Abraham Maslow’s needs theory is one of the most influential motivation theories in management and organizational behavior. What are its anthropological and ethical presuppositions? Are they consistent with sound business philosophy and ethics? This paper analyzes and assesses the anthropological and ethical underpinnings of Maslow’s needs theory from a personalistic framework, and concludes that they are flawed. Built on materialistic naturalism, the theory’s “humanistic” claims are subverted by its reductionist, individualistic approach to the human being, which ends up (...) in a needs-based ethics that understands goodness, virtue, and rights in instinctual, subjectivistic, and relativistic terms. Its moral imperative, “Be yourself!,” is either the materialistic fiat of genetic drives or the voluntaristic command of unbridled will. Significant implications for business educators, managers, and organizations are discussed, along with recommendations. Managerial theories and approaches that reduce personality to individuality are inconsistent with proper anthropological and ethical business principles. Adopting those individualistic theories may ultimately undermine organizational effectiveness, and the very essence of business as human activity and of management as human calling. Instead, personalistic anthropology and virtue ethics, rooted in Aristotelian–Thomistic thought, soundly account for properly human nature and the good life. Business educators and practitioners are encouraged to embrace this integral, truly humanistic framework for motivation, and management theory and practice. (shrink)

Albert Maslow points out that Wittgenstein dedicated a copy of the Tractatus to Morris Schlick with the following sentence: “ Jeder disese Sätze ist der Ausdruck einer Krankheit ” (Each of this propositions is the manifestation of a disease.) We will try to see some of the treatments to see if the remedy is not, in many cases, worse than the disease. Few philosophical texts have so many material surrounding it as the Tractatus, but and at the same (...) time do maintain such a vast spectrum of interpretations. To the point that one can expect every now and then, exegetical revolutions. Like the political ones, they usually burry the past in its way. An example: the appearance in the 1980s of Wittgenstein's Vienna was a fundamental milestone that showed that it is impossible to dissociate the author from the Viennese intellectual environment. However, attempts have been made to present this new approach as the refutation of the rest, falsely equating the Tractatus with continental philosophy in a book that is really weak in terms of elements of symbolic logic and without any expertise in regard to the philosophy of logic of Frege and Russell, which are essential to understand the context of the concepts in the text of the Tractatus itself and the records of the time. A similar case is the new interpretation that was awarded some ten years later by the North American school: they rightly called attention to the neglect of the essential paradox of the Tractatus of having intended to say what is shown. However, the value of this perspective is lost when the book is treated as the work of a postmodern nihilist, an antimetaphysical dialectician. The same can be said of the interpretation of Raymond Bradley, whose praiseworthy efforts to highlight the Tractarian modal element have resulted in an inadequate Leibnizian framing in his work The Nature of All Being (Bradley, 1992). To show an overview, I would broadly follow the outline of Cerezo (1998), adding and extending his taxonomy a bit. I think Cerezo´s outline is accurate and simple. Cerezo does not take into account contextualist readings or, in any case, it isnt her concern in her Lenguaje y Lógica in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Let us mention among the ways of reading the Tractatus the empiricist perspectives (in classical version, like Russell, or positivist, like those of Shlick and Carnap ), non-empiricist logicists ( Anscombe, Kenny ), Kantian ( Stenius, Coffa ), metaphysical (in actualist variant, Hacker, or positilist Leibnizian, Bradley), continental (such as Janik and Toulmin ), nihilistic ( Diamond and Conant, Ostrow and his dialectical idea ), and MacGuinn 's elucidatory -ecumenical attempt. David Stern (Stern,1998 ) made a stratification that is not incompatible with the one I point out. 1. The logical-atomistic reading ( logical atomist reading ) of Russell ; 2. The reading of logical positivism ( logical positivist reading ) : with the belligerent antimetaphysical charge ; 3. Metaphysical reading ( metaphysical reading ), like Hacker's, with a logically based idea of metaphysics; 4. The irrationalist reading ( irrationalist reading ) that Toulmin and Janik maintain, for example, or Isidro Reguera, where there is pre-eminence of the religious ethic elements; and 5. therapeutic reading ( therapeutic reading ), which poses it as a kind of infinity joke. We are going to add to the list a reading, which we will call a pathological reading. (shrink)

According to Maslow's Hierarchy of needs, only when lower or basic needs are satisfied will an individual be able to concentrate on higher needs. The motivation for the doing of original and creative philosophizing, theorizing in sciences and original work in disciplines or socio-cultural practices are some of the highest 'needs', values and attitudes. What are the values, attitudes and beliefs that groups of individuals subscribe to and employ to constitute their selves and realities? These things(that individuals experience (...) as it is their nature, their selves, their motivations, values and attitudes) are determined by genotypes, phenotypes, personality-types and other factors. (shrink)

