I argue that the "why be rational?" challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the “why be moral?” challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead in (...) terms of the demand for a philosophical characterisation of rationality that can do something to explain why rational requirements are the kinds of things that are, by their very nature, normative. I consider several accounts that have recently been offered – the distinctive-object account, the proper functioning account, and the subjective reasons account – and argue that none succeeds in meeting this challenge. I then sketch a new account, the “first-personal authority account”, which holds that rational requirements are what I call “standpoint-relative demands” concerning the attitudes we ought to have and form; and that complying with rational requirements is a matter of honouring our first-personal authority as agents. I suggest that the first-personal authority account does a better job of meeting the challenge. (shrink)

What is the philosophical role of an historical account of how someone, or some people, came to believe or value as they do? I consider some proposals, due to Bernard Williams and David Wiggins, according to which such an account might either vindicate or subvert our believing or valuing as we do. I suggest some reasons for scepticism about those proposals, at least when construed as providing a fundamental means of assessing cases of believing or valuing. The main problem raised (...) for the proposals, when so construed, is that they conflate reasons that now support believing or valuing with reasons for coming in the first place to believe or value. (shrink)

When Timothy Sprigge's The Vindication of Absolute Idealism appeared in 1983 it ran very much against the grain of the dominant linguistic and analytic traditions of philosophy in Britain. The very title of this work was a challenge to those who believed that Absolute Idealism fell with the critiques of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at the beginning of the 20th century. Sprigge, however, saw himself as providing an underrepresented position in the philosophical spectrum rather than as advocating (...) an abandoned view. For him, idealism did not fall at any determinate point in the history of philosophy. The truth of any philosophical thesis cannot depend on what happens to be currently fashionable, but rather must stand on the soundness of philosophical argument. To this end, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism is a bold statement of his conclusions, a synthesis of panpsychism and absolute idealism, which he contends is the most satisfactory solution to the question of the nature of consciousness and the mind-body problem. Sprigge's view of consciousness remains a challenge to mainstream physicalism and a viable option that addresses pressing contemporary concerns not only in metaphysics and philosophy of mind but also in environmental ethics and animal rights. (shrink)

(2004). A vindication of the rights of brutes. Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 259-264.

The purpose of this article is to vindicate the viability of Kurt H. Wolff''s methodology of surrender-and-catch for the human and social sciences. The article is divided into three sections. The first section explicates the fundamental significance of surrender-and-catch and Wolff''s motivation for advocating its practice. The second section compares surrender-and-catch with phenomenological methodology as well as objective science and the province of the everyday. The third section illustrates surrender-and-catch through my own practice. In this section I contextualize surrender-and-catch in (...) a triangulated design, which exhibits its flexibility and compatibility for use in conjunction with other forms of research. (shrink)

Natural law political theory grounds the authority of law in the law's capacity to advance the common good, but questions about what this common good is and how it relates to political life remain highly contested. The influential new natural law theory of John Finnis reduces political association to the operation of government and makes it a merely instrumental good that serves to secure and facilitate individual and social goods. Political community, on this account, does not realize any further human (...) good not already experienced in smaller human communities. In A Vindication of Politics, Matthew Wright challenges this account and argues that political community itself realizes an aspect of social life intrinsic to full human flourishing. Wright develops an account of the political common good that is both inclusivist and distinctive--that is to say, it includes within its orbit the diverse goods of individuals and other associations, and it recognizes the good of the political association itself. Drawing on the work of Edmund Burke and the example of Abraham Lincoln, Wright argues that political community has its own distinctive goods, including civic friendship and political culture, embodied in its history, institutions, practices, and ideals. Individuals do not have to run for office to be engaged in the political common good. Participation in the vibrant cultural life of one's political community is an intrinsic part of the common good. (shrink)

