Facial expressions are one of the commonly used implicit measurements for the in-vehicle affective computing. However, the time courses and the underlying mechanism of facial expressions so far have been barely focused on. According to the Component Process Model of emotions, facial expressions are the result of an individual's appraisals, which are supposed to happen in sequence. Therefore, a multidimensional and dynamic analysis of drivers' fear by using facial expression data could profit from a consideration of these appraisals. A driving (...) simulator experiment with 37 participants was conducted, in which fear and relaxation were induced. It was found that the facial expression indicators of high novelty and low power appraisals were significantly activated after a fear event. Furthermore, after the fear event, the activation of high novelty occurred earlier than low power. These results suggest that multidimensional analysis of facial expression is suitable as an approach for the in-vehicle measurement of the drivers' emotions. Furthermore, a dynamic analysis of drivers' facial expressions considering of effects of appraisal components can add valuable information for the in-vehicle assessment of emotions. (shrink)

Der protestantische Theologe Karl Girgensohn (1875–1925) ist 1903 mit seinem frühen Werk über das Wesen der Religion an die Öffentlichkeit getreten, welches einen starken religionsphilosophischen Standpunkt zum Ausdruck bringt. Kernüberlegung ist hierbei eine kognitive Theorie des Religiösen, in der die Gottesidee zentral ist. Unter Berücksichtigung der Biographie Girgensohns geht der vorliegende Beitrag auf diese frühe Studie zum Wesen der Religion ein und skizziert den Übergang des Autors von einem philosophischen zu einem experimentell-introspektiven Ansatz der Religiositätsforschung, welcher dann zum Fundament für (...) die Dorpater religionspsychologische Schule wurde. Basierend auf Girgensohns frühem Werk werden abschließend Implikationen für die heutige empirische Theologie vorgeschlagen.The Protestant theologian Karl Girgensohn (1875–1925) came to the public in 1903 with his early work on the nature of religion, which expresses a strong religious-philosophical standpoint. The core consideration here is a cognitive theory of the religious, in which the idea of God is central. Taking into account Girgensohn’s biography, the present contribution addresses this early study on the nature of religion and outlines the author’s transition from a philosophical to an experimental-introspective approach to religious research, which then became the foundation for the Dorpat School of the psychology of religion. Based on Girgensohn’s early work, implications for contemporary empirical theology are finally proposed. (shrink)

Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...) via the imposition of social norms) so that coordination becomes easier. Mindreading is derived from and only as effective as it is because of mindshaping, not vice versa. I critically assess McGeer’s, and Zawidzki’s proposal and contend that three common motivations for the mindshaping view do not provide sufficient support for their particular version of it. I argue furthermore that their proposal underestimates the role that epistemic processing plays for mindshaping. And I provide reasons for favouring an alternative according to which, in social cognition involving ascriptions of propositional attitudes, neither mindshaping nor mindreading is primary but both are complementary in that effective mindshaping depends as much on mindreading as effective mindreading depends on mindshaping. (shrink)

It is well known that on the Internet, computer algorithms track our website browsing, clicks, and search history to infer our preferences, interests, and goals. The nature of this algorithmic tracking remains unclear, however. Does it involve what many cognitive scientists and philosophers call ‘mindreading’, i.e., an epistemic capacity to attribute mental states to people to predict, explain, or influence their actions? Here I argue that it does. This is because humans are in a particular way embedded in the process (...) of algorithmic tracking. Specifically, if we endorse common conditions for extended cognition, then human mindreading (by website operators and users) is often literally extended into, that is, partly realized by, not merely causally coupled to, computer systems performing algorithmic tracking. The view that human mindreading extends outside the body into computers in this way has significant ethical advantages. It points to new conceptual ways to reclaim our autonomy and privacy in the face of increasing risks of computational control and online manipulation. These benefits speak in favor of endorsing the notion of extended mindreading. (shrink)

