There is a small but growing community of researchers spanning a spectrum of disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computationalist paradigm in favor of the enactive approach. The framework of this approach is centered on a core set of ideas, such as autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience. These concepts are finding novel applications in a diverse range of areas. One hot topic has been the establishment of an enactive approach to social interaction. The main purpose of (...) this paper is to serve as an advanced entry point into these recent developments. It accomplishes this task in a twofold manner: it provides a succinct synthesis of the most important core ideas and arguments in the theoretical framework of the enactive approach, and it uses this synthesis to refine the current enactive approach to social interaction. A new operational definition of social interaction is proposed which not only emphasizes the cognitive agency of the individuals and the irreducibility of the interaction process itself, but also the need for jointly co-regulated action. It is suggested that this revised conception of ‘socio-cognitive interaction’ may provide the necessary middle ground from which to understand the confluence of biological and cultural values in personal action. (shrink)

Bioethics claimed to offer a set of generally applicable, universally accepted guidelines that would simplify complex situations. In Thieves of Virtue, Tom Koch argues that bioethics has failed to deliver on its promises.

In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conative, (...) Imperativist, Reflexive and Dual Content views. Some of these have been developed in detail and others are natural extensions of existing views. However, we argue that none provides a satisfactory account of the target perceptual states. Driven by the failings of each account, we identify three conditions that any satisfactory theory of perceptual motivation must meet: Direct Motivational Force, Non-Obligatory Force and Intention-Independent Influence. Then we offer an account that attempts to fulfil these conditions: the Affordance Model. This model of perceptual motivation is premised on the claim that each of the target states involves the perception of a specific affordance for action and the triggering of Automatic Motor Initiations (AMIs). We suggest that AMIs can explain the motivational force of these perceptual states. (shrink)

Described by Jeffrey Masson as 'the single best introduction to animal rights ever written,' this new book by Tom Regan dispels the negative image of animal rights advocates perpetrated by the mass media, unmasks the fraudulent rhetoric of 'humane treatment' favored by animal exploiters, and explains why existing laws function to legitimize institutional cruelty.

Regan provides the theoretical framework that grounds a responsible pro-animal rights perspective, and ultimately explores how asking moral questions about other animals can lead to a better understanding of ourselves.

Philosophy written in English is overwhelmingly analytic philosophy, and the techniques and predilections of analytic philosophy are not only unhistorical but anti-historical, and hostile to textual commentary. Analytic usually aspires to a very high degree of clarity and precision of formulation and argument, and it often seeks to be informed by, and consistent with, current natural science. In an earlier era, analytic philosophy aimed at agreement with ordinary linguistic intuitions or common sense beliefs, or both. All of these aspects of (...) the subject sit uneasily with the use of historical texts for philosophical illumination. In this book, ten distinguished philosophers explore the tensions between, and the possibilities of reconciling, analytic philosophy and history of philosophy. Contributors: M. R. Ayers, John Cottingham, Daniel Garber, Gary Hatfield, Anthony Kenny, Steven Nadler, G. A. J. Rogers, Tom Sorell, Catherine Wilson, Yves Charles Zarka. (shrink)

This volume will collect Tom Beauchamp's 15 most important published articles in bioethics, most of which were published over the last 25 years, and most of ...

Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from (...) dynamic epistemic logic. As a result, we can clearly see that pretense imagination episodes are build up out of two kinds of imaginative stages, so I will present an argument by cases. This argument shows that pretense imagination might indeed provide us with justification for believing certain conditionals. Despite this, I will argue that these arenotthe kind of conditionals that allow pretense imagination to play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. (shrink)

In ancient times, the main approaches to metaphysical realism were intuitive. In modern times, foundationalism has replaced intuition as the main strategy to make out metaphysical realist claims to know. In On Foundationalism, Rockmore argues that foundationalism fails in all its known variants.