Transpersonal Psychology concerns the study of those states and processes in which people experience a deeper sense of who they are, or a greater sense of connectedness with others, with nature, or the spiritual dimension. Pioneered by respected researchers such as Jung, Maslow and Tart, it has nonetheless struggled to find recognition among mainstream scientists. Now that is starting to change. Dr. Michael Daniels teaches the subject as part of a broadly-based psychology curriculum, and this book brings together the (...) fruits of his studies over recent years. It will be of special value to students, and its accessible style will appeal also to all who are interested in the spiritual dimension of human experience. The book includes a detailed 38-page glossary of terms and detailed indexes. (shrink)

Valuing Peak Experience in Everyday Lives takes Abraham Maslow's concept of peak experience and compares how people have encountered transcendent peak experiences, and related phenomena such as flow and peak performance in their everyday lives. By examining existing research and sharing people's actual encounters in different contexts such as music, education, sport, creative arts and nature, the importance and value of peak experiences and self-transcendence in our lives can be better understood and fostered. The book explores the challenges, benefits (...) and opportunities presented by understanding peak experience in contemporary contexts. Drawing on research from positive psychology and transpersonal psychology, each of the twelve chapters, reports on a work or leisure context where peak experiences have been generated and studied. The chapters are introduced by drawing on relevant theory and research and then expanded via accounts, vignettes and examples from people immersed in those activities or contexts to provide a blend of case stories and theoretical foundations. The book is valuable reading for professional practitioners such as psychologists, educators, coaches, psychotherapists and those interested in personal development. It will also be relevant for students of transpersonal and positive psychology, humanism and human development, interested in understanding transcendent peak experiences and related concepts, such as flow. (shrink)

This paper will examine the transformative possibilities of liminal space as described by Victor Turner and Isabel Clark in the musical experience. It draws on the author's previous phenomenography of musical experience an analytical frame based on the liminality of musical experience using the notion of difference-in-relationship drawing on Martin Buber's "I-Thou experience" and including theorists such as Dewey, Maslow, Levinas, Derrida, Noddings and Shore, M and I. S. Csikszentmihalyi, and Custodero. It will examine the implications of (...) the use of a liminal music space for cultural and personal transformation including its relationship between this space and the everyday world, the loss of boundaries, collective vulnerability, the opportunity to try out new personas, the handing over of responsibility to a higher power and the capacity for joyful play and the possibility of empowerment. It draws on Shakespeare's play Midsummer Night's Dream (drawing, as it does on Ovid's Metamorphoses) to illuminate the nature of transformation. (shrink)

