In 2007, a private corporation specializing in deep-sea salvage retrieved a treasure-laden shipwreck in international waters southwest of the Iberian Peninsula. The wreck was that of a Spanish warship that sunk during the Napoleonic wars. Following the discovery, a legal dispute arose in U.S. federal courts, between the corporate salvors, the Kingdom of Spain, and other litigants. At issue in the legal proceedings was the status of the shipwreck and whether it was protected by sovereign immunity. At the heart of (...) this case are differing political imaginations concerning the authority of states and the role of corporations in the contemporary global order. Through a close reading of court documents and the narratives in which the courts’ rulings are embedded, we demonstrate that the case is symptomatic of the tension in neoliberal sovereignty between two overlapping and at times competing political rationalities: the neoliberal logic of capital and commerce and the logic of sovereign prerogative. (shrink)

Les origines des sciences de la communication aux États-Unis sont au moins triples: renouveau de l'enseignement de la rhétorique au début du XXe siècle, volonté de donner une formation universitaire aux journalistes, recherche sur les médias après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En retraçant à grands traits les voies d'émergence des sciences de la communication aux États-Unis, on saisit mieux, par contraste, la spécificité des Sic à la française.As an academic discipline, Communication originated in at least three loci: the renewal of (...) teaching of rhetoric at the beginning of the 20th century, the need for a university education addressing the requirements of future journalists and, finally, media research and teaching after WWII. A rough delineation of the origins of the discipline of Communication in the United States is a way to grasp constrastively the specificity of its French counterpart. (shrink)

L'article se donne pour objectif de montrer que la notion de rituel chez Goffman est à la croisée de deux grandes traditions intellectuelles : la sociologie religieuse d'inspiration durkheimienne, d'une part, l'éthologie, d'autre part. Dans ses travaux des années 1950 sur les « rites d'interaction », l'inspiration de Goffman est quasi-exclusivement durkheimienne. Les interactions sont des cérémonies que de petits prêtres rendent à de petits dieux. Mais Relations in Public marque un tournant: l'analyse des interactions, sous l'influence de l'éthologie, devient (...) beaucoup plus comportementale. Dans ses tout derniers travaux, l'analyse conversationnelle prend le relais de l'éthologie. Goffman réduit l'interaction à un déroulement de séquences formalisées. Les dieux sont redevenus des primates, mais des primates bavards.The article's objective is to show that the notion of ritual Goffman is at the crossroads of two major intellectual traditions: the sociology of religion inspired Durkheim, on the one hand, ethology, on the other hand. In his work in the 1950s on "interaction ritual" inspiration Goffman is almost exclusively Durkheim. Interactions are small ceremonies that priests to make little gods. But relations in Public marked a turning point: the analysis of interactions under the influence of ethology, behavioral becomes much more. The ritual becomes a ritual. In his latest work, conversational analysis takes over ethology. Goffman reduces the interaction to a sequence of sequences formalized. The gods have returned to primates, but primates much. (shrink)

In the middle part of his Brouillon Project on conics, Girard Desargues develops the theory of the traversale, a notion that generalizes the Apollonian diameter and allows to give a unified treatment of the three kinds of conics. We showed elsewhere that it leads Desargues to a complete theory of projective polarity for conics. The present article, which shall close our study of the Brouillon Project, is devoted to the last part of the text, in which Desargues puts his theory (...) of the traversal into practice by giving a very elegant tratment of the classical theory of parameters and foci. This will lead us to show that Desargues’ proofs can only be understood if one accepts that he reasons in a resolutely projective framework, completely assimilating elements at infinity to those at finite distance in his proofs. (shrink)

We analyse the behaviour of definite descriptions and proper names terms in mathematical logic. We show that in formal arithmetic, wether some axioms are fixed or not, proper names cannot be considered rigid designators and have the same behaviour as definite descriptions. In set theory, sometimes two names for the same object are introduced. It seems that this can be explained by the notion of meaning. The meaning of such proper names can be considered as fuzzy sets of equivalent co-designative (...) definite descriptions and their references as sets of all equivalent co-designative definite descriptions. (shrink)

