What kind of education is needed for democracy? How can education respond to the challenges that current democracies face? This unprecedented Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of the most important ideas, issues, and thinkers within democratic education. Its thirty chapters are written by leading experts in the field in an accessible format. Its breadth of purpose and depth of analysis will appeal to both researchers and practitioners in education and politics. The Handbook addresses not only the historical roots and philosophical (...) foundations of democratic education, but also engages with contemporary political issues and key challenges to the project of democratic education. (shrink)

Defending a procedural conception of global justice that calls for the establishment of reasonably democratic arrangements within and beyond the state, this book argues for a justice-based understanding of social development and justifies why a democracy-promoting international development practice is a requirement of global justice.

Due to the economic and social effects of globalization democracy is currently in crisis in many states around the world. This book suggests that solving this crisis requires rethinking democratic education. It argues that educational public policy must cultivate democratic relationships not only within but also across and between states, and that such policy must empower citizens to exercise democratic control in domestic as well as in inter- and transnational politics. -/- Democratic Education in a Globalized World articulates and defends (...) democratic conceptions of global citizenship education and educational justice on the basis of a democratic understanding of global justice. It will be of interest to researchers across the fields of education, political theory, philosophy, development and postcolonial studies. (shrink)

Shmuel Nili’s Philosophizing The Indefensible – Strategic Political Theory represents a sophisticated response to the widespread support of political positions that seem unreasonable from the perspective of liberal political morality. Nili takes seriously extreme right-wing, pro-life, pro-business, and climate change-sceptic positions that other liberal theorists seem to prefer sweeping under the carpet when turning towards yet another puzzle of liberalism. This is a refreshing move, which Nili pursues masterfully through the critical analysis of such seemingly indefensible positions in painstaking detail. (...) That said, readers who are intrigued by the political philosophical methods of Charles Larmore and the late John Rawls, who accept the fact of reasonable moral disagreement and focus primarily on the question of political legitimacy, may sometimes find that Nili’s argumentations are somewhat moralistic. (shrink)

Philosophical conceptions of educational justice are centered at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of education. They justify moral‐political rights to education and sometimes also determine who is responsible for their realization through which kinds of pedagogical practices or systemic educational reform. This article concentrates on contemporary conceptions of educational justice in primary and secondary education and highlights central practical implications that the various conceptions of educational justice have under non‐ideal circumstances. Section 2 explains the conceptions of fair and (...) luck‐egalitarian equal educational opportunity, Section 3 the conception of educational priority for the least‐advantaged students, and Section 4 the conception of democratically adequate education. Finally, Section 5 presents a philosophical conception of global justice in school education. Section 6 concludes. (shrink)

Nussbaum’s moral cosmopolitanism informs her capability-based theory of justice, which she uses in order to develop a distinctive model of cosmopolitan democratic education. I characterize Nussbaum’s educational model as a ‘statist model,’ however, because it regards cosmopolitan democratic education as necessary for realizing democratic arrangements at the domestic level. The socio-cultural diversity of virtually every nation, Nussbaum argues, renders it mandatory to educate citizens in a cosmopolitan fashion. Citizens must develop empathy and sympathy towards all co-citizens of their domestic polities (...) and cope effectively with socio-cultural diversity. I criticize Nussbaum’s statist model, because it neglects that due to the ways in which international institutions already constrain national decision-making, citizens will not fully enjoy the human freedom of co-determining the political choices that affect their lives unless international affairs are further democratized. Therefore I suggest extending Nussbaum’s statist model and outline an ‘internationalist model’ of cosmopolitan democratic education. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The central aim of Peter Hägel’s Billionaires in World Politics (BWP) is to challenge the assumption that private individuals lack agency and power in world politics – an assumption that is widely shared in the field of International Relations (IR). Hägel’s methodological strategy to achieve this aim is twofold. First, he concentrates on minutest biographical aspects of billionaires to lay bare the idiosyncrasy of their choices, and to falsify, thus, structuralist assumptions of how individual agency is undermined by factors (...) such as class, roles, or fields. Second, Hägel engages in counter-factual reasoning to support the claim that these individual decisions end up having a real impact on public affairs abroad. This impact is difficult to overestimate given that, as Hägel reveals, billionaires have affected a whole array of political issues, including Brexit, climate change policy, democratic development in Eastern Europe, global health policy, the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and the war in Iraq. This introduction starts off by elaborating on the central scholarly contribution of BWP. Following that, this introduction explains why the insights that BWP provides suggest that we do not live in a neo-feudal order, despite the immense global economic inequality which billionaires’ wealth manifests. (shrink)

