한자어 ‘良心’을 뜻으로 풀어쓰면, 좋을 양(良)과 마음 심(心), 즉 ‘좋은 마음’이다. 따라서 이것은 그 의미상 분명히 긍정의 형태를 지니고 있다. 동양사상에서 ‘良心’이라는 단어가 이런 의미를 지니고 있다면, 이 용어가 가령 독일어 게비쎈(Gewissen)의 번역어로서 적절한지가 의구심이 들 수밖에 없다. 게비쎈은 라틴어의 콘시엔치아(conscientia)와 그리스어의 쉰에이데시스(συνείδησις)를 번역한 것이다. 이 단어들은 ‘(~와) 함께’라는 ‘con-’, ‘συν-’어미와 ‘안다(知)’라는 뜻을 가진 단어와 결합한 형태이다. 따라서 이 단어들을 축자적(逐字的)으로 번역하면 ‘(~와) 함께 안다=공지(共知)’가 된다.BR 그런데 우리가 이들 단어들을 번역할 때 이들 단어들에게 일정 가치를 부여하여, 예를 들어 ‘선한 良心’, (...) ‘좋은 良心’ 등과 같이 사용할 경우에는 동어반복이 된다. 또한 반대로 ‘악한 良心(=악한 좋은 마음)’, ‘더러운 良心(=더러운 좋은 마음)’ 등과 같이 사용하면 모순을 유발하게 된다. 이러한 의구심 풀고자 이시까와는. (shrink)

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living (...) a moral life. In section one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent’s identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one’s capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection. (shrink)

Philosophical studies of complex scientific concepts are predominantly “adaptationist,” arguing that conceptual complexity serves important purposes. This is a historical artifact. Having had to defend their views against a monist presumption favoring simpler concepts, pluralists and patchwork theorists felt compelled to show that complexity can be beneficial. This neglects an alternative possibility: Conceptual complexity is largely neutral, persisting simply because it does little harm. This article defends the neutral theory of conceptual complexity in two forms: (a) as (...) a plausible theory in its own right and (b) as a useful foil for adaptationist arguments. (shrink)

This book argues that a conscientiously objecting medical professional should receive an exemption only if the grounds of an objector's refusal are reasonable. It defends a detailed, contextual account of public reasonability suited for healthcare, which builds from the overarching concept of Rawlsian public reason. The author analyzes the main competing positions and maintains that these other views fail precisely due to their systematic inattention to the grounding reasons behind a conscientious objection; he argues that any such view is plausible (...) to the extent that it mimics the 'reason-giving requirement' for conscience objections defended in this work. Only reasonable objections can defeat the prior professional obligation to assign primacy to patient well-being, therefore one who refuses a patient's request for a legally available, medically indicated, and safe service must be able to explain the grounds of their objection in terms understandable to other citizens within the public institutional structure of medicine. The book further offers a novel policy proposal to deploy the Reasonability View: establishing conscientious objector status in medicine. It concludes that the Reasonability View is a viable and attractive position in this debate. A New Theory of Conscientious Objection in Medicine: Justification and Reasonability will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in bioethics, medical ethics, and philosophy of medicine, as well as thinkers interested in the intersections between law, medical humanities, and philosophy. (shrink)

Accounts of solidarity typically defend it in teleological or loyalty terms, justifying it by invoking its goal of promoting justice or its expression of support for a shared community. Such solidarity seems to be a moral option rather than an obligation. In contrast, A Moral Theory of Solidarity develops a deontological theory grounded in equity. With extended reflection on the Spanish conquest of the Americas and the US Civil Rights movement, Kolers defines solidarity as political action on others' (...) terms. Unlike mere alliances and coalitions, solidarity involves a disposition to defer to others' judgment about the best course of action. Such deference overrides individual conscience. Yet such deference is dangerous; a core challenge is then to determine when deference becomes appropriate.Kolers defends defernce to those who suffer gravest inequity. Such deference constitutes equitable treatment, in three senses: it is Kantian equity, expressing each person's equal status; it is Aristotelian equity, correcting general rules for particular cases; and deference is 'being an equitable person,' sharing others' fate rather than seizing advantages that they are denied. Treating others equitably is a perfect duty; hence solidarity with victims of inequity is a perfect duty. Further, since equity is valuable in itself, irrespective of any other goal it might promote, such solidarity is intrinsically valuable, not merely instrumentally valuable. Solidarity is then not about promoting justice, but about treating people justly. A Moral Theory of Solidarity engages carefully with recent work on equity in the Kantian and Aristotelian traditions, as well as the demandingness of moral duties, collective action, and unjust benefits, and is a major contribution to a field of growing interest. (shrink)

Much liberal theorizing of the past twenty years has been built around a conception of neutrality and an accompanying virtue of reasonableness according to which citizens ought to be able to view public policy debates from a perspective detached from their comprehensive conceptions of the good. The view of “justifi catory neutrality” that emerges from this view is discussed and rejected as embodying controversial views about the relationship of individuals to their conceptions of the good. It is shown to be (...) based upon a “protestant” assumption according to which conceptions of the good can be cashed out in terms of propositional beliefs. An alternative conception of reasonableness, grounded in the stable disposition of individuals to prefer social peace over conflict is described. It is argued that it better satisfies the neutralist requirement than do theories of justifi catory neutrality. (shrink)