I begin by detailing the semantic range of the English terms ‘work’ and ‘labour’, in comparison with that of their closest Greek equivalents. Narrowing matters down to work in the sense of ‘occupation’, what is striking about Aristotle, I maintain, is his willingness to sort occupations into a hierarchy. This hierarchy is fourfold. At the bottom we have servile work, which is directed at life’s ‘necessities’, and is founded on mere habit. Then we have technē or skilled work, which typically (...) produces material objects, and requires expertise. Further up the hierarchy we have praxis or morally-informed activity, which reaches its apogee in the life of the politikos or ruler. At the summit of Aristotle’s hierarchy is theōria or intellectual contemplation, which supposedly approximates divine activity. After documenting the resilience of this hierarchy in the Western tradition, I outline three grounds for it – social, metaphysical and psychological – which are manifestly weak. I then elaborate other grounds for it – found both within and outside Aristotle’s texts – which, I argue, are manifestly strong, and thus deserve our endorsement even today. (shrink)

More than once in his writings, Hobbes pronounced on the scope and organization of science. He had provocative views about the subjects that could be termed “scientific” about the scientific subjects that were basic, and about the relative benefits of the various sciences. Some of these views reflect his allegiance to the new mechanical philosophy and his opposition to Aristotelianism; others show the influence of Bacon, who was a virtuoso deviser of blueprints for science. Still others belong to a program (...) of self-advertisement: Hobbes wished to be seen as an important scientist himself - an important worker in the field of optics and no less than the inventor of the science of politics. After expounding Hobbes's views about the organization of science and considering some of the problems they raise, I shall suggest that they throw light on old questions about what has been called “Hobbes's system”. (shrink)

In this paper, I tackle Aquinas’s notion of ‘natural inclinations’, specifically as it occurs in his seminal elaboration of the natural law in Summa Theologiae I-II. Question 94. Article 2. Maintaining that it constitutes a departure from Aristotle’s terminology, and is hence puzzling, I go on to investigate a raft of modern, mainly Anglophone, interpretations of the concept. Beginning with Jacques Maritain, I move through the broadly chronological sequence of John Finnis, Jean Porter, Steven Jensen, Justin Matchulat and Stephen Brock. (...) In each case, I argue that – despite these scholars’ philosophical ingenuity and textual facility – there are crucial problems with their respective approaches and construals. I end the paper by outlining my own construal of ‘natural inclinations’, which, even if not bolstered by heavy textual scholarship, is at least coherent and, moreover, avoids the philosophical pitfalls of the above interpretations. (shrink)

The debate over foundationalism, the viewpoint that there exists some secure foundation upon which to build a system of knowledge, appears to have been resolved and the antifoundationalists have at least temporarily prevailed. From a firmly historical approach, the book traces the foundationalism/antifoundationalism controversy in the work of many important figures Animaxander, Aristotle and Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Hegel and Nietzsche, Habermas and Chisholm, and others throughout the history of philosophy. The contributors, Joseph Margolis, Ronald Polansky, Gary Calore, Fred and Emily (...) Michael, William Wurzer, Charlene Haddock Siegfried, Sandra B. Rosenthal, Kathleen Wallace, and the editors present well the diversity, interest, and roots of antifoundationalism. Tom Rockmore is Professor and Chairman in the Department of Philosophy at Duquesne University. Beth J. Singer is Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. (shrink)

This is the first new scholarly edition since the nineteenth century of one of the greatest works in the history of philosophy: David Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. It is the fourth volume of the Clarendon Hume Edition, which will be the definitive edition for the foreseeable future. In this elegant and lucid Enquiry Hume gives an accessible presentation of his fully developed ethical theory, that is to say his theory of the foundation of morality in human nature. (...) He considered this work to be `of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best'. The distinguished Hume scholar Tom Beauchamp presents an authoritative text accompanied by introduction, annotation, glossary, biographical sketches, bibliographies, and indexes. (shrink)

Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible attendabilia. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a (...) sensitivity to affordances. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot as grippable and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things as attendable. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to explain Kant’s notoriously obscure argument for the principle that every rational being should be treated as an “end,” and not merely as a means. I take my lead from the appearance in the argument of terms and ideas that he uses earlier in the Groundwork to express two distinctive features of moral value and to make a related claim about how moral value is achieved. I argue that, of the candidates for the “end” of (...) moral action that Kant considers, only rational beings instantiate both of these features and satisfy the related claim. I also argue that these features and this claim explain why no other candidates need be considered and why moral actions must have an “end” at all. Thus I show that these features and this claim resolve the puzzles posed by Kant’s own argument and make sense of some of the remarks that he makes in it. (shrink)

Instead of impeding access to essential medicines in developing countries, the essay explores why and how patents can serve as a source of funding for the much needed access to medicine. Instead of a weakening of patents, prolonged protection periods are suggested in circumstances where there is widespread lack of access. The revenues from extended patents are seen as a source of funding for drug donations to the least developed countries.

