expressed in the "transcendental univocity" of the Kantian system; and the metanoetic methodology of Tanabe Hajime, which deals importantly with the issue of "rational progress" in Hegelian dialectic. Yet each intellectual framework deals with both Kant's and Hegel's systems. Part Two addresses what the problem of religion in Kantian and Hegelian philosophy is in more detail. Part Three, "Metaxology and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," and Part Four, "Metanoetics and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," offer a more detailed account concerning how Desmond's and Tanabe's philosophies tackle conceptual problems in modern philosophy of religion. Morisato's conclusion follows from these along with an endnotes section, bibliography, and index.According to Morisato, overcoming the problem of comparative philosophy--i.e., the "philosophical problem of comparing two systems of thinking rooted in different cultural and intellectual contexts" (p. 22)--means, at least in part, clarifying the extent to which philosophers of different culturalintellectual contexts and backgrounds share, as "kindred spirits" or as "intellectual companions," a consonance of thought regarding their philosophical perspectives. Desmond and Tanabe represent just such a pair, whose consonance of thought, expressed by Morisato en passant and expressed more definitively in the conclusion, is unified in a struggle against hegemonic structures in the [End Page 1] philosophy of religion, specifically those of Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of religion. William Desmond (1951–present) is a Catholic philosopher who currently holds the David R. Cook Chair in Philosophy at Villanova University. He has worked extensively on metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and German idealism. Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) was a Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto school and is perhaps most well-known for his Philosophy as Metanoetics. Morisato does a commendable job elucidating issues in modern systems of religion, which have undoubtedly been influenced by Kant's and Hegel's systems. As it concerns Kant, contemporary philosophy of religion still struggles with the claims of transcendental idealism, particularly its reduction of religious belief to mere postulates of practical reason. And as it concerns Hegel, what seems to be an unending, "progressive" self-return of dialectical monism has deeply influenced the way, and manner, in which religious adherents deal with societal views of the individual and individuals' views of society. By this token, Morisato's attempt to get beyond the so-called "extirpation" of the source of religious truth as the "creative power behind our understanding of reality and our existence" is refreshing, to say the least (p. 46). In what follows, I offer a relatively brief overview of Morisato's book and conclude with a reflection on the text.Morisato's critique of the Kantian and Hegelian systems begins with the argument that Kantian transcendental univocity implies that reason's autonomy, as dictates of the moral law as absolute duties, not only precedes divine legislation, but becomes one with it or else is reduced to it. In other words, for Kant, the rational-moral universal is divine law. However, reason's autonomy fails to comprehend the divine origination of finite particulars due to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:184 BOOK REVIEWS knower, one may avoid undercutting the position that the cognitive powers are passive, without failing to do justice to the fact that aware· ness and discrimination are activities of the knower {pp. 71-72; 148· 49, n. 6). Second, Kai holds that the individual human being cannot really he said to have intuitive mind in himself: "Man has mind; hut only to a certain degree and without (...) mind losing its independence from the human whole.... the divine mind is present in man without los· ing its character of divine mind " (p. 75). If only God has intuitive mind {pp. 155, n. 32; 156-57, n. 13), how can the individual human being really know, even in the sense of having discursive thought? Since knowledge depends on first principles, what does not possess the intuitive mind which knows the first principles would, it seems, not properly have knowledge. The only hope for a definitive interpretation of the disconcertingly brief De Anima, 3. 5, lies in the possibility that one can establish a definite connection between this chapter and other elements in the Aris· totelian corpus, a connection that would elucidate the otherwise in· scrutable teaching on active mind. It is the great merit of Kai to have made an excellent case for a connection between De Anima, 3. 5, and two other elements in the Aristotelian corpus: nous as it functions in the logic and epistemology, and the unmoved mover of Metaphysics, Lambda. Exploring this connection in a penetrating and thorough analysis of a great body of Aristotelian and secondary te~ts, Kai has not merely taken a position on a more than two-thousand-year-old con· troversy, hut also has decisively advanced our understanding of active mind. St. John's University Jamaica, New York JAMES T. H. MARTIN Anselm Studies: An Occasional Journal. Vol. 2. Edited by JosEPH ScHNAUBELT, OSA, et al., White Plains, New York: Kraus Inter· national Publications, 1988. Pp. 634. $55.00. This volume contains the proceedings of the Fifth International Saint Anselm Conference (Villanova University, September 16-21, 1985). Held in conjunction with the Tenth International Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference, the meeting occasioned papers concen· trating on areas of "influence and juncture" in the life and thought of St. Anselm and St. Augustine. Given the dependence of much of Anselm's work on the thought of St. Augustine, the Conference took as its particular