The neutral theory of biodiversity purports that patterns in the distribution and abundance of species do not depend on adaptive differences between species (i.e. niche differentiation) but solely on random fluctuations in population size (“ecological drift”), along with dispersal and speciation. In this framework, the ultimate driver of biodiversity is speciation. However, the original neutral theory made strongly simplifying assumptions about the mechanisms of speciation, which has led to some clearly unrealistic predictions. In response, several recent (...) studies have combined neutral community models with more elaborate speciation models. These efforts have alleviated some of the problems of the earlier approaches, while confirming the general ability of neutral theory to predict empirical patterns of biodiversity. However, the models also show that the mode of speciation can have a strong impact on relative species abundances. Future work should compare these results to diversity patterns arising from non‐neutral modes of speciation, such as adaptive radiations. (shrink)

MacDonald and Kreitman (1991) propose a test of the neutral mutationrandom drift (NM-RD) hypothesis, the central claim of the neutral theory of molecular evolution. The test involves generating predictions from the NM-RD hypothesis about patterns of molecular substitutions. Alternative selection hypotheses predict that the data will deviate from the predictions of the NM-RD hypothesis in specifiable ways. To conduct the test Mac- Donald and Kreitman examine the evolutionary dynamics of the alcohol dehydrogenase (Adh) gene in three species (...) of Drosophila. The test compares the number of DNA sequence changes between species and within species. The number of DNA differences is an indicator of the evolutionary rate of the Adh gene. Based on the test they conclude that there is strong evidence for adaptive protein evolution at particular sites in the gene. Understanding the test requires some basic knowledge about molecular terms and the predictions of neutral theory. The two important terms are fixed differences and polymorphisms. These are determined by comparing DNA sequences made up of thousands of individual nucleotide sites. A site that is unchanged within a species but different from a related species counts as a fixed difference. These are mutations that occur in some common ancestor of the lineage such that all descendants inherit the change. A site that differs within a species counts as a polymorphism. Determining the number of fixed differences and polymorphisms requires placing 1 each individual gene sequence onto a phylogenetic tree. A coalescent tree charts the ancestral relationships for a set of individual gene sequences. Sequences sampled from within a species form a within-species tree. The common ancestors of each within-species tree form a between-species tree. A detected difference counts as a polymorphism or a fixed difference depending on where it occurs in the phylogenetic tree (cf. Table 1). The test uses the numbers of polymorphisms and fixed differences as indicators of evolutionary rates.. (shrink)

This paper responds to contributions by Paul Billingham, Cécile Laborde and Jonathan Quong to a symposium on A Perfectionist Theory of Justice in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

In this paper I discuss Kant’s theory of conscience. In particular, I explicate the following two claims that Kant makes in the Metaphysics of Morals: (1) an erring conscience is an absurdity and (2) if an agent has acted according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that can be required of him/her. I argue that (1) is a very specific claim that does not bear on the problem of moral knowledge. I argue that (2) (...) rests on a strongly internalist line of argument. (shrink)

It would be a good thing to have at our disposal a general theory of location that is neutral with respect to the view that some objects have more than one exact location, the view that some objects are located without having an exact location, and the view that some objects are “spanners”—where a spanner is an object exactly located at a region that has proper parts but which has no proper part exactly located at a proper part (...) of the region. As far as I know, no theory of location that can be found in the literature has this feature. I put forward a new theory that does—or so I argue. The theory takes as its sole locational primitive the notion of being entirely located at. (shrink)

The neutral theory of biodiversity assumes that coexisting organisms are equally able to survive, reproduce and disperse, but predicts that stochastic fluctuations of these abilities drive diversity dynamics. It predicts remarkably well many biodiversity patterns, although substantial evidence for the role of niche variation across organisms seems contradictory. Here, we discuss this apparent paradox by exploring the meaning and implications of ecological equivalence. We address the question whether neutral theory provides an explanation for biodiversity patterns and (...) acknowledges causal processes. We underline that ecological equivalence, although central to neutral theory, can emerge at local and regional scales from niche-based processes through equalizing and stabilizing mechanisms. Such emerging equivalence corresponds to a weak conception of neutral theory, as opposed to the assumption of strict equivalence at individual level in the strong conception. We show that this duality is related to diverging views on hypothesis-testing and modeling in ecology. In addition, the stochastic dynamics exposed in neutral theory are pervasive in ecological systems and, rather than a null hypothesis, ecological equivalence is best understood as a parsimonious baseline to address biodiversity dynamics at multiple scales. (shrink)

One argument often made in support of liberal political morality is that liberalism, both as a theory and as a practice, is neutral in regard to the question of the good life. In this essay, I shall criticize and reject this argument. Now this conclusion is anything but novel; one would have almost as much difficulty finding a critic, of whatever perspective, granting that liberalism is indeed neutral with regard to the good as one would have finding (...) a liberal denying it. It is this phenomenon that I find especially interesting, and which serves to set the context of my discussion. If, as I aim to show, it is a relatively straightforward path of argument which leads to the conclusion that liberalism is not neutral with regard to the question of the good life, then why do so many liberals remain convinced that it is? Why, when liberals and their critics debate the issue of neutrality, do they so often seem to talk beyond one another? It seems to me that instances of these debates ought to come off better than they do, and so I shall attempt here to describe how they might. (shrink)