Lyotard defines being postmodern as an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’. Such incredulity includes, in particular, skepticism vis-à-vis Enlightenment ideals like autonomy. Motivated by such skepticism, several educational scholars put into question education for autonomy as it is practiced in the formal settings of national school systems. More specifically, they criticize that practices of autonomy education can have certain normalizing and ideological e￿ects that undermine the aim of creating autonomous subjects. This article examines these critiques of education for autonomy and argues that (...) they are best understood as calls for reforming educational practices, and not as outright rejections of education for autonomy. Thus, since the allegedly ‘postmodern’ critiques of autonomy education cannot be plausibly understood as radical ruptures with Enlightenment ideals, the article concludes that these critiques represent (merely) constructive self-critical reflections on what Habermas dubbed the ‘unfinished project of modernity’. (shrink)

This collected volume addresses issues pertaining to education and migration from a variety of philosophical and ethical perspectives. -/- It is high time to critically analyze ethical issues in education under conditions of globalization, not only because migration and globalization are topical issues, but also because dominant academic approaches in the ethics and political philosophy of education have a tendency to narrow their focus on the education of sedentary citizens. However, many learners and educators experience high levels of both voluntary (...) and constrained mobility. The contributions to Education and Migration address issues pertaining to migration-related education from a variety of ethical and philosophical perspectives, including analytic applied ethics, continental philosophy, care ethics, Hegelian philosophy, the capability approach and theories of distributive justice. Distinguished scholars, as well as younger researchers, from a variety of disciplines (educational scholars, lawyers, philosophers, psychologists and sociologists) tackle in these eight essays core issues in the ethics and political philosophy of education, such as citizenship education or justice in access to education, from a perspective that takes human mobilities into account. -/- The collection puts a special emphasis on the diversity of migratory experiences, on the significance of education for citizens and non-citizen migrants, long-term residents and undocumented children, immigrants and return migrants. (shrink)

When asking fundamental questions about education, philosophers have not shied away from giving radical answers. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, who found himself disenchanted with the artificiality and pride that he encountered in 18th century Paris, advocated a laissez faire education in the countryside. Such an “education by nature,” Rousseau thought, would keep children at bay from morally corrupt society and would allow them to become authentic and sincere persons. Similarly concerned with moral education, in the early 20th century the American (...) pragmatist John Dewey argued that experiential learning in socially diverse settings would be crucial for nourishing democratic culture. Being a pragmatist, Dewey also maintained that educational philosophy should always concentrate on solving practical difficulties of contemporary social life, instead of dealing with idle intellectual puzzles. In this spirit, oriented towards educational practice, several philosophers of education and educational theorists have recently turned their attention to the ways in which education might help solving some of the pressing problems arising from globalization. This special issue of Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric assembles the latest scholarship of some these philosophers and theorists on the topic of “Global Justice and Education” – a topic which until recently has been curiously neglected within the academic literature on global justice. Alejandra Boni (Technical University of Valencia) and Diana Carolina Velasco (University of Ibagué) analyze how power asymmetries in global knowledge production can give rise to epistemic injustices and explored how academics can collaborate with civil society actors to fight such injustices. Johannes Drerup (Technical University of Dortmund and Free University Amsterdam) responds to the postcolonial critique that global citizenship education is Western-centric by arguing that the dichotomy of “the West vs. the Rest” is outdated and that the critical study of colonialism should be part of global citizenship education. Juan Espíndola (National Autonomous University of Mexico) criticizes that low fee private schools in many developing countries often times do not provide an adequate education, and that global philanthropists should therefore be more careful in their support for these schools. Lindsey Schwartz (University of Wisconsin-Madison) discusses a number of problems that students living abroad face because two central principles of educational justice that are usually taken for granted at the national level either systematically overlook or exacerbate their problems. These two principles are the principle of educational adequacy and the presumption of responsibility on the part of a host country for meeting children’s educational needs. Due to their inappropriateness under conditions of globalization and, in particular, transnational migration, Schwartz demands a cosmopolitan revision of the first and a replacement for the second with a focus on collective responsibility. Finally, Danielle Zwarthoed (Catholic University of Louvain) critically examines the proposal that education for autonomy could be conceived of as a global educational aim, and points out that not only do non-Western cultures endorse the ideal of autonomy, but also that autonomy increasingly gains practical value in a world in which mobility is ubiquitous. -/- All paper drafts except that of Lindsey Schwartz have been subject to intensive debate during the two-day international workshop on “Global Justice In and Through Education,” held at the American University of Paris (AUP) on November 29 and 30, 2018. The international workshop was hosted by the Center for Critical Democracy Studies (CCDS) and was generously funded not only from the CCDS but also from the German Research Foundation (DFG). (shrink)