Der kürzlich verstorbene US-amerikanische Soziologe Robert K. Merton war der prominenteste und einflußreichste Anomie-Theoretiker nach Emile Durkheim. Seine Typologie der Arten individueller Anpassung an anomische gesellschaftliche Situationen bietet heute noch eine wertvolle Grundlage zur Analyse von Gesellschaften. Dieser Beitrag konzentriert sich auf einen dieser Anpassungstypen, den Ritualismus, der Merton zufolge beinhaltet, daß einerseits die kulturellen Ziele, allen voran das des wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands, heruntergeschraubt oder aufgegeben und andererseits die institutionellen Normen zur Erreichung dieser Ziele beinahe zwanghaft befolgt werden. Diese Definition überdenkend (...) versucht der vorliegende Beitrag herauszuarbeiten, daß innerhalb des Systems der Anpassungsformen das Herunterschrauben der kulturellen Ziele nicht das Hauptcharakteristikum ritualistischen, sondern konformen Verhaltens darstellt. Ritualisten haben den Prozeß des Herunterschraubens vielmehr bereits beendet, indem sie jegliche kulturellen Ziele aufgegeben haben, bis auf den einen Wert an sich, nämlich die institutionellen Regeln einzuhalten.Ritualistische Anpassung ist aus Merton`s Sicht für die Soziologie abweichenden Verhaltens, ganz zu schweigen von den Kriminalwissenschaften, nicht von Interesse. Im Gegensatz zu dieser Einschätzung versucht dieser Artikel die verschiedenen soziologischen und sogar kriminologischen Implikationen ritualistischen Verhaltens darzustellen, mit dem Ergebnis, daß Ritualismus sehr wohl ein soziales Problem darstellt. Der Ritualist unterwirft sich nicht nur selbst den institutionellen Normen, sondern fühlt sich auch dazu berufen, andere ständig an die Einhaltung der Regeln zu gemahnen und sie zu überwachen. Deshalb gibt es viele typisch ritualistische Formen abweichenden Verhaltens, wie Denunziation, erzieherischer Tadel oder Mobbing, die sogar in kriminelles Verhalten wie falsche Verdächtigung, Nötigung oder Beleidigung kulminieren können.Am schillerndsten ist die Rolle des Ritualisten in der Kriminalpolitik, nicht zuletzt heute in der Bundesrepublik. Repression jeglicher Art ist seine Antwort auf Regelverstöße und die Kriminalpolitik macht zunehmend Zugeständnisse an ritualistische Forderungen nach härterer und schnellerer Bestrafung oder umfassender Überwachung des öffentlichen Raumes. Ritualisten dominieren den sozialen Diskurs und die allgemeine Wahrnehmung von Kriminalität nicht nur, weil sie wichtige Nutzer und damit Zielgruppe gewisser Massenmedien sind und gerne Leserbriefe schreiben. Sie sind so dominant, weil ihre Art der Anpassung bei zunehmender wirtschaftlicher Krise die Konformität der Wirtschaftswunderzeit zurückgedrängt hat und heute die am weitesten verbreitete in der deutschen Gesellschaft ist. Daher ist auch die schon seit Jahrzehnten zu beobachtende Verschiebung der theoretischen Strafzweckbegründung hin zur Positiven Generalprävention alles andere als ein Zufall. The recently deceased US-sociologist Robert K. Merton has been the most prominent and influential anomie theorist since Emile Durkheim. His typology of modes of adaptation to anomic social situations still constitutes a valuable basis for analyzing society. This contribution focuses on one of these types of adaptation, ritualism, which according to Merton, involves the scaling down or abandoning of the cultural goals, above all economic wealth, on the one hand and to abide almost compulsively by institutional norms to attain these goals on the other. In reconsidering this definition, this contribution attempts to elaborate that within the system of adaptive modes scaling down does not describe the main characteristic of ritualistic behaviour, but first of all characterizes conformity. Ritualists, on the contrary, have already completed the process of scaling down by finally abandoning any cultural goal except the one end-in-itself, that is to comply with the institutional rules.Ritualistic adaptation, in Merton`s view, is of no interest to the sociology of deviant behaviour, not to mention criminal sciences. In contrast to this evaluation this contribution tries to delineate the various sociological and even criminological implications of ritualistic behaviour, leading to the conclusion that Ritualism does indeed present a social problem. The ritualist does not only surrender himself to the institutional means but feels competent to constantly reminding others of abiding by the institutional norms and supervising them. Hence there are many typically ritualistic forms of deviant behaviour like denunciation, disciplinary reproof or mobbing that may even culminate in criminal behaviour like false suspicion, duress or insult.Most ambiguous is the ritualist`s part in criminal policy, not at least in contemporary Germany. Repression of any kind is his answer to breaches of the rules and criminal policy more and more concedes to ritualistic demands for more severe and rapid punishment or extensive supervision of public facilities. Ritualists dominate the social discourse and general perception of criminality, not only because they are important users and therefore the target group of certain mass media, and like to write letters to the editor. They do dominate because in times of increasing economic crisis their mode of adaptation has forced back the conformity of the German economic miracle era and is now the most common one in contemporary German society. Thus, the shift in the theoretical justification of punishment towards a theory of positive general prevention, noticeable for decades, is anything but accidental. (shrink)