Compared to other aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy, Kant’s theory of conscience remains relatively unexplored in the secondary literature on his work. This is no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that in the Groundwork to a Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth: Groundwork) and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant's two most widely read works on ethics, conscience plays very little role. However, Kant has extended discussions of conscience in three of his lesser read (...) works: On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy (henceforth: Miscarriage), the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason (henceforth: Religion), and the Metaphysics of Morals. There are also many unpublished notes in which Kant discusses conscience, and it may be conjectured, on the basis of extant copies of students’ notes, that conscience was a frequent topic in Kant’s lectures. As commentators have begun to play closer attention to these lesser read works, the literature on Kant’s theory of conscience has begun to develop. It is thanks to this development that this Element is possible: there is an emerging consensus that Kant’s theory of conscience is important both in its own right and insofar as it can help to correct various misunderstandings that have become part of the standard view of Kant’s ethical thought. This Element is divided into two parts. The first focuses on exegesis of Kant’s ethics. One of the overarching theses of this first part of the Element is that, although many of Kant’s claims about conscience are prima facie inconsistent, a close examination of context generally can dissolve apparent contradictions. The second part of the Element focuses on philosophical issues in Kantian ethics. One of the overarching theses of this part of the Element is that many positions traditionally associated with Kantian ethics, including the denial of moral luck, the nonaccidental rightness condition, and the guise of the objectively good, are at variance with Kant’s ethics. (shrink)

This work is designed to show that there is an implicit connection between Ockham's academic and political careers in his theory of conscience. ;Thomas Aquinas offers a theory of moral responsibility according to which the conscientious individual has knowledge of the rightness of her act which does not preclude her doing otherwise. His account of the will, however, proves that this state of affairs never obtains. Ockham's alternative presupposes that we freely choose our own ends. He is (...) therefore entitled to assert that conscience is the knowledge of one's own acts as right or wrong. ;The libertarian metaphysics underlying Ockham's ethics is tested by the problem of unfulfilled prophecy. Thomas Bradwardine argues that the Antichrist is free not to come because it is possible for God to undo the past. Thomas Buckingham argues for the possibility that the prophecy never meant that the Antichrist was going to come. Meanwhile, Ockham is left with the possibility that God lied. Ockhamist John of Mirecourt shows why this 'heretical' solution is the only way to save the faith. Ockham's theory of conscience provides a sound basis for interpreting his treatise on heresy. Heresy is disobedience, not to authority, but to the truth. Since the condemnation of heresy is itself a paradigm instance of this kind of perversity, freedom of speech prevails by default. Ockham's conception of a community united by this realization provides an answer to twentieth-century speech-regulation advocates. ;Ockham thought that it is through our obedience to the truth that Jesus's promise to be with his disciples 'always, to the end of the age' will be fulfilled. According to Walter Burley, 'I promise you a Christian' converts with 'A Christian is promised to you by me.' According to Ockham, in contrast, it is an opaque construction. This account of the logic of indefinite promises implies that no individual can claim to be one of the disciples to whom Jesus was referring. ;I hope to leave the reader in a better position to appreciate the sense in which the claim that Ockham's two careers are united by his nominalism may be considered correct. (shrink)

Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist (...) and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self. (shrink)

Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction PART I Intentionality Chapter 1 Fodor’ Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum Chapter 2 Semantics, Wisconsin Style Chapter 3 A Theory of Content, I: The Problem Chapter 4 A Theory of Content, II: The Theory Chapter 5 Making Mind Matter More Chapter 6 Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs Chapter 7 Stephen Schiffer’s Dark Night of The Soul: A Review of Remnants of Meaning PART II Modularity Chapter 8 Précis of (...) The Modularity of Mind Chapter 9 Why Should the Mind Be Modular? Chapter 10 Observation Reconsidered Appendix: A Reply to Churchland’s ‘Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" References Index of Names. (shrink)

This dissertation does not argue for a particular theory of realism. It seeks to clear the ground for such a theory by clarifying the distinction between realism and reality. Realism is not reality. 'Realism' stands for theories that describe reality and how it exists mind-independently. I argue that much recent writing on realism misses the import of this distinction and proceeds "anti-philosophically." While some statements refer uncontroversially to an accepted state of affairs, others amplify, vouchsafe, or explain a (...) philosophical compunction about the received notion of reality. Philosophy consists, in accounting for what one does, says exists, or knows. So, the mere acceptance of the supposed "facts" is anti-philosophical. ;Philosophy should accept at least some "facts." But it has to rise above first order obviousness in order to dismiss or accept received views. The effort to proceed "antiphilosophically," insists that some statements or material be accepted uncritically or neutrally as explaining or settling important philosophical issues without philosophical assistance. ;Accordingly, I reject Devitt's "proposal" that we can "settle the realism issue before any epistemic or semantic issue" . Issues of reference cant help but pertain to settling that "Tokens of most current common-sense and scientific objects objectively exist independently of the mental" . The "constructivist turn" in realism holds that "realism" describes mind-independent entities, but not in a way that is itself independent of knowledge or meaning. Realism and much else, including our "facts," is "constructed" ; reality isn't. Hence, I also reject John Searle's attempt to "construct" all of social reality from non-social or "brute" reality alone. It is only by the social that we know the "non-social." I reject Michael Dummett's theory that the theory of meaning "underlies" metaphysics. Regardless, statements still refer to entities, without which they mean nothing. I favor Hilary Putnam's attempt to reject metaphysical realism despite his leanings toward idealism and a "limit concept" of reason and truth. Finally, I argue that Rorty's arguments for the "pointlessness" of realist and antirealist discussion are self-contradictory and nearly irrelevant. (shrink)

This article considers the difficult question of whether there are any reasons for theocratic religious devotees to affirm liberalism and liberal institutions. Swaine argues not only that there are reasons for theocrats to affirm liberalism, but that theocrats are committed rationally to three normative principles of liberty of conscience, as well. Swaine subsequently discusses three institutional and strategic implications of his arguments. First, he outlines an option of semisovereignty for theocratic communities in liberal democracies, and explains why an appropriate (...) valuation of liberty of conscience may justify a standard of that kind. Second, he addresses the question of permissible government aid for religion and symbolic endorsement of religious groups. Third, Swaine considers innovations and new approaches that could be employed internationally to better display liberal government's affirmation of religiosity, to promote liberty of conscience, and to help improve relations between liberal and theocratic parties around the globe. (shrink)

The intention of this essay does not, I fear, readily fit into any of the previous categories of ethical or moral philosophy. I am not concerned here with the Good, with values, or with the question of their recognition, foundation, and justification; nor am I concerned with duties and virtues. The linguistic and/or logical structure of ethical judgments, too, is outside my subject, as is the problem of Free Will.