Power is a key concern of international politics, one that the discipline of International Relations has been carefully examining for decades. Political theorists, by contrast – or at least those working within the analytical tradition – have devoted comparatively little attention to the question of which exercises of power beyond borders are problematic. Instead, they have focused on global material deprivation and have elaborated increasingly sophisticated accounts of which principles should govern the distribution of natural and socio-economic resources across borders. (...) But why should we care so much about the distribution of material resources per se, when news that makes the headlines is all about power? (shrink)

The article shows the interlacement of political philosophy and philosophy of education by justifying educational justice as central normative ground for analyzing educational policies as well as by defending a democratic conception of educational justice. In order to ground the importance of the concept of educational justice, the article explains the shortcomings of the alternative – functionalist and liberal perfectionist – normative grounds of educational policy. Then, the article develops a democratic conception of educational justice by first of all criticizing (...) the liberal conception of equal educational opportunity on the ground that it implicitly accepts as valid the socially existing understanding of educational success. Based on this critique the article defends a democratic conception of educational justice that demands the institutionalization of educational practices that prepare students to define themselves as democratic citizens what educational success should mean. (shrink)

In Democratic Education in a Globalized World (Routledge, 2019) I defend a discourse theory of global justice as the appropriate normative1 ground for conceiving educational justice and citizenship education under conditions of economic and political globalization. In addition, I articulate democratic conceptions of global educational justice and citizenship education that recognize a moral-political right to democratically adequate education and call for the creation of transnational democratic consciousness. Based on these conceptions I spell out school practices such as historically informed, cross-cultural (...) learning within socially diverse settings that would contribute to realizing these conceptions. In this article I reply to liberal perfectionist, communitarian-conservative and empiricist-historical critiques of Democratic Education in a Globalized World from Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein and Michael Geiss, respectively. I emphasize the feasibility of injustice-reducing educational practices, I explain how a discourse theory of justice accommodates considerations of both the good and the right, and I justify why the grim record of past educational experience does not render pointless the pursuit of progressive aims through education. (shrink)

Philosophical debates about educational justice concern the justification, the contents, and the realization of rights to education, and they take place at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of education. On the one hand, theorists of educational justice turn to conceptions of justice within political philosophy and use them as normative foundations when developing their conceptions of educational justice. On the other hand, they draw on conceptions of moral and political education within philosophy of education to show how persons (...) would eventually adopt and develop attitudes, knowledge, and skills that are needed to build and maintain a just social and political order. Due to this close interlacement between political philosophy and philosophy of education, it is apt to use the label political philosophy of education or philosophy of political education to characterize this distinctive field of philosophical research. Despite this interlacement, however, the intense and wide-ranging debates on global justice within contemporary political philosophy have hardly influenced the current debates on educational justice. The aim of this article is to transcend the national framing of the current discussion on educational justice by presenting a democratic conception of global educational justice. (shrink)

This introduction expounds educational problems that arise from transnational migration. It argues that it is high time to critically analyze normative issues of and in education under conditions of globalization because dominant approaches in normative philosophy of education tend to suffer from both a nationalist bias and a sedentary bias. The contributions to this special issue address normative problems pertaining to migration-related education from a variety of ethical and philosophical perspectives, including analytic applied ethics, continental philosophy, care ethics, Hegelian philosophy, (...) the capability approach and theories of distributive justice. They discuss the education of both citizens and migrants in the receiving society as well as in the country of origin, focusing on ethical issues pertaining to access to education as well as to the content of educational programs. (shrink)

Interview of Katrin Flikschuh, Rainer Forst and Darrel Moellendorf by Valentin Beck and Julian Culp for Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric.