How do we justify the normative standards to which we appeal in support of our moral progress judgments, given their historical and cultural contingency? To answer this question in a noncircular way, Elizabeth Anderson and Philip Kitcher appeal exclusively to formal features of the methodology by which a moral change was brought about; some moral methodologies are systematically less prone to bias than others and are therefore less vulnerable to error. However, we argue that the methodologies espoused by Anderson and (...) Kitcher implicitly appeal to the substantive principle of “moral universalism.” This sets up the positive project of the paper: an attempt to vindicate moral universalism with a pragmatic genealogy. Using resources from cultural evolutionary theory and the history of ideas we argue that the universalistic norms widely committed to in many societies today have the function of maintaining cooperation in large anonymous groups. Furthermore, while universalistic norms play this instrumental role, their functional benefits are best secured when people following such norms do so for intrinsic rather than instrumental reasons. Finally, having elaborated our pragmatic genealogy, we close by considering how this genealogy should affect our commitment to moral universalism and how it can complement the methods of Anderson and Kitcher. (shrink)

This paper is a critical response to Eli Hirsch’s recent work in metaontology. Hirsch argues that several prominent ontological disputes about physical objects are verbal, a conclusion he takes to vindicate common sense ontology. In my response, I focus on the debate over composition (van Inwagen’s special composition question). I argue that given Hirsch’s own criterion for a dispute’s being verbal – a dispute is verbal iff charity requires each side to interpret the other sides as speaking the truth in (...) their own languages –his case for verbalness comes up short. Hirsch ignores an important facet of charity, which I call charity to expressibility, viz. that we ought ceteris paribus to interpret linguistic communities as not speaking expressively impoverished languages. In fact, I argue that given his criterion, the debate over composition turns out nonverbal. I close by suggesting that even if the dispute over composition is nonverbal, the sides can arrive at a kind of limited conciliation through charitable interpretation of one another. Each side ought to interpret a great many of the other sides claims as “factual” even if false. (shrink)

This volume makes available for the first time critical editions of John Locke's A Vindication and A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, in which Locke defends his interpretation of the New Testament and of the Christian Religion against charges of heterodoxy. These works contribute greatly to our understanding of Locke's Christian commitments, which it is now recognized played an important role in shaping his philosophical opinions; they also demonstrate his sophistication as a biblical scholar, and the (...) breadth of his theological learning. The texts are accompanied by a historical introduction explaining the origin of the works and setting them in context. In addition to a textual introduction and critical apparatus, editorial notes help to clarify the text. The volume also includes a French translation and abridgment by Pierre Coste, a Huguenot scholar, who was patronized by Locke and worked on his translations while residing in Locke's household. This definitive edition is an important contribution to an understanding of the development of modern enlightened Christian attitudes. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problem of vindicating a particular type of inductive rule, a rule to govern inferences from observed frequencies to limits of relative frequencies. Reichenbach's rule of induction is defended. By application of two conditions, normalizing conditions and a criterion of linguistic invariance, it is argued that alternative rules lead to contradiction. It is then argued that the rule of induction does not lead to contradiction when suitable restrictions are placed upon the predicates admitted. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox (...) is considered, and an attempt to resolve it is offered. Finally, Reichenbach's pragmatic argument, hinging on convergence properties, is applied. (shrink)

Frege regarded Hume's Principle as insufficient for a logicist account of arithmetic, as it does not identify the numbers; it does not tell us which objects the numbers are. His solution, generally regarded as a failure, was to propose certain sets as the referents of numerical terms. I suggest instead that numbers are properties of pluralities, where these properties are treated as objects. Given this identification, the truth-conditions of the statements of arithmetic can be obtained from logical principles with the (...) help of definitions, just as the logicist thesis maintains. (shrink)

In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of responsibility (...) justifies moral luck. But this justification is no mere rationalization of the status quo. Recent experimental and evolutionary work on punishment and learning suggests that the very same reasons that justify moral luck have also shaped the evolution of our luck-sensitive moral practices. (shrink)

Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman was a ground-breaking work of literature which still resonates in feminism and human rights movements of today.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Vindication Wim Klever Comparing Hume with Spinoza I am accused ofhaving misread both, at least in certain respects; I would have gone too far in considering Spinoza as an influential root of Hume's thought. On occasion of Dr. Leavitt's criticism I would like to stress the following points: 1. In spite ofWolfson'sendeavourtoreduceSpinozatoAristotelian, scholastic and Jewish sources ofthe Middle Ages, many texts—in fact all texts in which Aristotle (...) ismentioned—constitute aconvincingproof that Spinoza not only rejected,just like Hume, all sorts ofAristotelian and scholastic speculation, buteven showedmuch contemptfor them.1 In the same way there cannot be any doubt that he rejected Maimonides' Jewish Aristotelianism.2 In the TTP he defines his position in sharp contrast to Maimonides. 2.Nominalism means that names may be used for the indication of many items whereas ideas are essentially ideas of particulars. According to Spinoza everything is reflected in its own specific idea,3 whereas names like 'ens', 'aliquid', 'man', etc. may be the sign, sometimes ambiguously but often also without confusion, of more things, which are vaguely conceived. This confused idea, then, is nevertheless the properideaofaparticularblurredimageinthebrains. Some eminent scholars like Stuart Hampshire and Martial Gueroult (I confess: not all ofthem) pretend that Spinoza is a true nominalist. I think the texts (and the whole structure of the system) enforce us to confess that they are right. 3.In the case of common things, that is, (elementary) things common to all beings, the human body included, the ideas of these things are, though particular, common too.4 In spite ofand in line with Hume's agreement with Spinoza's nominalism he does not deny, as Leavitt pretends, the existence of common notions. In "Of the Passions," part 1, section 10, he writes that "according to common notions a man has no power, where very considerable motives Ue betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires, and determine him to forbearwhathe wishes toperform."5Thispassageis notatallinconflict with Treatise 1.1.7 in which the real existence ofabstract ideas in our mind is refuted. The ideas of things we have in common with other natural beings, may not be called abstract for that reason. This section (T 17-25) is perfectly congruous with Spinoza's position. 4.I keep to my claim that there is a striking parallel between Spinoza's famous distinction between three kinds of knowledge Volume XVII Number 2 209 WIM KLEVER (2 Ethics 40s2) and some statements ofHume. Additional evidence for this claim (compared with what I gave already) is to find in Treatise 1.3.11, where Hume marks "several degrees of evidence,... distinguishing] human reason into three kinds, viz. that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities" (T 124, first emphasis added); and in the Enquiry, where all objects of human reason are dividedinto three (!)kinds as well, namely"Relations ofIdeas... either intuitively or demonstratively certain" and "Matters ofFact."6 Put into a diagram the resemblance becomes even more apparent: Spinoza Ethics opinio/imaginatio ratio intuitio Hume TreatiseEnquiry probabilityMatters of Fact proofdemonstratively knowledgeintuitively Careful comparison ofthe texts shows that the functions attributed to the various kinds ofknowledge are exactly the same in Spinoza as in Hume, contrary to what is suggested by Leavitt. I only need to remind him ofthe 'Spinozistic' opening ofTreatise 1.3.3: "Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence... Tis suppos'd to be founded on intuition,... All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable" (T 78-79). Both philosophers locate the highest kind of knowledge in the evidence of mathematics and the common properties of nature, explained in physics. Let us not forget that both are fully naturalists, for whom the understanding of things "sub specie aeternitatis" (Spinoza's description of the third kind of knowledge) means in fact the intuition of the particular essence of things in a scientific way. 5.In the TractatusTheologico-Politicus itiscertainly not Spinoza's intention to show that the third kind of knowledge is identical with prophecy. On the contrary, in the first two chapters he clearly demonstrates, in his scientific hermeneutics, that prophecy is... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue for a revised and precisified version of the infamous Verifiability Criterion for the meaningfulness of declarative sentences. The argument is based on independently plausible premises concerning probabilistic confirmation and meaning as context-change potential, it is shown to be logically valid, and its ramifications for potential applications of the criterion are being discussed. Although the paper is not historical but systematic, the criterion thus vindicated will resemble the original one(s) in some important ways. (...) At the same time, it will also be more modest insofar as meaningfulness will turn out to be relativized linguistically and probabilistically, and different choices of the linguistic and probabilistic parameters may lead to different verdicts on meaningfulness. (shrink)