In an article entitled "Is BAD a semantic primitive?", John Myhill suggested that the concept 'bad' should be removed from the list of semantic primitives put forward by Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard. Myhill argued that 'bad' is semantically decomposable, that there is no word in Biblical Hebrew that corresponds to the English word bad and, thus, no linguistic form that represents the primitive BAD in this language, and that 'bad' is dispensable in the semantic analysis and can be replaced (...) with other components without any loss or change of meaning. Discussing and illustrating some fundamental questions in the search for universal semantic primitives, the present author reconsiders these findings and finds a different answer to John Myhill's question. (shrink)

This paper first summarizes two central debates in the field of social scientific Internet research, namely the debate about the so-called ‘social impact of Internet use’ and the debate about the existence of community on the Internet. Early research discussed whether building up a community on the Internet was possible and what the effects of the use of the Internet were for its user. Recent research on the social consequences of Internet use suggests that ‘the’ Internet should no longer be (...) regarded as a constant that has uniform effects for its users. Rather, the consequences of its use depend on a number of contextual conditions. The paper presents some theories that explain which conditions and features of online groups facilitate the finding of solutions to bilateral or group-level problems of cooperation. (shrink)

When observers view a rapidly moving stimulus they may see only a static streak. We report that there can be a transient percept of motion if such a moving stimulus is preceded or followed by a stationary image of that stimulus. A ring of dots was rotated so rapidly observers only saw a continuous outline circle and could not report its rotation direction. When an objectively stationary ring of dots preceded or followed this rotating ring, the stationary ring appeared to (...) visibly launch into motion from a standstill or visibly rotate to a halt, principally in the same direction as the actual rapid rotation. Thus, motions too rapid to be consciously perceived as motion can nonetheless be processed by the visual system, and generate neural transition states that are consciously experienced as motion percepts. We suggest such transition states might serve a unifying function by bridging discontinuous motion states. (shrink)

Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation (...) bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. (shrink)

bk. 1. Tools for dialectic -- bk. 2. Historical-philosophical background materials -- bk. 3. Groundworks for dialectical logic.

abstract Can torture be morally justified? I shall criticise arguments that have been adduced against torture and demonstrate that torture can be justified more easily than most philosophers dealing with the question are prepared to admit. It can be justified not only in ticking nuclear bomb cases but also in less spectacular ticking bomb cases and even in the so‐called Dirty Harry cases. There is no morally relevant difference between self‐defensive killing of a culpable aggressor and torturing someone who is (...) culpable of a deadly threat that can be averted only by torturing him. Nevertheless, I shall argue that torture should not be institutionalised, for example by torture warrants. (shrink)

For synergistic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, AI outputs often need to be explainable to people. Explainable AI (XAI) systems are commonly tested in human user studies. However, whether XAI researchers consider potential cultural differences in human explanatory needs remains unexplored. We highlight psychological research that found significant differences in human explanations between many people from Western, commonly individualist countries and people from non-Western, often collectivist countries. We argue that XAI research currently overlooks these variations and that (...) many popular XAI designs implicitly and problematically assume that Western explanatory needs are shared cross-culturally. Additionally, we systematically reviewed over 200 XAI user studies and found that most studies did not consider relevant cultural variations, sampled only Western populations, but drew conclusions about human-XAI interactions more generally. We also analyzed over 30 literature reviews of XAI studies. Most reviews did not mention cultural differences in explanatory needs or flag overly broad cross-cultural extrapolations of XAI user study results. Combined, our analyses provide evidence of a cultural bias toward Western populations in XAI research, highlighting an important knowledge gap regarding how culturally diverse users may respond to widely used XAI systems that future work can and should address. (shrink)