In a first section, we discuss Quine’s claim according to which identity is a logical notion. We point out that Quine mixes up various types of identities: trivial (or diagonal) identity, Leibniz identity, etc.; and this leads him to commit several mistakes. In a second section, we review Quine’s criticisms to various philosophers (Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Leibniz, etc.), who according to him made confusion between names and objects in defining identity. We show that in fact only Korzybski can be accused of (...) such confusion. In a third section, we analyze the relation between identity and entity. We notice that for Quine a river is the result of the identification of river stages, but that he admits it as an entity by opposition to squareness, which according to him is a result of an identification process of higher abstraction. (shrink)

We study here equiformity, the standard identity criterion for sentences. This notion was put forward by Lesniewski, mentioned by Tarski and defined explicitly by Presburger. At the practical level this criterion seems workable but if the notion of sentence is taken as a fundamental basis for logic and mathematics, it seems that this principle cannot be maintained without vicious circle. It seems also that equiformity has some semantical features ; maybe this is not so clear for individual signs but sentences (...) are often considered as meaningful combinations of signs. If meaning has to play a role, we are thus maybe in no better position than when dealing with identity criterion for propositions. In formal logic, one speaks rather about well-formed formulas, but closed formulas are called sentences because they are meaningful in the sense that they can be true or false. Formulas look better like mathematical objects than material inscriptions and equiformity does not seem to apply to them. Various congruencies can be considered as identities between formulas and in particular "to have the same logical form". One can say that the objects of study of logic are rather logical forms than sentences conceived as material inscriptions. (shrink)

John Corcoran was a very well-known logician who worked on several areas of logic. He produced decisive works giving a better understanding of two major figures in the history of logic, Aristotle and Boole. Corcoran had a close association with Alfred Tarski, a prominent 20th-century logician. This collaboration manifested in Corcoran's substantial introduction to Tarski's seminal book, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (1956). Additionally, Corcoran's posthumous editorial involvement in 'What are logical notions?' (1986) breathed new life into this seminal paper authored by (...) Tarski. His scholarly pursuits extended to the intricate explication of fundamental concepts in modern logic, including variables, propositions, truth, consequences, and categoricity. Corcoran's academic curiosity extended further to the intersection of ethics and logic, reflecting his contemplation of their interrelation. Beyond these theoretical contributions, Corcoran was deeply engaged in the pedagogical dimensions of logic instruction. (shrink)

On the basis of bibliometric data, this chapter shows that international collaboration in the social sciences and humanities has increased strongly between 1980 and 2014, but that the pattern of exchange has known few structural changes. At the basic level of production capacity and article output, the global field of the SSH is best described as a Euro-American duopoly. At the higher level of co-authorships and citations, however, the field structure tends to be monopolistic: no language can compete with English, (...) no country can rival with the USA. Globalization effects have been relatively weak, and the growth of transnational exchange has reproduced rather than undermined existing hierarchies. Due to its hegemonic position, USA journals remain largely national in their authorship and references, and researchers in the USA are less frequently involved in transnational co-authorship than their colleagues in Europe. For European researchers, transnational collaboration has become somewhat more global in scope, but most of it has remained with the USA and other English speaking countries; China is the only country that has become significantly more important. In European countries the reference pattern indicates that bi-nationalism is the predominant form of transnational exchange: citation hierarchies are dominated by a combination of national and American journals, whereas international and European journals are virtually absent. Patterns of transnational collaboration and exchange thus tend to be structured like star networks with many relations to the center, less frequent relations among semi-central countries, and infrequent or absent relations among semi-peripheral and peripheral countries. (shrink)

Chaque époque se caractériserait par des dispositifs rituels de rassemblement des publics qui reflètent une certaine configuration socio-politique : du rassemblement collectif de la tradition théâtrale au modèle individualisé de l’exposition dans le contexte moderne. Comment rassembler des publics face aux défis de notre siècle?