The proponents of the ‘vindication’ or ‘pragmatic justification’ of induction have attempted to show that induction will work if any method does. This in turn serves as grounds for their claim that we have everything to gain by using induction and nothing to lose. Hence, they conclude that it is rational to use induction. Their claim that induction will work if any mehtod does is based upon the following argument:If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not (...) uniform and some other method works, the success of that method will then constitute a regularity to which induction can be successfully applied. In that case, induction will sanction the continued use of the successful method and hence will be successful as well. (shrink)

Hurford's discussion also vindicates the classical empiricist program in semantics. The idea that PREDICATE(x) is the logical form of the sensory representations encoded via the dorsal and ventral streams validates empiricists' insistence on the psychological primacy of sense data, which have the same form. In addition to knowing the logical form of our primitive representations, however, we need accounts of (1) their contents and (2) how more complex thoughts are derived from them. Ideally, our semantic vocabulary would both reflect the (...) psychological “primitiveness” of these representations and make clear how more complex representations derive from them. (shrink)

Nearly two hundred years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft wrote what is considered to be the first major work of feminist political theory: A Vindication of the Rights of Women . Much has been written about this work, and about Wollstonecraft as the intellectual pioneer of feminism, but the actual substance and coherence of her political thought have been virtually ignored. Virginia Sapiro here provides the first full-length treatment of Wollstonecraft's political theory. Drawing on all of Wollstonecraft's works and treating them (...) thematically rather than sequentially, Sapiro shows that Wollstonecraft's ideas about women's rights, feminism, and gender are elements of a broad and fully developed philosophy, one with significant implications for contemporary democratic and liberal theory. The issues raised speak to many current debates in theory, including those surrounding interpretation of the history of feminism, the relationship between liberalism and republicanism in the development of political philosophy, and the debate over the canon. For political scientists, most of whom know little about Wollstonecraft's thought, Sapiro's book is an excellent, nuanced introduction which will cause a reconsideration of her work and her significance both for her time and for today's concerns. For feminist scholars, Sapiro's book offers a rounded and unconventional analysis of Wollstonecraft's thought. Written with considerable charm and verve, this book will be the starting point for understanding this important writer for years to come. (shrink)

The works of Mary Wollstonecraft ranged from the early Thoughts on the Education of Daughters to The Female Reader, a selection of texts for girls, and included two novels. But her reputation is founded on A Vindication of the Rights of Woman of 1792. This treatise is the first great document of feminism—and is now accepted as a core text in western tradition. It is not widely known that the germ of Wollstonecraft's great work came out of an earlier (...) and much shorter vindication—A Vindication of the Rights of Men , written in the context of the issues raised by the French Revolution. This edition, which follows the model of other Broadview Editions in including a range of materials that help the reader to see the work in the context of its era out of which it emerged, is arranged chronologically, opening with Wollstonecraft's "other vindication." It also includes a wide range of other documents in appendices, as well as a comprehensive and authoritative introduction, chronology, and full index. (shrink)

. Vindicating Archer’s concepts of educational systems – centralized and decentralized – as exemplars of critical realist theorizing. Journal of Critical Realism: Vol. 18, Sustainability, Interdisciplinarity and Transformative change: A Critical Realist Response to the Crisis System, pp. 453-473.

