In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

Three‐dimensional structured illumination microscopy (3D‐SIM) has opened up new possibilities to study nuclear architecture at the ultrastructural level down to the ∼100 nm range. We present first results and assess the potential using 3D‐SIM in combination with 3D fluorescence in situ hybridization (3D‐FISH) for the topographical analysis of defined nuclear targets. Our study also deals with the concern that artifacts produced by FISH may counteract the gain in resolution. We address the topography of DAPI‐stained DNA in nuclei before and after (...) 3D‐FISH, nuclear pores and the lamina, chromosome territories, chromatin domains, and individual gene loci. We also look at the replication patterns of chromocenters and the topographical relationship ofXist‐RNA within the inactive X‐territory. These examples demonstrate that an appropriately adapted 3D‐FISH/3D‐SIM approach preserves key characteristics of the nuclear ultrastructure and that the gain in information obtained by 3D‐SIM yields new insights into the functional nuclear organization. (shrink)

El blanco y el negro son más que colores, son claves de un contraste simbólico en islas que montaron su estructura social –desde los tiempos coloniales– sobre la esclavitud que racializó las relaciones sociales y generó con ellas modos diversos de discriminación que llegan hasta nuestros días. Uno de los importantes aportes del negro a las artes plásticas del Caribe, es su color, un signo visual en el universo de las tensiones raciales, nacidas en el seno mismo de la sociedad (...) moderno–colonial. Este trabajo se propone distinguir esa trayectoria de significaciones visuales, a través de una selección de obras que emplean el blanco y el negro a partir del soporte físico del cuerpo con todas sus capacidades expresivas. Uno de los textos más significativos del siglo XX sobre la cuestión, Piel negra, máscaras blancas (1952) de Frantz Fanon, será asumido como un recurso de interpretación crítica para el estudio de la selección de obras y autores del Caribe insular que se inscriben en los conflictos de la racialización e inferiorización de las corporalidades, para explorar formas de un humanismo decolonizador, devolver el hombre a su lugar, resituar su “yo” y revalorizar su sitio en la historia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Idealism by Philip J. NeujahrYolanda EstesPhilip J. Neujahr. Kant’s Idealism. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. Pp. viii + 134. Paper, $16.00.In Kant’s Idealism, Philip Neujahr contends that the Critique of Pure Reason expresses no distinctively “transcendental” form of idealism. Neujahr disagrees with commentators, such as H. J. Paton and Henry Allison, who attempt to show that the Kantian project is in essence a coherent and tenable (...) one. He agrees with commentators, such as Norman Kemp Smith and P. F. Strawson, who argue that the various facets of Kant’s philosophy do not constitute a coherent whole. Moreover, he suggests that the tensions in Kant’s philosophy betray more serious, deep-rooted contradictions than have been previously imagined by the least generous interpreters.Neujahr maintains Kant’s theoretical philosophy contains disparate threads of idealism, which remain closely tied to the idealistic tradition preceding it, but which present no single idealist doctrine, because Kant provided neither a unified account of the nature of the cognitive subject nor a single theory of the subject’s relation to the object of knowledge. The description of the cognitive subject given in the Critique permits several readings. One might assume that the cognitive subject represents the individual human being. According to Neujahr, this interpretation yields a monadistic view of the subject, similar to Leibniz’s, which allows for no interaction between individual minds within a public, spatio-temporal world. Alternatively, one might imagine a universal mind, something akin to Berkeley’s God or Hegel’s Spirit, which is not equivalent to the individual human subject. This interpretation avoids some complications associated with the first view, but it makes it difficult to specify the relation between the cosmic mind and the phenomenal individual or to account for our a priori knowledge of the subjective contribution to experience.Unresolved tensions between the doctrines of sensibility and understanding generate ambiguities in Kant’s overall account of consciousness, including his explanation of the status of the subject and object of experience. Neujahr suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic presupposes a “correspondence” theory of consciousness, whereas the Transcendental Deduction contains a “coherence” theory of consciousness. According to Neujahr’s interpretation of the doctrine of sensibility, consciousness involves a relation between an ontologically distinct subject and object. On this reading, the status of the object seems ambiguous, and thus the phenomenal world remains in some sense “unreal” in contrast to the thing in itself. Neujahr believes the doctrine of understanding avoids these difficulties by eliminating the thing in itself and redefining “reality” in [End Page 143] terms of those features about the world that make it knowable, but he doubts the possibility of reconciling this approach with the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant’s distinction between the empirical and transcendental points of view is often seen as a way of entering and understanding his philosophy, but Neujahr argues that Kant’s use of this terminology is itself inconsistent and unhelpful without a thoroughgoing revision.Neujahr contends that Kant attempts to discover the conditions necessary for knowledge, but that he locates the source of these epistemic conditions within the mind and that this “psychologizing” tendency has important ontological implications. Neujahr considers the possibility of salvaging Kant’s philosophy by attempts, such as Allison’s, to give sympathetic epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism or by efforts, such as Strawson’s, to excise the idealism from the critical philosophy, but he denies that these endeavors can save transcendental idealism without violating the letter of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, he contends that Kant’s idealism remains vulnerable to skepticism in asmuch as it fails to answer Hume’s doubts about the unity of consciousness and Descartes’s questions about the existence of the external world.Neujahr’s unsympathetic reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy may appear unduly harsh to many readers. Many readers will wish for some acknowledgment that the second Critique and the third Critique might mitigate some of the inconsistencies delineated by Neujahr, who provides little elucidation of the first Critique through any texts other than the Inaugural Dissertation and the Prolegomena. Nonetheless, Kant’s Idealism grapples with complex issues in the first Critique and suggests a... (shrink)