This article will show that the work of international development organizations requires a constant reflection of the moral and political philosophical kind. A major reason for this is that while people agree that the abstract concept of development, in its normative usage, indeed, simply means social progress or good, or desirable, social change, they disagree profoundly about what social progress consists in exactly. There exists a normative disagreement about the conception of development that expresses best how social progress ought to (...) be defined in concrete terms. For example, should we really think of social progress only in terms of economic growth, i.e. in the accumulation of goods and services? Or should we instead, for example, think of it in terms of the eradication of extreme poverty? Or in terms of yet something else, like the expansion of options for human choice? (shrink)

In this article Julian Culp offers a new conceptualization of democratic citizenship education in light of the transformations of contemporary Western societies to which the use of digital technologies has contributed. His conceptualization adopts a deliberative understanding of democracy that provides a systemic perspective on society-wide communicative arrangements and employs a nonideal, critical methodology that concentrates on overcoming democratic deficits. Based on this systemic, deliberative conception of democracy, Culp provides an analysis of the public sphere's normative deficits and argues that (...) current political communication may be systemically distorted. Drawing on this analysis, he suggests that practices of democratic citizenship education in digitized societies must not concentrate narrowly on the effective and responsible use of digital technologies. Instead, these practices should also focus on the economic and cultural conditions that are co-responsible for the structural problems of political communication as well as address the democratic deficits that are reflected in inadequate communicative arrangements. (shrink)

Rising powers are fundamentally shifting the relations of power in the global economic and political landscape. International political theory, however, has so far failed to evaluate this nascent multipolarity. This article fills this lacuna by synthesizing empirical and normative modes of inquiry. It examines the transformation of sovereignty exercised by emerging democracies and focuses especially on the case of Brazil. The paper shows that – in stark contrast to emerging democracies’ foreign policy rhetoric – the ‘softening’ of sovereignty, which means (...) that emerging powers gain as well as lose certain aspects of sovereignty, has become the norm. The paper explores this softening of sovereignty from the perspective of global justice by assessing it on the basis of globalist, statist, and internationalist conceptions of global justice. We find that the emergent multipolarity contributes in various ways to the realization of the distinct socioeconomic and political criteria of these three conceptions of global justice. However, we also point out that the transformation of sovereignty generates particular problems for the realization of all three conceptions. (shrink)

This article explores the contribution of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality, politics, and law to theorizing educational justice. First, it analyzes Christopher Martin’s discourse-ethical argument that the development of citizens’ discursive agency is required on epistemic grounds. The article criticizes this argument and claims that the moral importance of developing discursive agency should be justified instead on the basis of moral grounds. Second, the article examines Harvey Siegel’s critique of Habermas’ moral epistemology and suggests that Siegel neglects that the (...) epistemic justification of moral claims proceeds differently from the epistemic justification of assertoric claims. Finally, the article presents a discourse-theoretic conception of educational justice that defends the importance of discursively justifying norms of educational justice through properly arranged structures of justification. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s most recent book, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, is an ambitious and thought-provoking work of social and political theory. Its main impetus is to provide a Hegelian reading of contemporary Western societies – and thus, so to speak, an actualisation of Hegel’s Philosophy of right. Readers of Honneth’s writings will recognise the hallmark of his previous work. He is committed, more than ever, to a Hegelian lens through which he pursues a methodology that explicitly blends (...) normative argumentation and social theory, a method Honneth refers to as normative reconstruction. Similarly to his approach in The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict (Honneth, 1996), Honneth (2014: 125) focuses on a single notion – this time it is freedom – through which he develops a theory of justice on the basis of an adaptation of Hegel’s three ‘ethical spheres’ (the family, the market, and the state). (shrink)

Rising powers are fundamentally shifting the relations of power in the global economic and political landscape. International political theory, however, has so far failed to evaluate this nascent multipolarity. This article fills this lacuna by synthesizing empirical and normative modes of inquiry. It examines the transformation of sovereignty exercised by emerging democracies and focuses especially on the case of Brazil. The paper shows that – in stark contrast to emerging democracies’ foreign policy rhetoric – the ‘softening’ of sovereignty, which means (...) that emerging powers gain as well as lose certain aspects of sovereignty, has become the norm. The paper explores this softening of sovereignty from the perspective of global justice by assessing it on the basis of globalist, statist, and internationalist conceptions of global justice. We find that the emergent multipolarity contributes in various ways to the realization of the distinct socioeconomic and political criteria of these three conceptions of global justice. However, we also point out that the transformation of sovereignty generates particular problems for the realization of all three conceptions. (shrink)