When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, these problems are often due to a specific psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the (...) research on science communication: many people tend to conform to ‘descriptive norms’, that is, norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel. Because of this tendency, science communication may frequently produce significant social harm. I contend that scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this potential harm and consider adopting strategies to mitigate it. I introduce one such strategy and argue that its implementation is independently well motivated by the fact that it helps improve scientific accuracy. (shrink)

The short version of the Bielefeld Partnership Expectations Questionnaire assesses the partner-related attachment dimensions fear of rejection, readiness for self-disclosure, and conscious need for care. The presented study investigated the factor structure in two samples and evaluated the convergent validity of scales. The sample included N = 175 patients with panic disorder and/or agoraphobia and N = 143 healthy controls. Besides, the BPEQ, the Experiences in Close Relationships Questionnaire, and the Brief Symptom Inventory were assessed as well, and the Adult (...) Attachment Prototype Rating was conducted. A confirmatory factor analysis of the three factor model revealed an acceptable model fit for the entire sample, patients and controls in terms of low RMSEA and SRMR. We found metric, scalar, and strict measurement invariance for the presence of anxiety disorder. However, only for fear of rejection and readiness for self-disclosure the reliability was acceptable, and convergent validity in terms of large correlations with the ECR scales was found in both samples. The scale conscious need for care had a questionable reliability and correlated only slightly with ECR-R scales. We conclude that fear of rejection and readiness for self-disclosure of the BPEQ-12 are reliable and valid scales for measuring partner-related attachment in healthy and clinical samples. (shrink)

Preface This book is about semantics and logic. More specifically, it is about the semantics and logic of natural language; and, even more specifically than ...

Many ethical frameworks require artificial intelligence (AI) systems to be explainable. Explainable AI (XAI) models are frequently tested for their adequacy in user studies. Since different people may have different explanatory needs, it is important that participant samples in user studies are large enough to represent the target population to enable generalizations. However, it is unclear to what extent XAI researchers reflect on and justify their sample sizes or avoid broad generalizations across people. We analyzed XAI user studies (N = (...) 220) published between 2012 and 2022. Most studies did not offer rationales for their sample sizes. Moreover, most papers generalized their conclusions beyond their target population, and there was no evidence that broader conclusions in quantitative studies were correlated with larger samples. These methodological problems can impede evaluations of whether XAI systems implement the explainability called for in ethical frameworks. We outline principles for more inclusive XAI user studies. (shrink)

In this book Uwe Steinhoff describes and explains the basic tenets of just war theory and gives a precise, succinct and highly critical account of its present status and of the most important and controversial current debates surrounding it. Rejecting certain in effect medieval assumptions of traditional just war theory and advancing a liberal outlook, Steinhoff argues that every single individual is a legitimate authority and has under certain circumstances the right to declare war on others or the state. He (...) also argues that the just cause cannot be established independently of the other criteria of jus ad bellum (the justification of entering a war), except for right intention, which he interprets more leniently than the tradition does. Turning to jus in bello (which governs the conduct of a war) he criticizes the Doctrine of Double Effect and concludes that insofar as wars kill innocents, and be it as "collateral damage", they cannot be just but at best justified as the lesser evil. Steinhoff gives particular attention to the question why soldiers, allegedly, are legitimate targets and civilians not. Discussing four approaches to the explanation of the difference he argues that the four principles underlying them all need to be taken into account and outlines how their weighing can proceed if applied to concrete cases. The resulting approach does not square the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets with the distinction between soldiers and civilians, which has extremely important consequences for the conduct of war. Finally, Steinhoff analyses the concept of terrorism and argues that some forms of "terrorism" are actually not terrorism at all and that even terrorism proper can under certain circumstances be justified. (shrink)