The tumor suppressor protein p53 is intimately involved in the cellular response to DNA damage, controlling cell cycle arrest, apoptosis and the transcriptional induction of DNA damage inducible genes. A transcriptional target of p53, Gadd45, was recently found to bind to PCNA, a component of DNA replication/repair complexes, thereby implicating Gadd45 in DNA metabolism(1). Using biochemical assays, a role for Gadd45 in excision repair in vitro has been demonstrated(1). Antisense experiments have also indicated an in vivo role for the GADD45 (...) gene in UV‐irradiation survival. These discoveries establish a link between p53 and DNA repair through Gadd45. (shrink)

Resumen El propósito de este trabajo es profundizar en el concepto de actividad de imagen y defender su utilidad como categoría de estudio para comprender diferentes tipos de comportamiento que afectan a la imagen social de los hablantes en la interacción comunicativa: cortesía, descortesía y actividad de autoimagen. Teniendo como base estudios sociopragmáticos del español desde una perspectiva cultural y estudios teóricos en inglés de la última década, se tratará el concepto de actividad de imagen, el cual se caracteriza de (...) acuerdo con dos conceptos claves: el del efecto social que un comportamiento comunicativo tiene sobre las imágenes de los hablantes y el del continuo social, la conexión que se establece entre sus imágenes en la interacción. De esta forma, se propone tratar la actividad de imagen desde dos perspectivas relacionadas: la de la dirección seguida por el efecto social hacia los interactuantes y la de las características de este efecto, siendo su interrelación el factor que permite identificar y caracterizar el tipo de actividad de imagen. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

To achieve their goals, organizations for individuals with intellectual disability have to stimulate high-quality relationships between professionals and family members. Therefore, achieving professionals’ trust in family members has become a challenge. One relevant factor in explaining professional’s trust in families is the degree to which family members use the “problem-solving” conflict management strategy in their disputes–disagreements with professionals. It is reasonable to argue that when family members use problem-solving conflict management, professionals’ trust increases. Professionals’ trust, in turn, stimulates the use (...) of problem-solving strategies by family members. However, it is also plausible that professionals are the initiators of this positive spiral. To examine this relationship between problem solving and trust over time, we conducted a longitudinal survey study in which 329 professionals reported on these two constructs three times. Using structural equation modeling, we compared four nested models: stability, causality, reversed causation, and reciprocal. The results of the χ2 difference tests, regarding the comparison of the models, showed that the reciprocal model was significantly superior to the alternative proposals. Our findings supported a complex view of the relationships between problem-solving conflict management and trust, based on dynamic reciprocal relationships over time. (shrink)

Bioethics emerged as a discipline in the 70s of the last century. One of its main objectives has been to analyze clinical cases that pose moral problems. This analysis is generally carried out by a multidisciplinary group, the Health Care Ethics Committee, which is comprised of ethical experts or healthcare providers assisted by a facilitator, depending on the context. Different methodologies are used in these situations. The deliberative method, in its various configurations, is the most widely used in many Committees. (...) Identify whether the deliberative method is included in regulated undergraduate and postgraduate teaching; analyze whether a single model can be identified or whether there is heterogeneity in the proposals. A bibliographic review was carried out, following the scoping review method. With respect to the first objective, there is no evidence on the teaching and use of the deliberative method in the Faculties and Schools of Medicine and Nursing, the emphasis is placed on training oriented to the resolution of clinical cases and a certain deliberative proposal is developed from them, more pragmatic than ethical-philosophical. In relation to the second objective, differences are observed between the two most prevalent schools (D. Gracia and B. Molewijk), with the model proposed by Gracia being used more in the Spanish-speaking world, and Molewijk's model in the English-speaking world. It can be seen that D. Gracia's proposal is more philosophical and Molewijk's more pragmatic. Finally, it is considered pertinent to further disseminate the deliberative method and its advantages, as well as its potential for bioethics education. (shrink)