In this article I argue that G.A. Cohen is mistaken in his belief that the concept of justice needs to be rescued from constructivist theorists of justice. In doing so, I rely on insights of John Rawls’ later work Political Liberalism and Rainer Forst’s discourse theory of justice. Such critical engagement with Cohen’s critique of constructivism is needed, because Cohen bases his critique of constructivism almost exclusively on Rawls’s arguments and positions in A Theory of Justice. He thus neglects - (...) at least by and large - that Rawls had further developed his constructivist method of justification in his later work Political Liberalism, as well as that Forst’s discourse-theoretical works offer elaborate versions of constructivism. These refined versions of constructivism recognize a plurality of reasonable conceptions of ideal justice and draw an important distinction between moral and political constructivism. Because of these features these advanced constructivist theories are not in need of Cohen’s rescue. (shrink)

Thomas Pogge absolvierte ein Ph.D.-Programm in Philosophie an der Harvard University und wurde dort von John Rawls betreut. Seine Dissertation argumentierte für die Extension Rawls’ Gerechtigkeitstheorie auf globale Verhältnisse. Pogges globale Gerechtigkeitstheorie betrachtet weltweite sozioökonomische Armut als strukturelles Problem für das insbesondere reiche Länder und deren Regierungen verantwortlich sind. In der Ausarbeitung seiner eigenen, politisch-liberalen Theorie internationaler Gerechtigkeit kritisierte Rawls Pogges Auffassung globaler Gerechtigkeit. Pogge wiederum hat in methodologischen Debatten Rawls’ politische Philosophie für deren Fokus auf die Grundstruktur und Grundgüter (...) verteidigt. (shrink)

The practice-independent approach to theorizing justice holds that the social practices to which a particular conception of justice is meant to apply are of no importance for the justification of such a conception. In this paper I argue that this approach to theorizing justice is incompatible with the method of reflective equilibrium because the MRE is antithetical to a clean separation between issues of justification and application. In particular I will be maintaining that this incompatibility renders Simon Caney’s cosmopolitan theory (...) of global justice inconsistent, because Caney claims to endorse both a humanity-centered PIA and the MRE. (shrink)

This essay revisits the metanormative version of the motivational critique of contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitan justice. I distinguish two ways of understanding this critique as leveling the charge of infeasibility against cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan motivation can be understood to be infeasible because it is impossible or because it is not reasonably likely to be achieved if tried. The possibilistic understanding is not persuasive, given that examples show that cosmopolitan motivation is possible. The conditional probabilistic understanding is more compelling, by contrast, because (...) under certain social conditions it may not be reasonably likely that cosmopolitan motivation is achieved if tried. I argue, however, that whether cosmopolitan motivation is infeasible in the conditional probabilistic sense depends on malleable social conditions, given that, according to a plastic account of the human moral mind developed by Allen Buchanan, social conditions can undermine or favor the formation of cosmopolitan motivation. I illustrate this plastic account by showing how it can explain recent anticosmopolitan orientations as “tribalistic” reflexes to global crises, like the COVID-19 pandemic, which involved competition for survival resources and (existential) threats. I conclude that cosmopolitan motivation is not infeasible under all social conditions and that cosmopolitanism therefore requires bringing about and maintaining those social conditions under which cosmopolitan motivation is feasible. (shrink)

Rising powers like India and Brazil have recently been gaining considerable economic and political power. This has led to the emergence of a nascent multipolarity in global affairs. Theorists of global distributive justice, however, continue to focus almost exclusively on the responsibility of the established powers for combating global poverty and neglect whether there is a similar responsibility of rising powers. That focus neglects that great shifts have occurred in the distribution of the economically severely poor over the past three (...) decades. According to recent work by Andy Sumner, 74% of those who live in extreme economic poverty resided in middle-income countries in 2008. This paper explores this lacuna and shows that there are several grounds for attributing a similar responsibility to rising powers. These grounds are familiar from discussions of the established powers' responsibility for global distributive injustice in the writings of John Rawls, Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge. They are the capa.. (shrink)

Contexts of violent, intractable conflict such as those present in Israel, Nigeria, or Iraq represent times of severe crisis. Reducing the high indices of violence is very urgent, but the attempts of establishing peaceful arrangements in the short- or medium-term usually fail. Peace education, by contrast, is a long-term endeavor to resolve violent, intractable conflicts that aims at affecting moral stances that the conflicting parties take vis-à-vis each other. Unfortunately, however, peace education in times of severe crisis also faces many (...) impediments. These impediments concern the agential, cultural, financial, and legal aspects of educative institutions within context of violent and intractable conflicts. Although these impediments strongly put into question the practice of peace education, this article shows that four reasons nevertheless strongly support this practice. These reasons refer to humanity’s natural goodness, the symbolic importance of peace education, the peace-promoting experiences facilitated through peace education, and peace education’s contribution to overcoming prejudices. (shrink)