Frege and Eucken were colleagues in the faculty of philosophy at Jena University for more than 40 years. At times they had close scientific contacts. Eucken promoted Frege's career at the university. A comparison of Eucken's writings between 1878 and 1880 with Frege's writings shows Eucken to have had an important philosophical influence on Frege's philosophical development between 1879 and 1885. In particular the classification of the Begriffsschrift in the tradition of Leibniz is influenced by Eucken. Eucken also influenced Frege's (...) choice of philosophical and logical terms. Finally, there are analogous positions concerning relations between concepts and their expressions in natural language, Frege was probably also influenced by Eucken's use of the term ?tone?. Eucken used Frege's arguments in his own fight against psychologism and empiricism. (shrink)

Answer-set programming (ASP) has emerged as a declarative programming paradigm where problems are encoded as logic programs, such that the so-called answer sets of theses programs represent the solutions of the encoded problem. The efficiency of the latest ASP solvers reached a state that makes them applicable for problems of practical importance. Consequently, problems from many different areas, including diagnosis, data integration, and graph theory, have been successfully tackled via ASP. In this work, we present such ASP-encodings for problems associated (...) to abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs) and generalisations thereof. Our encodings are formulated as fixed queries, such that the input is the only part depending on the actual AF to process. We illustrate the functioning of this approach, which is underlying a new argumentation system called ASPARTIX in detail and show its adequacy in terms of computational complexity. (shrink)

This paper proposes a method for computing the temporal aspects of the interpretations of a variety of Germa sentences. The method is strictly modular in the sense that it allows each meaning-bearing sentence constituent to make its own, separate, contribution to the semantic representation of any sentence containing it. The semantic representation of a sentence is reached in several stages. First, an ‘initial semantic representation’ is constructed, using a syntactic analysis of the sentence as input. This initial representation is then (...) transformed into the definitive representation by a series of transformations which reflect the ways in which the contributions from different constituents of the sentence interact. Since the different constituents which make their respective contributions to the meaning of the sentence are in most instances ambiguous, the initial representations are typically of a high degree of underspecification. (shrink)

Some artificial intelligence systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people’s social identity, for instance, their political orientation, remains largely unexplored. This paper argues that algorithmic bias against people’s political orientation can arise in (...) some of the same ways in which algorithmic gender and racial biases emerge. However, it differs importantly from them because there are strong social norms against gender and racial biases. This does not hold to the same extent for political biases. Political biases can thus more powerfully influence people, which increases the chances that these biases become embedded in algorithms and makes algorithmic political biases harder to detect and eradicate than gender and racial biases even though they all can produce similar harm. Since some algorithms can now also easily identify people’s political orientations against their will, these problems are exacerbated. Algorithmic political bias thus raises substantial and distinctive risks that the AI community should be aware of and examine. (shrink)

Following the studies of Araujo et al. (AI Soc 35:611–623, 2020) and Lee (Big Data Soc 5:1–16, 2018), this empirical study uses two scenario-based online experiments. The sample consists of 221 subjects from Germany, differing in both age and gender. The original studies are not replicated one-to-one. New scenarios are constructed as realistically as possible and focused on everyday work situations. They are based on the AI acceptance model of Scheuer (Grundlagen intelligenter KI-Assistenten und deren vertrauensvolle Nutzung. Springer, Wiesbaden, 2020) (...) and are extended by individual descriptive elements of AI systems in comparison to the original studies. The first online experiment examines decisions made by artificial intelligence with varying degrees of impact. In the high-impact scenario, applicants are automatically selected for a job and immediately received an employment contract. In the low-impact scenario, three applicants are automatically invited for another interview. In addition, the relationship between age and risk perception is investigated. The second online experiment tests subjects’ perceived trust in decisions made by artificial intelligence, either semi-automatically through the assistance of human experts or fully automatically in comparison. Two task types are distinguished. The task type that requires “human skills”—represented as a performance evaluation situation—and the task type that requires “mechanical skills”—represented as a work distribution situation. In addition, the extent of negative emotions in automated decisions is investigated. The results are related to the findings of Araujo et al. (AI Soc 35:611–623, 2020) and Lee (Big Data Soc 5:1–16, 2018). Implications for further research activities and practical relevance are discussed. (shrink)