¿Es Kant un sexista? La discusión contemporánea sobre el sexismo kantiano recorre todas las áreas del corpus desde la epistemología, metafísica, estética, ética hasta la filosofía política. En la presente investigación me concentraré en la discusión ética y política, en particular en el estatus moral de la mujer. Argumentaré que inclusive en la lectura más caritativa de Kant el estatus moral de la mujer es inferior al del hombre. Para desarrollar el punto anterior tomaré como hilo conductor el concepto de (...) carácter. Este concepto presenta dos ventajas. Por un lado, condensa ciertas preocupaciones morales como la relación entre sensibilidad y razón. Por otro lado, y en relación con el punto anterior, el carácter moral se expresa diferente en el carácter femenino y en el carácter masculino. En el primero se expresa el sentimiento, mientras que en el segundo se expresa la racionalidad. Dada la primacia de la racionalidad sobre sentimiento, el carácter moral masculino tiene ciertas ventajas sobre el femenino. (shrink)

Callosidad cerebral -- Odiseo y Dédalo -- Tántalo, Sísifo e Ixión -- Tiresias, Calígula y Edipo -- El jugador, Sansón y Butes -- Sócrates y Merlín -- La caña Pesante.

A principios del siglo XVII, Johannes Kepler estudió el ojo humano como instrumento óptico. Décadas más tarde, René Descartes propuso un experimento para aproximarse al ojo como si fuese un objeto separado por completo del cuerpo. Tomado como analogía de la cámara oscura, el ojo exterior ayudaría a entender la visión humana, a explicar la refracción de la luz y a modelar mejores instrumentos ópticos. Ese ojo exterior ampliaría asimismo la observación y exploración estética de la luz. El ojo objetualizado, (...) desprendido del cuerpo humano, se convertía en materia de estudio a disposición de un observador todavía completamente corporeizado. En este extrañamiento, el ojo técnico y el ojo orgánico se observan y modelan el uno al otro. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

This article is an edited transcript of the roundtable entitled “What is Philo-Performance?” that took place in Paris on 28 June 2014, within the framework of the “Theatre, Performance, Philosophy International Conference: Crossings and Transfers in Anglo-American Thought”. The conference was organized by Julien Alliot, Flore Garcin-Marrou, Liza Kharoubi and Anna Street from the LAPS, a French research group on performance philosophy.

This article comprises an up-to-date critical review of the field known as Economic Methodology or Philosophy of Economics (EM/PE). Two edited volumes (Kincaid and Ross 2021; Heilmann and Reiss 2021), a special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2021), and a recent bibliometric analysis of the field (Claveau et al. 2021) constitute the basis of the review. Drawing on these sources, we identify a number of problematic trends in current EM/PE research. We claim that these trends could be interpreted (...) as two kinds of biases, namely a micro-level bias and a mainstream bias. We discuss the respective details of these biases and their normative implications for the discipline. (shrink)

La existencia constituye un desafio para la relación entre pensamiento y realidad. Se aborda aquí esta problemática a partir de una aproximación entre Hegel y Tomás de Aquino, siendo que ambos sitúan la verdad en el ámbito de lo inteligible. Ahora bien, la realidad, al convocar la existencia, convoca también una reflexión sobre la inteligibilidad misma. Tomás encara la existencia como condición necesaria para la inteligibilidad; Hegel apela a la inteligibilidad como condición necesaria para la existencia. El talante metafísico de (...) esta discusión (diacrónica) alcanza su culminación en la cuestión sobre la existencia de Dios. (shrink)

This text seeks to introduce a question related to the place that philosophy occupies within the contemporary scene, thus opening a problematization regarding whether it can respond to the demands imposed on it by the present. In this regard, we seek to rethink the notion of philosophy from a standpoint that rescues its practical, material, and affective dimensions, making visible the transformative impulse that it can have with respect to the usual meanings associated with disciplinary production linked to the traditional (...) division between theory and practice, thus opening it to a dimension that recognizes the implicating (creative, interventional) role that philosophy has in the production of reality. (shrink)

Review of Flores-Júnior, O. La vie facile. Une lecture du cynisme ancien, Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin. (2021).