Recollections of humanistic and transpersonal psychology’s origin’s morph into the pros and cons of humanistic/transpersonal oriented schools developing APA accredited clinical programs. This discussion dovetails with the question will ATP ever become an APA division, raising an interesting alternative for those of us considering a career in counseling: becoming a spiritual coach. Enter the issue of psychedelic therapy and the Supreme Courts decision to allow ayahuasca as a sacrament by the Uniao Do Vegetal Church, and the importance of why (...) humanistic and transpersonal psychology need to clearly map out the territories and sub-divisions of science and religion. Finally this conversation raises a concern, that Maslow’s call for a “trans-human” psychology sought to encourage creating what we now call ecopsychology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Music Education and Spirituality:Philosophical Exploration IiAnthony J. PalmerMusic, beyond its pitches and rhythms, timbres and dynamics, has elusive qualities that many have difficulty identifying and discussing. In this regard Rabindranath Tagore speaks of the "ineffable":But when our heart is fully awakened in love, or in other great emotions, our personality is in its flood-tide. Then it feels the longing to express itself for the very sake of expression. Then (...) comes art, and we forget the claims of necessity, the thrift of usefulness; the spires of our temples try to kiss the stars and the notes of our music to fathom the depth of the ineffable.1Abraham Maslow points to a similar state of being:Transcendence refers to the very highest and most inclusive or holistic levels of human consciousness, behaving and relating, as ends rather than as means, to oneself, to significant others, to human beings in general, to other species, to nature, and to the cosmos.2 [End Page 143]One deep, the other beyond, both direct attention toward something richer, exceeding technical competence and excellent rendition of the score. Yet, the very realms where these qualities reside seem to be above our ability to assess other than to say, "we know it when we experience it."3 Is there some realization that we have transcended the mundane, passed over to another plane of existence and gone beyond an egocentric mind-frame? And could subjective reports satisfy any objective criteria that the event truly happened? Moreover, could one's experience be distinguished qualitatively from another's? This is one of the quandaries when attempting to assess experience of such an elusive nature. Although, these questions lie at the foundation of such an inquiry as this, answers await additional investigation at a later time. For the present, this study will be limited to laying the groundwork for these future explorations.A clarification of terms preceding this essay is imperative. To begin, the discourse will use 'spirituality' and 'transcendence' interchangeably. Various readings suggest that there is sufficient agreement that these terms describe the same noumenal experience. For example, physicist Fritjof Capra states that:Spiritual experience is an experience of aliveness of mind and body as a unity. Moreover, this experience of unity transcends not only the separation of mind and body, but also the separation of self and world. The central awareness in these spiritual moments is a profound sense of oneness with all, a sense of belonging to the universe as a whole.4This essay continues in this vein and that of my previous article on the subject5 that the religious and doctrinal are not part of the discussion. Therefore, an effort will be made to distance spirituality, as used here, from religion. In that light, a brief comparison will prove helpful.Spirituality has its roots in the Latin: "in + spirare (Latin to breathe). Archaic: to breathe or blow into or upon; to infuse (as life) by breathing."6 This "blowing upon" is no better illustrated than in the account in Genesis. Chapter 2, verse 4, line 7 reads: "Then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being."7 Psyche in Greek and atman in Sanskrit have essentially the same meaning of breath and being alive, that is, embodying an animating force.This animating force, in my view, is not of metaphysical origins, but rather inherent in the evolution of the human species. Spirituality is a human quality as a product of supreme levels of consciousness. Additionally, it has the quality of knowing that we are conscious. C. G. Jung's statement is appropriate in describing this seemingly incomprehensible characteristic.Were organized religion to disappear by some quirk of social process, the human community still cannot and must not do without cultivating the spiritual, [End Page 144] what Jung calls the "attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been changed by experience of the numinosum."8Diane Ackerman supports the non-metaphysical origins of the impulse.Our sensitivity to religion means that at some stage in human history, our chance of mating and surviving increased... (shrink)

Inspired by the views by the American educationalist Henry Giroux on the role teachers and educationalists should be playing in the time of postmodernism and by Abraham Maslow's concept of biological idioscyncrasy, the author discusses how the concepts of the dialogues created by the representatives of Norwegian Dialogue Pedagogy, Hans Skjervheim, Jon Hellesnes, and Lars Løvlie, can be applied in the area of higher education. The aim of pedagogy in the time of postmodernism is to provide learners with knowledge (...) and skills that will allow them to earn a living, maintain democracy and fight social, racial or gender injustice. This can be achieved only if educationalists provide for educating thinking and emancipated individuals and accordingly consider the issues of identities, ethics, differences, language, transformative intellectuals, and biological idiosyncrasy. The main pedagogical function of the dialogue concepts is to encourage Bildung by enlightening learners to seen and unseen power and authority relations. The dialogue can have a form of a discussion in class, at meetings, in talk between a teacher and a learner, and parents and a child, where everyone should be allowed to speak his or her mind. The dialogue in instructional situations is also understood as a dialogue in a broad sense, including texts in the text-books. Depending on the type of problem that is discussed, a dialogue can take many different forms, all of which can and should be used in supervising graduate and post-graduate students, as the use of the concepts will promote emancipation and self-determination. When it comes to the issues of ethics, transformative intellectuals and biological idiosyncrasy, the use of the concepts should be an approach of choice. However, the author argues that the dialogue concepts do not meet the requirement for the language that Giroux suggests that pedagogy in the time of postmodernism should use, and are based on assumptions that partly conflict with the postmodern understanding of the truth. The author proposes that a new type of a dialogue, the dialogue that allows existence of several narratives at the same time, should be developed. (shrink)

This essay is, first, a theoretical and historical study of some classical scientific ways of studying human being in the world. The more readily accessible and more commonly discussed "models" of being human were chosen for review here, but structuralism is included because I believe it will have ,the same impact in America as it has had in France, and I hope that American readers might be forewarned about what may be ideologically at stake before the technical, and fruitful, (...) aspects of the movement become an academic fad in the United States. The subjects included are mainline experimental psychology from Wundt to Skinner, with its relatively shortlived functionalist and Watsonian-behaviorist formulations; holistic psychology from Brentano through Stumpf, Husserl, and Goldstein to Maslow, Rogers, and contemporary "third force" psychology; and the psychoanalytic model, for which the only paradigm is Freud himself. Preeminence is given to psychological paradigms, since their subject matter lies closest to the classical philosophical tradition from which "philosophical anthropology" emerged. (This book is, in the final analysis, a prolegomenon to an articulated philosophical anthropo logy. ) Sociological models are also considered: the "classical" tradition from Comte to the present, and Marxist anthropology from the manu scripts of 1844 to the present. The structuralist model, from Durkheim to Chomsky, is also considered, since it cuts across and gives new dimensions to all the foregoing models. The essay is, second, a phenomenological critique of these historico theoretical considerations. (shrink)