This special issue deals with anthropogenic climate change, which represents an urgent normative challenge. Carbon emissions that humans produce mainly through their consumption of relatively cheap fossil fuels are causing dangerous climate change, that is, climate change that threatens present and future people’s ability to lead decent lives. While the international community has been acknowledging the existence of dangerous climate trends since 1990 (when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published its first report), various initiatives designed to launch a coherent (...) international climate policy have systematically been failing until very recently. The UN climate change conference – which concluded its work in Paris in December 2015 – does, however, give us some grounds for hope. The Paris Agreement, published on December 12th 2015, consists in a global commitment to limit the rise in global temperatures to less than 2 degrees Celsius. The pact will become binding once 55 parties who produce over 55% of the world’s greenhouse gases ratify it. The Paris Agreement is the first global pact on climate change to enjoy unanimous consensus, yet doubts about its effectiveness and success conditions remain. Furthermore, to determine the shape that our global climate policies should take, persistent normative disagreements need to be settled. These include, crucially, disagreements on how the burdens and costs of climate change mitigation, as envisaged by the Paris Agreement, should be distributed. After all, how to go about addressing dangerous climate change touches upon several disputed normative questions. And this is where this special issue intervenes. The issue includes contributions from Elizabeth Cripps, Dale Jamieson, Anja Karnein, Darrel Moellendorf, and Henry Shue. (shrink)

Meyer and Sanklecha's elaborate article1 addresses an issue of practical importance for all of us who are living in highly industrialized countries, and who are formulating or revising our life plans and long-term projects. It examines whether the expectation of people living in highly industrialized countries to be able to continue to emit greenhouse gases at their current average level in the future (Expectation E) is epistemically and politically legitimate, and morally permissible. Such an investigation is directly relevant for any (...) formulation or revision of a life plan or long-term project, since any such plan or project should take into consideration whether it is accessible both from an empirical and from a normative point of view. Thus, as many potential life plans and long-term projects are based upon Expectation E, people living in highly industrialized countries must determine whether Expectation E is realistically achievable and consistent with relevant normative standards. For if Expectation E turned out to be either epistemically illegitimate, politically illegitimate, or morally impermissible, then certainly prima facie people living in highly industrialized countries would have good reason to formulate and revise their life plans and long-term projects in such a way that these would avoid being based upon Expectation E. Therein lies the crucial practical import of Meyer and Sanklecha's article. This comment engages with two aspects of Meyer and Sanklecha's relatively brief discussion of the political legitimacy of Expectation E and leaves aside for the most part their analyses of the epistemic legitimacy and moral permissibility of Expectation E. (shrink)

This chapter develops and discusses a Deweyan perspective on the contemporary difficulties of deliberation within the highly fragmented digitized public spheres of liberal democracies. A high level of fragmentation is a key feature of digitized public spheres, as digital technologies like computers, the internet, and social media platforms facilitate the creation of political content, the circumvention of traditional gatekeepers like journalists, and the personalization of access to political debates. As a result, democratic theorists are concerned that the digitized public spheres (...) are insufficiently inclusive for identifying public opinions that are generally. The Deweyan perspective developed in this chapter adds new insights into the existing analyses of political deliberation by emphasizing the importance of a well- functioning democracy for citizens’ lifelong education, as well as by highlighting the impact of cultural transformations on liberal democracy. However, despite the valuable insights that can be generated by the Deweyan perspective, this article also criticizes it for failing to deal adequately with the unavoidable pluralism of reasonable understandings of the good life in a liberal democracy. The chapter therefore also seeks to evaluate to what extent, if at all, the Deweyan insights can be taken up as well by a political liberal perspective that seeks to accommodate this pluralism. (shrink)

Die Staatsform einer konstitutionellen Demokratie ist von zentraler Bedeutung für John Rawls’ Gerechtigkeitstheorie. Sie stellt das grundlegendste, rechtlich verfasste Institutionensystem einer Gesellschaft dar, welches Bürger*innen gleiche Grundfreiheiten ermöglichen soll, einschließlich der hierfür erforderlichen kulturellen, ökonomischen und sozialen Voraussetzungen. Diese Form der Demokratie soll die wichtigsten institutionellen Anforderungen Rawls’ liberal-egalitärer Auffassung binnenstaatlicher Gerechtigkeit verwirklichen.