In a time of globalization, Political Philosophy for the Global Age provides a theoretical basis for the convergence of human values in terms of legitimate conceptions of time, language, and notions of self. Sánchez Flores reviews what she considers to be the most important positions in the current debate on political theory (liberalism, communitarianism, feminism, and postcolonialism) and also proposes her own original contribution. Sánchez Flores’s unique approach is a critique of a type of morality formulated solely on (...) the basis of the Judeo-Christian view of reality. It is a theoretical construct that becomes an invitation to explore other notions of human morality and an inquiry into the need to produce a political philosophy that universalizes an ethics of caring and responsibility as well as provides a locus where diverse human cultures can meet. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to describe the social networks of the Maghrebis in Alicante, some of the problems they face in their daily life, and the role played by the “mosque” as a place not only of prayer but also of mutual help and support. At the same time, the analysis shows that Islamophobia has increased in the city, as it has done in other places in Spain and Europe following the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, with the resulting rejection (...) of the Maghrebis clearly seen in their relationship with local inhabitants and in some of the local authorities’ political decisions. (shrink)

Mi propuesta versa sobre ciertas condiciones de posibilidad cognitivas y antropológicas que tratan de las ciencias naturales. En este sentido, la imaginación desempeña un papel fundamental en el origen de las ciencias. Sin embargo, el debate filosófico acerca de este tópico es insuficiente. Defino "imaginación científica" como una ensoñación sofisticada, controlada por la razón y la experiencia (o los experimentos), cuyo papel es producir nuevos objetos científicos. Hay tres tipos de imaginación científica: vaga, operacional y exacta. La primera concierne las (...) metáforas y las analogías. La segunda versa sobre los modelos en el sentido de representaciones imaginarias que simplifican e idealizan la realidad. La tercera es acerca de los modelos en el sentido matemático estricto. Finalmente, la imaginación científica está conectada con el mundo de la vida cotidiana. Así, el observador científico es un observador encarnado y, en consecuencia, su corporalidad provee las percepciones que son necesarias para la imaginación. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objeto reflexionar sobre la articulación de la producción y la reproducción desde un plano normativo, a partir del movimiento de las que limpian. Para ello se analizará la lucha de las Kellys siguiendo la conceptualización de «luchas de frontera» de Nancy Fraser. Se examinarán las estrategias de invisibilización del trabajo de infraestructura del cuidado y su articulación entre lo público y lo privado, dando cuenta de sus contradicciones. Para concluir, poniendo el foco en el proceso de (...) visibilización de este colectivo, señalando las consecuencias sociopolíticas de su emergencia como sujeto político. (shrink)

Background: In the last decades, there have been important developments in the scientific and technological areas of healthcare. On certain occasions this provokes conflict between the patients' rights and the values of healthcare professionals which brings about, within this clinical relationship, the problem of conscientious objection. Aims: To learn the opinions that the Nurses of the Madrid Autonomous Community have regarding conscientious objection. Research design: Cross-cutting descriptive study. Participants and research context: The nurses of 9 hospitals and 12 Health Centers (...) in the Madrid Autonomous Community. The study was done by means of an auto completed anonymous questionnaire. The variables studied were social-demographical and their opinions about conscientious objections. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Ethical Community of Clinical Research of the University Hospital Príncipe de Asturias. Participants were assured of maximum confidentiality and anonymity. Findings: A total of 421 nurses answered the questionnaire. In total, 55.6% of the nurses confirmed they were religious believers, and 64.3% declared having poor knowledge regarding conscientious objection. The matters that caused the greatest objections were voluntary abortions, genetic embryo selection, refusal of blood transfusions, and therapy refusal. Discussion: Different authors state that the most significant cases of conscientious objections for health professionals are those regarding carrying out or assisting in abortions, euthanasia, the practice of assisted reproduction and, finally, the prescription and dispensing of the morning-after pill. In our study, the most significant cases in which the nurses would declare conscientious objections would be the refusal to accept treatment, the selection of embryos after genetic diagnosis preimplantation, the patient’s refusal to receive blood transfusions due to religious reasons and pregnant women’s request for voluntary abortions within the first 14 weeks. Conclusion: Nurses’ religious beliefs influence their opinions regarding conscientious objection. The nurses who declare themselves as religious believers object in a higher percentage than those without religious beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper I draw on Einstein's distinction between “principle” and “constructive” theories to isolate two levels of physical theory that can be found in both classical and (special) relativistic physics. I then argue that when we focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e. explanations of physical laws, the two leading views on explanation, Salmon's “bottom-up” view and Kitcher's “top-down” view, accurately describe theoretical explanations for a given level of theory. I arrive at this conclusion through an analysis of explanations (...) of mass—energy equivalence in special relativity. (shrink)