Cet article vise à montrer l’extrême proximité entre ces deux mathématiciens-philosophes que furent Gian-Carlo Rota et Gilles Châtelet disparus la même année. Au moins quatre points communs les relient : une philosophie romantique radicale ; une rigueur intellectuelle exemplaire ; une vision affine de la recherche mathématique ; une révolte intérieure exécrant tout sensus communis.This text shows the great proximity between two mathematicianphilosophers, Gilles Châtelet and Gian-Carlo Rota who both died in the same year 1999. There are at least four (...) common points amongst themselves: a radical romantic philosophy; an exemplary intellectual rigor; a great affinity in their vision of mathematical research; an inmost rebellion against all common sense. Quest’articolo tende a mostrare l’estrema prossimità tra due matematici-filosofi che furono Gian-Carlo Rota e Gilles Châtelet che ci hanno lasciato lo stesso anno. Ci sono almeno quattro punti comuni che le legano: una radicale filosofia romantica; un rigore intellettuale esemplare; una visione affine della ricerca matematica; una rivolta intima che esecra ogni senso comune.This article is in French. (shrink)

Il semble que, malgré les nombreuses mises en garde de ces dernières années venant de différents côtés, l’installation de dispositifs d’évaluation s’opère actuellement dans tous les secteurs de la société et les institutions : l’hôpital et le système de santé, les institutions d’éducation et de formation en général, les universités et la recherche en particulier,...

of implication and generalization rules have a close relationship, for which there is a key idea for clarifying how they are connected: varying objects. Varying objects trace how generalization rules are used along a demonstration in an axiomatic calculus. Some ways for introducing implication and for generalization are presented here, taking into account some basic properties that calculi can have.

What is the effect of age on the political participation of disabled people? The various statistical analyses (multiple correspondence analysis and regression) yield contradictory results. To understand the effect of age and disability on voting, it is necessary to break down these two dimensions to identify three types of population: elderly people who have become disabled, aging disabled people, and people who have lived for a long time with a disability. Voting behavior is useful to clarify the contours of these (...) populations. This allows us to affirm that older disabled persons behave electorally as they have been socialized to do. This analysis also shows how the problem of aging is not solely related to biological age. Finally, it shows that the population of people considered administratively as disabled includes very heterogeneous categories of people, whose fates are clearly differentiated. (shrink)

Le volume présente une pluralité d'approches, allant des pratiques qui produisent les sources à la généalogie de la pensée de l'action et de "la pratique". Sont aussi traitées les formes de l'enquête qui peuvent faire controverse et les réinterprétations des catégories sociales par les acteurs eux-mêmes. D'autres cas d'études portent sur les expériences de réactivation de pratiques du passé et les problèmes qu'elles posent à l'écriture historienne. Au-delà de leurs différences épistémiques, ces démarches ont en commun de proposer des chemins (...) de recherche et d'enquête qui rompent avec les versions téléologiques de l'histoire. Elles explorent des configurations qui n'enferment jamais complètement les acteurs, même lorsqu'ils opèrent dans des mondes contraignants, qu'il s'agisse d'institutions, de structures et de groupes sociaux, de concepts et de catégories cognitives. (shrink)

Les dites « intelligences artificielles » (IA) signent moins le remplacement des facultés humaines que l’apparition d’une nouvelle catégorie de mémoire générant de façon récursive des discours, images et sons qui peuvent ressembler aussi bien à des « créations » qu’à des documents « authentiques ». Cette automatisation de l’expression et de la représentation à partir des données massives accumulées sur le Web explique pourquoi la question des arts, loin d’être anecdotique, est devenue consubstantielle aux modèles statistiques actuels. On peut (...) y percevoir l’émergence d’un nouveau réalisme qui déstabilise les archives du passé comme les perspectives de futur. La nature contrefactuelle de ce réalisme alien trouble ce sur quoi nous fondions auparavant les indices de vérité. (shrink)