objective the understanding of the relationship between BOOK REVIEWS 185 faith and reason. While the focus of the papers in this volume includes both saints, the principal emphasis falls on Anselm as inheritor and interpretor of the methods and ideas of his intellectual ancestor. A brief introduction provides cameo presentations of Anselm's character as abbot, monk, and archbishop, together with a conspectus on Anselm's position vis-a-vis the canonical and ecclesiological issues of his day. The papers are then divided into five chapters: "Anselm's Monasticism." "The Proslogion Argument," "Truth: Anselm and Augustine," "Theological Method," and "The Anselmian Worldview." While the papers are of use to scholarly readers desiring detailed treatment of central issues in Anselm's logic and epistemology, the un· doubted strength of the collection lies in its well-calculated effort to integrate an understanding of Anselm's intellectual and spiritual out· look with the theological, spiritual, and literacy currents of his time. Especially for the historian of intellect and society, the essays in this volume provide analysis that advances our understanding of the cultural context of the 11th and 12th centuries. The contribution to our understanding of Anselm's culture is par· ticularly clear in the first and fourth divisions of the volume, the sec· tions dealing with monasticism and Anselm's worldview. In the former division, Glenn Olsen's assessment of " Anselm and Homosexuality" neatly evaluates the evidence for Anselm's sexual orientation made controversial by John Boswell's Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality. In fact, the present article, together with its notes, provides a useful summary of the critical literature which has grown up of late around the Boswellian thesis as well as the study of literary expressions of affection in the 11th and 12th centuries. Olsen grasps the... (shrink)

Responding to questions put to him at a Roundtable held at Villanova University in 1994, Jacques Derrida leads the reader through an illuminating discussion of the central themes of deconstruction. Speaking in English and extemporaneously, Derrida takes up with unusual clarity and great eloquence such topics as the task of philosophy, the Greeks, justice, responsibility, the gift, the community, the distinction between the messianic and the concrete messianisms, and his interpretation of James Joyce. Derrida convincingly refutes the charges of (...) relativism and nihilism that are often leveled at deconstruction by its critics and sets forth the profoundly affirmative and ethico-political thrust of his work. The “Roundtable” is marked by the unusual clarity of Derrida’s presentation and by the deep respect for the great works of the philosophical and literary tradition with which he characterizes his philosophical work. The Roundtable is annotated by John D. Caputo, the David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University, who has supplied cross references to Derrida’s writings where the reader may find further discussion on these topics. Professor Caputo has also supplied a commentary which elaborates the principal issues raised in the Roundtable. In all, this volume represents one of the most lucid, compact and reliable introductions to Derrida and deconstruction available in any language. An ideal volume for students approaching Derrida for the first time, Deconstruction in a Nutshell will prove instructive and illuminating as well for those already familiar with Derrida’s work. (shrink)

This article, which is an adaptation of a lecture delivered at Villanova University in the Fall of 2015, proposes a reading of Augustine’s Confessions with the assistance of the notions of absorption and theatricality. The very use of those notions is meant to counterbalance the readings generated by our overfamiliarity with Augustinian interiority. By replacing interiority with a concept that, heretofore, is alien to the Augustinian vocabulary, it becomes possible to block facile access to mystical interpretations of conf. on (...) the one hand, and to embark upon the task of reassessing the nature of “confessing” on the other. This new reading demonstrates the difficulties involved in approaching the confessor fully involved in his act of sustained confessing. A comparison is also made with the notion of absorption in the visual arts. Just as spectatordom becomes problematic vis-à-vis a painting whose personae look inward rather than outward, so too the position of the reader vis-à-vis a text whose confessing creator uninterruptedly addresses his Confessee demands a redefinition of the reader’s role and place in the process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 487 Although this reviewer would have appreciated a fuller expression of the dialectical interdependency and synthetic elements holding between Fichte and Schelling than Schurr actually developed, his study is nevertheless an orderly and well-documented presentation of their fundamental views. The study can serve as a solid and professional introduction to the postKantian phase of German Idealism, and it most certainly deserves translation into English. LAWRENCES. STEPELEVICH (...) class='Hi'>Villanova University Die Konstitution der Jl'sthetik in Wilhelm Diltheys Philosophie. By Michael Heinen. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie, Psychologie und P~dagogik, no. 100. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974. Pp. 220) Michael Heinen's book draws attention to Dilthey's interest in the original dimension of art experience. That interest has been the traditional stock in the trade of philosophers since the ancient Greeks, and most crucially since the subjectivization of the aesthetic sphere in the speculative thought of Kant and German idealism. But the point is that there is a gap between those philosophers who speculated about perception, aesthetic pleasure, and the enjoyment of the senses, and who tried to justify those speculations through wide-ranging inquiries into the order of the world and its understanding through our ego and its potentialities--betweenthem and Dilthey, who knows that this age-old enthusiasm for metaphysical and epistemological inquiries has become obsolete. The earlier display of erudition may be vast and awe inspiring. But in Dilthey's mind an interest in those inquiries is no longer foremost. Commendable as all of them may be, they approach the world of the work of art and its experience from the outside, in an independent, self-sufficient, and almost autonomous manner, without facing up to the horizon of the world in which an artistic work is rooted. This horizon of the world emerges as the leitmotif of Heinen's book. Heinen reminds the reader that those who create are immersed in this horizon. The conditions under which they work, the tools they have, the methods they use, the materials that are available to them, the ideas they have in mind--all this can be traced back to the world which surrounds them. Moreover, they belong to an historical world. They are oriented toward a past they remember, a future they anticipate; and all they think, or feel, or will, stands in an historical context, long before they are conscious of themselves in this respect. Heinen rightly points out that this creates a problem not only for the analysis of the artistic expression but for the field of hermeneutics, for the method of understanding this expression. It is not so much something that is understood in its meaning by referring to an ego, or a system of cognitive faculties. It emerges from the socio-historical world; and we must place it back in the same horizon from which it emerges. Heinen agrees with Dilthey that we always find ourselves within the whole of life; and when understanding something--a work of art or any other historical object--we have to do it within the full context of life to which we belong. It is an objectification of life that we have to understand from life itself. This may help to explain why a work of art is more than an object created by an artist through his inspiration and the unconscious production of his genius. From his Hegelian perspective Heinen tells us that whenever an artist is involved in the creation of something he is dependent upon the world in which he lives and upon a dialectic between himself and the horizon of life. Heinen expressly defends the probability of this dialectic in a chapter on the presuppositions of Dilthey's aesthetics (pp. 134-162). He studies Dilthey's attempt to discover a methodological basis for the human sciences. He calls attention to the remarkable sequence of sketches in which Dilthey distinguishes between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, between human sciences that, in one way or another, deal with historical and other manifestations of 488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY life and inner experience, and natural sciences that deal with phenomena, with objects of nature. Dilthey is profoundly conscious and frank in announcing that the human sciences also treat phenomena or objects. But... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIND FORMING AND MANUDUCTIO IN AQUINAS* MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York QUINAS'S CONCERN for pedagogy is plain from his explicit discussions of the subject, the most noteworthy of which is found in the preface to the Summa Theologiae. His qualities as a teacher of beginning students have been brought out by numerous modern authors, among whom are Josef Pieper,1 who underlines both Thomas's ability to (...) arouse wonder and his use of ordinary language intelligible to all, and James Weisheipl,2 who points out that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle reveal a concern for the neophyte who is trying to comprehend the relation between faith and reason. One important aspect of Aquinas's teaching on pedagogy generally does not get the attention it merits, however, and this is the need for ' manuductio.' 3 ' Manuductio ', or ' xeipaywv£a ' (literally, 'leading by the hand') is an expression which Aquinas *This paper was read at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic, Mediaeval, and Renaissance Studies, Villanova University, Pennsylvania, September 1991. 1 Cf. Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962)' c. 8. 2 Cf. James Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas d'Aquino (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 281. 3 This article drew much of its inspiration from the works of Msgr. Maurice Dionne, a thinker who both elaborated upon and consciously implemented Aquinas's teachings on this subject. Cf. especially: Initation a la logique, ed. Yvan Pelletier (Ste-Foy, Quebec: L'Institut Apostolique Renaissance inc., 1976), and La N ecessite de la logique en regard de chacune des vertus intellectuelles, ed. Louis Brunet, vol. 1 (Quebec: Societe d'Etudes Aristoteliciennes 1980), hereafter cited as La N ec. 201 202 MARIE I. GEORGE adopts from Dionysius.4 It is a word that has different but related meanings in the moral, intellectual, and spiritual orders. Our intention is to elucidate the thomistic doctrine of ' leadingby -the-hand ' in the context of intellectual education, or ' mind forming,' discussing its nature, its necessity, and its place in the global picture of human knowing as outlined by Aquinas. We will begin by delineating in general what manuductio is by comparing two key passages, the first of which is to be found in the Summa Theologiae: The teacher leads the students from what is already known to knowledge of things unknown in two ways. First, by putting before him certain aids or instruments which his intellect uses in order to acquire science ; for example, when he presents him with some less universal