Defending the possibility of a neutral functional theory of law

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1):91 (2008)
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Abstract

I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis.

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Kenneth M. Ehrenberg
University of Surrey

Citations of this work

Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law?Luka Burazin - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (3):385-401.
Law is not (best considered) an essentially contested concept.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2011 - International Journal of Law in Context 7:209-232.
Functions in Jurisprudential Methodology.Kenneth Ehrenberg - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):447-456.
Unlocking Legal Validity: Some Remarks on the Artificial Ontology of Law.Paolo Sandro - 2018 - In Anne Mackor, Stephan Kirste, Jaap Hage & Pauline Westerman, Legal Validity and Soft Law. Cham: Springer Verlag.

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