Dayal’s (2004) theory of kind terms accounts for the definiteness and number marking patterns in kind terms in many languages. Brazilian Portuguese has been claimed to be a counter-example to her theory as it seems to allow bare “singular” kind terms, which are predicted to be impossible according to her theory. However, the empirical status of the relevant data has not been clear so far. This paper presents a new data point from Singlish and confirms the existence (...) of bare “singular” kind terms. A revised theory of kind terms is proposed that accounts for it. The proposed theory puts forth a number system with three basic categories, i.e. singular, plural and general. It is claimed that bare “singular” kind terms are in fact derived from general NPs, which are associated with number-neutral properties. The paper also discusses why bare “singular” kind terms are not perfectly acceptable in Brazilian Portuguese. (shrink)

Critical thinking, considered as a version of informallogic, must consider emotions and personal attitudesin assessing assertions and conclusions in anyanalysis of discourse. It must therefore presupposesome notion of the self. Critical theory may be seenas providing a substantive and non-neutral positionfor the exercise of critical thinking. It thereforemust presuppose some notion of the self. This paperargues for a Foucauldean position on the self toextend critical theory and provide a particularposition on the self for critical thinking. Thisposition on (...) the self is developed from moretraditional accounts of the self from Descartes toSchopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This study analyzes conscience as a specific cognition, as an axiological consciousness of a human act. The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas plays an important role here: He assumes conscience to be a cognition; his concept of conscience is quite significant and had great influence on philosophical thinking. Nevertheless, this doctrine on conscience is not satisfying enough from the viewpoint of epistemology and, therefore, it requires a complement. Such a complement is found in phenomenological analyses, especially in (...) those concerning consciousness. Underlying the main problem of the study--which is conscience as cognition--is the question of enriching Thomism with phenomenology."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

International human rights law is profoundly oxymoronic. Certain well-known international treaties claim a universal character for human rights, but international tribunals often interpret and enforce these either narrowly or, if widely, they rely upon sovereign states to enforce the rights against themselves. International lawyers and diplomats have usually tried to resolve the apparent contradiction by pressing for more general rules in the form of treaties, legal doctrines, and institutional procedures. Despite such efforts, aliens remain who are neither legal nor illegal (...) and who thereby slip through a discourse that claims universality. I ask, why does international legal discourse claim a universality of human rights enforceable by impartial, politically neutral tribunals when it also recognises that a state may refuse to recognise some groups as “persons”? I turn to the works of Bernhard Waldenfels for an explanation. To that end, I briefly outline two examples of state-centered human rights treaties. I then reconstruct Waldenfels’ explanation as to how a territorial sense of space needs an alien exterior to the space. The territorial structure assumes time is frozen as of the date of the foundation of the structure. The body of the alien is taken as a biological body. The personality, motives, and actions of the alien are the consequence of the imagination of people inside the territorial boundary. The dominant international legal discourse reinforces and institutionalises such a territorial sense of space and frozen time because the territorial state is considered the primary legal subject of international law. I also retrieve, however, an experiential but concealed sense of space and time. To retrieve this sense of space and time requires that lawyers see the world through the twilight of legality heretofore ignored as pre-legal. (shrink)

Judging on the basis of standard accounts of commodification, one might reasonably suggest that liberalism intrinsically lacks an adequate theory of commodification. Liberalism, with its commitment to individual choice and to neutrality as regards competing evaluation practices, seems conceptually incapable of identifying or abolishing many significant forms of commodification. This essay aims to refute this claim. It employs a strategy of appealing to the harm principle as grounds for a liberal anti-commodification theory. I claim that we are harmed (...) when we are denied ways to meaningfully engage in certain evaluative practices, ways that depend on evaluations shared with others with whom we stand in meaningful social relationships. Markets can crowd out these shared evaluations, and to this extent cause us psychological harm; this in turn supplies grounds for restrictions on certain markets within a liberal state. (shrink)

Describing resources and their relationships with organisms seems to be a useful approach to a ‘unified ecology’, contributing to fill the gap between natural and human oriented processes, and opening new perspectives in dealing with biological complexity. This Resource Criterion defines the main properties of resources, describes the mechanisms that link them to individual species, and gives a particular emphasis to the biosemiotic approach that allows resources to be identified inside a heterogeneous ecological medium adopting the eco-field model. In particular, (...) this Criterion allows to couple matter, structured energy and information composing the ecological systems to the biosemiotic and cognitive mechanisms adopted by individual species to track resources, transforming neutral surroundings into meaningful species-specific Umwelten. The expansion of the human semiotic niche that is a relevant evolutionary process of the present time, assigns the role of powerful and efficient agency to the Resources Criterion to evaluate the effect of human intrusion into the natural systems with habits of key stone species, under the challenge of a growing use of alloctonous, immaterial and symbolic resources of the actual globalized societal models. The Resource Criterion interprets the ecological dynamics contributing to complete the epistemology of the ecology, to open a bridge toward economy and other societal sciences, and to contribute to formulate a General Theory of Resources. (shrink)