proposition which nevertheless the student is able to judge from things already known; or when he proposes to him some sensible examples, or similitudes, or opposites, or some other things of this sort, from which the intellect of the learner is ' led by the hand ' (manuducitur) to the knowledge of a truth previously unknown to him. The other way [the teacher leads the student] is when he strengthens the intellect of the learner... inasmuch as he proposes the order of principles to conclusions to the student, who perhaps by himself would not have so much ability to put things together (virtutem collativam) that from the principles he could deduce the conclusions. And therefore it is said in Posterior Analytics. Bk. I, that 'demonstration is a syllogism making one know '. And through this mode the one who demonstrates makes the listener know.5 4 Cf. In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Ezpositio (Turin: Marietti, 1950), where St. Thomas comments on the following phrase from Dionysius (p. 14) : "E1r ailT7]11 a11a"Yoµe110J11 a11aTaTtX7/ xe1pa"YOJ1lla" ("ad ipsam sursum actorum suscitative manuductio "). The commentary reads (p. 17, # 48) : "Further, it is necessary that man progress to better things; and as to this, he says fifthly ' suscitative manuductio sursum actorum ' i.e., those things which go up, that is, make progre"ss, 'ad Ipsam ', namely to the Divinity. [The expression] 'suscitative' manuductio, however, is used because not only can one give a helping hand to those wanting to make progress, but one can even stimulate or urge [people] to progress." All translations are my own. Cf. also Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 27, art... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A CONTRADICTION IN SAINT THOMAS'S TEACHING ON CREATION THEODORE J. KONDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania 0 THOSE FAMILIAR with Saint Thomas's writings is generally known that the Angelic Doctor changed his position on a number of philosophical issues during the course of his relatively short professional career. For instance, there is his opinion concerning the instrumental role of higher creatures in the creation of the universe-something he (...) allowed as possible in his Commentary on the Sentences but later rejected in his Disputed Question On the Power of God and in the Summa Theologiae. Another example is Thomas's view on the possibility of an actual infinite multitude, an opinion he accepted in the early Disputed Question On Truth but argued against in the Summa Theologiae.1 However, to change one's mind on a particular issue is not to contradict oneself, since to do that is to say or hold, in the same time frame, pwhile also saying or holding not p. However, in his Treatise on Creation in the Summa Theologiae, Saint Thomas does, at least once, contradict himself in what he has to say on the question of the demonstrability of the world's temporal beginning, a contradiction which, to my knowledge, has never previous1 On the question whether higher creatures can be instrumental causes in the creation of lower creatures see In Sent. IV, d. 5, q. 5, a. 3; De potentia Dei, q. 3, a. le and Summa Theologiae, I, q, 45, a. Sc. On the issue of an actual infinite multitude see D. Q. De veritate, q. 2, a. 9 and Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 7, a. 5. However, in the De aeternitate mundi-a work possibly written after Saint Thomas completed the first part of his Summa-Aquinas asserts, towards the end of this work, that no demonstration has as yet been forthcoming that God cannot produce a multitude that is actually infinite. 51 52 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON ly been noted. In what follows I intend to expose this contradiction and to see whether there is any possible way for him to escape it. I In article 1 of Question 46 of the Prima pars, Aquinas argues that it cannot be demonstrated that the world of creatures always existed, given that the actual existence of creatures depends upon the causal will of God and the only thing which God wills necessarily is Himself.2 Consequently, whether or not the world exists, or is created eternally or with a temporal beginning, are matters entirely up to God's free will.3 In the following article he argues that neither can the world's temporal beginning be demonstrated but that this is something known only by faith.4 It cannot be demonstrated from the world itself since demonstration proceeds by way of knowledge of the universal essences of things and universals abstract from the hie et nunc, or from the question of temporal origin.5 Nor can it be proved from the world's efficient cause-the divine will-seeing that God's will cannot be investigated by reason except as regards those things which God wills necessarily (and what He wills about creatures is not among 2 " Dicendum nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc ponere non est impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quad voluntas Dei est causa rerum. Sic ergo necesse est esse sicut necesse est Deum velle ilia, cum necessitatis effectus ex necessitate causae dependeat, ut dicitur in Meta. Ostensum est autem supra quod, absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum." ST I, q. 46, a. le. Latin quotations from Saint Thomas appearing in the footnotes are from the Leonine edition. 3 " Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed eatenus mundus est quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi ex voluntate dependeat, sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur necessarium mundum semper esse: Unde nee demonstrative probari potest." Ibid. 4 " Dicendum quod mundum non semper fuisse sola fidei tenetur, et demonsrtative probari non potest; sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est." Ibid., a. 2c. 5 "Et hujus ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi... (shrink)