Pluralistic theories of global distributive justice aim at justifying a plurality of principles for various subglobal contexts of distributive justice. Helena de Bres has recently proposed the class of disaggregated pluralistic theories, according to which we should refrain from defending principles that apply to the shared background conditions of such subglobal contexts. This article argues that if one does not justify how these background conditions should be regulated by principles of a just global basic structure, then the realization of the (...) principles that are justified for the subglobal contexts of distributive justice can erode and undermine justice over time. For example, the realization of justice in international trade might undermine climate justice, at least if climate justice requires increasing tariffs but justice in international trade calls for reducing tariffs. Principles of a just global basic structure would have to ensure that such justice-eroding spillover effects from one to another context of justice do not occur. Finally, the article responds critically to de Bres’ objections that an account of a just global basic structure is too idealistic, not action guiding, and superfluous. (shrink)

Global justice is a nearly all-encompassing concept, which not only permits, but makes it mandatory, to reflect upon its importance in the most diverse areas of global politics – trade, migration and tax regulation, for instance. Unsurprisingly, then, most theorists of global justice have analyzed the import of their conception for the practice of development aid/cooperation. Additionally, some also have argued that justice represents the most relevant normative concept for spelling out as to how to understand development. -/- However, there (...) are many lacunae in this field of research. The continuing criticisms that the existing theories of global distributive justice entail a parochial justification of the development practice and an insufficiently democratic understanding of development demand a revisiting of these theories. Moreover, very little scholarly attention has been devoted so far to the fact that the criteria that are employed to allocate official development assistance may lack a sound normative justification. In addition, new research in development economics on the question as to how to best explain global economic inequality promises to shed new light on moral questions regarding the proper kind of ascription of moral responsibilities for reducing this inequality. And finally, on a more practical level, few theorists of global justice made explicit contributions to the ongoing deliberations about the post-2015 development agenda. -/- The special issue of the journal Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric aims to contribute to filling the existing research gaps concerning the various linkages between global justice and the theory and practice of development. (shrink)

The actual uses of the concept of justice in social and political conflicts refer to a variety of different understandings of justice. These different understandings include fair cooperation, equality of opportunity for welfare and justified coercion. In this paper I will argue, however, that at a more fundamental level the core meaning of social or political justice – its universal grammar, so to speak – is that of justifiable rule. This means that a social or political order can only be (...) deemed just if it is justifiable to those who are subject to that order. The paper will further explain this universal grammar of justice by way of identifying the ways in which it is connected to a justification-based conception of moral respect. In conclusion, the paper will defend this understanding of social or political justice as justifiable rule against the critique that it is parochial or Western-centric. (shrink)

John Rawls wurde 1921 in Baltimore im Bundesstaat Maryland als zweiter von fünf Söhnen geboren. Nach dem Besuch einer privaten und einer öffentlichen Schule in Baltimore wechselte Rawls an die religiöse Kent School im Bundesstaat Connecticut. Wie sein älterer Bruder Bill studierte Rawls in Princeton, wo er 1943 sein Studium mit einem Bachelor of Arts abschloss. In seiner Senior Thesis Über Sünde, Glaube und Religion beschäftigte sich der zu dieser Zeit streng religiöse Rawls mit dem Problem des Bösen, auf das (...) er durch Veranstaltungen von Norman Malcom gebracht wurde. (shrink)

It has often been noted that liberal democracies are facing a serious political crisis. A common reaction to this situation is to call for more comprehensive or more effective liberal democratic education. This volume discusses some of the most important challenges to and critiques of the paradigm of liberal democratic education. In doing so, it offers novel insights into how liberal democratic education can be amended, extended or qualified to address the special challenges of the current political moment.

Martha Craven Nussbaum ist in New York City geboren und wuchs in einer gut situierten, protestantischen Familie in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, auf. Sie begann 1964 ihr Studium am Wellesley College in Massachusetts, zog allerdings 1966 nach New York City, wo sie zunächst eine Stelle in einem Repertoiretheater annahm. Noch im gleichen Jahr setzte sie ihr Studium an der New York University an der dortigen School of the Arts für ein Jahr im Fach Theater fort, bevor sie nach zwei weiteren Studienjahren (...) an der NYU einen Bachelor of Arts mit dem Hauptfach Altphilologie erwarb. 1969 konvertierte sie zum Judentum und heiratete Alan Nussbaum. (shrink)