In Democratic Education in a Globalized World (Routledge, 2019) I defend a discourse theory of global justice as the appropriate normative1 ground for conceiving educational justice and citizenship education under conditions of economic and political globalization. In addition, I articulate democratic conceptions of global educational justice and citizenship education that recognize a moral-political right to democratically adequate education and call for the creation of transnational democratic consciousness. Based on these conceptions I spell out school practices such as historically informed, cross-cultural (...) learning within socially diverse settings that would contribute to realizing these conceptions. In this article I reply to liberal perfectionist, communitarian-conservative and empiricist-historical critiques of Democratic Education in a Globalized World from Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein and Michael Geiss, respectively. I emphasize the feasibility of injustice-reducing educational practices, I explain how a discourse theory of justice accommodates considerations of both the good and the right, and I justify why the grim record of past educational experience does not render pointless the pursuit of progressive aims through education. (shrink)

J. J. Katz in “The Problem of Induction and its Solution” argues that not only a validation but also a vindication of induction is impossible. In the course of his argument a number of interesting issues arise about what is actually required for a satisfactory vindication. The aim of those who have sought to provide a vindication for induction has been to show that it is the most satisfactory means for forming expectations about the future; they have (...) accepted the impossibility of showing that induction must, or will probably, lead to true predictions. Feigl gives a general characterisation of vindication as an “argument concerning means with respect to ends” and contrasts it to validation which is a justification of a knowledge claim by establishing it as true or probably true. We cannot validate the rules of induction but we can give a vindication of the adoption of these rules. Katz accepts Feigl's distinction in general terms but proposes some modifications to meet certain defects which he believes to be present in the latter's account. Katz distinguishes two senses of vindication, an “expediency vindication” which “establishes a justificandum as a suitable means,” while a “preferability vindication” “establishes the justificandum as the preferable means for achieving the end.” An expediency vindication shows that the proposed means is a sufficient condition for achieving the end in view, but it need not establish this means as necessary to achieve this end. A preferability vindication will establish the means as necessary to achieve this end in the best way. He then proceeds as follows: “an argument which demonstrates that a justificandum is a necessary condition—but only a necessary condition—for achieving the relevant end is not a real vindication.” He holds that the vindication of a certain means must show at least that it will achieve the end sought, and preferably that it is the best way of achieving this end. (shrink)

Fetzer famously claims that program verification is not even a theoretical possibility, and offers a certain argument for this far-reaching claim. Unfortunately for Fetzer, and like-minded thinkers, this position-argument pair, while based on a seminal insight that program verification, despite its Platonic proof-theoretic airs, is plagued by the inevitable unreliability of messy, real-world causation, is demonstrably self-refuting. As I soon show, Fetzer is like the person who claims: ‘My sole claim is that every claim expressed by an English sentence and (...) starting with the phrase “My sole claim” is false’. Or, more accurately, such thinkers are like the person who claims that modus tollens is invalid, and supports this claim by giving an argument that itself employs this rule of inference. (shrink)

Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...) the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson. (shrink)

e presenta el debate entre reduccionismo y no reduccionismo respecto de la probabilidad objetiva y se identifican las cargas dialécticas adquiridas por cada posición: el problema de la motivación y el problema de la explicación. Se argumenta que, mientras que el problema de la motivación no presenta ningún desafío para los no reduccionistas, los reduccionistas no son capaces de responderlo exitosamente. Contrariamente a lo que se ha sugerido, ambos lados comparten el problema de la explicación. Se argumenta que los no (...) reduccionistas pueden responderlo exitosamente, mientras que los reduccionistas no son capaces de hacerlo. Por lo tanto, el lado no reduccionista tiene una ventaja dialéctica importante. (shrink)