Although the historian confronts the question of what is not known in the same terms as does any other researcher no matter his or her discipline, the conditions of the debate are different for the historian because of the problematic nature of the science of history. While practically all the other sciences, including the social sciences, struggle against ignorance by seeking to discover and establish laws that will govern the facts, history must always face, in spite of its ever more (...) sophisticated techniques, the contingency of its materials, which are fundamentally human. The materials of history can not—in spite of what some have asserted—be contained within any single, all-encompassing mode of reasoning that would allow for the creation of constitutive abstract models. In spite of this reality the historian persists, like Sisyphus, in organizing knowledge. Man apparently has no choice but to believe that his activities have some logical basis. The historian therefore collates facts in order to develop cognitive and interpretive structures that will be durable. What gives the discipline of history its epistemological originality is the painfully central role it accords to the question, “What do we not know?” Man wants to know, believes he knows. The ignorance of historians thus seems especially upsetting when applied to our own century. How could the methodological progress of the science of history, along with the professionalization of the historian's craft, have led to an actual increase of uncertainty concerning a period so close to us in time? Today's man-in-the-street—endowed only with his memory, which seems so rich in “truths”—finds it hard to believe that any event or structure of the twentieth century could remain unknown. Limiting our inquiry to the twentieth century is not, however, justified solely by the practical consideration of trying to gain a better grasp of our times. Indeed in this brief article devoted to the relationship between ignorance and the history and historiography of the twentieth century, we will not attempt to inventory all the events, persons, mentalities or economic facts which historical knowledge has until now been incapable of explaining. Unlike the other sciences, whose struggle against ignorance is accomplished by a gradual process of nibbling at the margins of the unknown, the discipline of history must always keep in mind that the masses of granite that form the foundation of History are in fact but a body of statements that can only aspire to the status of truth. The aim of our inquiry— without of course claiming to be exhaustive—will therefore be to identify the nature of the obstacles that lie in the historian's path. These problems are of three kinds. The first concerns access to knowledge, and is tied—although not exclusively—to problems of the techniques of historical research. The second concerns the difficulties related to conceptualization and therefore to the uses of knowledge. There can be no knowing without know-how. Finally, the third pertains to the lack of permeability between history and the other human and social sciences, which creates for the historian the challenge of interdisciplinary exchange. (shrink)

For many years, M. Jean d'Ormesson has been doing me the honor of asking me to write for Diogenes. More recently, he suggested that I should coordinate an issue of this review that would be devoted to my extended discipline, History, but history in the way in which I understand it. It was certainly not for lack of interest that I did not reply to the first request but, no doubt, because of the sense of a chronic lack of time (...) - almost a pleonasm - from which I, like everyone else, suffer. It was not because I was cured that I accepted the second invitation but probably because I allowed myself, with full knowledge of the facts, to entertain the idea that editing an issue would take up less time than simply contributing. … In fact, as everyone knows, the opposite is true, especially when the occasional editor also volunteers to be one of the contributors. This issue is now completed and I sincerely thank M. Jean d'Ormesson for having wished to entrust me with this task that I have enjoyed very much. (shrink)

In order to tell the story of Man and understand our emergence better, we can readily follow on from Heinz Tobien, though we do not need to go back so far in time - just a few million years.Clearly, our fundamental origin is animal. Thus it is easy to understand that in the great genealogy (known as phylogeny), there was one vital (geological) moment when our line was forever detached from the animal “kingdom.” The evidence of palaeontology, like that of (...) molecular biology, today locates this point - which is, by definition, the very point of origin of our family, the hominids - in Eastern Africa around 8 million years ago. In order to state this, palaeontology rests on two sets of results. All the most ancient hominids, without exception, are East African, and the oldest of all goes back more than 7 million years. Through the study of various characteristics of the cells of contemporary primates, having arranged them in an order of increasing complexity and having hypothesized that this contemporary complexity may be a reflection of that which developed through time, molecular biology has, on the basis of palaeontological dating, calibrated this transformation and its different stages and constructed what is called a molecular clock. In this way, it has arrived at two conclusions. The primates closest to Man are by far the great African apes (chimpanzees, gorillas), and the “distance” that separates us - in other words the degree of difference that exists between them and us - situates the divergence of our two branches at just over 7 million years. (shrink)

« Le terme ‘immigration’ a donc été inventé au début des années 1880 pour désigner un dramatique ‘problème’ de société, qu’il fallait résoudre de toute urgence pour sauver la France. Mais on constate que, dès cette époque, plus le nombre de ceux qui se sont dévoués à cette noble cause a grandi et plus ‘le problème’ s’est aggravé » Gérard Noiriel L’un des...