On Will Kymlicka’s conception of multicultural citizenship, group membership enables personal autonomy by way of providing individuals with meaningful options. Many educational and political theorists have employed Kymlicka’s argument to defend a multicultural education as proper preparation for democratic citizenship in socially diverse liberal societies. Multicultural education includes the study of a variety of cultures and is meant to promote the development of a cultural identity, inter-cultural empathy and tolerance, and the cross-cultural construction of shared positions. Recently, however, Elizabeth Anderson (...) has challenged multicultural citizenship and education on the grounds that they lead to the formation of group-specific biases, stereotypes, and inequalities in cultural and social capital. Therefore, she proposes an integrationist conception of citizenship education that requires citizens from different groups to collaborate within educational and public contexts. This article takes issue with the nationalist framing of this debate and Anderson’s integrationist conception because they neglect how large-scale social transformations like economic globalization and global governance have generated the need for transnationalizing democracy and democratic citizenship. Adopting a transnational perspective, this article ascribes an important role to multicultural education for learning the attitudes, knowledge, and skills that empower citizens to exercise democratic control both across and beyond national borders. The article emphasizes how the formation of intercultural empathy through multicultural education facilitates engagement in transnational social movements and political discourses. Finally, the article responds to objections concerning the lack of feasibility, cosmopolitan bias, and counter-productiveness of multicultural education and transnational democratic citizenship. (shrink)

The evidence of laboratory experiments of behavioral economists shows that individuals behave reciprocally. These data put into question the pure self-interest thesis of human motivation of the homo oeconomicus model and call for alternative models. Focusing on the explanation of reciprocal behavior in Trust Games, this article proposes two directions that economists and other social scientists might want to consider in order to establish a more solid foundation for economic theory. First, it presents models that economic theorists developed to explain (...) the laboratory evidence of reciprocal behavior. It highlights that all of these models subscribe to the Humean view that desires are at the source of any human motivation and suggests an alternative Kantian model where reasons have the capacity to motivate human action. Second, it emphasizes that a supplementary examination of the social background conditions would illuminate the analysis of the findings because of the connection between the 'local' and society-wide demands of reciprocity. (shrink)

Der Begriff Supranationalität entstammt politisch-rechtlichen Kontexten und bezeichnet die Eigenschaft einer jenseits des Nationalstaates angesiedelten politisch-rechtlichen Autorität, Maßnahmen ergreifen und Gesetze erlassen zu können, die für Nationalstaaten einen verbindlichen Charakter haben.

This paper will argue that there are good reasons to uphold certain forms of the practice among states to give and receive “official development assistance” (ODA). These reasons are grounded in a discourse-theoretic, internationalist account of global justice and represent a novel moral rationale for certain forms of this practice – the “International Development Practice”, for short. This discourse-theoretic, internationalist account agrees with theorists of global distributive justice – like Charles Beitz and David Miller – that the continuation of certain (...) forms of the International Development Practice is a demand of justice, rather than solely a demand of humanity. Yet it also rejects their view that the moral rationale for a certain form of the International Development Practice is to further realize an ideal of global distributive justice. Instead, the moral rationale for a certain form of the International Development Practice is that this practice can contribute to establish the social and political structures that are necessary to enable people to engage in justificatory practices that are constitutive for the construction of principles of global justice. (shrink)

Global Justice and International Affairs is a helpful collection of papers published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy. The collection is a testament to the Journal of Moral Philosophy’s quality and commitment to publishing work on important topics. The book is divided into four parts and brings together key articles from the journal on sovereignty and self-determination, cosmopolitanism and nationalism, global poverty and international distributive justice, and war and terrorism. On one way of looking at the book – the first (...) and second parts are concerned with which groups of people are the proper subjects of justice and what kinds of rights and duties they have. The third and fourth parts consider what the content is of what we owe to people and how we musttreat the poor and those with whom we are in conflict. (shrink)

It may seem obvious that recognizing people’s human rights involves freeing them from poverty and thereby allowing them to exercise their agency. On closer inspection, however, it is not at all clear what recognizing people’s human rights, freeing them from poverty, and respecting their agency requires. Diana Meyers’s nice collection of essays carefully examines the meanings and practical normative implications of poverty, agency, and human rights in a way that points out various conceptual connections and potential practical dilemmas. The authors (...) consider, for instance, ways in which fighting poverty can compromise, as well as promote, aspects of women’s agency. They also consider how we can respect migrants’ human rights to take up decent jobs abroad without worsening their children’s experience of poverty back home. One general strand of argument running through the papers is that the narrow focus on individual agency and responsibility for harms is misplaced in our globalizing world. Recognizing this fact may better help us achieve global justice. (shrink)