The neutral theory of molecular evolution has been instrumental in organizing our thinking about the nature of evolutionary forces shaping variation at the DNA level. More importantly, it has provided empiricists with a strong set of testable predictions and hence, a useful null hypothesis against which to test for the presence of selection. Evidence indicates that the neutral theory cannot explain key features of protein evolution nor patterns of biased codon usage in certain species. Whereas we (...) now have a reasonable model of selection acting on synonymous changes inDrosophila, protein evolution remains poorly understood. Despite limitations in the applicability of the neutral theory, it is likely to remain an integral part of the quest to understand molecular evolution. (shrink)

The answer to the question 'what is money?' has changed throughout history. During the Gold Standard era, money was seen as gold or silver (the theory known as bullionism). In the early 20th century, the alternative theory known as chartalism proposed that money was a token chosen by the state for payment of taxes. Today, many economists take an agnostic line, and argue that money is best defined in terms of its function, e.g. as a neutral medium (...) of exchange. This paper argues that none of these approaches adequately describes the nature of money, and proposes a new theory, inspired by non-Newtonian physics, which takes into account the dualistic real/virtual properties and complex nature of money. The theory is applied to the example of the emergence of cybercurrencies. (shrink)

'The many virtues of Constitutional Justice are evident throughout the piece. The author should be congratulated for even attempting to construct a normative theory of liberal constitutionalism... Constitutional Justice is a work that faithfully carries on the grand tradition of normative legal thought. No small task, and Allan succeeds admirably.' -Law and Politics Book ReviewThis book offers a systematic interpretation of the ideal of the rule of law, arguing that the principles it identifies provide the foundations of a liberal (...) democratic legal order. It explains the essential connections between a range of matters fundamental to the relationship between citizen and state, including freedoms of speech and conscience, civil disobedience, procedural fairness, administrative justice, the right of silence, and equal protection or equality before the law. The principles of public law are interpreted in the light of liberal legal and political philosophy.Readership: Scholars and students of law, philosophy, and politics. (shrink)

We develop a theory of necessity operators within a version of higher-order logic that is neutral about how fine-grained reality is. The theory is axiomatized in terms of the primitive of *being a necessity*, and we show how the central notions in the philosophy of modality can be recovered from it. Various questions are formulated and settled within the framework, including questions about the ordering of necessities under strength, the existence of broadest necessities satisfying various logical conditions, (...) and questions about their logical behaviour. We also wield the framework to probe the conditions under which a logicist account of necessities is possible, in which the theory is completely reducible to logic. (shrink)

If a political theory of ownership is to be acceptable, it must rationally prescribe one system or model of ownership as opposed to others. Such a prescription would be rational only if strong normative arguments could be mounted to show it more desirable than its competitors. Thus, the prefatory work for such a theory would consist in the construction of viable models of ownership from which a sound choice could be made. This project would, however, be successful only (...) if originating from coherent, evaluatively neutral analyses of the concept of ownership and other related ideas. The point of this essay is to do this prefatory work. (shrink)

In Secularism and Freedom of Conscience Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor distinguish two models of a secular state: a republican and a pluralist-liberal one. Whereas the former displays a tendency to relegate religious beliefs from the public sphere for the sake of its postulated neutrality, the latter emphasizes the importance of freedom of conscience and, consequently, the right of individuals to manifest their religious commitments also in public. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s views on religion cannot (...) provide a general framework that would warrant the pluralist-liberal kind of secularism. To that effect, focusing on Kant’s distinction between the private and the public use of reason, introduced in his 1784 essay on enlightenment, I claim that the public sphere construed along the Kantian lines could not provide a space in which a plurality of different, heteronomously grounded beliefs, could coexist with one another. Comparing Kant’s theory with Spinoza’s—particularly with regard to their critique of revelation and the proposal to reinterpret the Scripture in the light of universal moral principles—I also suggest that, as a rationalist about religion, Kant comes close to the secularizing tendency of the ‘radical Enlightenment.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Beyond Heaven and Earth: A Cognitive Theory of Religion by Gabriel LevyKevin SchilbrackBeyond Heaven and Earth: A Cognitive Theory of Religion. Gabriel Levy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2022. 249 pp. $45.00 paperback; open access.The interdisciplinary field of religious studies includes both the humanities and social sciences in a tricky detente. Some religion scholars focus on interpreting texts, teachings, and rituals in an effort to grasp (...) what religious practitioners understand themselves to be doing. Other scholars want to move beyond the the practitioners’ views to create explanatory accounts of religion in terms of social power, psychological benefits, and modules in the evolved brain—causal accounts of which the practitioners might not be aware or that they might deny. Gabriel Levy argues that to develop consilience between the divergent efforts of the humanities and the sciences, the academic study of religion would be well served by developing a more adequate metaphysics that can do justice simultaneously to human behavior as moved both by subjective reasons and by material forces. Specifically, he recommends the “anomalous monism” of Donald Davidson. [End Page 98]According to this view, there is only one kind of reality, and this is a monist metaphysics that includes no nonmaterial or supernatural entities. However, this one kind of reality is “anomalous” in that the world we experience together permits two irreducible vocabularies, one that is physical and deterministic and another that is mental and includes free will. Davidson considered this two-sided approach Spinozistic (169), and Levy notes its similarities to Thomas Nagel’s “neutral monism” (8, 35, 50–51). In short, then, Levy is proposing to scholars of religion a non-reductive but science-friendly “pragmatist monism” (8) that would be congenial to many readers of this journal. Such a metaphysics would also be in line with the methodological naturalism that, for many, defines the legitimate scope of the academy. We might therefore consider this book an example of a philosophy of religious studies, or even a metaphysics for religious studies.An important feature of Davidson’s approach is that, on his account, semantic content is necessarily intersubjective and therefore non-nomological and irreducible to the physical. Imagine a parent offering their prelinguistic child a doll while asking, “Do you want your doll?” or pulling the child away from a neighbor’s dog while telling them, “You have to be careful around dogs.” Davidson argues that human beings learn the meaning of words and sentences in social exchanges like these as the listener makes an educated guess about the entities to which the other person is referring, a process that Davidson calls “triangulation.” The generation of meaning on this model depends on the human capacity for shared intentionality about things in the world. Davidson argues that having meaningful thoughts, even when alone, then requires that one has had intersubjective, “triangulated” experiences like these. As Levy says, “semantic content arises in immanent, contextual, enacted dialogue and conversation with other agents” (182). It follows that this Davidsonian approach insists on irreducible, non-eliminable mental categories such as meaning, belief, and reasons, now recast in terms of practical engagement with things rather than inner representations of them. Many in religious studies are critical of the field’s focus on subjective categories like these, but, as Levy points out, the meaning-generating and reason-giving subject on a Davidsonian model is necessarily a socially embedded self and not the free-floating, disembodied, or ahistorical self that is critiqued by post-structuralists like Michel Foucault (169–70).Levy introduces this model (ch. 1) and then explores several topics in its light. He proposes that beliefs about religious entities are a subset of imagining fictional entities, so that Mickey Mouse, Santa Claus, and Zeus are in the same cognitive category (ch. 2). He argues that there is a continuum between the human ability to interpret language and the ability of human beings and [End Page 99] other animals to interpret information in their natural environments (ch. 3). In the last three chapters, he connects his discussion to the Sefer Yitzirah, a medieval Jewish mystical “book of creation” that describes the cosmos as structured by language (ch. 4), to... (shrink)