Among the defining characteristics of moral cosmopolitanism are the convictions that personal relations, membership in social or political organizations like local communities or nation-states are insignificant for agents when determining their scope of moral concern. The moral scope is unlimited and the moral duties reach globally. Following up observations made by Onora O’Neill and others, it is argued that Singer’s model needs a complementary tool to allocate duties.That tool can be found by supplementing the agent centered perspective of the model (...) with a regard for the social and institutional circles encompassing right holders. Instead of focusing on the duty holder, I suggest that the cosmopolitan’s “ultimate unit of moral concern” – here, the claimholder is regarded central.Thus, Singer’s cosmological model is kept, but in a rights-based methodological approach for allocating duties. Methodologically, what needs to be investigated is whether the scope of legitimate moral claims expands from the agent for the same reasons that the circle of moral concern expands from Singer’s agent. (shrink)

A systematic comparison between Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ethics. I argue that Kierkegaard supplies a proleptic and largely successful critique of Nietzsche's claims and arguments in moral philosophy.

From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle. By Leunissen Mariska.

Since its publication in 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue has made a significant impact throughout the humanities disciplines. This new collection unpacks the influence of After Virtue on ethical and political theory, sociology and theology, and offers a multi-faceted exploration of its significance.

This Handbook provides an intellectually rigorous and accessible overview of the relationship between natural law and human rights. It fills a crucial gap in the literature with leading scholarship on the importance of natural law as a philosophical foundation for human rights and its significance for contemporary debates. The themes covered include: the role of natural law thought in the history of human rights; human rights scepticism; the different notions of 'subjective right'; the various foundations for human rights within natural (...) law ethics; the relationship between natural law and human rights in religious traditions; the idea of human dignity; the relation between human rights, political community and law; human rights interpretation; and tensions between human rights law and natural law ethics. This Handbook is an ideal introduction to natural law perspectives on human rights, while also offering a concise summary of scholarly developments in the field. (shrink)

In this article I critically discuss Michael Steven Green's Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition and R. Kevin Hill's Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of his Thought. Firstly, I raise textual doubts about Hill's interpretation of the early Nietsche as a Kantian critic of Schopenhaur. Secondly, I argue that Hill fails to establish that Nietzsche's later theoretical philosophy developed through a direct engagement with Kant's. Thirdly, I raise broader criticisms of Hill's 'Kantian' approach, and argue that Green's alternative account identifies an (...) underappreciated Kantian theme in Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy, although Green misrepresents Nietzsche's ultimate conclusions. Finally, I argue that while Hill rehearses prevailing misinterpretations of Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies, Green's accoung also illuminates Nietzsche's developing criticism of Kantian notions of moral agency.In diesem Artikel werden die Bücher Michael Steven Greens Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition un R. Kevin Hill's Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of his Thought kritisch diskutiert. Erstens bezwifle ich aus textualen Gründen, dass Hills Interpretation richtig ist, der frühe Nietzsche habe mit Kant Schopenhaur kritisiert. Zweitens, so mein Argumentation gelingt es Hill nicht nachzuweisen, dass Nietzsches spätere theoretische Philosophie direkt aus seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Kant hervorgeht. Drittens kritisiere ich den Kantischen Ansatz Hills umfassender und ziehe die alternative Deutung Greens heran, die ein wenig beachteres Kantisches Thema in Nietzsches theoretischer Philosophie ausmacht, wenngleich Green Nietzsches letze Schlussforlgerungen falsch interpretiert. Schließlich zeige ich, dass hill die vorherrschenden Missdeutungen der Moralphilosophie von Kant und Nietzsche wiederholt, während Green Nietzsches wachsende Kritik an den Kantischen Vorstellungen vom moralisch handelnden Subjekt beleuchtet. (shrink)

In this new volume, On Constructivist Epistemology, Rockmore traces the idea of constructivism and then proposes the outlines of an original constructivist approach to knowledge, building on the work of such thinkers as Hobbes, Vico, and Kant.