A configuration of infantile attributes including a large head, large eyes, with a small nose and mouth low on the head comprise the visual baby schema or Kindchenschema that English speakers call “cute.” In contrast to the stimulus gestalt that evokes it, the evoked emotional response to cuteness has been little studied, perhaps because the emotion has no specific name in English, Norwegian, or German. We hypothesize that cuteness typically evokes kama muta, a social-relational emotion that in other contexts is (...) often labeled in English as being moved or touched, heartwarming, nostalgia, patriotic feeling, being touched by the Spirit, the feels, etcetera. What evokes kama muta is sudden intensification of a communal sharing relationship, either communal sharing between the person and another, or communal sharing between observed others. In accord with kama muta theory, we hypothesize that a kama muta response to cuteness results from a sudden feeling of communal sharing with the cute target. In colloquial terms, the perceiver adores the cute kittens and their heart goes out to them. When a person perceives cute targets interacting affectionately - that is, intensifying communal sharing between them - this should strengthen a kama muta response. We experimentally investigated these predictions in two studies (N = 356). Study 1 revealed that videos of cute targets evoked significantly more kama muta than videos of targets that were not particularly cute. Study 2, pre-registered, found that, as hypothesized, when cute targets interacted affectionately they evoked more kama muta and were humanized more than when they were not interacting. We measured the level of kama muta by self-reports of sensations and signs and of feelings labelled heartwarming, being moved, and being touched. Participants' ratings of kama muta were positively correlated with reported cuteness. In addition, as in our previous research on kama muta elicited by other types of stimuli, trait empathic concern predicted kama muta responses and perceived cuteness. The studies thus provide first evidence that cute stimuli evoke the heartwarming emotion of kama muta. (shrink)

Wes Morriston has argued that given the mixture of goods and evils found in the world, the probability of God’s existence is much less than the probability of a creator who is indifferent to good and evil. One of my goals here is, first, to show how, by bringing in the concept of dispositions, Morriston’s argument can be expressed in a rigorous, step-by-step fashion, and then, second, to show how one can connect the extent to which different events are surprising (...) to conclusions concerning the probabilities of those events. My second goal is to evaluate two important objections to Morriston’s argument advanced by Timothy Perrine in his article, ‘Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil.’ Perrine’s first objection involves comparing how probable the evils in the world are if God exists with the probability if there is a deity who is indifferent to good and evil, and Perrine argues that given the version of skeptical theism that he and Stephen Wykstra have defended, the probability given theism is greater than the probability given an indifferent deity. Perrine’s second objection focuses instead on the probability of the mixture of goods and evils found in the world, and here he argues that there is no way of assigning a probability to that, either given the God-hypothesis or given the indifferent deity hypothesis, and therefore no way of comparing the probabilities of those two hypotheses. I then set out arguments that show that neither of Perrine’s objections is sound. (shrink)

If God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that we should obey such a command by appealing to divine (...) transcendence and mystery. I show that each approach faces significant challenges, and that none is completely satisfying. (shrink)

We like to rate each other. We rate restaurants on Yelp, drivers on Lyft, and movies on Rotten Tomatoes. And these ratings can help us make decisions. With all of this rating going on, wouldn’t it be helpful if we rated how ethical other people are? Knowing the moral scruples of others could help us make friends, choose who to date, and avoid getting ripped off. But even though lots of ratings are useful, I don’t think that giving each other (...) a moral score is a good idea. In fact, I think it might make us even more unethical. (shrink)

Weber argues that causal modelers face a dilemma when they attempt to model systems in which the underlying mechanism operates according to some set of differential equations. The first horn is that causal models of these systems leave out certain causal effects. The second horn is that causal models of these systems leave out time-dependent derivatives, and doing so distorts reality. Either way causal models of these systems leave something important out. I argue that Weber’s reasons for thinking causal modeling (...) is limited in this domain are lacking. (shrink)

Wes Furlotte critically evaluates Hegel's philosophy of human freedom in terms of his often-disregarded conception of nature. In doing so, he gives us a new portrait of Hegel's final system that is surprisingly relevant for our contemporary world, connecting it with recent work in speculative realism and new materialism.