Russell’s theory of desire in _The Analysis of_ Mind is subject to a seemingly overwhelming objection, apparently stated first by Wittgenstein and subsequently elaborated even more compellingly by Anthony Kenny. The puzzle is that, before he became a neutral monist, Russell had used essentially the same argument as part of a critique of William James’s theory of knowledge. Since Russell had already formulated the argument as part of his case against generally naturalistic, and specifically neutral monist, (...) theories of propositional attitudes, why did he think his own neutral monist theory of desire was exempt? I canvass various suggestions, but argue that none of them are effective. (shrink)

I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility (...) of a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis. (shrink)

BackgroundThe nursing profession considers conscience as the foundation and cornerstone of clinical practice, which significantly influences professional decision-making and elevates the level of patient care. However, a precise definition of conscience in the nursing field is lacking, making it challenging to measure. To address this issue, this study employed the hybrid approach of Schwartz Barcott and Kim to analyze the concept of conscience-based nursing care.MethodsThis approach involves a three-phase process; theoretical, fieldwork, and analytical. A systematic literature review (...) was conducted using electronic databases during the first phase to find relevant papers. The content of 42 articles that met the inclusion criteria was extracted to determine the attributes, antecedents, and consequences of consciousness care using thematic analysis. Based on the working definition as a product of this phase, the plan of doing the fieldwork phase was designed. During this phase, data were collected through interviews with nurses all of whom were responsible for patient care in hospitals. In this phase, 5 participants were chosen for in-depth interviewing by purposeful sampling. Data were analyzed using directed content analysis. The findings of the theoretical and fieldwork phases were integrated and the final definition was derived.ResultsThe integration of the theoretical and fieldwork phases resulted in identifying four key characteristics of conscience-based nursing care. Firstly, it involves providing professional care with a conscientious approach. Secondly, ethics is at the core of conscience-based care. Thirdly, external spirituality plays a significant role in shaping one's conscience in this context. Finally, conscience-based nursing care is both endogenous and exogenous, with professional commitment being the central focus of care.ConclusionConscience-based nursing care is an essential component of ethical care, which elevates clinical practice to professional care. It requires the integration of individual and social values, influenced by personal beliefs and cultural backgrounds, and supported by professional competence, resources, and a conducive organizational atmosphere in the healthcare field. This approach leads to the provision of responsive care, moral integrity, and individual excellence, ultimately culminating in the development of professionalism in nursing. (shrink)

Without directly addressing the Demarcation Problem for logic—the problem of distinguishing logical vocabulary from others—we focus on distinctive aspects of logical vocabulary in pursuit of a second goal in the philosophy of logic, namely, proposing criteria for the justification of logical rules. Our preferred approach has three components. Two of these are effectively Belnap’s, but with a twist. We agree with Belnap’s response to Prior’s challenge to inferentialist characterisations of the meanings of logical constants. Belnap argued that for a logical (...) constant to exist, its rules must be conservative over a previously given consequence relation and guarantee the uniqueness of the constant. The twist is that we require logical vocabulary to be provably conservative, not over a previously given formal consequence relation, but over a previously given meaningful vocabulary of a language. Uniqueness is also a feature defined in terms of provability: if two syntactically distinguished expressions are governed by the same rules, then formulas with them as main operators are interderivable. Belnap’s criteria are not only those for the existence of a logical constant, but more: they are what distinguishes logical vocabulary from all other expressions. It is the defining mark of a logical constant that it is provably conservative over the fragment of the language which excludes it and that its rules guarantee its uniqueness. The third component is the topic neutrality of logic. The provable conservativeness of logic over a previously given vocabulary of a language is motivated, in part, by appeal to molecularism in the theory of meaning. Molecularity is a feature endorsed by the theory of meaning as a whole, so it does not distinguish logical constants from other expressions. The same is true for conservativeness. We argue that molecularity, and hence conservativeness, are implicit presuppositions of speakers’ use of language: the addition of new vocabulary to a language is presupposed to be conservative. But this presupposition is one that we should be able reflectively to endorse (such as when attempting a rational reconstruction of the use of the vocabulary). Thus, where conservativeness is found to fail, this defect should be remedied and the use of the vocabulary corrected (as in classical negation) or excised altogether (as in pejoratives). We go on to characterise a notion of topic neutrality, which we argue applies to logical vocabulary. We then note that reflective endorsement of the conservativeness of a topic neutral vocabulary requires a proof that the vocabulary is conservative relative to any base vocabulary. Thus we require that logical vocabulary be demonstrably conservative. Allying this requirement, distinctive of logic, to a general consideration about the commitments of assertion yields a mode of justification for logical constants akin to some conceptions of Harmony, i.e., to the idea that the consequences of assertion of a logical complex need to be warranted by the grounds and ought to be the strongest consequences warranted by the grounds. Intuitionistic logic acquires a somewhat familiar justification but emanating from a new motivation. (shrink)

