Empirical Vindication of Moral Luck

Noûs 53 (4):987-1007 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of responsibility justifies moral luck. But this justification is no mere rationalization of the status quo. Recent experimental and evolutionary work on punishment and learning suggests that the very same reasons that justify moral luck have also shaped the evolution of our luck-sensitive moral practices.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,388

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Luck Defended.Nathan Hanna - 2012 - Noûs 48 (4):683-698.
Drawing a Line: Rejecting Resultant Moral Luck Alone.Huzeyfe Demirtas - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
Moral Luck and Business Ethics.Christopher Michaelson - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):773-787.
The inescapability of moral luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310.
Free Will and Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2022 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White, A Companion to Free Will. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 378-392.
Individual Moral Responsibility and Luck.David Worster Concepcion - 2002 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
A problem for moral luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View.Zahra Khazai Tamaddon & Fatemeh - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 10 (18):189-218.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-24

Downloads
188 (#133,202)

6 months
8 (#390,329)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Victor Kumar
Boston University

References found in this work

Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
Punishment and Responsibility.H. L. A. Hart - 1968 - Philosophy 45 (172):162-162.

View all 22 references / Add more references