Public and academic medical ethics debates surrounding justice and age discrimination often proceed from a problematic understanding of old age that ignores the diversity of older people. This article introduces the feminist perspective of intersectionality to medical ethical debates on aging and old age in order to analyze the structural discrimination of older people in medicine and health care. While current intersectional approaches in this field focus on race, gender, and sexuality, we thus set out to introduce aging and old (...) age as an additional category that is becoming more relevant in the context of longer life expectancies and increasing population aging. We analyze three exemplary cases on the individual, institutional, and public health level, and argue that considering the intersections of old age with other social categories helps to accommodate the diverse identities of older people and detect inequality and structural discrimination. (shrink)

severe and prolonged pain, in heartbreak and destruction, in disloyalty and betrayal, in the suffering of the innocent, in unjust punishment. He has, in short, an intense dislike for anything that you or I might approve of or enjoy. If he had his druthers we'd all be utterly miserable and come to a bad end. Now I' ve certainly never met a demonist, and I suppose we can agree that demonism would be an extraordinarily implausible view. Still, it is worth (...) asking why this is so, What is it that makes demonism so absurd?' In part 1 of this paper, I explore and critically evaluate the suggestion that we know the Demon does not exist because there are so many instances of goodness that such a being would have no apparent "reason" for allowing. Throughout, myAemonist will be helping himself to the "insights" of theists who defend classical theism against a parallel problem — the so-called evidential problem of evil — by claiming that we just don't know enough to make the argument go through. In part 2, I draw out two implications. First, that this purely defensive strategy works just as well for demonism as for theism. And second, that if this approach to the argument from evil works as well as some theists believe, then there is no.. (shrink)

In a recent paper, I claimed that if a familiar line of argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events worked as advertised, it would work just as well against the possibility of an endless series of pre-determined events. The present paper is my response to objections by William Lane Craig. It argues that neither Craig’s claim that an endless series of events is a merely potential infinite nor his claim that future events don’t exist is successful in (...) blocking my original conclusion. (shrink)

Social categorizations regarding gender or age have proven to be relevant in human-robot interaction. Their stereotypical application in the development and implementation of robotics in eldercare is even discussed as a strategy to enhance the acceptance, well-being, and quality of life of older people. This raises serious ethical concerns, e.g., regarding autonomy of and discrimination against users. In this paper, we examine how relevant professional stakeholders perceive and evaluate the use of social categorizations and stereotypes regarding gender and age in (...) robotics for eldercare. Based on 16 semi-structured interviews with representatives from technology development, industry, and nursing science as well as practice, we explore the subjects’ awareness, evaluations, and lines of argument regarding the corresponding moral challenges. Six different approaches of dealing with categorizations and stereotypes regarding gender and age in care robotics for older people are identified: negation, functionalistic relativization, explanation, neutralization, stereotyping, and queering. We discuss the ethical implications of these approaches with regard to professional responsibility and draw conclusions for responsible age tech in pluralistic societies. (shrink)

Sober develops an account of adaptations on which they must have been positive causal factors for reproductive success. Glymour defends an account of a proper subset of adaptations—adaptations to particular environmental conditions—on which traits must interact in a special way with adapting conditions to cause reproductive success. These theories render conflicting judgments about which traits count as adaptations in some interesting cases. In this article I explore one such case and argue that we ought to replace the notion of adaptation (...) qua positive causal factor with a novel notion of adaptation. (shrink)

Contributors use a variety of theoretical frameworks to analyze distinct areas of Craven’s work, including ecology, auteurism, philosophy, queer studies, and trauma. Scholars of cinema studies, horror, and ecology will find this book of particular interest.