The proper role of conscience in healthcare continues to be a topic of deep interest for bioethicists, healthcare professionals, and health policy experts. This issue of HEC Forum brings together a collection of articles about features of these ongoing discussions of conscience, advancing the conversations about conscience in healthcare from a variety of perspectives and on a variety of fronts. Some articles in this issue take up particularly challenging cases of conscientious objection in practice, such as Fleming, (...) Frith, and Ramsayer’s contextually rich piece on midwives in Scotland or Harter’s professionally grounded analysis; others engage the changing institutional landscapes which impact considerations of conscience, such as Cummins’ work on the role of employers in institutional policies about conscience and Ben Moshe’s discussion of publicity and institutional committees. Pieces by Howard and Pilkington both raise conceptual considerations about how we think about the role of conscience in medicine, questioning the use of “conscientious objection” in these discussions, and Byrnes pushes back on the most influential work in this area by Mark Wicclair. The issue concludes with a piece by Wicclair, which engages each of these distinct offerings, further extending the discussions of conscience in healthcare and helpfully connecting key themes discussed by authors in this issue to his contributions and to the longer tradition of discussions of conscience in medicine. This issue challenges readers to engage different arguments from different perspectives and asks them—in some cases—to be open to revising how they think about the role of conscience and the existence of and justification for conscientious objection in the dynamic, interdisciplinary fields of healthcare. (shrink)

A few years ago, an illusionist theory of consciousness appeared in the philosophy of consciousness. It makes an unexpected statement – there is actually no phenomenal consciousness, it is illusory. This illusion is created introspective distortion of physical processes in the brain, which seem to us to have special phenomenal properties. However, an equally strong form of physicalism in the philosophy of consciousness has already appeared more than fifty years ago – identity theory of the mental and physical. (...) Moreover, the proponents of illusionism themselves admit their connection with the identity theorists. As a result, it is reasonable to ask whether illusionism is simply a modern adaptation of the identity theory, and not a new independent theory. This article is devoted to this issue. First, the author presents both theories, focusing on their key statements, arguments and advantages described by the followers of the respective approaches. Then the author makes a comparison, highlighting common places and differences for the approaches. Among the former, the following are noted: the physicalist spirit of both theories; their denial of the existence of a special mental properties metaphysically different from physical ones; argumentation in favor of the pragmatic attractiveness of a theory; defending their key theses as primarily hypotheses that may turn out to be true; a similar strategy for explaining the error, as a result of which we come to the conclusion about the existence of the mental. However, the author also points out a number of serious differences: different attitudes to the possibility of neutral notion for properties of experience; differences in the vision of the content of the mind-body problem; illusionist denial of the real referent of the language of phenomenality; the development of the concept of illusion, which entails a number of new solutions and problems; the epistemological significance of the main arguments of illusionism is more influential in comparison with identity theory. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that, despite the fact that a significant part of the content of the theories coincides, illusionism has a number of key differences. This testifies, on the one hand, to the skillful use of past achievements of the physicalist-oriented philosophy of consciousness, and, on the other, to the fundamental novelty and independence of illusionism. (shrink)

The historical reconstruction of the origins of the Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution (NTME) has been seen purely as an extension of a long-held theoretical debate between the classical and balance schools of Population Genetics. In this perspective, the NTME is but a different interpretation of the then recently published data on high intrapopulation genetic variability. In this paper we try to show that this thesis is deficient and partially incorrect. We show that the sources for the construction (...) and development of the NTME are more varied than this traditional account. We support the Dietrich Historical Thesis, which is the view that different versions of the NTME (Kimura, and King and Jukes) show different kinds of experimental and theoretical support and coincide in recognizing the importance of the then new molecular experimental approach and of its comparative results in evolutionary biology. We stress this case to show the limits of the traditional approach in history and philosophy of science that emphasizes the theoretical activities of scientists and the theoretical characterization of disciplines. (shrink)

Comparative studies of DNA sequences provide opportunities for testing the neutral and the selection theories of molecular evolution. In particular, the separate estimation of the numbers of synonymous and nonsynonymous substitutions is a powerful tool for detecting selection of the latter. The difference in the patterns of these two types of substitutions of mammalian genes turned out to be in accord with the slightly deleterious or nearly neutral mutation theory for nonsynonymous changes. Interaction systems at the amino (...) acid level were suggested to be responsible for such nearly neutral, or very weak, selection. Synonymous substitutions are not strictly neutral, but because of their minute effect, random drift predominates such that the rate of substitution is only slightly less than the completely neutral prediction. It was concluded that the strictly neutral theory has not held up as well as the nearly neutral theory, yet remains invaluable as a null hypothesis for detecting selection. On the other hand, the main difference between the nearly neutral and the traditional selection theories is that the former predicts rapid evolution in small populations, whereas the latter predicts rapid evolution in large populations. (shrink)