"Contemporary" is the controlling word in the title of this book of provocative readings, but foundational ideas of a timeless stamp are also brought to bear after the reader’s attention has been captured. In the section on ethics and society, for example, some selections deal with sex, marriage, abortion, eugenics, and women’s rights, but others are archly included on free will, the good life, duty, and the nature of ethical disagreement. The nineteen philosophers whose works are excerpted for this (...) section range from Kant and Bentham in an earlier era through Bertrand Russell and A. H. Maslow of the recent past to today’s Simone de Beauvoir, A. C. Ewing, and Charles L. Stevenson, as well as younger thinkers such as Arthur C. Danto and Nicholas Rescher. The remaining sections of the book cover political problems, language and art, experience and nature, and existential, religious, and other views of the meaning of life. An article by Huston Smith on the religious import of drugs concludes the volume. The editors’ introduction describes in fresh ways what a philosophical approach to an issue is and provides a useful setting for the relevant readings which follow. In the introductions to the five sections of the book, they take a closer look at the particular areas of interest and again try to illuminate the readings, in a different way by setting before the reader the truly challenging questions with which the readings will grapple.—W. G. (shrink)

Influenced by the logical positivism of Moritz, and by Russell and Ramsey, Maslow's interpretation is that Wittgenstein's basic philosophy is a kind of Kantian phenomenology. In this, the first critical study of the Tractatus by an American philosopher, Maslow examines Wittgenstein's solipsism and mysticism, neglected areas of his philosophy.

" This eBook edition contains the complete 168 page text of the original 1966 hardcover edition. Contents: Preface by Abraham H. Maslow Acknowledgments 1.

Many AI systems that make important decisions are black boxes: how they function is opaque even to their developers. This is due to their high complexity and to the fact that they are trained rather than programmed. Efforts to alleviate the opacity of black box systems are typically discussed in terms of transparency, interpretability, and explainability. However, there is little agreement about what these key concepts mean, which makes it difficult to adjudicate the success or promise of opacity alleviation methods. (...) I argue for a unified account of these key concepts that treats the concept of understanding as fundamental. This allows resources from the philosophy of science and the epistemology of understanding to help guide opacity alleviation efforts. A first significant benefit of this understanding account is that it defuses one of the primary, in-principle objections to post hoc explainable AI (XAI) methods. This “rationalization objection” argues that XAI methods provide mere rationalizations rather than genuine explanations. This is because XAI methods involve using a separate “explanation” system to approximate the original black box system. These explanation systems function in a completely different way than the original system, yet XAI methods make inferences about the original system based on the behavior of the explanation system. I argue that, if we conceive of XAI methods as idealized scientific models, this rationalization worry is dissolved. Idealized scientific models misrepresent their target phenomena, yet are capable of providing significant and genuine understanding of their targets. (shrink)

ResumeMeans-centered approach to science is contrasted with a problem-centered orientation. Overstress on and too exclusive concern with method, instrument, technique or procedure fosters the following mistakes:1) Emphasis on polish and elegance rather than on vitality, significance and creativeness.2) Giving the commanding positions in science to technicians rather than discoverers.3) Over-valuation of quantification for its own sake.4) Fitting problems to techniques rather than vice-versa.5) Creation of a false and pernicious hierarchical system among the sciences.6) Overstrong compartmentalization between the sciences.7) Emphasis on (...) the difference rather than the similarities between scientists and other truth-seekers.8) Creation of a scientific orthodoxy, which in turn a) tends to block the development of new methods, b) tends to exclude many problems from the jurisdiction of science and c) tends to make scientists “safe” rather than daring and unconventional.9) Neglect of the problems of values, with a consequent blurring of the criteria for judging the worth or importance of an experiment. (shrink)

We show that Shelah’s Eventual Categoricity Conjecture for successors follows from the existence of class many strongly compact cardinals. This is the first time the consistency of this conjecture has been proven. We do so by showing that every AEC withLS below a strongly compact cardinalκis <κ-tame and applying the categoricity transfer of Grossberg and VanDieren [11]. These techniques also apply to measurable and weakly compact cardinals and we prove similar tameness results under those hypotheses. We isolate a dual property (...) to tameness, calledtype shortness, and show that it follows similarly from large cardinals. (shrink)

Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. (...) We outline one such non-Dualist view, suggest how to resolve the dispute, respond to some objections, and argue that ours is but one of many views that survive Unger’s challenge. All these views are incompatible with microphysicalism. So Unger’s discussion does contain an insight: if you are the only conscious subject in your chair, then microphsyicalism is false. Unger’s mistake was to infer Substance Dualism from this; for microphysicalism is not the only alternative to Dualism. (shrink)

RésuméDans une importante série de publications, et dans un ouvrage sous presse intituléThe instinctoid nature of basic needs, le Dr Maslow à développé une théorie de la motivation dont le présent article résume à grands traits ľune des thèses principales. – Contrairement à la tendance essentielle de la Psychologie américaine, qui est ?expliquer ľaction humaine à partir ?un très petit nombre de besoins purement physiologiques , ľauteur pense qu'il est indispensable de faire place à des besoins ?un ordre plus (...) relevé. Notamment, ľhomme désire la sécurité, ľamour, ľestime de soi, ľinformation, un système de valeurs, la beauté, enfin ľactualisation de soi‐même.Ľexistence de ces besoins et leur caractére fondamental sont démontrés par ľexpérience clinique et par le fait que leur non‐satisfaction entraîne divers troubles. Dautres impulsions humaines, telles que ľagression, les perversions, etc., souvent présentées comme instinctives, constituent en réalité des réactions secondaires à la frustration des besoins fondamentaux.Ces higher needs ont apparu plus tardivement que les besoins physiologiques dans la vie de ľindividu aussi bien que dans celle de ľespèce. Ils sont moins urgents à satisfaire, plus fragiles, plus aisés à réprimer et àétouffer, plus dépendants de conditions complexes, internes aussi bien qu'externes. Leur satisfaction est essentielle pour le bonheur, la sérénité, la santé, la longévité de ľindividu et pour sa faculté de coopération avec autrui. Ce sont eux également qui jouent dans les psychothérapies les plus efficaces. II est à noter que, contrairement à la conception traditionnelle qui favorise un certain ascétisme, ľobservation clinique montre que c'est sur la base ?une satisfaction préalable des besoins biologiques, qu'apparaissent et se développent le mieux les besoins supéieurs.De cette vue nouvelle résultent une série de conséquences capitales:1. La dichotomie cognition‐conation est radicalement fausse et doit faire place à la thèse ?une interpénétration.2. Pareillement inacceptables sont les oppositions de ľégoïsme et de ľaltruisme, de ľinstinctif et du rationnel, de ľapollinien et du dionysiaque.3‐4. La morale devrait moins insister sur ľinhibition que sur la spontanéité, et la culture moins sur la répression des besoins que sur leur gratification.5. Le système des valeurs authentiques doit être déduit, non plus de spéculations logiques ou de ľautorité?une Révélation, mais de la pleine connaissance de ľhomme.6. Les besoins éievés étant affectés ?une certaine fragilityé, le rôle de la culture est, non pas de les inhiber, mais de les protéger.7. Education et psychothérapie doivent moins faire appel áľinhibition et au contrôle qu'à la spontanéité et àľépanouissement.8. Traditionnellement, aux deux directions fondamentales de la pensée politique, libérale ou réactionnaire, correspondent deux vues de ľindividu humain, dont ľune insiste sur ľinfluence du milieu et ľautre sur les facteurs internes héréditaires. Les considérations qui précèdent imposent au libéralisme de faire place aux facteurs innés et aux théoriciens des facteurs innés ?admettre un certain libéralisme. (shrink)

For many people "animal rights" suggests campaigns against factory farms, vivisection or other aspects of our woeful treatment of animals. Zoopolis moves beyond this familiar terrain, focusing not on what we must stop doing to animals, but on how we can establish positive and just relationships with different types of animals.

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

How did the universe begin? What is truth? How can we live good live? The Little Book of Philosophy answers these questions and more. Packed with simple explanations, witty illustrations, and step-by-step diagrams that untangle complex theories, you'll find plenty of food for thought in this book, whether you're a novice, a student, or an armchair philosopher"--Page 4 of cover.

In this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jürgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post‐1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth‐century vision: that (...) if we are to grapple with the complexities of present‐day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation‐states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the “differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him.”1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl‐Otto Apel: to “think with Kant against Kant” in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy. (shrink)