Among others, four significant criticisms have been leveled against Kant’s morality. These criticisms are that Kant’s morality lacks a motivational component, thatit ignores the spiritual dimensions of morality espoused by a virtue-based ethics, that it overemphasizes the principle of autonomy in neglecting the communal context of morality, and that it lacks a theological foundation in being detached from God. In this paper I attempt to show that, when understood in the broader context of his religious doctrines and the overall philosophical (...) project of the architectonic of reason, Kant’s morality has a strong motivational component, supports the forming of a virtuous character as an essential element in a complete moral life, must be grounded in a community so as to realize peace and happiness for rational individuals, and is linked, ultimately, to a theological foundation. (shrink)

The paper comments on David Rosenthal’s claim that saying “p” is performance-conditionally equivalent to saying “I believe that p”. It is argued, by way of counterexamples, that the proposed performance-conditional equivalence does not hold in this generality. The paper further proposes that avowal expressivism gives necessary conditions for the performance-conditional equivalence: it holds only if the speaker’s utterance of “p” is a non-explicit expressive act expressive of the belief that p and the utterance of “I believe that p” is an (...) explicit expressive act expressive of the very same belief. If that is correct, the performance-conditional equivalence thesis provides an argument against Rosenthal’s preferred avowal descriptivism and in favor of avowal expressivism. (shrink)

This article questions Balibar’s claim that Simondon’s concept of the transindividual does not fulfil all the requirements for a materialist ‘philosophical anthropology’. In fact, we demonstrate that Simondon’s philosophy of individuation, and notably his concept of the transindividual, can be, as it were, included in a genealogy of aleatory materialism. Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is indeed a philosophy of the transindividual insofar as it involves the constant revision of the different historical forms taken by social relations in the coevolution of (...) human beings and their techno-social and natural milieu. Simondon’s way of conceiving anthropogenesis as an open and ‘metastable’ field in which individuals and processes relate to each other maintaining their own knowledge in motion, marks, in our view, a materialist style of thinking. Against this background we analyse Simondon’s overcoming of the dichotomy between the individual and society through a ‘double rejection’, we sketch his theory of a ‘double source’ for social relations, and we explain in what sense, from his perspective, the transindividual ‘can be said in many ways’. (shrink)

This essay responds to the machine question in the affirmative, arguing that artifacts, like robots, AI, and other autonomous systems, can no longer be legitimately excluded from moral consideration. The demonstration of this thesis proceeds in four parts or movements. The first and second parts approach the subject by investigating the two constitutive components of the ethical relationship—moral agency and patiency. In the process, they each demonstrate failure. This occurs not because the machine is somehow unable to achieve what is (...) considered necessary and sufficient to be a moral agent or patient but because the characterization of agency and patiency already fail to accommodate others. The third and fourth parts respond to this problem by considering two recent alternatives—the all-encompassing ontocentric approach of Luciano Floridi’s information ethics and Emmanuel Levinas’s eccentric ethics of otherness. Both alternatives, despite considerable promise to reconfigure the scope of moral thinking by addressing previously excluded others, like the machine, also fail but for other reasons. Consequently, the essay concludes not by accommodating the alterity of the machine to the requirements of moral philosophy but by questioning the systemic limitations of moral reasoning, requiring not just an extension of rights to machines, but a thorough examination of the way moral standing has been configured in the first place. (shrink)

Psychologists and neuroscientists have recently been unearthing the unconscious processes that give rise to moral intuitions and emotions. According to skeptics like Joshua Greene, what has been found casts doubt on many of our moral beliefs. However, a new approach in moral psychology develops a learning-theoretic framework that has been successfully applied in a number of other domains. This framework suggests that model-based learning shapes intuitions and emotions. Model-based learning explains how moral thought and feeling are attuned to local material (...) and social conditions. Philosophers can draw on these explanations, in some cases, in order to vindicate episodes of moral change. Explanations can support justifications by showing that they are not mere rationalizations. In addition, philosophical justifications are a fertile source for empirical hypotheses about the rational learning mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and emotions. (shrink)