Mit der neuzeitlichen Säkularisierung verliert auch der Protestantismus seinen Volkskirchencharakter. Das hat eine Neuorientierung zur Folge. An die Stelledes theistischen Gottesbildes tritt das Paradox vom 'abwesenden' Gott. Der Autor interpretiert das Glaubensparadox als Widerfahrnis von Befreiung und Verpflichtung durch den Anderen in der 'Spur' Gottes. Er diskutiert diese für die Zivilgesellschaft relevanten Potentiale mit Feministischer Theologie, mit der Umgestaltung des Erlösungschristentums in einen Protestantismus der Versöhnung mit unserer Endlichkeit und der Schöpfungswelt. Vom methodischen Gesichtspunkt wählt der Autor einen phänomenologisch-dekonstruktiven Ansatz (...) im Gespräch mit Bonhoeffer, Nancy, Levinas und mit der protestantischen Tradition. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that the fundamental difference of the formal and the informal position in the philosophy of mathematics results from the collision of an object and a process centric perspective towards mathematics. This collision can be overcome by means of dialectical analysis, which shows that both perspectives essentially depend on each other. This is illustrated by the example of mathematical proof and its formal and informal nature. A short overview of the employed materialist dialectical approach is (...) given that rationalises mathematical development as a process of model production. It aims at placing more emphasis on the application aspects of mathematical results. Moreover, it is shown how such production realises subjective capacities as well as objective conditions, where the latter are mediated by mathematical formalism. The approach is further sustained by Polanyi’s theory of problem solving and Stegmaier’s philosophy of orientation. In particular, the tool and application perspective illuminates which role computer-based proofs can play in mathematics. (shrink)

Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, across the political spectrum, from very left-leaning individuals and moderates to (...) very right-leaning individuals, participants reported experiencing ideological hostility in the field, occasionally even from those from their own side of the political spectrum. Finally, while about half of the subjects believed that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals in the field is not justified, a significant minority displayed an explicit willingness to discriminate against colleagues with the opposite ideology. Our findings are both surprising and important, because a commitment to tolerance and equality is widespread in philosophy, and there is reason to think that ideological similarity, hostility, and discrimination undermine reliable belief formation in many areas of the discipline. (shrink)

It has been argued that our currently most satisfactory social epistemology of science can’t account for science that is based on artificial intelligence (AI) because this social epistemology requires trust between scientists that can take full responsibility for the research tools they use, and scientists can’t take full responsibility for the AI tools they use since these systems are epistemically opaque. I think this argument overlooks that much AI-based science can be done without opaque models, and that agents can take (...) full responsibility for the systems they use even if these systems are opaque. Requiring that an agent fully understand how a system works is an untenably strong condition for that agent to take full responsibility for the system and risks absolving AI developers from responsibility for their products. AI-based science need not create trust-related social epistemological problems if we keep in mind that what makes both individual scientists and their use of AI systems trustworthy isn’t full transparency of the internal processing but their adherence to social and institutional norms that ensure that scientific claims can be trusted. (shrink)

In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they (...) negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that advocates of that proposal assume a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine their own project of ensuring reliable belief formation in science. (shrink)

Many artificial intelligence (AI) systems currently used for decision-making are opaque, i.e., the internal factors that determine their decisions are not fully known to people due to the systems’ computational complexity. In response to this problem, several researchers have argued that human decision-making is equally opaque and since simplifying, reason-giving explanations (rather than exhaustive causal accounts) of a decision are typically viewed as sufficient in the human case, the same should hold for algorithmic decision-making. Here, I contend that this argument (...) overlooks that human decision-making is sometimes significantly more transparent and trustworthy than algorithmic decision-making. This is because when people explain their decisions by giving reasons for them, this frequently prompts those giving the reasons to govern or regulate themselves so as to think and act in ways that confirm their reason reports. AI explanation systems lack this self-regulative feature. Overlooking it when comparing algorithmic and human decision-making can result in underestimations of the transparency of human decision-making and in the development of explainable AI that may mislead people by activating generally warranted beliefs about the regulative dimension of reason-giving. (shrink)