The ecologist today finds scarce ground safe from controversy. Decisions must be made about what combination of data, goals, methods, and theories offers them the foundations and tools they need to construct and defend their research. When push comes to shove, ecologists often turn to philosophy to justify why it is their approach that is scientific. Karl Popper’s image of science as bold conjectures and heroic refutations is routinely enlisted to justify testing hypotheses over merely confirming them. One of the (...) most controversial theories in contemporary science is the Neutral Theory of Ecology. Its chief developer and proponent, Stephen Hubbell, presents the neutral theory as a bold conjecture that has so far escaped refutation. Critics of the neutral theory claim that it already stands refuted, despite what the dogmatic neutralists say. We see the controversy through a Popperian lens. But Popper’s is an impoverished philosophy of science that distorts contemporary ecology. -/- The controversy surrounding the neutral theory actually rests on a methodological fault. There is a strong but messy historical link between the concepts of being neutral and being null in biology, and Hubbell perpetuates this when he claims that the neutral theory is supplies the appropriate null for testing alternative theories. What method is being followed here? There are three contenders: -/- Null hypothesis testing tests for whether a there is a pattern to be explained. Null modeling tests for whether a process is causally relevant to a pattern. Baseline modeling apportions relative responsibility to multiple processes each relevant to a pattern. -/- Whether the neutral theory supplies an appropriate “null” depends upon whether null hypothesis, null modeling, or baseline model is intended. These methods prescribe distinct inference patterns. If they are null hypothesis testing or null modeling, the neutralists’s reasoning is invalid. If they are baseline modeling, the justification of a crucial assumption remains opaque. Either way, the neutral-null connection is being exploited rhetorically to privilege the neutral theory over its rivals. Clarifying the reasoning immunizes us against the rhetoric and foregrounds the underlying virtues of the neutralist approach to ecology. -/- The Popperian lens distorts theoretical development as dogmatism. Lakatos’s view of science as the development of research programmes clarifies the epistemology of the neutral theory. Focusing philosophical attention on the neutralist research programme illuminates (1) the synchronic uses of the neutral theory to make predictions and give descriptions and explanations; (2) its diachronic development in response to theoretical innovation and confrontation with data; (3) its complex relationships to alternative theories. For example, baseline modeling is now seen to be its primary explanatory heuristic. The justification for baseline modeling with the neutral theory, previously hidden from view, is seen in the logic of in the neutralist research programme. (shrink)

With the transition from a one-person psychology of instinctual needs to a two-person psychology of relational needs, the metapsychological focus tends to shift from instinct theory to emotion motivation and systems theory, and, accordingly, familiar concepts have to be rethought. In this article, the superego is reconceptualized as a psychic regulation system for self-evaluation, comprising the capacity for empathy, the proneness to experience self-conscious emotions, such as shame, pride, and guilt, and the capacity for moral reasoning. This new (...) conceptualization provides useful tools for addressing the actual functioning of the conscience in clinical psychoanalysis. Affective neuropsychoanalysis can make important contributions to this rethinking of the superego. It also brings clinical practice and psychoanalytic metapsychology closer to empirical research beyond the scope of clinical psychoanalysis. The new model offers ample opportunities for integrating affective neuroscience into the functioning of the conscience. (shrink)

A promising recent development in molecular biology involves viewing the genome as a miniecosystem, where genetic elements are compared to organisms and the surrounding cellular and genomic structures are regarded as the local environment. Here we critically evaluate the prospects of Ecological Neutral Theory, a popular model in ecology, as it applies at the genomic level. This assessment requires an overview of the controversy surrounding neutral models in community ecology. In particular, we discuss the limitations of using (...) ENT both as an explanation of community dynamics and as a null hypothesis. We then analyze a case study in which ENT has been applied to genomic data. Our central finding is that genetic elements do not conform to the requirements of ENT once its assumptions and limitations are made explicit. We further compare this genome-level application of ENT to two other, more familiar approaches in genomics that rely on neutral mechanisms: Kimura’s Molecular Neutral Theory and Lynch’s Mutational Hazard Model. Interestingly, this comparison reveals that there are two distinct concepts of neutrality associated with these models which we dub ‘fitness-neutrality’ and ‘competitive neutrality’. This distinction helps to clarify the various roles for neutral models in genomics, for example, in explaining the evolution of genome size. (shrink)

An electrifying introduction to complexity theory, the science of how complex systems behave--from cells to human beings, ecosystems, the known universe, and beyond--that profoundly reframes our understanding and illuminates our interconnectedness. Nothing in the universe is more complex than life. Throughout the skies, in oceans, and across lands, life is endlessly on the move. In its myriad forms--from cells to human beings, social structures, and ecosystems--life is open-ended, evolving, unpredictable, yet adaptive and self-sustaining. Complexity theory addresses the mysteries (...) that animate science, philosophy, and metaphysics: how this teeming array of existence, from the infinitesimal to the infinite, is in fact a seamless living whole and what our place, as conscious beings, is within it. Physician, scientist, and philosopher Neil Theise makes accessible this "theory of being," one of the pillars of modern science, and its holistic view of human existence. He notes the surprising underlying connections within a universe that is itself one vast complex system--between ant colonies and the growth of forests, cancer and economic bubbles, murmurations of starlings and crowds walking down the street. The implications of complexity theory are profound, providing insight into everything from the permeable boundaries of our bodies to the nature of consciousness. Notes on Complexity is an invitation to trade our limited, individualistic view for the expansive perspective of a universe that is dynamic, cohesive, and alive--a whole greater than the sum of its parts. Theise takes us to the exhilarating frontiers of human knowledge and in the process restores wonder and meaning to our experience of the everyday"--Publisher's website. (shrink)