This comment provides an overview of the four articles by Lindwall, Lymer and Ivarsson; Lynch and Wong; Macbeth, Wong and Lynch; and Macbeth and Wong, which make up the kernel of this Special Issue of Discourse Studies on Epistemics; and it also examines the reasons for the assorted difficulties the authors of those articles have with the Epistemic Programme being proposed for conversation analysis. The legitimacy of their concerns is underscored by showing that the charge the EP makes, which is (...) that the CA developed by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson gives an incomplete account of linguistic interaction, is founded on a number of mistakes. The first mistake is the idea that CA cannot effectively address so-called action formation. The second is a misunderstanding of the idea of ‘proof procedure’ in CA. The third mistake is that conversation can better be understood through an abstract analytic construction, rather than an emphasis on participants’ analysis. And the fourth is that it is necessary to rely upon an imputed cognitive machinery that is asserted to underlie conversation. The systematicity and generative power of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson’s radical work on turn-taking in conversation is emphasised and a question that begs to be answered arises, which is how well the EP compares to that earlier and still-radical work, something that the kernel articles address in their return to key transcripts used in the EP. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's shadow hangs over almost every field of intellectual inquiry. His book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has become a modern classic. His influence on philosophy, social science, historiography, feminism, theology, and (of course) the natural sciences themselves is unparalleled. His epoch-making concepts of ‘new paradigm’ and ‘scientific revolution’ make him probably the most influential scholar of the twentieth century. -/- Sharrock and Read take the reader through Kuhn's work in a careful and accessible way, emphasizing Kuhn's detailed studies (...) of the history of science, which often assist the understanding of his more abstract philosophical work. These historical studies provide vital insight into what Kuhn was actually trying to achieve in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: an endeavour far less extreme than either his ‘foes’ or his ‘fans’ claim. In the book's second half, Sharrock and Read provide excellent explications, defences and, where appropriate, criticisms of Kuhn's central concept of ‘incommensurability’, and tackle head on the crucial issue of whether Kuhn's insights concerning the natural sciences can be extrapolated to other disciplines, such as the social sciences. -/- This is the first comprehensive introduction to the work of Kuhn and it will be of particular interest to students and scholars in philosophy, theory of science, management science and anthropology. (shrink)

On a Molinist account of creation and providence, not only is there is a complete set of truths about what every possible person would freely do in any possible set of circumstances, but these conditional truths are part of the very explanation of our existence. Robert Adams has recently argued that the explanatory priority of these conditionals undermines libertarian freedom. In the present essay, I take at close look at Adams’ argument and at the Molinist response of Thomas Flint. After (...) showing that Flint’s response is inadequate, I develop what I believe to be a more successful Molinist response to Adams’ argument. Along the way, I seek to provide some insight into the nature of libertarian freedom and the proper interpretation of the much discussed “principle of alternate possibilities.”. (shrink)

According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive.

This article discusses some issues that arise from the fact of `conceptual change'. We focus on the difficulties that Ian Hacking encountered when considering whether the consequence of conceptual change is the fact that the past of individual actions is indeterminate (Hacking, 1995). We consider his use of Anscombe's thesis on actions under description and find that he misrepresents it. We further find that he neglects tenses of descriptions and redescriptions, the contrast of which is essential to concepts that entail (...) a contrast in understandings of how the matters were then, how they are now, or will be in the future. (shrink)

Can God be both omnipotent and essentially good? Working with the Anselmian conception of God as the greatest possible being, a number of philosophers have tried to show that omnipotence should be understood in such a way that these properties are compatible. In the present paper, I argue that we can, without inconsistency or other obvious absurdity, conceive of a being more powerful than the Anselmian God. I conclude that contemporary Anselmian philosophers have conflated two logically distinct questions: (1) How (...) much power would be possessed by the best possible God? and (2) How much power is required for omnipotence? When these questions are distinguished, it can be seen that the Anselmian God does not have maximal power and is not omnipotent. (shrink)

It is widely thought that moral education is not compatible with the mission of higher education. In this article, I point out that the issue is a bit more complicated. There are some virtues, like honesty, that play a key role in university life, making it possible that other moral virtues like justice and compassion might also be important for helping students succeed at their colleges and universities.

Brandon claims that to explain adaptation one must specify fitnesses in each selective environment and specify the distribution of individuals across selective environments. Glymour claims, using an example of the adaptive evolution of costly plasticity in a symmetric environment, that there are some predictive or explanatory tasks for which Brandon’s claim is limited. In this paper, I provide necessary conditions for carrying out Brandon’s task, produce a new version of the argument for his claim, and show that Glymour’s reasons for (...) making his claim are problematic. I provide a few interpretations of Glymour’s argument but ultimately raise worries for what I take to be the key premises. (shrink)

A one-credit seminar devoted to theological issues. Can be taken three times for credit. This semester, we'll be discussing Thomas Morris's highly readable book on Pascal and the meaning of life. To give you a quick sense of what this book is about, here are the chapter titles, followed by a few paragraphs from the first chapter.